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Abstract
This thesis considers the factors that affect the escalation of terrorist 
violence. Terrorists often have an emotional and psychological stake in  
preserving the identity, the character, and, above all, the existence of their 
group. This has the effect of subverting ends to means: the ideology and 
goals of the group become secondary in importance to the necessities of 
organisational survival. At the same time, terrorism is generally a highly 
inefficient means of acliieving strategic political objectives. Confronted by 
the failure of their campaign and unable to move from violence, since 
that would endanger the group's survival, terrorists may conclude that 
their best option is to increase the level of violence that they employ. In 
the past, self-imposed restraints and the fear of a backlash have often 
prevented terrorists from resorting to higlily lethal acts of violence.
However, recently these dynamics have been combined w ith  "non- 
traditional" terrorism  that finds greater levels of violence not only 
acceptable, but necessary. Such terrorism  has encompassed a range of 
motivations, but much of it reflects a growing dependence on religion, 
often combined with other factors, as legitimation. Undoubtedly, such 
groups aspire to higher levels of violence than has been the case with 
other, more traditional terrorist organisations. Consequently, they may be 
more willing to regard mass terrorism as justifiable.
These factors are considered in the context of the increased opportunities 
for nuclear proliferation, arising from the collapse of the former Soviet 
Union, and the increased feasibility of biological or chemical terrorism. 
The thesis concludes by arguing that, whereas non-conventional terrorism  
was once a remote threat, the changing nature of terrorism, combined 
with its intrinsic escalatory and self-perpetuating nature, means that the 
threat of nuclear terrorism  has never been greater than it is now.
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Introduction - The Opportunities For Nuclear Terrorism
On March 20, 1995, members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult released a 
lethal nerve agent, sarin, on the Tokyo underground. The attack caused 
the death of 12 people and injuries to over 5000 others and was the first 
major sub-state use of a w eapon of mass destruction. A lthough 
terrorism using non-conventional weaponry had been the subject of 
academic and governmental discussion for twenty years prior to the 
attack, the events in Tokyo gave new impetus to this debate. Aum's 
actions broke a norm, that terrorists almost invariably limit their 
attacks to conventional means, and, given the derivative nature of 
many terrorist tactics, it thus increased the hkelihood that there will be 
further attacks using weapons of mass destruction.
This thesis concentrates almost entirely on just one part of non- 
conventional terrorism, nuclear terrorism. There are three reasons for 
tliis: firstly, within the relatively limited confines of a doctoral thesis, 
an in-depth study of the opportunities for chemical, biological and 
nuclear terrorism would preclude a meaningful examination of the 
factors that would make terrorists prepared to contemplate using such 
weapons, the topic that is at the heart of this dissertation. 
Consequently, it is necessary to focus on just one of the three varieties 
of device. Secondly, nuclear weapons possess a unique destructive force 
and still, eight years after the end of the Cold War, remain unsurpassed 
in their power as a tool towards political legitimacy^ and in their ability 
to capture the attention of a wide audience. Finally, in the wake of the 
collapse of the former Soviet Union, the opportunities for rogue states 
and sub-state actors to acquire fissile material have risen exponentially. 
Since 1989, the proHferation of the means to acquire weapons of mass 
destruction has become one of the foremost global issues for the future. 
Since the change has been the greatest in the case of nuclear, rather
1 One of the strategies that many govermnents employ to undermine the effects of 
terrorism is to refuse to negotiate or otherwise deal with the group, since to do 
otherwise would be to acknowledge them as political entities that caimot be ignored, 
and thus to recognise the effectiveness of their campaign in gaining the group a voice. A 
credible nuclear tlireat makes such a strategy difficult, since the potential consequences 
of an attack are too immense for a government to ignore. Of course, acknowledging the 
existence of the group, or negotiating with them, do not preclude other, more forceful 
methods of dealing with the threat.
than chemical or biological, weapons, it is they that are most deserving 
of renewed study.
Nuclear terrorism covers a broad spectrum, from low-level incidents of 
threats involving radioactive material through attacks on reactors to a 
terrorist nuclear bomb. There have been several terrorist attacks on 
reactors, such as the ETA rocket assault on Lemoniz in northern  
Spain,*2 and the possibility of sabotage or a siege and hostage situation 
developing at a facility remains, particularly from single-issue anti- 
nuclear groups. In most cases, the latter form of terrorism is aimed at 
highlighting security and safety failures at facilities, and for that 
purpose, such actions will continue to remain a possibility.3 However, 
where the objective is to embarrass the government or to gain leverage 
for a group, then other varieties of nuclear terrorism have become 
increasingly likely because the feasibility of acquiring fissile material 
has also increased, making such actions easier and therefore more 
attractive. The result has been that "the threat of terrorist use of 
weapons of mass destruction has never been greater; and at the same 
time, it is never going to be less than it is right now."^
 ^David Fischer's response to Thomas Davies "What Nuclear Means & Targets Might 
Terrorists Find Attractive?" in Paul Leventhal & Yonah Alexander (eds.). Nuclear 
Terrorism: Defining The Threat, (Wasliington DC:Pergammon, 1985) pp. 85-86.
 ^Terrorists too though continue to regard reactors as possible targets for attack. For 
example, the Chechen rebels have made several threats against Russian nuclear power 
facilities, although these have never materialised. "Chechen Rebels Reportedly 
Planning To Target Nuclear Facilities", BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. March 14, 
1996. There have also been threats against reactors in Lithuania and Ukraine and by 
Sikh extremists against Indian facilities. See, for example: G. Kulbitsky, "Germany 
warns Lithuania About Intended Terrorist Act”, TASS. November 12, 1994; "Attack 
Threatened On Lithuanian Reactor", Reuters. November 12.1994; "White Brotherhood 
Sect Threatens Acts At Nuclear Power Stations", BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. 
November 23, 1993; "FBI Withheld Sikh Threat To Atom Plant, Gandhi Says", Los 
Angeles Times. June 4, 1985; Rone Tempest, "Gandhi Says FBI Should Have Told Him  
Earlier Of Terrorist Death Plot", Los Angeles Times. Tune 5, 1985. Four people were 
arrested in the USA in 1989 for plotting to sim ultaneously sabotage electrical 
transmission lines to tlnee reactors in California, Arizona and Colorado, conspiring to 
"cause a significant interruption and impairment of the function of the [facilities]", 
Paul Feldman & Richard E. Meyer, "4 Held In Plot To Cut Lines Near Nuclear Plants", 
Los Angeles Times. Tune 1,1989,
 ^ Kyle Olson, Testimony to: US Senate Committee on Global Affairs, Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. 
104th Congress, 1st Session, October 31 and November 1,1995, p. 104.
Nuclear Proliferation
Easier access to fissile material is largely a result of the collapse of the
former Soviet Union and the growth of nuclear trafficking that has
stemmed from it.^ FBI chief, Louis Freeh, has described the situation as
"the greatest long-term threat to the security of the US"^ and Graham
Allison, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, has stated that "the
greatest single threat to die security of America today is the tlireat from
loose nukes from the Soviet Union"7 Russia too acknowledges the
danger. As early as 1989, then  chairm an of the KGB, Vladimir
Kryuchkov said:
The threat of nuclear terrorism is for us very dangerous. The 
fact is that on the globe several tons of enriched uranium  has 
disappeared from sites where it was produced and stored. It is 
not teclinically difficult to make a nuclear device, and this 
will m ean that individual groups can terrorize not only 
towns, but even entire countries.®
While nuclear weapons rem ain under tight military supervision,^ 
there is a huge quantity of nuclear materials, dispersed throughout 
Russia, that is far less secure. One estimate puts the Russian inventory 
at 150 metric tonnes of weapons grade plutonium, 1000 metric tonnes
 ^ There is widespread recognition of this as the root of the current proliferation 
problem. For example, Stella Rimington, formerly Director General of MI5, states that 
"...the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction...is not a new threat, of course, but i t 
has been made more immediate by the collapse of tlie Soviet Union, General instability  
there has resulted in the loosening of controls over both sensitive materials and related 
expertise." Stella Rimington, "Security & Democracy- Is There A Conflict?", The 
Richard Dimbleby Lecture 1994, BBC Educational Development. 1994. p. 9. Graham 
Allison has noted that: "Russia is a state in revolution... This revolution is shredding 
the fabric of a command and control society, in a state that houses a superpower nuclear 
arsenal and a superpower nuclear enterprise.", Graham T. Allison, Testimony To The 
Senate Coimnittee On Foreign Relations Subcommittee On European Affairs. August 23,
1995.
 ^ "Sceptical Bear Ill-Disposed To H aving Its Claws Clipped", Financial Times. 
January 15,1996, p. 4.
 ^ Graham T. Allison, Testimony to: US Senate Committe on Government Affairs, 
Permanent Subcommittee On Investigations, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction". 104th Congress, 2nd Session, March 13,1996.
® Alexander Rahr, "Soviet Fear Of Nuclear Terrorism", Report On The USSR. Volume 
2, Number 13, (March 30,1990), p. 11.
 ^Although even this may be less secure than once believed. Many nuclear warheads are 
being stored in facilities intended for conventional weapons "in less than adequate 
physical security." Warhead disassembly plants at Zarechny, Trekhgorny and Lesnoy 
have especially worryingly lax security. There may have been at least one case where 
a fissile material component of a weapon was stolen and then recovered. William  
Potter, "Before The Deluge? Assessing The Threat Of Nuclear Leakage From The Post- 
Soviet States", Arms Control Today. (October 1995), p. 13.
of enriched uranium, and at Chelyabinsk alone about 685,000 cubic 
m etres of radioactive w a s t e W i l l i a m  Potter, D irector of Non- 
Proliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, 
puts the figures at 165 tons of separated weapons-usable plutonium and 
1100 to 1300 tons of highly enriched uraniumT^ However, no-one 
really knows what quantities are involved because during the Cold 
War, Soviet facilities were set production targets. When they exceeded 
these, m aterial was kept aside rather than be declared, so as to 
compensate for any shortfalls in subsequent targets.^ ^  Consequently, 
they were more concerned to produce as much nuclear material as 
possible, rather than keeping an accurate record of existing stocks. 
Furthermore, material was counted in rouble value rather than in 
weight and inventories could be out by several tons.^3 This obviously 
all poses immense problems of accounting;^ 4 and the danger is 
heightened by poor security, especially at nuclear sites, secret cities and 
research institutes.^^ As an example, Charles Curtis of the US Energy
Phil Williams & Paul Woessner, "Nuclear Material Trafficking: An Interim  
Assessment", Transnational Organized Crime, Volume 1, Number 2, (Suimner 1995), pp. 
211-212. Frank Barnaby suggests that the military stockpile of plutonium in the former 
Soviet Union is around 125 tomies, of which about 50 tonnes are outside nuclear weapons. 
Russia is dismantling around 1800 nuclear weapons per year, containing around 7 tonnes 
of plutonium. Frank Barnaby, "Nuclear Accidents Waiting To Happen", The World 
Today, Volume 52, Number 4, (April 1996), p. 94. A number of the so-called plutonium 
cities have recently changed their names. Chelyabinsk-65 is now Ozersk, Tomsk-7 
Seversk, and Krasnoyarsk-26 is Zheleznogorsk. Oleg Bukharin, "The Future of Russia's 
Plutonium Cities", International Security, Volume 21, Number 4, (Spring 1997), p. 126.
11 Potter, "Before The Deluge...", p. 12.
12 Leonard Spector,. Director, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Project, Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, Washington DC, Interview with Author. November 15,1996, 
Washington D.C.
I^ John Sopko, "The Changing Proliferation Threat", Foreign Policy. Volume 105 
(Winter 1996-97), p. 10.
14 As an example, the Russians appear to have forgotten completely about the highly 
enriched uranium which was later purchased by the United States from Kazakhstan 
under Project Sapphire. It is impossible to know how many other caches of material 
may be unclaim ed by the relevant authorities in the former USSR. A llison, 
Testimony.... August 23,1995.
I^ Williams & Woessner, "Nuclear Material Trafficking...', pp. 211-212. The problem  
stems, at least in part, from the fact that in the Soviet Union, nuclear security was 
dependent on the fact that it was a closed state with strict controls over foreign travel 
by its citizens, internal security within the state was strict and discipline was rigidly 
enforced when controls were violated, and there was simply no black market for nuclear 
materials. Personnel were tightly screened and closely supervised by members of the 
security services. Usually, nuclear material could only be accessed in a three man team: 
two technicians and a member of the security services. Clearly, such procedures are no 
longer feasible in the new Russia and members of the security services are now as likely 
to be responsible for nuclear diversion as anyone else. US General Accounting Office.
Department visited the Kurchatov Institute near Moscow and found 
about 160 pounds of weapons grade uranium stored in lockers secured 
only by a chain through the handles of the lockers. There was no other 
security.! 6 It is estimated that fewer than 20% of these research facilities 
have even the most elementary electronic monitoring system as part of 
the security.!2 "ptie problem is further exacerbated by the fact that there 
are over 100 such storage sites and civilian research facilities in the 
fo rm er S ov ie t Union.!® in  M arch  1994, the  Russian 
Counterintelligence Service reported to President Yeltsin that there 
had been 900 thefts from military and nuclear plants and 700 thefts of 
secret technology in the second half of 1993 alone.! ^  The Ministry of 
Internal Affairs reported 900 attempts to gain illegal entry into nuclear 
facilities in 1993.2® The German federal criminal police (the BKA) 
reported 267 cases of "illicit traffic in nuclear or radioactive materials" 
in 1994, compared to 241 in 1993, 158 in 1992 and 41 in 1991.2! Much of 
the theft is insider crime: staff employed within the industry making 
the most of their access to nuclear material.22
Furthermore, the amounts of material available for theft will only 
increase in the near fu ture. Russian-Am erican arm s reduction 
agreements mean that Russia will cut its number of nuclear warheads 
from 30,000 to 5000 by the year 2000, increasing its supplies of HEU by
"Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of US Efforts to Improve Nuclear Material Controls 
in Newly Independent States", (March 1996), pp. 18-19.
John Barry, "Future Shock", Newsweek. July 24,1995. pp. 34-37.
!2  Allison, Testimony.... March 13,1996.
Holly Yeager, "Warning: Nuclear Theft Peril Rising; Stockpiles of Bomb M aterial 
Are Growing But Security Is Lagging In The Former Soviet Union, Experts Say", The 
Orange County Register. March 14,1996, p. A03.
Williams & Woessner, "Nuclear Material Trafficking...", p. 212.
29 Rensselaer Lee III, "Post-Soviet Nuclear Trafficking: Myths, Half-Truths, and the  
Reality", Current History, (October 1995), p. 345.
21 A. Robitaille & R, Purver, "Smuggling Special Nuclear Materials", Canadian 
Security Intelligence Service, Commentary. Number 57. (May 1995).
22 See for example, Richard Beeston, "Russian 'Secret City' Admits Uranium Stolen By 
Civilians", The Times. August 25,1994, p. 8. Even some of the former Soviet nuclear 
scientists are involved in the theft of materials, an example being the man who worked 
in the secret city of Krasnoyarsk and who attempted to smuggle two pounds of weapons- 
grade material out of the country. See T. de Waal, The Times. May 8, 1996 , p. 13 or 
Christopher Bellamy & Phil Reeves, "Western Spies Find No Shortage of Secrets", 
The Independent. May 8,1996.
hundreds of tonnes and of plutonium  by tens of tonnes 23 Currently 
there is a considerable debate on w hat should be done w ith the 
additional material: using it as part of a closed fuel cycle is the most 
probable option.24 However, whatever is decided seems certain to take 
time to implement, adding to the risk of the material falling into the 
wrong hands. It seems unlikely that the disposal process will begin 
before 2010, due to the lack of a technological infrastructure and the 
enormous cost involved. This may be a mixed blessing in the current 
situation, given the social and economic state of the former Soviet 
Union, because the transportation of fissile materials at the moment 
would only increase the possibilities for their theft.23
The problem is not limited to Russia; Ukraine, Kazakhstan and the 
Baltic states are in a similar predicament and there has been leakage 
from non-members of the former Soviet Union too: 130 barrels of 
enriched uranium waste were stolen from a facility in South Africa in 
August 1994,26 m ore than a ton of beryllium , used in nuclear 
warheads, vanished from Stockholm airport in 199527 and there have 
been seizures of illicit nuclear m aterials in Switzerland, Poland, 
Turkey, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Austria, 
Belgium, Italy and India.2®
An additional problem has been a haemorrhage of personnel. The 
nuclear industry used to support entire cities such as Tomsk, but 
cutbacks have resulted in thousands of redundancies.29 Workers often 
lived in secret cities where they were well paid and liighly respected
23 Aleksandr Bolsunovsky, "How To Utilize Fissile Materials After Dismantling 
Russian Warheads", The Monitor: Nonproliferation. Dem ilitarization and Arms 
Control, Volume 2 Number 4 (Fail 1996), p. 1. Bukharin assesses the quantities from th is  
source to be around 100 tons of plutonium and 500 tons of uranium. Bukharin, "The Future 
of Russia's....", p. 126.
24 For a sample of this debate, see: Mike Moore, "Plutonium: The disposal decision". 
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Volume 53, Number 2, (March/April 1997), pp. 
40-41; John P. Holdren, "Work with Russia", The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 
Vokune 53, Number 2, (M arch/April 1997), pp. 42-45; Edwin S. Lyman & Paul 
Leventhal, "Bury the stuff". The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Volume 53, Number 
2, (March/April 1997), pp. 45-48.
25 Bukharin, "The Future of Russia's...", p. 140.
26 John Deutch, Testimony to: US Senate Committe on Government Affairs, Permanent 
Subcommittee On Investigations, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction". 
104th Congress, 2nd Session, March 20,1996.
27 "Nuclear Material Disappears", The Globe &: Mail. November 231996, p. A12.
23 Robitaille & Purver, "Smuggling Special Nuclear Materials..."
29 "Uranium, plutonium, pandemonium". The Economist. Tune 5,1993, p. 105.
members of Soviet society. Since 1989, they have periodically been 
unpaid for months at a time; their wages have failed to increase in line 
with inflation and they have lost their cachet in society.3® Vladimir 
Orlov, a Russian nuclear safety expert, stated in July 1997 that: "The 
industry is seriously and dangerously underfunded - 70% of security 
devices at Russian facilities are outdated...Some of the staff working at 
these plants are desperately depressed and haven't been paid in 
months - and the temptation to smuggle nuclear material out is great. 
The situation is very serious."3! In such circumstances, it is not 
surprising that some Russian scientists have been tem pted to offer 
their services elsewhere: their base wage tends to be around $67 a 
month; the Russian press reports that Iran is offering $5000 per month 
for form er Soviet s c i e n t i s t s . 3 2  Other prospective employers offer 
similar amounts. The problem is exacerbated by the Russian press’s 
publication of alleged prices for nuclear m aterials in W estern 
c o u n t r i e s .3 3  Between 1000 and 2000 indiv iduals have detailed 
knowledge of nuclear weapons design and another 3000 to 5000 have 
been directly  involved in the production  of p lu ton ium  and 
enrichment of uranium in the former Soviet U n i o n . 3 4  1991, at least 
one Russian nuclear scientist, from Krasnoyarsk, turned down an offer 
from Iraq. Brazil, India, Libya and Pakistan are alleged also to have 
actively sought scientists from the Soviet nuclear program, and in 1991, 
no fewer than 19 high-level scientists emigrated from Russia to
39 "Darkness visible". The Economist. December 25 1993-January 7 1994, pp. 47-50. 
Bukliarin, "The Future of Russia’s...", p. 134.
31 Mark Franchetti, "US atom workers help Russia", The Sunday Times. Tuly 20,1997. 
Douglas Shaw & William Alberque, "Cooperative Efforts to Prevent the Terrorist 
Acquisition of Nuclear Materials from Russia, the New Independent States, & the 
Baltics", Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement. Volume 6,Nuiuber 2 Autumn 1997, 
pp. 169-178,
32 Sam Seibert with Karen Breslau, John Barry, Carroll Bogert, Betsy McKay, Andrew 
Nagorski, Theresa Waldrop & Christopher Dickey, "To Build A Bomb", Newsweek. 
May 15,1995, pp. 10-15.
33 Lee, "Post-Soviet Nuclear Trafficking...", p. 345.
34 W illiam Potter, "Exports and Experts: Proliferation Risks From The N ew  
Commonwealth", Arms Control Today. (January/February 1992), p. 34. These numbers 
arc disputed: in 1992 Gennadii Evstaf'ev claimed that of about 100,000 scientists 
involved in some way with the production of WMD, only "several tens" had the 
knowledge to produce a bomb. However, many other knowledgeable Russian sources put 
the figure at 2000 to 4000 scientists with high level expertise and a couple of hundred 
who know in theory how to build a nuclear bomb from start to finish. D. L. A verre, 
"Proliferation, Export Controls and Russian National Security", Contemporary Security 
Policy. Volume 17, Number 2, (August 1996), p. 195.
Israel 35 Money is not the only possible way for scientists to be 
recruited: the Aum Shinrikyo cult attracted Russian scientists and 
research students ' atten tion  through vast donations to leading 
facilities. They then attempted to persuade them to join the cult itself. 
They partially succeeded, having a follower who worked in the TV. 
Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy and another in the Mendeleyev 
Chemical Institute, a facility that researched nerve gas, amongst other 
things.36 However, at the moment, the majority of scientists that are 
moving are doing so to states that already possess a nuclear capability, 
such as Israel or China, that are intent on upgrading the quality of that 
capability.37 Such vertical proliferation is a major global concern, but is 
not of immediate importance to the issue of nuclear terrorism since it 
involves a level of complexity and sophistication well beyond any 
foreseeable terrorist objective. While it does not preclude that groups, 
such as Aum Shinrikyo, might be able to recruit specialists to their 
cause, it is also questionable whether terrorist organisations, intent on 
m aintaining tight security, would want to risk using a mercenary 
scientist, no matter what their expertise or the amount they were being 
paid.3® This is particularly so since the information required to design 
and construct a crude nuclear device is so readily available that 
weapons scientists from  the form er Soviet U nion are alm ost 
superfluous. The biggest barrier to micro-prohferation is the ability of 
groups to obtain sufficient fissile material and it is in this that the 
opportunities for rogue states or non-state actors to exploit the 
increased vulnerability of people and material is considerable. Russia, 
w ith US assistance, is im proving their accountability and control 
systems, but the extent of the problem remains vast.39
35 Potter, "Exports & Experts...", p. 34.
36 David E. Kaplan & Andrew Marshall, The Cult At The End Of The World: The 
Incredible Story Of Anm. (London: Random House, 1996), pp. 73-76; James K. Campbell, 
"Excerpts from Research Study 'Weapons of Mass Destruction & Terrorism: 
Proliferation By Non-State Actors’", Terrorism & Political Violence. Volume 9 Number 
2 (Summer 1997), pp. 35-39; Frank Barnaby, Instruments of Terror, (London: Vision 
Paperbacks, 1996), pp. 128-132; Christopher Drew, "Japanese Sect Tried To Buy US 
Arms Teclmology, Senator Says", New  York Times. October 31 1995, p. A5.
37 Thomas Cochran, Senior Scientist, Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington 
DC. Interview with Author. November 21,1996, Wasliington D.C.
33 Richard Falkenrath, Executive Director, Center for Science and International 
Affairs, JFK School of Government, Harvard University, Interview with Author, 
November 12,1996, Cambridge, Mass.
39 "Threat Of Nuclear Terrorism Increasing", Central News Network. August 22.1995.
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The extent of nuclear trafficking, the so-called grey market, is much 
debated: a March 1996 General Accounting Office report linked lax 
control over fissile materials to several nuclear thefts and the tlireat of 
nuclear blackmail, but found no direct evidence of a market operating 
within the former Soviet Union A® This would suggest that the trade is 
still in its infancy and has yet to be firmly established, that it is still a 
series of opportunistic bilateral deals, but in fact, there has yet to be a 
single unequivacated example of stolen nuclear materials reaching a 
bona fide customer 4i Of 278 radioactive theft incidents recorded by the 
Russian MVD between January 1992 and December 1995, only eight 
involved a purchase, in each case to a middleman.42 It is worth noting 
that when the Aum cult was investigating methods of developing a 
nuclear device (in 1993 they sought a meeting with Russian Minister of 
nuclear energy, Viktor Mikhailov, possibly to enquire about the cost of 
a nuclear warhead, but their request for a meeting was denied), they 
eventually sought to acquire the fissile material in the form of natural 
uranium from Australia. Given Aum's vast wealth, and their excellent 
contacts with Russian security forces and dealers in black-market arms, 
it seems almost inconceivable that they did not seek an alternative 
source of the fissile material first, and yet they evidently failed in this 
quest.43 However, the Aum example is probably not a good one in this 
case since, if they had been less idiosyncratic about acquiring nuclear 
material, they w ould certainly have done more to target Japan's 
reprocessing facilities. It would offer an excellent and obvious source of 
material and although not a soft target by any means, was surely not an 
impossible one, given the cult's resources. That there have been no 
unequivocal cases of a transaction involving stolen fissile m aterial 
may be as m uch a reflection of our ability to apprehend these
49 US General Accounting Office. "Nuclear Nonproliferation...".
41 James L. Ford, "Nuclear Smuggling: How Serious A Threat?", Institute for National 
Strategic Studies. Strategic Forum, Number 59, (January 1996). See too the excellent 
chronology of known incidents in: Paul N. Woessner, "Chronology of Radioactive & 
Nuclear Smuggling Incidents: July 1991 - June 1997", Transnational Organized Crime, 
Volume 3 Number 1 Spring 1997, pp. 114-209. This is an updated version of the 
chronology by the same author in Volume 1 Number 2 of the same journal.
42 Rensselaer Lee III, Address to: Institute For National Security Studies. Center for 
Strategic Leadership, "Report of the Executive Seminar on Special Material 
Smuggling", September 13 1996, p. 21.
43 Kaplan & Marshall, The Cult.... pp. 110-112 and 126; Drew, "Japanese...", p. A5; 
Barnaby, Instruments.... pp. 129-130; Campbell, "Excerpts from Research...", p. 36.
smugglers as the absence of such a market.44 There clearly are states 
(and maybe substate actors), such as Iran, that would be wilHng buyers 
for such material. Equally, there is solid evidence of individuals who 
have been able to obtain such material, but who have little contact w ith 
buyers. It is these individuals that have been caught as they tried to 
find a market for their product. The real risk, in terms of a m arket 
developing, comes from m iddlemen willing to exploit an individual's 
access to sources of material and also having contacts with buyers. The 
obvious candidates for such a role would be the military or organised 
crime in Russia.45
It has even been suggested that the market that may exist is composed 
almost exclusively of non-weapons grade m a t e r i a l 4 6  or a situation 
artificially created by journalists and security service personnel setting 
up sting o p e r a t i o n s , 4 7  the notable example being the case of the seizure
44 Sopko, "The Changing Proliferation...", p. 11.
45 Cochran, Interview...
46 For example, of the 158 cases of transactions involving illicit radioactive materials 
recorded by the BKA in Germany in 1992, 59 were fraudulent and of the remaining 99 
examples, only 18 actually did involve radioactive material. Myles Robertson, "The 
Impact Of Crime In Eastern Europe On The European Union", Low Intensity Conflict & 
Law Enforcement. Volume 3 Number 1 (Summer 1994), p. 144. However, by 1994,77 out of 
124 cases of actual or attempted nuclear smuggling from former communist states that 
were reported to Western authorities involved uranium or plutonium rather tlian more 
harmless materials. Robitaille & Purver, "Smuggling Special..." It is undeniable that 
the vast majority of the cases of nuclear smuggling have involved non weapons-grade 
material. See for example, Woessner "Chronology..." or the CIA's chronology of 
incidents from November 1993 to March 1996 in Gordon C. Oeliler, "The Continuing 
Threat From Weapons Of Mass Destruction", Testimony To The Senate Armed Services 
Committee. Appendix A, March 27, 1996. However, it is difficult to assess whether 
most buyers believe that they would receive weapons grade material and had then 
been "duped" by their suppliers or whether it reflects a genuine trade in this quality of 
material, as w ould be suggested by articles such as "Romania Police Reveal 
Radioactive Smuggling Case", Reuters. March 15,1996. Tliere can be no doubt that there 
is a least some trickery in the market, the best example of which is that of red mercury, 
an almost mythical and certainly mysterious element that the Soviets allegedly used 
to facilitate their nuclear program. Since the late 1970s, there have been at least 25 
attempts to sell red merciuy on the black market, generating dozens of stories. All these 
sales have involved ordinary mercury compounds of little use in a weapons program, 
sold at exorbitant rates. The concensus of most experts is that red mercury does not exist 
at all. See The Uranium Institute, "Red Mercury", UI Briefing. Number 92/5  and US 
Department of Energy, "Red Mercury: Caveat Emptor", Critical Technologies 
Newsletter. (April 1992), Volume 10 Issue 1.
47 Phil W illiams & Paul Woessner, "The Real Threat Of Nuclear Smuggling", 
Scientific American. Volume 274, Nmnber 1, (January 1996), pp. 26-27.
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of 350 grams of atomic fuel at Munich airport on August 10, 1 9 9 4 .4 8
There is little doubt though that the quantities of low-grade material
being trafficked are in c r e a s in g .4 9  It is also important to note that it is
only in bomb-building that the quality of fissile material is key: most
other forms of nuclear terrorism  would be just as effective using
industrial-grade material as weapons-grade. Furthermore, while it is
possible that the market has been inflated in Germany, where most of
these supposed sting operations have occurred; there is increasing
evidence that there are several more conduits into the West which
have grown in significance, as the profile of the German one has risen
and thus decreased its usefulness to nuclear smugglers. It seems clear
that progressively more and more material is being brought through
southern routes such as the Balkans or Turkey, rather than through
Eastern Europe.6® In many cases traditional routes for smuggling a
range of other goods are being utilised for the nuclear traffic. John
Deutch, Director of Central Intelligence, testifying before a Senate
Committee on March 20, 1996, stated:
The countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus - Kazakhstan, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan - form 
transit links between Asia and the West, and the Middle East 
and the West. The break-up of the Soviet Union has resulted 
in the breakdow n of the institutions that kept many 
smugglers and questionable traders out of this region. The 
pervasive control once exerted by a combination of the Soviet 
KGB, the Soviet military, and the Soviet border guards no 
longer exist. Even before the break-up, however, some of the 
sou thern  borders, especially w ith  A fghanistan, were 
penetrable. According to anecdotal information from recent
43 The sliipment was Russian MOX (mixed-oxide fuel) for reactors, perfectly usable for 
bomb-building since it contained plutonium enriched to 87%. Bruce Nelan, "Formula For 
Terror", Time. August 29.1994, p. 15. The possibility that the Munich seizure was a 
sting operation is still being investigated in the German courts. See for example, 
Patricia Clough, "German Master Spy Accused Of Plutonium Sting", Sunday Times. 
May 14, 1995. At the very least, the END knew of the sliipment and allowed it to 
continue to Germany, rather than alerting Ukrainian or Russian authorities. 
"Germany's Plutonium Sting Was Sham - TV Report", Reuters. February 15, 1996. There 
does now seem little doubt that the plutonium was of Russian origin, although the  
precise source remains unclear. Vyacheslav Kevorkov & Gennady Kulbitsky, "Germany 
Ready To Give Russia 10 Grams Of Smuggled Plutonium", TASS. February 14,1996.
49 Potter, "Before The Deluge...", p. 12.
39 Examples of these alternative routes are suggested by cases such as the seizure of 
nearly 255 grams of high-grade uranium in Macedonia or by the arrest of five Siberian 
criminals trying to sell 5kg of U-235, stolen from Kazakhstan, to contacts in Cliina or 
Pakistan. "Pair tried to sell uranium". Globe & Mail. April 4 1997, p. A8; "Arrests in 
uranium-theft case", Globe & Mail. April 5 1997, p. AS.
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travellers to these areas, anything can go across the borders in 
these countries for a minimal p r i c e .3 !
Such smuggled goods have in the past included antiques, drugs and
conventional weaponry. All trade in these and nuclear goods too
seems to centre on the Pakistani town of Peshawar, on the border with
Afghanistan. There, there is a thriving market for nuclear equipment,
some of it of weapons-making calibre, stolen from reactors and military
installations within the former Soviet republics. Goods on offer are
reputed to include ultra-powerful magnets, catalysts and alloys to make
therm o-nuclear devices and enriched uranium . Iran, India and
Pakistan are all alleged to be buyers, and there is the added risk of
terrorists also making use of the Peshawar market: religious extremists
from Algeria, Kaslimir, Egypt and Sudan used the town as a back base
in the war between the Soviet Union and the mujahedin. Many are
stiH in Peshawar. A great deal of the material available in the town is
fake: worthless but dangerous radioactive waste passed off as enriched
uranium. In part, this reflects many of the sellers' own ignorance of the
properties of the smuggled goods: there are num erous stories of
material being transported and stored recklessly by Afghan traders who
are then fatally irradiated as a result. The extent of the nuclear market
in Peshawar is hard to assess, but even Pakistani officials such as
General Naseerullah Babar, the interior minister, concede that it exists:
"... there was someone here offering these things [nuclear arms]. They
bring photographs and tilings, though not the m aterial i t s e l f . " 5 2  At
least some of the smuggling is concealed under legitimate exports, for
example, shipments of cesium-137, correctly labelled and with the
required paperwork, may also include a quantity of illicit nuclear
material, such as HEU or plutonium. Such practices form an important
part of the criminal proliferation in the former Soviet U r d o n . 3 3
It would also be a considerable exaggeration to suggest that there has 
been no weapons-grade material trafficked: since 1992 there have been 
at least six examples of such trade. In 1992, an employee stole 3.7 
pounds of HEU from the Luch Scientific Production Association at 
Podolsk in Russia. Around 1.8kg of material enriched to 30% U-235 was 
stolen from two fuel assemblies at a facility of the Northern Fleet naval
51 Deutch, Testimony...
32 Tim McGirk, "A Year Of Looting Dangerously", The Independent. March 24,1996.
33 Lee, Address, p. 23.
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base at Andreeva Guba in July 1993 by two naval serviceman. In 
November 1993, a Russian Navy captain stole about 10 pounds of HEU 
from the Murmansk submarine fuel storage facility. German police 
discovered 5.6 grams of supergrade plutonium in Tengen and then 0.8 
grams of HEU in Landshut in May and June 1994. In December 1994, 
Czech police seized six pounds of HEU in Prague .3 4 it is worth making 
two further points, based in part on comparisons with drug trafficking: 
physical detection measures are not infallible, generally, those caught 
trafficking drugs are the ones who are less experienced or competent at 
it, the good ones are much more likely to get through; and drug seizure 
rates vary between 10% and 40%, even if the nuclear seizure rate was 
well above that, the probability that some goes undetected is 
considerable.35 The strict comparability of the drugs example is 
debatable: nuclear smuggling is likely to be much smaller in volume 
and receive a much higher priority than drugs do; but the comparison 
is at least suggestive.36 There is little evidence that drug trafficking 
routes are being used to smuggle nuclear materials, but the fact that 
they are established and successful makes them easily adaptable for 
nuclear materials diversion.37
It is apparent that there are several different varieties of nuclear 
trafficker currently operating. Most of the detected smuggling so far has 
been by amateurs simply trying to make some fast m oney.3® In some 
cases, these individuals have no knowledge or experience of nuclear 
material, so there are instances of someone carrying cesium in their 
shirt pocket and dying as a result; or of a St Petersburg butcher who 
stored enriched uranium  in his fridge and tried to sell it at weekly 
street markets in the city. That such people can acquire material is 
indicative of just how easy gaining access to it really is. These amateurs 
are almost invariably simply opportunists: they rarely have past 
crim inal records, links to organised crime or illegal business
34 W illiam Potter, Testimony to: US Senate Committe on Government Affairs, 
Permanent Subcommittee On Investigations, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction". 104th Congress, 2nd Session, March 13,1996.
33 Williams & Woessner, "Nuclear Material Trafficking...", pp. 208-209.
36 The problem has forced specific counter-measures to be contemplated by 
organisations such as the EU. See, for example, 1806 General Affairs Council. Brussels, 
28 November 1994.
37 Deutch, Testimony...
33 Bernd Schmidbauer, "Hlegaler Nuklearhandel und Nuklearterrorismus", 
Internationale Politik. Volume 50. Number 2, (February 1995).
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involvement. Instead, they tend to be employees or former employees 
of the nuclear-industrial complex, linked to such an insider, or hve in 
the vicinity of a vulnerable facility .3 9 They also appear rarely to have a 
customer in m ind at the time of the diversion or theft, rather, they 
have been willing to seize their chance and then seek a buyer.^® In 
many cases, they are simply people who are desperate to find a way to 
m aintain their livelihoods. The situation at the Zvezda repair yard 
gives a good indication of their plight. There, striking workers, 
frustrated at their inability to force the Russian government to pay 
their overdue wages, threatened to sabotage the nuclear submarines at 
the yard.6! It would be quite plausible to believe that these workers 
might, given the opportunity, also resort to theft of the available 
nuclear material. A more sophisticated group are those opportunist 
entrepreneurs and business people who regard trafficking as simply an 
extension of their legitimate activities. The Russian Internal Affairs 
Ministry Economic Crimes division has reported that, of the 172 people 
arrested for nuclear smuggling in 1993, 10 were directors of small 
commercial enterprises and 2 were low-level employees of the same 
firms. These dealers have export licences and Western bank accounts 
and trade legally and illegally in goods such as oil, weapons or rare 
materials. Nuclear trafficking is simply a highly profitable sideline, one 
done primarily on consignment.62 This group is by no means limited 
to inhabitants of the former Soviet states: there have been arrests of 
citizens of every state where trafficking has occurred.
The extent of the Russian Mafiya's role in nuclear trafficking is hard to 
assess: it would increase the likelihood of a crackdown on the sector as 
a whole and offers relatively low incentives for them, especially while 
other activities such as drugs smuggling are so lucrative, providing an 
easily accessible mass m arket and little physical danger from the 
materials.63 In fact, there is some evidence that the main mafiya groups 
positively discourage such activities in case they endanger other 
interests or risk the considerable leverage the mafiya enjoys w ith
39 Lee, "Post-Soviet Nuclear Trafficking...", p. 345.
69 Potter, "Before The Deluge...", p. 12.
6! Geoffrey York, "Unhappy Russian workers threaten nuclear disaster". The Globe & 
M ail. Tuly 21997, pp. 1-2.
62 Lee, "Post-Soviet Nuclear Trafficking...", p. 346.
63 Potter, "Before The Deluge..,", p. 14.
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political and law enforcem ent officials.64 A lthough the Russian 
authorities have made numerous arrests of individuals with links to 
organised crime attem pting to smuggle non-weapons grade nuclear 
material, there is little evidence currently that large organised crime 
groups per se, w ith  established  structures and in ternational 
connections, are involved in the trafficking of radioactive materials 65 
These organisations do possess the means to acquire nuclear materials 
by threats or bribery and, almost certainly, the network to move them  
out of the country.6 6 In truth, organised crime is not monolithic and is 
barely organised. It is closely intertw ined w ith governm ent, and 
increasingly the line between political and criminal agendas has been 
blurred. There are an estimated 2,500 organised crime groups in Russia, 
many with increasingly sophisticated international links. In 1994, the 
official Russian estimate was that such groups controlled 40,000 state 
and private organisations, including hundreds of state enterprises, 
companies, co-operatives, banks and markets.67 The official figure for 
mafiya membership, 20,000 to 25,000, is almost certainly understated: 
other sources suggest the num ber is closer to 100,000.6® Russian 
organised crime is a series of networks encompassing criminals, 
businessmen, politicians, bureaucrats, security and military personnel, 
who between them are more than capable of moving stolen fissile 
material w ithout Western intelligence forces ever being aware of the 
fact. The relative ease with which this could be achieved suggests that it 
would be extremely rash to wholly exclude the possibility of organised 
crime being involved in nuclear trafficking and certainly not as the 
result of any moral strictures.69
Amongst those best able to engage in nuclear smuggling are former 
Soviet bloc military and intelligence personnel, some of whom spent 
their Cold War careers moving material and technology from West to 
East, and now find themselves, using the same methods, able to simply
64 Mark Galeotti, "Mafiya: Organized Crime in Russia", lane’s Intelligence Review. 
Special Report 10, (June 1996), p. 19.
65 Deutch, Testimony...
66 Williams & Woessner, "Nuclear Material Trafficking... ”, pp. 215-217.
67 Graham H. Turbiville, "Mafia In Uniform: The ’Criminalization’ of the Russian 
Armed Forces", Foreign Military Studies Office. Fort Leavenworth. Kansas. (July 1995), 
pp. 3-5.
63 Galeotti, "Mafiya... ”, p. 4.
69 Sopko, "The Changing Proliferation... ”, pp. 6-7.
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reverse the route7 Like the scientists of the former Soviet Union, 
many military personnel greatly resent the deterioration in standards 
of living, budgets and social status, and might be willing to exploit the 
lax security surrounding fissile m aterial/^ In October 1996, Russian 
defence minister. General Igor Rodionov, warned that the army was 
demoralised and on the brink of revolt over unpaid salaries and poor 
conditions. Furthermore, this state of affairs applied equally to the 
strategic rocket forces (SRF), the section of the army responsible for 
security of Russia's nuclear a r m o u r y G i v e n  their poor w ork 
conditions, there is no substantial reason to believe that personnel 
responsible for Russia's WMD are more reliable than the demonstrably 
corrupt military officials assigned to other duties.^3 There are already 
several examples of military personnel using their access to nuclear 
material for their profit. On November 29, 1993, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Alexei Tikhomirov of the Russian Navy and Alyak Beranov, deputy 
administrator of the Polyarnyy submarine base, stole 4 kg of uranium  
from the Navy's nuclear weapons and fuel store in Murmansk, in the 
hope of selling it for $50,000. Lieutenant Dimitri Tikhomirov, Alexei's 
brother and in charge of a nuclear reactor, helped them handle the fuel. 
The thieves walked through a hole in the perimeter fence, forced the 
padlock on the fuel-store door, and stole 3 fuels rods containing 
uranium  235 enriched to 20%. The theft was not discovered until 
twelve hours later, by which time Tikhomirov and Beranov had 
smuggled the fuel into the top-security Polyarnyy naval base where it 
was stored in Beranov's garage for seven months, until Dimitri got 
drunk and boasted to fellow officers, when the three were arrested.74 
The theft would have taken even longer to detect were it not for the 
fact that the thieves left the door to the warehouse open. Otherwise, it 
"could have been concealed for ten years or longer".^^ Another concern 
about the Russian military centres on the fact that it may be possible for
See for example, Roger Boyes, "Bonn Uncovers Nuclear Leaks At Military Bases", 
The Times. August 25,1994, p.8.
Jennifer G. Mathers, "Corruption In The Russian Armed Services", The World Today, 
Volume 51, Numbers 8-9, (August-September 1995), pp. 169-170.
James Adams & Carey Scott, "US fears grow as Russia loses nuclear grip". The 
Sunday Times. October 271996, p. A19.
Turbiville, "Mafia In Uniform...", p. 17.
Andrew Veitch, "Nuclear Smuggling", Transcript of Channel 4 Television 7pm News, 
February 15,1995.
Potter, "Before The Deluge,..", p. 10.
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rogue officers to bypass the authorisation process for launching a 
nuclear strike. Supposedly, only the President of the Republic can 
legitimately order such an action bu t the reality is probably that all 
technical checks could be circumvented in a m atter of hours or days, 
depending on the weapon. Such an eventuality would obviously open 
up an entire new range of nuclear terrorism as a p o s s i b i l i t y . ^ ^
The main buyers for nuclear material are almost certainly pariah states 
eager to take a shortcut towards nuclear programmes of their own.^^ 
Although there have been states pursuing nuclear weapons since the 
Second W orld War, some do question w hether there is really a 
dem and for stolen or illegally bought nuclear material. There is 
currently little hard evidence to decisively prove the existence of this 
market, but that is possibly more a reflection of the fact that the 
opportunities stemming from the collapse of the former Soviet Union 
are so relatively new. However, in view of the expense and time 
required to develop a nuclear capability, it seems unlikely that states 
would decline the opportunity to ease the process by acquiring fissile 
m a t e r i a l . There is decisive evidence that both Iran and Iraq, for 
example, sought to ilhcitly obtain other items of use to a nuclear 
weapons programme, so it is illogical to suppose that they would scorn 
the opportunity to obtain fissile material.^^ Weapons-grade material is 
simply not sold on the open market, so states are compelled to produce 
their own or to acquire the m aterial illicitly. The purchase of such 
material would probably save proliferator states 8-10 years on their 
weapons programmes and, in view of the time and facilities required 
for manufacture, improve the chances of maintaining the secrecy of 
the project.^o It seems unlikely though that this will replace
Adams & Scott, "US fears...", p. A19.
Nelan, "Formula...", p. 19.
Graham T. A llison & Richard Falkenrath, "The World's Biggest Problem?", 
Prospect. (February 1996), p. 83. It is worth noting though that among those states not 
seeking to acquire a nuclear capability are those within the former Soviet Union from 
which fissile material is leaking. All the non-Russian successor states have signed the 
NPT as non-nuclear weapon states and many have concluded safeguard arrangements 
with the IAEA. Potter, "Before The Deluge...", p. 13.
Spector, Interview.... The examples are: a carbon-fibre winding machine that could 
be used for the centrifuge process and two shipments of gyroscopes from dismantled 
strategic rockets that Iraq received. The first was dumped in the Tigris to hide it from 
UN inspectors and the second was found in Jordan.
Oleg Bukharin, "Nuclear Safeguards & Security In the Former Soviet Union", 
Survival. Volume 36, Number 4, (Winter 199T5), p. 53.
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proliferator states' normal process of hidden weapon acquisition; states 
will use the black market to facilitate the indigenous development of a 
nuclear capability rather than as a substitute for it. States derive 
considerable regional and international leverage from their nuclear 
programmes and are unlikely to be willing to abandon them in favour 
of an external supply system that is bound to be unpredictable and 
unreliable, particularly when every effort is being made internationally 
to shut it down altogether.®^
W hether this equates to an increased likelihood of state-sponsored
nuclear terrorism  is more problematic. It would be rash to wholly
exclude the possibility: the Director General of M15 has said that "Some
two dozen governments are currently trying to obtain such technology.
A number of these countries sponsor or even practise terrorism, and
we cannot rule out the possibility that these weapons could be used for
that p u r p o s e . However, sponsoring states w ould have to be
completely certain of plausible deniability in perpetuity for any terrorist
attack since the repercussions from states that have been the victim of
an act of nuclear terrorism could be immense. Furtherm ore, having
given a client terrorist group a nuclear weapon, the sponsor state has
very little control over the group, and may even be subjected to
blackmail by the organisation. This conclusion is emphasised by the
experience of East Germany in sponsoring the actions of lllich Ramirez
Sanchez (Carlos the Jackal) in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Markus
Wolf, who controlled much of East Germany's foreign intelligence
network, regarded Carlos as a liability, someone who "disregarded all
the rules of discretion, there-by endangering those who worked with
him." Wolf's main objective was
getting him out of the country as soon as possible - no simple 
task. One of the most difficult aspects of liaison with terrorists 
like Carlos was that the power relationsliip between us and 
them  had an un fo rtunate  tendency to reverse itself. 
Originally, Carlos was grateful for assistance in organising Ms 
clandestine life. But once he sensed that we were less keen on 
Ms presence, Ms mood turned nasty. He began to make the 
same tMeats towards us that he carried out against enemy
Rose Gottemoeller, "Preventing A Nuclear Nightmare", Survival. Volume 38, 
Number 2, (Summer 1996), p. 172.
Rimington, "Security...", p.9.
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governments, warning those who tried to dissuade him from 
a visit that he would seek out East German targets abroad.®®
A lthough state-sponsored nuclear terrorism  is no t im possible, 
particularly if a state found itself in extremis, it makes more sense to 
suggest that, having obtained fissile material, a state would use its own 
agencies to exploit the situation. Richard Falkenrath argues that unless 
a state could guarantee complete control over its client group, it is very 
unlikely that a state would use a terrorist organisation to deliver a 
nuclear device because the stakes are too high, in which case the 
problem essentially becomes one of deterrence.®^ This is certainly true 
for a nudear-yield weapon, but may not be so for radiological devices 
since it might be possible to ensure that such a weapon dispersed 
radiation covertly, minimising the risk of detection. Whether a state 
would choose to utilise such a capability is another question, but it is 
not inconceivable, although its effects would almost certainly be long­
term, rather than instantaneous, so would be more likely to be a form 
of extended punishment than a means of leverage for the terrorists. 
However, by and large, states seem to seek membership of "the nuclear 
club" for the security, prestige and the leverage that it conveys on a 
regional and global level, ra ther than for the overt intention of 
imminently using the new capability.®® It is w orth  noting, as an 
analogue, that while there are a num ber of states that sponsor 
terrorism and have a chemical or biological weapons capability, there is 
little evidence that there has been biological or chemical terrorism by 
sub-state actors as a result.
While state-sponsored groups potentially have many advantages in  
terms of resources, the real danger from an intelligence and incident 
aversion perspective comes from groups such as Aum Shinrikyo or 
loosely-affiliated splinters of larger organisations, such as the alleged 
bombers of the M urrah Building in Oklahoma, because they come 
from nowhere. Aum "just w eren 't on anyone’s radar screens".®^
Markus Wolf with Anne McElvoy, "When Carlos the Jackal turned nasty". The 
Sunday Times. Tune 151997.
Falkenrath, Interview ...
An interesting discussion on why states proliferate is contained in: Scott D. Sagan, 
"The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation", Current History. (April 1997), Volume 96, 
Number 609.
^6 Floyd Clarke, Former Deputy Director, FBI, Interview with Author, November 20, 
1996, Washington D.C..
19
Likewise, one of the reasons that it took so long to apprehend the 
alleged Unabomber was that he had no network, there was no chain of 
people leading back to him. As yet, there is little evidence that terrorist 
groups are buyers in their own right,® ^  although if the flow of nuclear 
materials out of Russia continues, it is probably only a m atter of time 
before a well-resourced organisation is able to become a purchaser. 
Such a group need not be state-sponsored: the Aum Shinrikyo cult had 
a billion dollars and 40,000 members spread world-wide.®® Director of 
Central Intelligence Deutch has stated: "We currently  have no 
evidence that any terrorist organization has obtained contraband 
nuclear materials. However, we are concerned because only a small 
amount of material is necessary to terrorize populated areas."®^
It is worth noting though that it would be unwise to assume that cost 
alone is likely to be the determining factor that precludes terrorist 
groups from acquiring fissile material. Although Aum were certainly 
exceptional, in terms of their assets, an increasing num ber of terrorist 
organisations are self-funded. This is as a result of two, inter-related 
trends: firstly, the amount of state-sponsorship for terrorism, which 
although never as widespread as was sometimes claimed was still a 
significant elem ent in in te rnational terrorism , has decreased 
dramatically with the end of the Cold War and the declining necessity 
for surrogate warfare in other states; and secondly, to compensate for 
the first point, terrorist groups have become increasingly involved in 
racketeering and transnational crime. The Revolutionary Arm ed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC), for example, has been heavily involved in 
drug trafficking. A study of Colombian guerrilla finances found that 
they had doubled between 1991 and 1994, with drugs contributing 34% 
of the income, extortion and robbery 26% and kidnappings 23%.^® The 
IRA has been involved in social clubs, charities, gaming and fraud to 
supplement its finances.^^ Many of these activities are international:
Williams & Woessner, "Nuclear Material Trafficking...", p. 222.
"Thinking The Unthinkable", N ew  Scientist. Editorial, May 11, 1996, p. 3.
Deutch, Testimony...
S. Kendall, "Colombia measures the cost of violence". Financial Times, November 12
1996.
The best account of this is to be found in James Adams, The Financing of Terror. 
(Sevenoaks, New English Library, 1986.) Richard Clutterbuck has written extensively 
on the connection between drug trafficking and terrorism. See, for example, Richard 
Clutterbuck, Terrorism In An Unstable World. (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 87-111.
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the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam are allegedly involved in fraud, 
extortion, alien smuggling and drug trafficking in Canada, all to aid 
their cause in Sri Lanka7^ It is increasingly obvious that "the links 
between war and crime are growing stronger in the 1990s," As an 
example, in February 1994, a notorious Peruvian drug baron was 
sentenced to Hfe in prison, but for treason as a result of his business 
with the Sendero Luminoso guerrillas, rather than because of his drug 
trafficking. The connection betw een the two types of illegal 
organisation stems, in part, from  the increased accessibility of 
in ternational crim e for terrorists, arising from  easier travel, 
communications and m oney-laundering in the m odern world. In 
some cases, terrorism itself has become a source of income: both the 
IRA and the UDA have construction rackets that largely determine 
which firms receive the building contracts (in exchange for a kickback) 
to reconstruct the areas of Belfast wrecked by the two groups' 
violence.^®
W hether this equates to terrorist groups having considerable 
disposable income, and therefore being potential buyers of fissile 
material, is questionable. It seems likely that it is the largest, most 
sophisticated groups that are able to exploit these opportunities. For 
others, it probably remains that terrorism is an expensive occupation, 
especially for underground organisations, needing to support members 
who are unlikely to be able to have another form of income. Rather 
than building up their assets, most groups seem to lead a relatively 
hand-to-mouth financial existence, dictated by immediate operational 
needs, as well as the prerequisite of maintaining the group as a viable 
organisation.
The dim inution of state-sponsorship, compared to that of the 1980s 
when it was the pre-em inent characteristic of terrorism , may be 
important for another reason: it may mean that those terrorist groups, 
unconstrained by the agendas of actors that have a stake in the 
international system and that are clearly vulnerable to reprisals from
Samuel Porteous, "The Threat From Transnational Crime: An Intelligence 
Perspective", Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Commentary. Number 70, 
(Winter 1996), pp. 5-6.
Charles Hanley, "Increasingly guerrillas financed by drugs", Toronto Star. December 
29 1994, p. A19.
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other states, have greater freedom of action. No longer restrained by 
this influence, they may be more inclined to take radical action, 
possibly even involving weapons of mass destruction.
Nuclear Terrorism
Concerns about nuclear terrorism are not new: in the past 25 years, a 
multitude of books have been written on the subject. However, the 
literature prior to 1989 is dominated by a few key studies. Willrich and 
Taylor’s book, published in 1974, effectively set the genre. It argued that 
building nuclear weapons was relatively straightforward, provided that 
terrorists could acquire the necessary nuclear m aterial. They 
concentrated on the opportunities for theft of such material from the 
United States programme, and urged that greater precautions be taken 
to safeguard it.^^ This was followed in 1975 by Brian Jenkins' article: 
"Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?", originally published by the California 
Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, and subsequently as a 
paper by the Rand Corporation.^® This was a critical study because it did 
deal with the question of terrorist motivation, not only could terrorists 
go nuclear, but would they want to? Consequently, it has become the 
most cited, important, and most influential work in the subject of 
nuclear terrorism. Jenkins' m uch-quoted central argum ent was that 
"Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead,"^® 
and that consequently mass-destructive terrorism was unlikely, since it 
would be counter-productive to the terrorist's aims. The next key book 
was in 1979, Norton and Greenberg's Studies in Nuclear Terrorism, an 
edited collection of articles and conference papers. There was no 
overarching hypothesis that linked these essays; instead, it reflected the 
best survey of the arguments to that date on the likelihood of nuclear 
terrorism. It included work by authors who believed that nuclear 
terrorism posed a real threat that had to be addressed immediately 
(Beres); and that state-sponsorsliip, leading to a heightened danger, was 
plausible (Krieger); along w ith others who believed that terrorists 
would be unwilling to go nuclear (Jenkins); that nuclear terrorism was
Mason Willrich & Theodore B. Taylor, Nuclear Theft: Risks & Safeguards. 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publisliing Company, 1974.)
Brian Jenkins, "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?", California Seminar on Arms Control 
and Foreign Policy. Paper Number 64, Los Aiigeles, Crescent Publications, 1975 and Rand 
P-5541. November 1975.
Jenkins, "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?", Rand P-5541. November 1975, pp. 4-5.
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unlikely (Mullins); and that proliferation by states was not only more 
plausible, but also more dangerous (Schelling). It considered the threat 
to nuclear energy facilities (Flood) and how to combat that threat 
(Kupperman), as well as the possibility of theft of nuclear material and 
the means to prevent it7  ^Leventhal and Alexander's books. Nuclear 
Terrorism: Defining The T hreat (1985) and Preventing Nuclear 
Terrorism  (1987), contained reports on the proceedings of a conference 
and then, in the later book, on the findings of the International Task 
Force on the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism which was established 
as a result of the earlier conference. These reports were combined with 
essays that assessed various aspects of the problem. In the 1985 book, 
these included a discussion of the plausibility of nuclear terrorism 
(Jenkins); and of the means and targets that terrorists might use 
(Davies). The book also included articles on preventing the threat 
(O'Keefe) and possible responses by government and industry to the 
issue (Giuffrida). The 1987 volume included analysis of the means that 
terrorists could use to go nuclear; the factors that might make them 
want to do so; and responses to, and strategies for dealing with, a threat, 
in c lu d in g  sa feg u a rd s , in te rn a tio n a l m easu res  and  threat 
minimisation.^® The 1970s and 1980s also saw a series of im portant 
studies by the Rand Corporation which added significantly to the 
existing literature. These reports considered, in various forms, several 
central aspects of the subject of nuclear terrorism  including the 
likelihood of terrorists resorting to such weapons amd the key attributes 
of potential adversaries, including hostile employees, w ithin the 
context of the overall threat. Among the most im portant of these 
studies were: Bass, Jenkins, Kellen, Krofcheck, Petty, Reinstedt and 
Ronfeldt's "Motivations & Possible Actions Of Potential Criminal 
Adversaries Of US Nuclear Programmes’’,^  ^ Bass and Jenkins’ "A 
Review Of Recent Trends In International Terrorism  & N uclear
Augustus Norton & Michael Greenberg, Studies In Nuclear Terrorism. (Boston: G. K. 
Hull, 1979).
Leventhal & Alexander, Nuclear Terrorism: Defining The Threat.
Paul Leventhal & Yonah Alexander (eds). Preventing Nuclear Terrorism. (Lexington. 
Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1987.)
Gail Bass, Brian Jenkins, Konrad Kellen, Joseph Krofcheck, Geraldine Petty, Robert 
Reinstedt, David Ronfeldt, "Motivations & Possible Actions Of Potential Criminal 
Adversaries Of US Nuclear Programmes", RAND. February 1980.
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Incidents A b r o a d " , ! oo deLeon, Hoffman, Kellen and Jenkins' "The 
Threat Of Nuclear Terrorism: A Reexamination",!®! and Reinstedt and 
W estbury's "Major Crimes As Analogs To Potential Threats To 
Nuclear Facilities & Programs",!®^
Prior to 1989, the literature on nuclear terrorism dealt with the subject 
from two main perspectives: the means by which terrorists might be 
able to "go nuclear", and the reasons that might compel them to use or 
to reject such a possibility. With the end of the Cold War, the dynamics 
that underpinned the answers to both of these questions have altered 
considerably. Not only have the means by which sub-state actors could 
acquire fissile material changed, but the nature and motivations of 
terrorism itself have also changed. In the 1990s, there has been a 
growth in terrorism  perpetrated by groups that cannot be readily 
pigeon-holed as nationalist-separatist, left-wing, right-wing, religious 
or into any of the other typologies that were effective in describing 
"traditional" varieties of group. In every case, examples of these types 
still exist: ETA and the IRA rem ain nationalist-separatist, Sendero 
Luminoso are left-wing, neo-Nazi attacks occur in a multitude of states, 
and Hizbollah are religious terrorists. However, supplementing these 
have been other, "non-traditional" types of organisation, such as Aum 
Shinrikyo, the bombers of the M urrah Building in Oklahoma City, or 
the ad hoc group, led by Ramiz Yousef, responsible for the attack on the 
World Trade Center in 1993. Although several "traditional" terrorist 
groups talked about resorting to nuclear weapons, they were, in  
general, conservative in their tactics and in the levels of violence they 
were willing to use to pursue their goals. The newer, "non-traditional" 
groups have not only been more violent, they have also been more 
innovative, and m ore willing to use new types of w eaponry. 
Furtherm ore, they have, in m any cases, been unconstrained by 
considerations of proportionality or the need to appeal to an audience 
for support, factors that were critical in ensuring that "traditional"
I®® Gail Bass, Brian Jenkins, "A Review Of Recent Trends In International Terrorism & 
Nuclear Incidents Abroad", RAND. April 1983.
101 Peter deLeon, Bruce Hoffman with Konrad Kellen, Brian Jenkins, "The Threat Of 
Nuclear Terrorism: A Reexamination", RAND N-2706. January 1988.
Robert Reinstedt, J Westbuiy,"Major Crimes As Analogs To Potential Threats To 
Nuclear Facilities & Programs", RAND. April 1980.
24
terrorist groups used a measure of self-restraintd®® Bearing this in 
mind, it is valid to question not only whether the opportunities for 
nuclear terrorism  have changed in the past eight years, but also 
whether the desire of terrorist groups to perpetrate such attacks has 
altered in that period.
Since 1989, however, much of the literature on nuclear terrorism has 
been predominantly focused on the new opportunities for nuclear 
smuggling and theft, arising from the collapse of the former Soviet 
Union, and on the possible ramifications of that, in terms of the ease 
with which terrorists could use the material to build a nuclear-yield 
device. Although much of the avalanche of articles on the subject have 
been highly derivative, a few have been outstanding. These include the 
report. Avoiding Nuclear A n a r c h y , ! ®4 arid subsequent testimony before 
the United States Congress by Allison, Cote, Falkenrath, and Miller; 
and articles by Phil Williams and Paul Woessner!®®, William Potter!®^, 
Oleg Bukharin!®^, and Rensselaer Lee III.!®® However, where these 
studies dealt with nuclear terrorism, it was as a by-product of the 
nuclear proliferation issue. Most recently, Bruce Hoffman's article 
"Terrorism and WMD: Some Preliminary Hypotheses " has gone some 
way towards filling this gap. In it, Hoffman argues that the new type of 
terrorism is more religious and lethal than was its predecessor, and 
concludes that this combination, along with increased opportunities 
for acquisition of non-conventional weaponry, makes the possibility of 
m ass-destructive terrorism  a m uch m ore real th rea t than was 
previously the c a s e . ! ® 9  However, the question of why terrorists might 
resort to nuclear weapons, beyond the increased opportunities for 
doing so, remain to some extent, unaddressed. Tliis thesis attempts to 
analyse the nature of terrorism in the post-Cold War world. The issue 
of nuclear terrorism acts as a catalyst for this study. The thesis shows
103 Bruce Hoffman, "Terrorism and WMD: Some Preliminary Hypotheses", The 
Nonproliferation Review. Volume 4, Number 3, (Spring/Summer 1997), pp. 45-47.
104 Graham Allison, Owen Cote, Richard Falkenrath & Steve Miller, "Avoiding 
Nuclear Anarchy; Containing The Threat Of Loose Nuclear Weapons & Fissile 
Material", Center for Science & International Affairs fCSIAL JFK School of 
Government, Harvard University, (April 1996.)
105 Williams & Woessner, "Nuclear Material Trafficking...".
106 Potter, "Before The Deluge..."
Bukharin, "The Future..."
19® Lee, "Post-Soviet Nuclear Trafficking..."
Hoffman, "Terrorism and WMD..."
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that while nuclear terrorism is important and remains a critical threat, 
even if tire increased opportunities for fissile proliferation did not exist, 
the nature  of contem porary terrorism  w ould m ean that mass- 
destructive terrorism would stül be a problem.
To achieve this objective, the dissertation will consider, in-depth, the 
motivations and objectives of terrorism. It is not intended that this 
should be a general theory of terrorism, so much as an analysis of 
certain key and specifically relevant aspects of it, in particular, of the 
debate over whether it is instrumentality or group psychology that is 
the predom inant driving force beliind terrorist's actions. It is this 
thesis' hypothesis that the former is a real factor, since terrorists are 
goal-oriented, but that these goals may often become subverted by the 
latter, by the drive to maintain the organisation's structural integrity. 
Such an outcome would have a profound impact on the terrorists' 
ultimate objectives, as well as on their willingness to use extreme 
measures by which to achieve these goals. This discussion, between 
rational activity, geared to a specific goal, and psychological pressures 
that promote a continuation and even an escalation of the group's 
campaign has unfolded for nearly twenty years. Martha Crenshaw, who 
has tended to subscribe increasingly to an instrumental perspective, 
summarised much of this argument in 1981: "Significant campaigns of 
terrorism depend on rational political choice. As purposeful activity, 
terrorism  is the result of an organization's decision that it is a 
politically useful means to oppose a government." However, she 
concludes the same article by arguing that:
The psychological relationships within the terrorist group - 
the interplay of commitment, risk, solidarity, loyalty, guilt, 
revenge^ and isolation - discourage terrorists from changing 
the direction they have taken. This may explain why - even if 
objective circum stances change w hen, fo r exam ple, 
grievances are satisfied, or if the logic of the situation changes 
w hen, for exam ple, the terrorists are offered other 
alternatives for the expression of opposition - terrorism may 
endure until the terrorist group is physically destroyed.!!®
Jerrold Post, a political psychologist, has argued that terrorists join, and 
rem ain w ithin, the group because they are dependent on the 
organisation for psychological relief from their own feelings of being
Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism", Comparative Politics. Volume 13 
(July 1981), pp. 358, 396-397.
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an outsider. Terrorism offers an identity and a sense of belonging that 
they have been unable to find elsewhere. However, he is careful to 
differentiate between terrorists who are nationalist-separatist and those 
who are anarchic-ideologues, since for the former, violence offers a 
reaffirmation of their cultural and social identity, whereas, for the 
latter, violence is a blow against their society. In both cases, terrorists 
remain able to justify their violence by minimising the effects of their 
actions through a series of largely unconscious attempts to shift blame 
and ultimate responsibility onto others. Consequently, it is Post's belief 
that: "political terrorists are driven to commit acts of violence as a 
consequence of psychological forces, and that their special psycho-logic 
is constructed to rationalize acts they are psychologically compelled to 
commit... individuals are draw n to the path of terrorism in order to 
commit acts of violence."!!!
This thesis assesses the likelihood of nuclear terrorism by considering 
both sides of this theoretical debate concerning terrorist motivations. It 
discusses both the individual and the group pressures that apply to 
terrorists and then supports them with empirical examples from the 
literature, ideally in the form of memoirs of, or interviews with, the 
terrorists themselves. This approach is applied not only to the 
"traditional", left-wing or nationalist-separatist, groups that were the 
original basis for most of the theories of terrorism, but also to the right- 
iving, religious and "non-traditional" types of group that have become 
increasingly prevalent in terrorism in the past 15 years. This approach 
has the benefit of combining the extensive theoretical literature on 
terrorism  w ith the means of "proving" their hypotheses by testing 
them against the primary sources: the memoirs or direct quotes of the 
terrorists themselves. In doing this, it will be demonstrated that it is 
possible to make a judgem ent about the willingness of various 
categories of terrorist to employ weapons of mass destruction to further 
their campaigns. It could be argued that such a technique leaves the 
thesis at the mercy of its sources, since, obviously, it is only possible to 
analyse that which has been written or said by terrorists. Only some 
terrorists have w ritten about their activities at all, and of those that
111 Jerrold M. Post, "Terrorist psycho-logic; Terrorist behaviour as a product of 
psychological forces" in Walter Reich (ed.). Origins Of Terrorism: Psychologies. 
Ideologies, Theologies. States Of Mind, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), p. 25.
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have written, their version of events risks being selective or even self- 
serving, designed to portray them, afterwards, in the best light. Clearly, 
therefore, there is a possibility that this will give only a partial picture. 
To minimise the danger that this could skew the conclusions of this 
study, many different sources are used, and all are placed within the 
framework of the theoretical literature, intended to test these theories, 
rather than being relied upon in their own right. In order to mitigate 
any problems of objectivity or perception, this thesis deliberately 
considers a wide range of perspectives from both sides of the theoretical 
discussion. Furthermore, the cases of terrorism used in the study were 
specifically chosen to reflect as wide a geographical and chronological 
diversity as possible. Every continent except Australia is represented, 
and the groups reflect not only the entire period from 1968 onwards, 
the beginnings of m odern international terrorism, but also the era of 
colonial terrorism, wliich occurred considerably before that date. This 
approach, by providing a representative cross-section of terrorist 
groups, heightens the validity of the study's conclusions because it 
offers an analysis that is not culturally or chronologically limited in its 
application. For the same reason, the thesis is careful to differentiate 
between the various types of terrorist group, especially when the 
general point being made is only selectively applicable. In tliis mamier, 
it is in tended that this study should offer a w indow  into the 
motivations of terrorist organisations and the likely causes of their 
resort to nuclear weapons.
In considering the opportunities for nuclear proliferation, the thesis 
relies heavily on testimonies given before various committees of the 
United States Congress. There are two principle reasons for tliis: firstly, 
the Congress hearings represent the most comprehensive open-source 
and current account of the extent of the problem in the former Soviet 
Union and include information that is either unavailable elsewhere or 
has been published in a m ultitude of other places. The Congress 
hearings are therefore not only extensive, but also accessible. Secondly, 
and more im portant, since the counter-proliferation efforts in the 
former Soviet Union are being predominantly led by the United States, 
using the reports from Congressional committees offers an insight into 
the information that is being used to provide the impetus for these 
efforts and into the effectiveness of the campaign to rem edy the 
situation. These testimonies, along with reports w ritten  by non­
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governmental organisations such as the Rand Corporation, and much 
of the rapidly expanding library of articles on the subject, are then 
supported by practical examples, in many cases drawn from the media 
w ithin the past three years, and by interview s, conducted in 
Washington DC in November 1996, with a range of experts familiar 
with the problem. This approach has ensured that it has been possible, 
not only to reflect the current proliferation situation, bu t also to 
compare, and thereby test, both empirical studies and United States 
policy statem ents about the perceived threat w ith the theoretical 
literature, described earlier, and with terrorists' own words.
While it is obviously desirable that no sub-state actor acquires access to
nuclear material, this study is specifically concerned with the possibility
that it might be terrorists that not only gain such access but also use it
in pursuit of their objectives. Consequently, it is necessary to define
"terrorism", to differentiate it from  other types of violence or
intimidation. It is vital to have at least some basis for delineating the
subject under discussion; otherwise, there is a danger that it wiU be "a
book on an unidentified subject, so that the author can include
w hatever he sees fit", as one criticism of another discussion of
terrorism had it.ü^ The most widely accepted academic definition is
that of Schmid and Jongman, in part because theirs is based on a survey
of over one hundred other definitions. They define terrorism as:
an anxiety-inspiring m ethod of repeated violent action, 
employed by (semi-)clandestine individual, group, or state 
actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, 
whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of 
violence are not the main targets. The immediate hum an 
victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of 
opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic 
targets) from a target population, and serve as message 
generators. Threat- and  violence-based com m unication 
processes betw een terrorist (organization), (imperilled) 
victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main 
target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target 
of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether 
intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.!!®
Cited in Alex P. Sclimid & Albert J. Jongman, Political Terrorism; A New Guide To 
Actors. Authors, Concepts. Data Bases. Theories & Literature. (New Brunswick, New  
Jersy: Transaction Books, 1988), p. 3.
Ibid.. p. 28.
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While it is extremely thorough in its coverage, this definition has the 
weakness of being overly general. It includes far more actors and 
actions than is helpful for the purposes of this thesis. Other, non- 
academic, organisations put the emphasis elsewhere. The FBI defines 
terrorism as "the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or 
property to intimidate or coerce a government or civilian population 
in furtherance of political or social o b je c t iv e s .T h is  definition has 
the advantage of imposing an absolute, the legality of the action, on the 
definition, so it circumvents the problem of whether the act has to be 
morally unjustified to be terrorism, rather than freedom fighting, for 
example. W ilkinson defines it as; "coercive intim idation. It is the 
systemic use of m urder and destruction in o rder to terrorise 
individuals, groups, communities or governments into conceding to 
the terrorists' political demands."!!® This contains the im portant 
concept that terrorism must be systemic: one-off or unco-ordinated acts 
of violence do not constitute terrorism. There is a further difficulty in 
all of these definitions, as they relate to this thesis: they do not 
differentiate between actors that use terrorism as an occasional tactic 
and those for whom it is their main activity. Wliile it is undeniable 
that both states and guerrilla organisations, for example, do resort to 
terrorism, as one amongst several means to an end, they are not the 
focus of this study. It is crucial that the distinction between such actors 
and terrorists is made, because the psychological and organisational 
dynamics at the heart of this discussion differ so greatly between the 
two. The factors that would make states resort to weapons of mass 
destruction are obviously completely different from those wliich affect 
terrorists. Consequently, for the purposes of this study, terrorism will 
simply be "the systemic and unlawful use, by individuals or groups, of 
violence or the threat of violence to coerce concessions from, or 
influence, a wider audience than the immediate victims."
The difference between states and terrorists, particularly in relation to 
nuclear proliferation, is a critical aspect of this study, worthy of fuller 
discussion. The general consensus amongst academics as to why states 
seek nuclear weapons is that they do so if the state believe that they face
!!"! Andrew Silke, "Terrorism and the Blind Man's Elephant", Terrorism & Political 
Violence. Volume 8, Number 3, (Autumn 1996), p. 21.
Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism And The Liberal State. (London: Macmillan, 1979), p. 49.
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security threats that cannot be dealt with other means. In this analysis, 
nuclear weapons are first and forem ost instrum ents of national 
security. Such weapons are the ultimate guarantee of a state's survival 
from external pressure (obviously, as is shown in the case of the former 
Soviet Union, nuclear weapons are less effective at combating pressure 
from internal sources.) They compel their owners to be accepted as part 
of the international status quo, since the costs of removing a nuclear­
arm ed state w ould be so great. From a security perspective, this 
deterrence elem ent of nuclear-w eapon possession is the m ost 
important. This is because it has become increasingly accepted that the 
utility of such weapons for gaining military or political concessions 
from another state, irrespective of w hether it possessed nuclear 
weapons too, are minimal. The threat is too disproportionate to have 
credibility. Consequently, nuclear weapons have become instruments 
of last resort, to be used to protect a state, or conceivably a regime, from 
ultimate defeat.
It could be argued that nuclear weapons might fulfil a similar role for 
terrorist groups. Certainly, any state, confronted by a nuclear-armed 
terrorist group, would have to be extremely careful in the way that they 
dealt with the organisation. In this way, nuclear weapons might be a 
way that a terrorist group could stave off defeat and collapse. If this 
were so, and bearing in m ind that organisational survival is a prime 
objective of terrorist groups, then nuclear weapons might well appear 
to be highly attractive options. In contrast to states, such devices might 
also have some use as instruments to gain concessions from a state. 
This is particularly so for those terrorist groups that are not bound by 
the need for proportionality or a fear of the counter-productive 
consequences of such an action. Furtherm ore, since terrorist 
organisations are not as easily targeted as a state's population, it would 
be harder for an attacked state to launch reprisals or counter-attacks, in 
the same way that it would do against an attack by another state.
There is also an extent to which, as has been argued earlier, nuclear 
weapons represent an important symbol of statehood, status and of 
prestige. They enable their owners to be able to stand, as equals, with 
the largest and most powerful states in the world. Scott D. Sagan 
suggests that: "Military arsenals can be envisaged as serving symbolic
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functions similar to flags, airlines, and Olympic teams. They are part of 
an international norm concerning what it means to be a m odern and 
legitimate state."!®^ This has consequences for nuclear terrorism too. 
An important aspect of terrorism is the attempt, by the group, to deny 
the pow er and legitim acy of their enemies, e ither a state or 
government. Nuclear weapons would enable the terrorist organisation 
to claim to be at least the equals, militarily, of their opponents.
Nuclear terrorism needs to be defined for the purposes of this study. As 
was discussed earlier, it encompasses a range of threats with the only 
common theme that they include a central nuclear component. This 
means that every thing from anti-nuclear protests; attacks of, or siege- 
and-hostage situations at, a nuclear reactor; to the use, or threatened 
use, of a radiological dispersal device or of a nuclear-yield device would 
be acts of nuclear terrorism. Few studies have radically differed in 
accepting that these elem ents were parts of nuclear terrorism. 
However, the emphasis on different aspects of the subject has varied. 
For example, Willrich and Taylor’s predom inant concern was the 
vulnerability to theft of material from civil fuel cycle in the United 
States.!!7 One exception to a broad definition of nuclear terrorism was 
Norton and Greenberg's book. They focused on a nuclear-yield device, 
deliberately not dealing with radiological terrorism or the sabotage of 
nuclear facilities because they argued that the former, while significant, 
was indistinguishable from  chemical or biological terrorism  and 
should be analysed as such. The latter, sabotage, "more properly 
belong[ed] to a discussion of attacks upon high-value targets or 
inherently dangerous facilities."!!® Particu larly  in the case of 
radiological terrorism, this seems to underestimate the symbolic and 
psychological importance of an attack comprising a nuclear element. 
However, Norton and Greenberg's exclusive approach appears to be 
unusual. At the introduction to the conference, from which stemmed 
Leventhal and Alexander’s first book on the subject, Paul Leventhal 
"cited the risks of explosive nuclear fuels being stolen from commerce 
and made into bombs; of actual weapons or weapons components 
being stolen and exploded; and of nuclear facilities being sabotaged or 
conventional industria l installations being subjected to nuclear
Sagan, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation", p. 154.
117 Willrich and Taylor, Nuclear Theft: Risks & Safeguards
118 jsjorton & Greenberg, Studies In Nuclear Terrorism, p. 23 n.8
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sabotage."!!9 their 1987 book, the threat of nuclear terrorism, defined 
by the International Taskforce on the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, 
was, in order of severity: "[the] theft and explosion of a nuclear 
weapon...[the] theft of nuclear materials and their use or threatened use 
in a crude homemade bomb - or, with help from a state, in, a more 
sophisticated device...[and the] sabotage or tlireatened sabotage of a 
reactor, fuel facility, or fuel shipment."!2® Rand also found nuclear 
terrorism to be a broad term. Although most studies concentrated on 
specific aspects of the subject, nuclear terrorism , as a term , 
encompassed actions against civilian or military nuclear facilities, 
including against vehicles used to transport nuclear m aterials or 
components. The term also incorporated the use of nuclear weapons or 
material to tlireaten or destroy people or property.!2! Latterly, the focus 
has increasingly been on terrorism involving radiological and nuclear- 
yield weapons,!22 but any definition of nuclear terrorism would still 
have to retain the other types of threat. However, since this thesis 
essentially addresses the question of how far terrorists might go, most 
attention will be devoted to considering the most extreme forms of 
nuclear terrorism: the possibility of the terrorist use of a radiological 
dispersal or a nuclear-yield device.
If the possibility of terrorists obtaining fissile material can no longer be 
wholly excluded, the next question has to be one of motivation. The 
increased availability of such material is important, not only in its own 
right, but also because it vastly increases the options available to 
terrorists, and may radically heighten the level of devastation they are 
capable of causing, the political leverage and the attention for their 
cause they can obtain. However, that does not alter the question: if 
they have the opportunity, would terrorists resort to nuclear weapons, 
and if so, what sorts of weapons are they most likely to use? In order to 
answer this, the thesis will, having discussed the increased 
opportunities for terrorists to "go nuclear", concentrate on the 
desirability, from the terrorist’s perspective, of doing so.
Robert Beckman, "Conference Report - International Terrorism: The Nuclear 
Dimension", Terrorism. Volume 8, Number 4, (1986), p.352.
!20 Leventhal & Alexander, Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, p. 12.
deLeon, Hoffman with Kellen & Jenkins, "The Threat Of Nuclear Terrorism: A 
Reexamination", p. 3.
122 gee, for example, the discussion of nuclear terrorism in: Hoffman, "Terrorism and 
WMD...", p. 50.
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By examining the psychology of terrorists and terrorism, both from an 
individual and an organisational perspective, using the theoretical 
literature and comparing it to empirical examples, the thesis will draw 
conclusions about the reasons that people join and rem ain w ithin 
terrorist groups, as well as the pressures that are exerted on the group 
to escalate the levels of violence that they employ. The concept of 
political violence as the result of some set personality or terrorist type 
is dismissed, but it is argued that leaders do play an important role in 
determining the character of the group. The nature of terrorist groups 
is that they make dissent and exiting extremely difficult, and deflect 
responsibility for actions onto others, so that it is easier to rem ain 
within the organisation and accept its use of violence. Furthermore, 
violence is the activity that sets the group apart, it gives the 
organisation its identity, so any attem pt to alter that is extremely 
difficult.
The tactics and targeting decisions of terrorist organisations are then 
considered, using the psychological insights gained from the previous 
chapter and comparing them to a rational, instrumental perspective of 
why groups use the methods they do and the basis for that decision. 
The thesis finds that though terrorism  is not an effective means of 
achieving political objectives, groups that use it are often unable to 
resort to alternative strategies, for the reasons that are outlined above. 
Consequently, as the group begins to fail and face the possibility of 
defeat, it will often favour escalating the level of violence that it 
employs, believing it to be the best means of recapturing their 
advantage.
The thesis then considers the case of religious terrorism, arguing that it 
offers a unique legitimising force for violence, one that is increasing in 
importance as a justification and that is the most probable m otivating 
force for an act of mass destructive terrorism. It analyses how the 
divinely ordained aspect of this terrorism makes it more absolutist and 
less constrained by secular morality than is the case for other types of 
terrorist group. The two varieties, secular and religious, are compared 
and some key sim ilarities in their organisational dynamics are 
discussed. The chapter concludes by considering messianic violence 
that is especially relevant to mass-destructive terrorism since, in some
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cases, it may promote the use of extreme levels of violence to hasten 
the end of the world and the salvation of the messianic adherents.
The study then discusses politically-motivated terrorism, from both the 
right and the left sides of the political spectrum. Right-wing terrorism  
is subdivided into conservative violence and radical violence, the 
latter of which is the increasingly prevalent variety. The perpetrators, 
motivations, and group dynamics of the two types are then compared 
with the conclusions derived from the previous chapter on psychology 
and the im portance of split delegitimisation, the belief that the 
government and the undesirable sections of society that they seek to 
protect are enemies, is noted. The section concludes that although m ost 
right-wing terrorism is instrumental, amongst groups, notably White 
Supremacists in the United States, where religion is also important to 
their beliefs, the likelihood of m ass-destructive violence is m uch 
greater. This is supported by the fact that it is precisely amongst such 
groups that most attem pted cases of non-conventional terrorism have 
occurred in the United States.
In contrast, although left-wing groups are the least likely to engage in 
high-level nuclear terrorism, it is anti-nuclear groups that have been 
responsible for most low-level nuclear acts to date. Tliis phenomenon 
of single-issue terrorism is examined and is connected to other forms 
of radical leftist violence. As w ith each of the other main types of 
terrorism, the motivations, psychology and dynamics of left-wing 
groups are discussed. Of particular importance is their self-perception 
as the just protectors of the people and the environment against the 
forces of imperialist big-business and government. Tliis is key because 
it means that such groups tend to be self-limiting, making an act of 
nuclear terrorism  from such a group very unlikely, since they 
emphasise the proportionality and justice of their cause and so would 
believe that an act of mass terror would be counter-productive and 
unjust.
The thesis' final chapter draws together the elements already discussed 
and considers their implications for nuclear terrorism. It begins by 
discussing the feasibility of constructing a nuclear-yield device from 
fissile material and decides that though not impossible, it still would be 
a difficult task. Radiological terrorism  is then considered as an
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alternative to a nuclear-yield device, since it would offer many of the 
same benefits to the terrorists without the same difficulty in acquiring 
the material and constructing a nuclear-yield bomb. The chapter then 
discusses the changing nature of m odern terrorism, asking whether 
there are circumstances in which terrorists might want to kill as many 
people as possible, and whether a nuclear weapon was likely to be the 
way that this could be achieved. The conservative attitude of many 
terrorist groups towards weaponry and tactics is noted and contrasted 
with the increasing lethality of terrorism  itself. Previous cases of 
nuclear terrorism are noted, along with the significance of Aum's 
attack, and then chemical and biological weapons are considered as 
alternatives to nuclear weapons. The conclusion is that while nuclear- 
yield weapons remain unlikely, radiological ones are more plausible. 
However, the changing nature of terrorism and in particular, the 
increased importance of religion as a motivation, makes a full nuclear 
attack impossible to discount completely. The chapter ends by 
considering possible governmental responses to the threat, such as 
improving the control, protection and accountability of fissile materials 
and heightened intelligence, contingency planning and emergency 
responses. However, the thesis’ ultimate conclusion is that although 
these measures may help the immediate problem and lessen the risk of 
nuclear terrorism stemming from the collapse of the former Soviet 
Union, the changing nature of terrorism, and the constant escalatory 
pressures on individuals and groups within terrorist organisations, 
means that the problem and the threat of mass-destructive violence 
will remain, even after the present danger has been mitigated.
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The Psychological Motivations For Terrorism
Terrorism is an extraordinary and extreme form of political behaviour; 
its historical, political, economic, religious and social causes are far 
from clear, but it does seem apparent that a major influence is the 
individual psychology of those who perpetrate such acts. From the 
point of view of analysis, this poses a problem since there is the 
difficulty of acquiring detailed information that could be used to build 
an effective psychological theory of terrorism. Much of the data comes 
either from studies of other forms of violence, political behaviour or 
group interactions that are then extrapolated to explain terrorism; or is 
from studies of former terrorists which is problematic since they have 
either been caught, or else have renounced violence, undoubtedly 
affecting their perceptions of the acts they previously committed. To a 
large extent then, psychological studies of terrorism could be viewed as 
largely speculation, albeit of an informed nature.
A further difficulty arises due to the extremely diffuse nature of
terrorism, making it questionable whether any single psychological
theory of the phenomenon could be sufficiently comprehensive so as
to include the vast variety. The basis of terrorism extends ideologically
from revolution or national self-determination to defence of the status
quo; structurally from centralised and hierarchical to a near anarchical
model; methods and targeting vary from group to group and even
w ithin the same group over time. It is also the case that the
motivations for terrorism may be quite different across cultwes, what
drives an individual in N orthern Ireland to join the IRA differs from
that which drives someone in Germany to join the RAF, so is likely to
vary just as significantly from someone in the Middle East joining
Abu Nidal's organisation or someone in Peru joining the Shining
Path. As Crenshaw has argued:
Answers to the questions of why individuals are attracted 
to terrorism , why terrorism  finds support amongst the 
population, why a terrorist organisation chooses particular 
strategies, and why terrorism has extreme effects in some 
cases but not in others depend on political and social context
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and type of terrorist organisation as well as on psychological
t h e o r y .!  23
While this context is vital, it is the psychological explanation for 
terrorist actions that this section will focus on, along w ith the 
implications of that for acts of mass destructive terrorism.
It is im portant to note at the outset that there are considerable 
differences in the psychological pressures and motivations of initiating 
a campaign of terrorism  and continuing one, and between being a 
leader of a terrorist group and a follower within one. Furthermore, the 
idea of being a terrorist is not a straightforward one: it is not necessary 
to have physical interaction w ith victims to be a terrorist. Most 
organised groups also consist of individuals involved in finance, 
logistics, propaganda, or weapons-building, to name only a few of the 
activities besides violence. For example, there are several categories of 
member w ithin ETA, each of which has a vital role to play in the 
preservation and support of the organisation. However, relatively few 
etarras carry weapons and even less have been involved in activities 
that could clearly be defined as "terrorist", i.e. violent actions.!24 Such 
individuals are clearly still terrorists, but does their psychological 
motivation differ from those that are involved in violent acts?!2® 
They are terrorists by association, but does that mean that they share 
the guilt that those terrorists involved in violent acts have to deal 
with?! 26
123 Martha Crenshaw, " The Psychology of Political Terrorism" in Margaret Herman 
(ed.) Political Psychology- Contemporary Problems & Issues. (San Francisco; Jossey- 
Bass Inc., 1986) p. 383.
!24 Robert P. Clark, "Patterns in the Lives of ETA Members", Terrorism: An 
International Tournai. Volume 6, Number 3, (1983), p. 425.
!25 Although there is clearly some overlap: for example, the cell of the FLQ that 
kidnapped and then murdered Pierre Laporte in 1970 was originally intended to raise 
finance for the organisation. Allowing for this overlap, the fact remains that there is 
some gradation of involvement, most notably between those who are involved in 
violence and those who are not. In 1970, the FLQ had between 40 and 100 extremists 
willing to commit acts of violence; a limited editorial and propaganda section; some 
200-300 active supporters; and between 2000 and 3000 passive sympathisers, Eleanor S. 
Wainstein, "The Cross & Laporte Kidnappings, Montreal, October 1970", RAND- 
R1986-DOS/ARPA. October 1976, p. 2.
^26 Maxwell Taylor, The Terrorist. (London: Brassey's, 1988) p. 137
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Individual Psychology
Terrorist acts clearly require the threat or actual use of force, yet they 
are also apparently unnecessarily violent to the outside observer, they 
target seemingly innocent and random victims. There is a tendency to 
seek explanations that set the terrorist apart from other people, to 
assume that the terrorist is unusual simply because the acts they 
com m it are in  tha t they b reak  the "rules of engagem ent". 
Consequently, there is a tendency to give labels to terrorists and their 
actions, for example, Dominic McGlinchey, former leader of the INLA, 
was known as the "Mad Dog"!27 ; Tim McVeigh, bomber of the M urrah 
Building in Oklahoma, has been described as a "monster".!28 a  
practical example of the dangers of attempting to dehumanise terrorists 
is provided by Menachem Begin, once the leader of Irgun. When 
British security forces raided his flat, they found two pictures of him, 
one that bore a fair resemblance to him, the second of wliich did not. 
The British chose to dissem inate the second photograph though 
because the first made him look "more or less human." The result that 
Begin was unrecognisable from his picture and was able to continue to 
walk the streets with some degree of impunity.!29 However, it appears 
that terrorists often do follow rules but not necessarily the ones that 
might be deemed "conventional" by most people. Even within the 
bounds of conventional rules, acts of extreme violence are not 
invariably regarded as abnormal or unacceptable: tlie cases of warfare or 
self-defence are both examples of this and both are frequently used by 
terrorists as justifications for their acts.!®® The key difference is that in 
conventional morality, justifications such as self- defence or war!®!
127 See for example, Walter Ellis, "Rebel Consumed by Blood Lust and Republican 
Rage", The Times. 12th February 1994, p. 6.
128 Yhe Sunday Times. Magazine Cover, 3rd September 1995.
^29 Menachem Begin, The Revolt: Story Of The Irgun. (New York: Henry Schuman 
Incorporated, 1951) pp. 103-105.
Taylor, The Terrorist, pp. 73-77. 
fT e r r o r ism  is frequently compared to warfare, most often by the terrorists themselves 
because it offers a form of legitimacy, vital to justify the acts committed. An example 
that demonstrates both this point and that most terrorists are not "mad bombers", bent 
on destruction, no matter what the cost to themselves comes from Lehi (the Stern Gang), 
a group renowned for the bloodiness of its actions. Yitzhak Shamir, one of the leaders of 
the group, wrote:
Lehi was in no way made up of suicide squads. We were not Kamikaze fighters; we 
valued life... On the other hand, we were all well aware that our enemies vastly 
outnumbered our friends and that soldiers indeed die in action."
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require an element of proportionality to be acceptable, the idea of 
"reasonable force". Terrorist morality is more likely to be absolutist and 
therefore to lack this component, so that the end can be made to justify 
the means in a way that is not possible, certainly using Judaic-Cliristian 
morality. This emphasis on proportionality means that it would be 
difficult to justify an act of mass destructive violence w ith such 
conventional constraints. By contrast, the absolutist terrorist’s focus on 
results over methods makes it impossible to completely rule out any 
action, including nuclear terrorism, no matter how heinous, purely on 
the basis of m orality. This is because, as Bandura argues, by 
rationalising their actions as warfare, the terrorist is able to ensure that 
killing is free from  self-censoring restra in ts  by "cognitively 
restructuring the moral value of k i l l i n g . "!®2 This task is eased if, 
through the moral sanction of violent means, people are able to see 
themselves as battling against violent oppressors; non-violent means 
of opposition have been ineffective; and the suffering caused by these 
terrorist counter-attacks can be portrayed as less than that inflicted by 
the enemy. The end is the key; the means secondary. Margolin is right 
to emphasise "not so much the normality of terrorism (which it clearly 
is not) b u t its susceptib ility  to the norm al rules controlling 
behaviour."!®® The psychology governing terrorist behaviour are 
applicable to other people; terrorist acts however, are still far from 
conventional behaviour. Terrorism is abnormal, terrorists are not: they 
conform to psychological rules and can thus be analysed in such terms.
If there is a risk of over generalisation in dealing with psychological 
explanations for terrorism; there is also the danger of reductionism, of 
finding mono-casual explanations for the phenomenon. Psychologists 
who have written on the subject of terrorism are in general agreement 
that there is no common "terrorist personality"; and in fact, as 
Crenshaw notes, terrorism is as much a result of group interaction as of 
individual choice.!®4 Corrado found that it w as unlikely that
Yitzhak Shamir, Summing Up: An Autobiography. (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
1994), p. 38.
132 Albert Bandura, "Mechanisms Of Moral Disengagement" in Reich, Origins Of 
Terrorism.... p . 164.
Joseph Margolin, "Psychological Perspectives In Terrorism" in Yonah Alexander & 
Seymour Finger (eds.) Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. (New York: John Jay 
Press, 1992) pp. 271-274.
Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Political Terrorism", p.385.
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" n a r c i s s m " ^ 3 5  or the "death i n s t i n c t " ^ 36^ both Freudian theories of 
personality, explain terrorism in even a small number of ideologically 
radical g r o u p s . ^  Pogt argues that while there was no set terrorist 
"type", a num ber of personality traits did occur frequently amongst 
individuals involved in terrorism, notably that of "splitting". This is 
characteristic of people whose personality developm ent has been 
shaped by psychological damage during childhood, they have a 
damaged self- image and never wholly reconcile the "good" and "bad" 
aspects of their nature. Instead they split it into what "is me" and that 
wliich is "not me", projecting all their weaknesses onto others. They 
seek an external target to blame for all their inadequacies, gaining 
satisfaction and respite by being able to believe that "it’s not my 
fault"i38 and this is a trait that is frequently found in the terrorists own 
explanations of their actions. A prime example of this is the bombing 
of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, on July 22, 1946, in which 91 
people were killed and 45 injured.l39 Irgun, the group responsible for 
the attack planned to give enough time for the hotel to be evacuated, 
and issued bomb warnings to the hotel, the Palestine Post and the 
French Consulate. Furthermore, since the bombers became involved in  
a gun fight w ith British forces shortly after planting the device, the 
British could have reasonably have been expected to believe that the 
threats were genuine. However, the hotel was not evacuated.^ 
A nother example of the same phenom enon is offered by Maria 
McGuire, in many respects an IRA moderate, nonetheless describes an 
attack in 1971 in which there were widespread civilian casualties. The
135 Narcissism in Freudian theory, is any investment of libido in aspects of the self as 
opposed to external objects. Rom Harre & Roger Lamb (eds.). The Encyclopedic 
Dictionary Of Psychology, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers Limited, 1983) p. 406.
136 death instinct, Freud believed, is balanced by the life instinct (Eros) which he 
attempted to identify with libido. The libido has tlie effect of turning the usually self­
destructive death instinct outwards, onto the external world. This is then manifested as 
the destructive instinct, the instinct for mastery and the will for power. Ibid.. pp. 240- 
243 and Erich Fromm, The Anatomy Of Human Destructiveness. (London: Penguin Books, 
1977). Appendix pp. 581-631.
Raymond R. Corrado, "A Critique Of The Mental Disorder Perspective Of Political 
Terrorism", International journal Of Law & Psychiatry. Number 4 (19813, pp. 293-310.
138 jerrold M. Post, "Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behaviour As A Product Of 
Psychological Forces" in Reich, Origins Of Terrorism.... p. 27.
139 This is the official count, issued on August 4,1946 by the British authorities. See J. 
Bowyer Bell, Terror Out Of Zion. (New York: St Martin's Press, 1977), p. 172. However, 
Begin, writing five years after the attack, still put the figure at over 200 killed or 
injured. Begin, The Revolt, p. 220.
Begin, The Revolt, pp. 212-230.
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IRA blamed the security forces in Belfast for failing to clear the area 
quickly enough; the security services blamed the IRA for giving a 
deliberately ambiguous warning; McGuire beheved that the result was 
due to a misunderstanding, that the IRA's aim was not to deliberately 
cause casualties in this case. There are two further interesting points 
that she makes in her description of the bombing in Donegal Street: 
although blaming the security services, the IRA accepted responsibility 
for the action, and by doing so felt that they had in some way atoned for 
the casualties, suggesting a curious, almost Confession-like attitude 
towards responsibility. The second point is the connection between 
action and audience and shows the way that many terrorists assess the 
success of an operation, in terms of its impact on the audience: "I did 
not connect w ith the people who were killed or injured in such 
explosions. I always judged such deaths in terms of the effect they 
would have on our support- and I felt this in turn depended on how 
many people accepted our e x p l a n a t i o n . " i 4 i  This is an important aspect 
of terrorism because, as will be discussed later, it is this awareness of 
the consequences of such acts on terrorist support that, to some extent, 
determines the levels of violence that the terrorist is willing to employ. 
The constraints that mitigate against highly lethal acts of terrorism are 
therefore not moral, so much as political and instrumental.
Taylor and Quayle state that "the violence and damage the terrorist 
inflicts is the result not of a personality trait or disposition, but of an act 
of some form- a behaviour... responses to circumstances and forces." It 
is terrorist actions that is the key defining factor, rather than a 
psychological profile that is specific to terrorists.^42 They do not have 
traits that are unique to those who commit acts of political violence.
^41 Maria McGuire, To Take Arms. (London: MacMillan, 1973), pp. 102-103. McGuire's 
book has to be treated with some caution: it is evident that she did not see action with 
the IRA, and it is not clear whether she even belonged to the organisation, rather than 
to its political wing, Sinn Fein. Consequently, the extent to which she was privy to 
Army Council decisions is also debatable. However, her book remains important 
because it does offer an unprecedented insight into the Republican movement. M. L. R. 
Smith, Fighting For Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement. 
(London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 112-113.
It is also sometimes the case that terrorists defend their actions by putting them in the 
context of actions by other groups or the authorities. Abu lyad defended the PLO 
campaign, stating: "We stopped terrorism in 1974... but the Israelis did not, although  
they convinced the world of the contrary. They continued to attack us." Patrick Seale, 
Abu Nidal: A Gun For Hire. (London: Arrow Books Ltd, 1992), p. 175.
^42 Maxwell Taylor & Ethel Quayle, Terrorist Lives. (London: Brasseys, 1994) p. 33.
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instead, it is necessary to regard  such acts as stem m ing from 
individuals who are psychologically normal. There is w idespread 
consensus that the overw helm ing majority of terrorists are not 
m entally  ill, abnorm al, psychopaths^^s or even  especially  
psychologically disposed towards violence. One possible and high- 
profile exception to this may be Kozo Okamoto, one of the JRA 
members responsible for the Lod Airport attack in May 1972, He was 
declared sane to stand trial for the attack, but there m ust be some 
doubts. He exhibited indications of a "death wish" and "survival guilt", 
repeatedly stating that he only wanted to die after his capture. He 
sought the death penalty and co-operated with the prosecution to speed 
the trial process, although he eventually received a prison sentence 
rather than death. Kozo treated the trial as a propaganda opportunity 
for the proletarian revolution against the bourgeoisie. His statement 
ended:
When I was a child, I was told that when people died they 
became stars. I didn't really beheve it, but I could appreciate it.
We three Red Army soldiers wanted to become Orion w hen 
we died. And it calms my heart that all the people we killed 
will also become stars in the same heavens. As the 
revolution goes on, how the stars will multiply!
To some extent, tliis reflects the Japanese Buddhist tradition that an
indiv idual's life and death  are m erely stations in the greater
continuum of hum an existence, that life is only meaningful in its
social context, not in the individual's experience. This would have
made his sacrifice of life easier to rationalise, it was a by-product of the
act rather than being the aim in itself. Although it is possible to
partially rationalise Kozo's attitude, his statement, along with the fact
that he attempted to circumcise himself with a pair of scissors whilst in
prison, must cast serious doubts on his sanity.^44 While an individual
must be oriented towards terrorism, to some extent, they are selected by
existing members of the group. The covert and illegal nature of
terrorism makes it unlikely that such an unstable individual would
knowingly be chosen. A mentally ill member of a terrorist group
143 Psychopaths are characterised by antisocial, irresponsible, aggressive and 
impulsive behaviour. It is associated with parental deprivation and a history of 
childhood disturbance. Aggressive traits are most prominent in early adulthood, and 
tend to decrease later, although lack of motivation and insight remain constants. Harre 
& Lamb, The Encyclopedic..., p. 502.
144 Patricia Steinhoff, "Kozo Okamoto", Asian Survey. Volume 16, Number 9, 
(September 1976), pp. 830-845.
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would be a "loose cannon", a security threat that endangered the entire 
group. Sain Melville was a prime example of this: he "played" at being 
a terrorist, dressing up, and holding up his girlfriend, Jane Alpert, in 
the bath. He consistently broke his own rules on not discussing 
terrorist activities or using friend's houses as addresses for illegal 
activities that could have led to the whole group being traced. He even 
stored dynamite in his own home and would spend hours playing 
with it. His violence was impulsive and ranged from threatening to 
beat up Alpert when she disagreed with him over bombing a radical 
radio station to unilaterally planting a bomb at the Marine Midland 
Bank in New York, W hen Alpert asked him why he had chosen 
Marine Midland, his response was: "No particular reason. I just walked 
around Wall Street until I found a likely-looking place." He had 
merely planted the bomb at random . Unsurprisingly, his actions 
appalled the other members of his group who were more inclined to 
plan their terrorism carefully, as they did in attacking the Whitehall 
Induction Centre, an army draft centre, on October 8, 1969.^45 
Therefore, it is logical that most terrorist groups w ould avoid 
recruiting such a person; although it is possible that in cell-based 
organisations with less central control, it would be harder for the group 
to exercise such a stringent hold over recruitment, making it possible 
that a psychopath could become a member of the g r o u p . 4^6 A further 
exception might be Eliahu Giladi, a leader of LEHI, who according to 
Shamir:
was perhaps the only one of us who was, by nature, an 
extremist, a fanatic, a m an free of the fetters of personal 
loyalties or ordinary sentiments, who found it difficult to 
function within any framework or discipline...
Then he developed a new idee fixe: Lehi should 'do away', as 
he put it, with the Zionist leadership, kill Ben-Gurion and
145 Jane Alpert, Growing Up Underground. (New York: William Morrow & Company 
Inc., 1981), pp. 178-219.
146 Another means by which a psychopath or mentally ill person could be part of a 
terrorist group is if they had established it. Abu Nidal used to be renowned for his 
ferocious nationalism, but now it is for his murderous methods. He is responsible for 
hundreds of deaths within his own organisation: Dozens died in the 1970s when the 
group was based in Iraq, but it is estimated that between November 1987 and the end of 
1988, when his colleagues objected, around six hundred of Iris own people were purged, 
nearly half of his membership, and the number of people who died in the first three 
years of the intifada.  To be so bathed in blood is scarcely normal behaviour; in many 
organisations it would have led to an attempted coup; but the authoritarian and 
suspicious nature of Abu Nidal's group has precluded this. Presumably, potentially 
dangerous rivals have been amongst those purged. Seale, Abu Nidal. pp. 287-288.
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clear the stage. He was not a traitor or an informer, but he 
was irrational. I waited for him to change, for the dreadful 
fantasies to leave him, but he went on, talking icily about the 
need to kill. I knew then that I'd have to make a fateful 
decision and I did. I decided that we couldn't go on like that; 
G iladi was too dangerous to the m ovem ent. The 
circumstances being what they were [most members of the 
organisation were in prison], there weren't many people I 
could talk to freely, but I did speak to two or three of my 
colleagues and the next day the decision was made - and 
carried out.^47
However, these cases are unusual: Shamir in the same passage says: "I 
tried to find out what happened in other underground groups, other 
resistance movements, but never found a p a r a l le l ."^48 The nature of 
most terrorism is that it involves long periods of inaction interspersed 
with bouts of activity. It therefore requires reflective rather than 
impulsive violence and the ability to delay gratification derived from 
activity through the long and dull planning stages that characterise the 
preparation for an attack in most organised terrorist g r o u p s . 4^9 it is 
doubtful whether such inactivity would appeal greatly, or satisfy the 
psychological needs of a psychopath, even were they to join a terrorist 
group. Taylor and Q uayle d istingu ish  betw een  hostile and 
instrumental aggression. The former was a spontaneous upsurge of 
emotion and anger whereas the latter referred to aggression as a m eans 
towards some other end, it was calculated and usually a deliberate 
policy for a specific goal. Most terrorist acts fall into this second 
category, they are born not of frustration but of planning. They argue 
that aggression, like any behaviour, can be learned, that it is related to 
its consequences, and that when it is rewarded, by media attention for 
example, then it occurs more f r e q u e n t l y . ^ post suggests that 
individuals are draw n to the path of terrorism because it gives an 
opportunity to commit acts of violence and they are psychologically
^47 Shamir, Summing.... pp. 42-43.
148 Ibid. p. 43.
149 McGuire cites the case of the Northern Volunteers that caused grave concerns 
within the IRA in 1969 by openly carrying their arms; gambling with their weapons 
next to their money; and by being drunk and quarrelsome. On one occasion, they were 
watching horse racing and shot the television when their horse lost; on another they  
shot at the door of a disco in Dublin to wliich they had been refused entry. Although 
not psychopatliic, it is obvious that their uncontrolled, impulsive violence was a grave 
embarrassment to the IRA, and the Volunteers as an organisation was marginalised as a 
result. McGuire, To Take Arms, pp. 83-84.
1^ ® Ibid. pp 19-20.
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compelled to commit these acts in order to exorcise the enemy
within.i^i Alpert says that her terrorism "stemmed as much from a
longing for acceptance as from a passion to rebel, as much from the
kinds of relationsliips I formed in childhood as from my outrage at the
U n it e d  S ta te s  g o v e r n m e n t ." i5 2  Post t o o  b e l i e v e s  th a t  m o s t  terrorism is
n o t  a  r e s u lt  o f  te r r o r is t s  b e in g  p s y c h o p a t h ic  o r  p s y c h o t i c , ! a n d  th a t
most terrorists are "normal", the factors governing behaviour in most
people can still be applied to t e r r o r i s t s T ^ ^  Taylor notes that:
Many authors refer to the psychopaths inability to profit from 
experience; this alone may well serve to distinguish m ost 
political terrorist from the psychopath. Another, and rather 
im portant difference betw een the psychopath  and the 
terrorist is that while both are manifesting behaviour outside 
the normal moral and legal framework, for the psychopath, 
the purposiveness of the behaviour if it exists, is essentially 
personal. This is clearly not the case for the terrorist.!55
Although most terrorists are "normal" psychologically, some do 
display schizoid tendencies: McDonedd cites the example of the ETA 
member, Amaia, who denied being responsible for people's deaths yet 
in the next sentence said that she was pleased to have killed "the 
bastards".!56 This is an example of "splitting", a person holding two 
opposing attitudes to the same subject. It may be a symptom of 
schizophrenia!57, a lthough  the existence of such a schizoid!58 
mechanism is not necessarily an indication of mental instability. It is 
more likely that such tendencies reflect the individual's means of 
dealing with the effects of their actions: by separating its results from 
the credit for the action, the terrorist is able to derive the necessary
!5! Post, "Terrorist Psycho- Logic ..." pp. 25-26.
Alpert, Growing UpUndergroimd. pp. 17-18.
153 A psychotic is someone suffering from a psychosis: a serious disorder of mental 
functioning, whether physically or personality based. Harre & Lamb, The 
Encyclopedic.... pp. 507-508.
!^4 Post, "Terrorist Psycho- Logic..." pp. 25-26.
155 Taylor, The Terrorist, p.88.
1^  ^ Eileen McDonald, Shoot The Women First. (New York: Random House Inc., 1991), 
pp. 233-234.
1^  ^ Schizophrenia is a mental illness in which there is a fundamental disturbance of 
the personality characterised by disturbances of thinking, motivation and mood 
together with delusions and hallucinations but in which cognition is normal. Harre & 
Lamb, The Encyclopedic.... p. 544.
158 The schizoid withdraws from affectional , social and other contacts with an 
autistic preference for fantasy and introspective reserve. Harre & Lamb, The 
Encyclopedic.... p. 462.
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satisfaction w ithout having to overcome the guilt associated with it. 
Such traits certainly do not correspond to any tendency towards 
psychopathy in the overwhelming majority of terrorists that operate 
w ithin groups. This is im portant for nuclear terrorism  because it 
largely dispels the scenario, so beloved of film-makers and novelists, 
that an act of nuclear terrorism would be the work of some maniacal 
individual, intent on either dominating the world or holding it to 
ransom. Terrorism, especially nuclear terrorism, is more likely to be 
conducted for limited political (rather than purely financial) gains and 
to require the resources of a group of psychologically norm al 
individuals.
Far from being psychopathic, Knutson found that many terrorists were 
"psychologically non-violent".!59 Tliey spent a great deal of their efforts 
in attem pting to avoid the ultim ate responsibility for deaths by 
transferring the guilt onto an external source and in planning their 
actions so that while violence was threatened, it was rarely actually 
used. They saw terrorism as a last resort, an act of personal futility 
when all other options had been exhausted. However, there is a 
difficulty here in separating motivation from rationalisation, the idea 
of "we had no choice" as a justification for their actions. In seeking to 
displace responsibility, they sought to view their activities as arising 
from the dictates of authorities, not from their own volition; they are 
an instrument, not the cause of the violence, so are freed from self­
censorship for it . ! 60 Begin applied an almost existential aspect to the
Irgun's decision to resort to violence:
...we steeled our hearts against doubts, and against alternative 
"solutions."
What use was there in writing memoranda? What value in 
speeches? If you are attacked by a wolf in the forest, do you try 
to persuade him that it is not fair to tear you to pieces, or that 
he is not a wolf at all but an innocent lamb? Do you send h im  
a "memorandum"? No, there was no other way. If we did not 
fight we should be destroyed. To fight was the only way to 
salvation.
...There are times when everything in you cries out: your 
very self-respect as a human being lies in your resistance to 
evil.
Jeanne N. Knutson, "The Terrorists Dilemmas: Some Implicit Rules Of The Game", 
Terrorism: An International lournal. Volume 4, (1980), p. 199.
!60 Bandura, "Mechanisms of Moral...", p. 173.
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We fight therefore we arefi^i 
It is also the case that Knutson's observations only apply to some 
terrorists: Morf found a fascination with violence amongst members of 
the FLQ!62 and Bollinger amongst West German groups. Members of 
the organisations showed unconscious aggressive tendencies and the 
group provided an outlet for these emotions that stemmed from 
personal feelings of inadequacy and inferiority.!63 This is supported by 
Kaplan, who states that:
"Terrorism is a response to a lack of s e l f - e s te e m " ! 6 4  
However, it seems that Sean O'Callaghan is more typical of terrorists. 
Describing his killing of Detective Inspector Peter Flanagan, of the RUG 
Special Branch, he said: "I felt that he had been a legitimate target and 
that it was a job weU done. But I do not think I enjoyed killing."! 65
Erikson developed a theory linking an individual's psychology to 
society which helps explain the need of many terrorists to belong to a 
group, and which would reinforce the idea that being a terrorist is of 
secondary importance to membership of the organisation.! 66 He argued 
that the concept of identity was the key; that personality developed 
th rough  a series of ch ildhood  tu rn ing  po in ts th a t formed 
developmental stages. These crises could either be resolved or not, but 
if not, they could come back to dog the individual, especially in 
adolescence when they were seeking to find a stable identity. The 
earlier failure to establish trust, autonomy, initiative or industry would 
be a handicap in their search for a positive identity and could lead to 
confusion or a negative identity. Identity is not found alone, it is rooted 
in the ethnic, family and national inheritance of an individual, based 
on collectivity and connected to historical circumstances. Erikson 
explored the need for "fidelity", to have faith in something, the key 
role played by ideology as the guardian of identity.!67 He cited the
161 Begin, The Revolt, p. 46.
Gustave Morf, Terror In Quebec; Case Study Of The FLO. (Toronto; Clark Irwin, 
1970.)
!63 Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Political Terrorism", p. 387.
!64 Abraham Kaplan, " The Psychodynam ics Of Terrorism", Terrorism: An 
International lournal. Volume 1, Numbers 3 /4 , p. 245.
165 Sean O'Callaghan, "The Killer Who Said Sorry: Confessions of a gunman who 
betrayed the IRA ", Sunday Times. December 151996, Section 3, p. 2.
166 H. Erikson, Childhood & Society. (New York: Norton, 1963) & Identity: Youth 
& Crisis. (New York: Norton, 1968.)
167 Erikson, Identity...p. 232.
48
example of youth undergrounds that utilise this need for fidelity and 
are a store of anger for those deprived of something in which they had 
faith. A crisis of identity can also make spme youths susceptible to 
"totalism", assuming a totalistic collective identity that promises 
certainty.
Erikson argued that the rage felt by individuals at being helpless was 
projected onto controlling figures and engendered feelings of guilt. 
Failure to achieve objectives could lead such individuals to suffer 
feelings of self-doubt, suspicion, shame, inferiority and incompetence 
that acted as a further handicap on their subsequent activities, leading 
to their underachieving again. Bollinger suggested that the act of 
joining a terrorist group represented the last attem pt to establish an 
identity; in doing so, an individual was seeking purpose and identity 
from the organisation.!^» Often they would abandon their individual 
responsibilities and assume the collective identity of the group, 
enabling a feeling of belonging. Both Susan Stern, a member of the 
Weathermen organisation, and Michael Baumaim, founder of the 2nd 
of June Movement in West Germany during the early 1970s, cite 
membership of the group as a key factor in their progression into 
political violence.! 69 This is a vital point in an explanation of why 
individuals join a terrorist group and why they are able to commit 
terrorist acts: the group enables them to feel valued, a chance to feel 
omnipotent and express aggressive tendencies whilst neutralising any 
feelings of guilt through the intellectual and emotional justifications of 
the group. The individual’s justification for terrorism is related at a 
fundam ental psychological level to a sense of purpose and self 
worth.!70 The fact that belonging to a terrorist organisation may be a 
final attempt to establish identity by an individual means that it is 
entirely plausible to suggest that they believe that they have "nowhere 
else to go". This would certainly make the individual concerned more 
willing to accept the absolutist perspective of the terrorist group and 
willing to overlook or justify the violent consequences of that.
168 Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Political Terrorism", p. 392.
!69Konrad Kellen, "Terrorists- What are They Like? How Some Terrorists Describe 
Tlieir World & Actions", RAND N-1300-SL. (November 1979), p. 15.
Taylor & Quayle, Terrorist Lives, p. 35.
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Many terrorists have a "negative identity", a vindictive rejection of the
roles and norms considered desirable and proper by the individual's
family and community. Having failed to achieve the objectives set, the
individual prefers to be "a bad person" rather than a nobody. If early
steps towards acquisition of a negative identity are treated by society as
final, then individuals may be railroaded into conformity with the
worst that is expected of them, finding their refuge in radical groups
that assure them of a degree of certainty, and forced into their choice by
others interpretation of their behaviour. The same effect can be seen to
exist when governments put pressure on terrorist groups, they make
the group into "something" by being forced to recognise its presence;
and narrowing the choices of the group if it wishes to continue being so
acknowledged. Media coverage is also vital, the life blood of terrorist
organisations: the group is in constant need of reaffirmation of its
existence and importance, such coverage provides this. When the SLA
kidnapped Patty Hearst:
...Cinque and his comrades could not hide their delight and 
illusions of grandeur over the widespread blast of publicity 
given to them in the press as a result of my kidnapping. I 
was their passport to fame and popularity... Cinque and the 
others could not resist telling me what was being said about 
them . It w ould  all help  spread  the w ord  of their 
revolutionary war against the government, they said, for 
"the people" would now know that the oppressors could be 
engaged in open combat. It proved that they had been right 
aU the time... !7i
Begin also noted the key role of publicity for the campaign of the Irgun: 
"The interest of the newspapers is the measure of the interest of the 
public. And the public - not only Jews but non-Jews too - were 
manifestly interested in the blows we were striking in Eretz Israel." He 
suggested that this publicity was important not only for publicising the 
Irgun's cause, but because it precluded excessive measures being used 
to repress the revolt, the British being sensitive to world o p i n i o n . ! 72 
Consequently, it might be possible to argue that in some circumstances, 
as far as some groups are concerned, adverse publicity is better than no 
publicity at all to maintain the existence of the group. If true, it would 
remove a major constraint from the actions of such groups because the 
consequences would be secondary in importance to the fact of having
!?! Patty Hearst, Patty Hearst. (London: Corgi Books, 1988), p. 55. 
Begin, The Revolt, p. 55.
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staged a publicly acknowledged attack. In such a case, the results would 
matter less than that it was spectacular and newsworthy. Given these 
criteria, a high level act of terrorism, such as a nuclear attack, would 
have considerable attractions for the group.
There is little doubt that nationalist-separatist terrorist groups, such as 
ETA or the IRA, differ considerably in this respect from anarchic- 
ideologue groups, such as the RAF. They have different degrees of 
negative identity, since it is quite possible that the former type will not 
be perceived wholly adversely in their own community, and that 
joining a terrorist group was an act of solidarity and commitment to 
the community into which an individual was born, although even in 
this case, the decision to be a terrorist would be an extreme o n e . !  7 3  One 
clear exception to this is that of Armenian groups where the resort to 
violence is encouraged by embracing the concepts of martyrdom, 
armed struggle and the legacy of ancestors in pursuing the first two as 
central to the political and religious culture.!74 Even in this instance, it 
is the case that of an Armenian diaspora of around 1.5 million, fewer 
than 150 people have been active members of the Justice Commandos, 
Armenian Revolutionary Army or Armenian Secret Army for the 
Liberation of Armenia (ASALA).!75 Some terrorist groups claiming to 
act on behalf of a m inority community actually have almost no 
support there: the FLQ in Canada never achieved widespread support 
and rem ained isolated from  society and from political parties 
espousing a similar political objective. Similarly the African-American 
community in the United States largely rejected the actions of the Black 
Panthers, even if sometimes in agreement with their grievances.!76 A 
third category, religious fundam entalist terrorists, is also crucially 
different since their intended audience of influence is not elite decision 
makers, it is the deity.!77 As w ith nationalist-separatist movements.
173 Taylor, The Terrorist, p. 165.
!74 Khachig Toloyan, "Martyrdom As Legitimacy: Terrorism, Religion & Symbolic 
Appropriation In The Armenian Diaspora" in Paul Wilkinson & Alexander Stewart 
(eds.). Contemporary Research On Terrorism. (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 
1987.)
!7 5 ib id .pp. 92-93.
!76 Martha Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach To The Analysis Of Political 
Terrorism", Orbis. Volume 29, (Fall 1985), p. 469.
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their community may be sym pathetic to their cause, even if it 
condemns their actions. In one sense, although the perception that 
they have at least some support is im portant, the actual level of 
support that a terrorist group enjoys is secondary to the belief that they 
are in the right and will ultimately be seen to be so. Yalin-Mor, a 
member of LEHI, provides an example of this:
...I admit that in 1944 most Jews were quite satisfied with 
British rule in Palestine. They did business, they were quite 
well off. If you had taken a vote, perhaps eighty or ninety per 
cent would have given a good opinion of the British. But this 
was not the point. They were the alien power and we had to 
fight them to gain our freedom, whether they were liberal or
in h u m a n .! 7 8
Providing that they believe themselves to be right and to be ahead of 
pubhc opinion, terrorists may be willing to act against the prevailing 
popular consensus. Support and thus public opinion about a situation 
is important, and is a major restriction on extremes of terrorism, such 
as the use of nuclear weaponry, but it is not the sole factor in terrorists' 
rationalisation of how to conduct their campaign. Consequently, it 
would be unwise to assume that public opinion or support alone 
would determine or necessarily constrain the action of a terrorist 
group.
The anarchic-ideologue group remains most likely to be isolated from 
society and is far more likely to be seen in purely negative terms. It 
draws its strength from political ideals which provide both the goals to 
aim for and the justification for the methods to achieve that g o a l .! 79 
Even this represents something of an over generalisation since the 
degree to which a group exists "underground" varies. Some, such as 
the RAF in West Germany consist largely of professional terrorists who 
have no other employment and live concealed from the authorities; 
whilst others, such as the Red Cells, were "part-time" terrorists. 
Obviously, the extent to which members of the group remain in touch 
with the outside world has implications for the amount of cohesion 
and solidarity that exists w ithin the group. If the organisation is
178 Nicholas Bethell, The Palestine Triangle: The Struggle For The Holy Land. 1935- 
48. (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1979), p. 161.
!79 Taylor, The Terrorist. p.l65.
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underground or in some other way isolated, then the members of the 
group will become increasingly dependent on one another for 
com pany and a release from  the pressure the ind iv idual is 
experiencing in the highly stressful situation they are in. The group 
and its activities become the individual's life, all-encompassing in a 
way that is not the case if the individual has an existence beyond the 
group. In the former case, the individual increasingly focuses on, and 
identifies with, the group. This difference is also significant for the 
strategic choices that the group makes. Crenshaw suggests that part- 
time terrorists are less likely to use actions that require extensive 
planning whereas the costs of maintaining a professional terrorist 
group means that the organisation has to spend involved in fund­
raising activities such as bank r o b b e r i e s . !
Knutson argued that negative identity reflects the values instilled early 
in life, that it reaffirms etlinic traditions and roots, and that it is unwise 
to blame all terrorist activity on mdividual difficulties with a positive 
identity. Many adolescents with a negative identity rebel socially, in 
their choice of clothes or music for example, but not politically. This 
may reflect their inner needs or a lack of opportunity to join a terrorist 
group, or it may show that there are more factors to be considered than 
simply whether or not an individual has difficulty with their identity. 
The resort to terrorism is not one but two decisions, firstly to break 
with society and secondly to join a group espousing political violence. 
They are not synonymous because many people achieve the former 
and not the latter, monks are just one example.!^! An additional trait 
in a number of terrorists has been their sense of being morally betrayed 
at a crucial stage in their development that formed the basis for an  
acute sensibility to perceived injustices by the establishment later. In 
the case of members of the Baader-Meinhof gang, this betrayal was 
their parents Nazi past. The early failure of their parents to prove 
worthy of the role model for conscience that was assigned to them lead 
the members of the gang to violently oppose resent what their parents 
had stood for, and by extension, what the establishment stood for.!^^ 
This is an extreme example and the circumstances are exceptional;
Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach ...",p. 470. 
Kellen, "Terrorists- What Are They Like? ...", p. 34. 
Erikson. Identity... p .ll9 .
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however, the tendency for terrorists to feel that they have been 
betrayed is a frequent one. As well as occurring in individuals with 
anarchic-ideologue leanings, it is an aspect of nationalist-separatist 
terrorism. Leila Khaled speaks of "European Zionists" that expelled the 
Palestinians from their lands by military might and who now "live 
where we should be living while we float around, e x i l e d " !  ^ 3  and goes 
on to argue that no Palestinian should ever forget "the three historic 
days of betrayal...: the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917; the 
partition of Palestine, November 29, 1947; and the proclamation of the 
state of Israel, May 15 ,1 9 4 8 ."! ^ 4
Erikson further postulates that the choice of terrorism  as an anti­
authoritarian conflict may be because:
The individual unconsciously arranges for variations of an 
original theme which he has not learned either to overcome 
or to live with: he tries to m aster a situation which in its 
original form has been too much for him by meeting it 
repeatedly and of his own a c c o r d . ! 5^
The individual who was unable to violently challenge their parents' 
authority at the time that they were a child may later try to overcome 
that fear by attacking external authorities such as the social and political 
elites. Post suggests that there is a key difference here between anarchic- 
ideologue terrorists and those involved in nationalist- separatist 
movements. The latter reflected loyalty to parents who had been 
disloyal to the established regime, so was an effort to carry on the 
mission of elders who had been wounded by the regime. For them, 
terrorist acts represented a rite of passage, enabling them to be widely 
known in the community and even l i o n i s e d . ! ^6 was only anarchic- 
ideologue terrorism  that represented an attack on the parental 
generation who had been loyal to the r e g i m e . ! ^7 W here individuals
Leila Khaled, My People Shall Live. (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1973), p. 22, 
Ibid, pp. 31-32.
185 Erikson. Childhood... p. 189.
186 jgj-joid M. Post, "Rewarding Fire With Fire: Effects Of Retaliation On Terrorist 
Group Dynamics", Terrorism. Volume 10, Number 1, (1987), p. 25.
I®7 Susan Stern, for example, a member of the Weatherman Organisation, became 
involved in terrorism through the radical student movement of the late 1960s to which 
she had been introduced by her husband, Robby Stern. In the Autumn of 1965, she 
taught at a ghetto school in Syracuse wliich profoundly affected her view of society 
and the way that it seemed to her to be failing. In August 1967, she attended the New  
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Students for Democratic Society (SDS), which had links to the Black Panthers; and 
later in the year, joined their group. By August 1968, she was working in the Los
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were loyal to their parents' generation who in turn had been loyal to 
the regime, then terrorism rarely occurred.!
It is possible that terrorists are "stress-seekers" who find terrorism 
attractive because it offers an element of d a n g e r .!W h e n  Susan Stern 
became a terrorist, she says: "I wondered how I had led a middle-class 
existence for so long. I knew that that part of my life was over. I would 
never again know how to be or want to be Susan Stern- Student, 
housewife, potential mother."!^^ This would be significant for the 
likelihood of nuclear terrorism because it would mean that acts were 
primarily the result of individual's internal rather than external 
imperatives; the factors that are the primary causes of terrorism stem 
predom inantly from psychological motivations, ra ther than from 
socio-economic conditions or any other form of outside stimuli. More 
importantly, it would suggest that terrorism is escalatory, something 
that obviously would have great significance for the prospects for 
nuclear terrorism. Terrorists have to do increasingly difficult acts in 
order to satisfy their need. Stress-seekers fall into two categories: the 
individual that is uncomfortable as a follower who wiU be attention- 
seeking and require self-affirmation in the face of danger; and the 
group stress seeker who will abandon their individuality in favour of 
the group, merging into the collective personality. This may represent 
a significant difference between leaders and followers, with the latter 
more interested in the group itself, rather than in its activities.
Leaders are more likely to possess the traits that would make violent 
oppositional behaviour attractive to them. Sullwold, a German
Angeles office of the SDS, and attended the Democratic Convention in Chicago, and 
was one of those outside the Convention Hall involved in repeated clashes with Mayor 
Daly's police force. She became increasingly affiliated to the Progressive Labor 
faction within the SDS, which after the resolution "Toward a Revolutionary Youth 
Movement" (RYM) in December 1968, began to split from the rest of the SDS, a process 
that lasted until August 1969 when the Seattle Weatherman was formed. By this time. 
Stern had participated in the Ave riots in Seattle's University District; and two 
months later in the Days of Rage in Chicago, where she was arrested for assaulting a 
police officer. By the end of the year, the Weathermen were attacking university 
ROTCs; and had decided to go underground. From there, they organised further 
demonstrations and attacks on establishment targets connected with the Vietnam War. 
Susan Stern, With The Weathermen: The Personal Tournai of a Revolutionary Woman. 
(New York: Doubleday & Company Inc, 1975).
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psychologist, noted two types of terrorist leader: the extrovert who
tended to be unstable, uninhibited, inconsiderate, self-interested and
unemotional with a high tolerance for stress and a reluctance to accept
responsibility for their actions; and the neurotically hostile who tended
to be suspicious, defensive, intolerant, aggressive, to reject internal
criticism and be hypersensitive to external criticism.!^! Abu Nidal, for
example, while a mixture of the two types to some extent, clearly
displayed more aspects of the latter variety than the former. According
to Seale, he is extremely violent and generates great fear, even amongst
his own members; yet he is a fantasist who trusts no-one and lives a
secluded, self-protective life, w ith few of the trappings of his
considerable success in his role. Although not m aterialistic, he is
egotistic, as one acquaintance put it: "For Abu Nidal, self is everything.
W hen he feels personally threatened, he goes b e r s e r k .  Cinque,
leader of the SLA, displayed considerably more of the second group of
tendencies. Hearst says that:
He was the leader and never hesitated to remind you of that... 
he told us on several occasions that our top priority in this or 
any other action was to protect our leader. [He would say] 
"I'm the black leadership of the SLA. Without me, you’d all 
be nothing. There'd be no revolution." ... To me, he seemed 
to be a strutting egomaniac, swilling plum wine most of the 
day... doing whatever he dam n well pleased, while all the 
others struggled mightily to shape up to his fantasy of an elite 
army of revolutionary c a d r e . !
It is worth noting that by no means all terrorist leaders are as extreme
in their behaviour as Cinque or Abu Nidal. Most of the founders and
leaders of the Tupamaros in Uruguay were singularly mainstream.
They mostly came from regular families and were recognised and
respected members of the community. Although political militants,
most of them began their involvem ent in one of the three major
political parties in the country. For these leaders, m any of them
professionals of high repute that had actively and fuUy participated in
other organisations prior to forming the Tupamaros, the resort to
terrorism  cannot be simply labelled as a search for identity or
belonging. In this case, it seems to have been fired prim arily by
ideology. It was a conscious tactical decision based on the belief that the
191 Jerrold M. Post, "Notes On A  Psychodynamic Theory Of Terrorist Behaviour", 
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time for revolution was at hand and m ounting frustration at the 
failure of their previous efforts to achieve their objectives.!94
However, Weinberg and Eubank, in their study of Italian groups 
suggest that the notion of the leader as an entity emotionally and 
psychologically separate from ordinary members of the organisation, 
may be problematic. Terrorist groups may be sufficiently unusual that 
leadership requires relatively few additional predispositions, in which 
case the fact of being a leader may reflect a particular situation or 
interaction that causes individuals to move from being followers. 
Another possibility is natural evolution: since many terrorist groups 
have a high turnover w ith members exiting the group, dying or being 
captured, it is possible that leadership comes to those who simply 
remain w ith the group longest. This hypothesis would particularly 
apply to organisations that exist over several generations of terrorists, 
but seems to be largely disproved by groups such as ETA or the IRA 
where leaders seem to be selected more on the basis of ability than 
longevity. The idea of leadership in itself is not straightforward: the 
role a leader has to play in a terrorist organisation depends to a large 
extent on the type of group: on its size, goals, and organisational 
structure for example. One variety of leadersliip might entail directing 
a small band in dangerous violent acts, while another might be to 
refine the group's political views and to manage its resources. The 
differences might mean that the psychology of leadership in terrorist 
groups was dependant more on the type of organisation and therefore 
the type of role played by the leader, than on simply the fact of being a 
terrorist leader.! 95
Group Psychology
Terrorism though is not the act of individuals; it is committed by 
groups who reach collective decisions based on commonly held beliefs. 
This is not to suggest that lone terrorists do not exist: they obviously 
do. hidividuals do act alone to commit acts of violence with a political
!94 Fernando Loez-Alves, "Political Crises, Strategic Choices, and Terrorism: The Rise 
and Fall of the Uruguayan Tupamaros", Terrorism & Political Violence. Volume 1, 
Number 2, (April 1989), pp. 208-209.
195 Leonard Wemberg & William Eubank, "Leaders & Followers In Italian Terrorist 
Groups", Terrorism & Political Violence. Volume 1, Number 2, (April 1989), p. 157.
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objective and end in mind, the Unabomber in the United States is an 
example. However, most terrorism is not the work of such people, but 
rather of groups; and it is the psychology of collections of individuals, 
groups, that is im portant in assessing the driving forces behind 
terrorism. It is a political act perpetrated by individuals acting together 
and trying, together, to justify their behaviour. These justifications 
reflect prevailing social values and to some extent, social conditions, 
although the individual's perception of the latter is more im portant 
than the reality.!96 It represents a response to the psychological and 
social environment as experienced by the individual rather than being 
a quality inherent within the individual terrorist.!97 There clearly are 
links between background conditions and the incidence of terrorism; 
the former undoubtedly affects susceptibility to the attractions of 
terrorism, ability to overcome moral restraint or fear of the costs, and 
collective beliefs.!98 Studies of the backgrounds of terrorists from the 
RAF and Red Brigades show a pattern of incomplete family structure, 
especially during adolescence. In the German example, 25% had lost a 
parent by the age of 14; and one third had had juvenile convictions.! 99
!96 Martha Crenshaw, " Questions To Be Answered, Research To Be Done, Knowledge 
To Be Applied", in Reich, Origms Of Terrorism... p. 250.
For example, Cinque genuinely beheved that "The press... were all a bunch of bourgeois 
pigs; the news media were all owned by fascist multinational corporations. All sorts of 
lies were spewed out in the newspapers and on the television about the SLA. Tins was a 
class war: the capitalists and the bourgeoisie against the SLA and the people." P. 
Hearst, Patty Hearst, p. 66. Later. Cinque went out knocking on doors in the area around 
where tlie group were hiding because the SLA felt unable to risk going out for provisions 
on a regular basis, so he sought people who would as suppliers for the them in the safe 
house. Cinque believed that: "They're all poor people in this neighbourhood... and now  
that they know who w e are, they’ll all be w illing to help. " Ibid. p. 174. 
Unsurprisingly, he met with only very little success: one family did offer to assist; most 
were singularly unappreciative of Ms efforts for the revolution on their behalf.
!97 Taylor & Quayle, Terrorist Lives, p. 189.
!98 One example is that of Jorde, a former terrorist with Abu Nidal's organisation, a 
Palestinian born in Lebanon, but who grew up in Algeria. He was a petty th ief, 
unemployed and very reluctant to work to take care of his mother and sisters. He 
entered Spain illegally, and made some underworld contacts, but was deported after a 
few months to Lebanon. He became involved in Abu Nidal's group through a girlfriend 
in Beirut who was also engaged in work for the organisation. He was attracted to the 
organisation predominantly because it offered to him a meal a day, and a bed without 
the necessity of regular work. Although the process of initiation was unpleasant, Jorde 
continued witliin the group mainly because he could not see any alternative he sought 
means of escape but could not find any. His former life did not appeal greatly, and he 
hoped that after Ms traimng was ended, he would be able to live at the organisation's 
expense in appealing European cities. Seale, Abu Nidal. pp. 9-27.
199 Jerrold M. Post, "Hostilité, Conformité, Fraternité: The Croup Dynamics Of 
Terrorist Behaviour ", International lournal of Croup Psychotherapy. Volume 36, 
Number 2, (April 1986) pp. 214-215.
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Their lives were characterised by social isolation and personal 
f a i l u r e .200 The decision to join a national-separatist group represents 
less of an extreme break with society, but even there, it often stems 
from a feeling of alienation. Children of mixed Spanish- Basque 
heritage are scorned and rejected in the Basque region, they make up 
only 8% of the population yet 40% of the membership of ETA. They 
attempt to be more nationalistic than the Basques themselves; they 
attem pt to exaggerate their political identity to find a psycho social 
i d e n t i t y .201 Idoia Lopez Riano was one of ETA's m ost effective 
assassins until her capture in France in 1994, yet her parents were from 
Salamanca, not the Basque country. She learnt the language at school, 
and while not perfect was quite fluent. Her introduction to ETA 
probably came via a boyfriend; and by the age of twenty she had joined 
one of the organisation's most lethal cells, led by Juan Manuel Soares. 
As part of this group, she participated in some of the worst atrocities of 
ETA’s campaign: including the execution at point-blank range of three 
soldiers; a car bomb that killed nine and the rocketing of the Defence 
Ministry across a ten-lane motorway. When four of the cell were 
captured in 1989, they received a total of 9000 years in prison sentences. 
It appears that Lopez Riano actively sought out danger and was unable 
to avoid drawing attention to herself, even to the extent that she 
became known as La Tigressa (the tigress) in the Spanish p r e s s .202
The same tendency to exaggerate a national identity might be said to 
exist amongst a num ber of the IRA’s members. Sean MacStiofain, 
leader of the break by the Provisionals from the Official IRA, and first 
Provisional Chief of Staff, was born John Stephenson in south-east 
England. His mother was Irish, but it was his service with the Royal
200 TEis is supported by examples such as that of Sam Melville, whose parents 
separated soon after he was born; he grew up in a discordant household which he left 
at the age of sixteen and did various odd jobs until he "rediscovered" Ins father. His 
father, a member of the American Communist Party, persuaded him to graduate from 
high school, which M elville did only with great difficulty, but was increasingly 
disillusioned with the party. After he left it, Melville cut all contact with him. By 
this time, Melville was in a failed marriage and drifting from job to job. After liis 
marriage broke up, he lived with whatever woman would give liim a place to stay; his 
chief ties were to the radical movement wliich gave liim a vision of the future and the 
means to express his discontent with establishment America. Alpert, Growing Up 
Underground, pp. 118-122.
Post, "Hostilie, Conformité, Fraternité..." pp. 214-215. Clark, "Patterns...", p. 433. 
202 Anne McElvoy, "The Trapping Of A Tigress", The Times. Magazine, September 9, 
1995, pp. 23-26.
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Air Force that accentuated his ancestral nationalism. He joined the IRA 
via various Irish Language movements in the 1950s; served a prison 
term for his part m the Felstead School armoury raid of 1953; and was a 
key factor in the Provisional's organisational build up between 1969 
and 1971.203 Undeniably dedicated to the cause of Irish nationalism, he 
did take his Irish identity to extremes: Maria McGuire states in her 
autobiography that he refused to speak anything other than Gaelic in 
his house and expected others to do likewise; and that he claimed to be 
tee-total to emphasise Ms single-minded commitment to the c a u s e . 2 0 4
Even if most Western terrorists did come from identifiable categories, 
such as being young, or middle class rebels of broken homes, it is 
unhelpful to a general explanation of terrorism since it is largely 
culturally specific, and more crucially it fails to account for the fact that 
the vast majority of people of similar backgrounds do not resort to 
terrorism . Consequently, few analysts of terrorism  attribute it 
exclusively to environment.205
Where political culture is important is in bringing meaningful symbols 
and narratives to the individual's attention.206 TMs is particularly the 
case with national-separatist groups where the community's history 
and experience may be a key factor.207 The best example of tMs is that 
of Arm enian organisations. Toloyan has identified several such 
symbols that are central to an Arm enian consciousness and self- 
identity: that of the Genocide that occurred under Turkish rule in 1915 
and 1922, wMch in the Armenian narrative is closely identified with 
Christ's Passion, and the victims of wMch are invariably regarded as 
martyrs; the story of St. Vartan wMch deals with heroic resistance and 
the eventual martyrdom of Vartan and Ms followers in the battle of 
Avarayr in 450-451 AD; and the betrayal by the Great Powers at the
263 See Sean MacStiofain, Revolutionary In Ireland, (London: Gordon Cremonesi, 1975.)
264 McGuire. To Take Arms, pp. 71-72.
265 Crenshaw, " Questions To Be Answered... ", pp. 250-253.
266 Maria McGuire came from a middle-class Catholic family in Dublin with no 
history of Republicanism; she did w ell at school and went to University College, 
Dublin. However, she was fascinated by Irish history and came to hate the fact that 
Ireland was not free of its ties with Britain and continued to be dominated by the 
conservative Catholic Church; and to dislike the ineffectual politicians who told an 
accepting people that Ireland was free. McGuire. To Take Arms, pp. 11-15.
267 Crenshaw, " Questions To Be Answered...", p. 253.
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Congress of Berlin in 1878, where Armenian interests where ignored. 
The A rm enian represen tative  at Berlin was the Patriarch  of 
Constantinople, Megerdich Khrimian, who used the m etaphor of 
herisa (an Armenian dish); but whereas the Powers had iron ladles, he 
had only a paper one, so got no herisa. Until the Armenians got an 
iron ladle (seen as a image for armed force), the situation would 
continue because they could never rely on their allies for help. The 
narrative of St. Vartan is also vital because he was prepared to risk all 
in defence of Armenian Christianity, a crucial component of national 
identity. Therefore m artyrdom  is accepted as wholly valid in such 
cases; and because all Armenians recognise Vartan as an ancestor, they 
acknowledge his moral and symbolic authority. These three narratives 
mesh the elements of armed self-reliance, m artyrdom and an acute 
awareness of being persecuted by other powers into the Armenian 
national identity, and thus do much to engender an environment in 
which terrorism may be seen as a valid option in pursuit of nationalist 
objectives.208 Furthermore, particularly in cases, as w ith the Armenian 
one, where the terrorist comes from a community that believes it has 
been grossly persecuted or wronged, it is easier to morally justify high 
level acts of violence as an attempt to gain revenge, acquire justice or 
otherwise right that wrong.
It is often suggested that violence is self-perpetuating, that if children 
are socialised into patterns of violence then these acts may become part 
of the social fabric, the norm  in the community, and the Arm enian 
example would certainly appear to support this perspective. However, 
it is unclear whether this occurs on a wider basis; it does seem possible 
that growing up surrounded by violence would to some degree inure 
the individual to the horror of it, possibly therefore lowering the m oral 
constraints that might otherwise exist. More significant though, is that 
if such violence exists in an individual's society, it offers an outlet for 
their emotions that they would be forced to spend elsewhere otherwise. 
Observational learning also plays a significant role in the development 
of aggression. Violent cultures, through the provision of role models, 
may provide many opportunities for the young to be initiated into 
violence. Groups in themselves can act to facilitate violence by giving
268 Toloyan, "Martyrdom As Legitimacy...", pp. 93-96.
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opportunity for imitation.209 it is undeniable that groups also learn 
through imitation of their predecessors, by studying their publications 
and deriving lessons from their mistakes.2!0 One of the clearest 
examples of this is the Irgun under the leadership of Begin, that was 
acutely aware of the case of the Zealot revolt in 73 CE which resulted in 
a 1900 year exile from the Jewish homeland. He blamed this on two 
factors, that the Zealots engaged in fratricidal violence and that the 
scale of their terrorism was so considerable that it compelled the 
Romans to crush the rising. Begin was careful to ensure that the Irgun 
did not retaliate, no matter how extreme the provocation from other 
Jewish groups, and that they struck against only "legitimate" targets.2ü 
In some cases, terrorist groups even receive training from such 
organisations: the PFLP ran training camps for European radicals in the 
late 1 9 6 0 s,2 i2 Kozo Okamoto acquired his weapons expertise there prior 
to the attack on Lod Airport; and "Carlos" was recruited by Bassam 
Abu-Sharif, and later helped to run  such camps for foreigners .213 n  
makes sense to suggest that the resort to terrorism in all but a few cases 
represents the combination of motivation and opportunity. While it is 
common-sense that terrorist groups have an origin in some way, and 
may coalesce around a leader, the majority of terrorists become 
members of existing groups or found their own after membership of 
another group. A vital element in an individual's progress towards 
terrorism, therefore, is access to a group that offers, and accepts the
209 Taylor & Quayle, Terrorist Lives, pp. 20-21. The terrorist group that Sam Melville 
and Jane Alpert formed was partially inspired in its begimhngs by the FLQ: Melville 
offered sanctuary in the Alpert's flat to two members of the FLQ for a number of weeks. 
Melville and Alpert then enabled the two Canadians to hijack a plane to Cuba, by 
providing the weapons and doing the necessary reconnaissance while the fugitives 
stayed under cover in the flat. It was Alpert and Melville's first experience of 
terrorism, and the impact on the latter was considerable, he discovered a taste for such 
illicit activities, which Alpert acquiesced with to retain Melville’s affections. Alpert, 
Growing.... pp. 153-156 and 166-167.
216 The Provisional IRA in the early 1970s looked at the guerrilla campaigns against 
the British in Aden and Cyprus; and studied "The War Of The Flea ", an assessment of 
guerrilla theory and practice, by Robert Tauber, and compared it to the campaigns in 
China, Cuba, Vietnam and Israel. McGuire, To Take Arms, p. 74.
211 See Begin, The Revolt, p. 153 and David C. Rapoport, "Terror & the Messiah: An 
Ancient Experience & Some Modern Parallels ' in David C. Rapoport & Yonah 
Alexander (eds). The Morality Of Terrorism: Religious & Secular lustifications. (New  
York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 2nd Edition, pp. 31-33.
212 Bassam Abu-Sharif & Uzi Mahnaimi, Tried By Fire. (London: Little, Brown & 
Company, 1995), pp. 65-66.
213 Ibid. pp. 69-72 and 78-79.
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mdividual into, m e m b e r s h i p s  ! 4  Sean O’Callaghan was able to join the
IRA at the start of their campaign because he was known and could be
used for low-level work. He recounted that:
When the Provisional IRA was formed and started seeking 
support around Tralee, the members knew who I was because 
of my father [who had been interned by the Irish government 
as a result of his IRA activities in the 1940s], It turned out that 
the owner of a sweetie shop was the man to talk to about 
joining. He passed me on to the owner of a supermarket up 
the street, who was in charge.
I was taken to a big farm and into a granary, where there was 
a group of people. Some of them started digging away grain 
with wooden shovels, revealing a pile of about 30 to 40 guns. 
Our job was to clean and package them for shipment up to 
Northern Ireland.215
For most followers, membership of the group is the vital motive. 
Before engaging in acts of terrorism, usually there is a progression 
through the ranks of the group or even a drift from other groups and 
organisations. As the individual moves towards those that espouse 
violence, the groups became increasingly radical. Kellen suggests that 
there is a long process of alienation, rebellion and experimentation 
with a variety of social settings and political ideas, and only then a 
commitment to terrorist action and a clandestine lifestyle.2!6 The 
decision by an individual to use violence is not a sudden one. 
Participation in riots or demonstrations is often the entry into a life of 
violence although obviously not all rioters or demonstrators go on to 
become terrorists.2i7 f o r  the Italian  Red Brigades, the m ain 
recruitm ent area was groups form ed in M ilanese factories that 
functioned primarily as critics of union policy. They used alternative 
methods of action to strikes such as sabotage or picketing, actions that 
would damage production w ithout harm ing the workers in the 
factories. These movements were gradually infiltrated by the Red 
Brigades, and with that came a progression towards illegality. In the 
Red Brigades, people were initially asked to perform "individual illegal 
actions" such as distributing propaganda documents around their 
factory or storing weapons at their home. Later they might be required
214 Taylor, The Terrorist, p. 153.
215 O’Callaghan, "The Killer... ”, p. 1.
216 Kellen, "Terrorists- What Are They Like? p. 24.
217 Taylor & Quayle, Terrorist Lives, pp. 39-40.
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to spray graffiti on factory walls or leave intimidator messages in the 
offices or homes of the m anagement. The progression to violence 
occurred only after the individual had passed a number of tests, not on 
their weapons skill or ideological knowledge, bu t simply on their 
commitment to the group and their willingness to conform within 
it.2!8 In ETA, the process of gaining membership is also a gradual one. 
Although most members were in their mid to late twenties on joining 
the organisation, as adolescents, m any engaged in "searching 
behaviour", seeking solutions to the crises of culture and national- 
identity that affected them. In most cases, they sought alternatives to 
armed struggle before they joined ETA (often following a great deal of 
discussion and heart-searching w ith their friends). Older etarras 
approach the prospective member, usually on an innocuous occasion, 
such as during a m ountain  climbing expedition. If the young 
prospective member expresses interest, they are approached again a few 
months later and invited to participate in a simple, low-security 
operation, such as spray-painting slogans on a wall. If they perform 
well, they will be invited to be involved in increasingly complex and 
risky actions. It may be as much as a year before the new recruit gains 
full membership of ETA. This time frame can even be considerable 
longer, because it is quite common for young prospects to resist joining 
the group for m onths or even years after the initial approach, 
presumably until they come to believe that there is no alternative to
terrorism.219
Crenshaw states that the decision to resort to violence is as a result of 
association with the group. The choice is between participating in 
violence and leaving the group. The individual who is already a 
member of the group and has become dependent on the things it could 
supply, finds it difficult, in psychological terms, to go back .220 Taylor 
and Quayle assert that the realisation of this boundary being crossed is a 
key point in the psychology of a terrorist, but that it is a state of m ind 
rather than a legal or moral point of reference. It might arise as a result 
of a personal event such as the death of a friend "in action" or from an 
incident of significance to the community or party, such as an atrocity
2!8Alison Jamieson, "Entry, Discipline & Exit In The Italian Red Brigades", Terrorism 
& Political Violence. Volume 2, Number 1, (Spring 1990), pp. 1-3.
2!9 Clark, "Patterns In The Lives...”, pp. 427, 439-443.
220 Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Political Terrorism", p. 389.
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committed by the establishment. Whereas before, the individual might
be willing to perform small and unim portant tasks for the group,
afterwards there is a willingness to act as a fully fledged t e r r o r i s t .221
German sources refer to this critical point as "der sprung" (the leap).
For Baumann, the event was the shooting of a student by the police
during a dem onstration; he refers to its im pact on him as "a
tremendous flash" and that "it left an indelible i m p r e s s i o n ."222 For
Bassam Abu-Sharif, the key moment was when, in the aftermath of the
Arab defeat in the 1967 War, a Palestinian girl offered to sleep with h im
for five dinars. He describes the moment:
[Palestinian girls] had  to sell them selves, d ishonour
themselves just to survive? Anger took hold of me... A
blurred image danced in front of me: the girl, w ith her hand 
out, offering herself up for money.
I understood now what I had to do. There was no going back. 
My own fight began here, now. I would not stop until that 
girl, and the thousands like her, were back in their rightful 
homes. I would regain our country or die for it.223
However, this clearly is not a universal event. Clark found almost no
evidence of a single catalytic occurrence that transformed the opinions
of ETA recruits. Instead, it was a gradual progression, as a result of
discussion and thought, that brought them to membership of the
o rg a n isa tio n .2 2 4  H o w e v e r ,  it  d o e s  s e e m  to  b e  g e n e r a lly  tr u e  a m o n g s t
terrorist groups that the qualitative decision to tu rn  to violence is
harder to make than the quantitative one on the level of violence to
employ and, at a later stage, whether to increase that level. Particularly
if the progression is steady, rather than rapid, terrorists evidently find it
psychologically easier to escalate their violence than to engage in
terrorist acts in the first place. This suggests that even the highest levels
of violence differ in quantity, rather than quality from more standard
acts of terrorism, and therefore may not be as psychologically troubling
for the terrorist as might be otherwise supposed. Furthermore, when
the alternative is to leave the group, many individuals appear willing
to acquiesce to committing extremely violent acts on behalf of the
organisation.
221 Taylor & Quayle, Terrorist Lives, p.44.
222 Kellen, "Terrorists- What Are They Like? ...", pp. 18-19.
223 Bassam Abu-Sharif & Uzi Mahnaimi, Tried By Fire, p. 50.
224 Clark, "Patterns In The Lives...", p. 443.
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When the existence of the group precedes the decision to turn to 
terrorism, the decision might be made by the group as a whole or by a 
faction within the organisation. Alpert's group discussed the issue 
from the perspectives of its morality, effectiveness and the precedents 
for terrorism. They argued about targeting and came to the conclusion 
that "physical destruction aimed at the enemy [was] the only course left 
to revolutionaries." However, they also found that it was impossible to 
be completely candid, since with new explosives in their possession, 
no-one was willing to admit to having second thoughts for fear that 
they would be accused of cowardice,225 individual who has become 
highly dependent on the group may acquiesce with the decision to use 
violence even though they may not have m ade an independent 
choice.^2^ Obviously, this is not always the case: Leila Khaled debated 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the m orality of hijacking and the 
legitimacy of revolutionary violence, before she became deeply 
involved in illegal activities for the Palestinian campaign, although 
she had been involved in non-violent actions for the cause for years 
beforehand. The progression  to violence w as no t n a tu ra l or 
automatic.227 Zvonko Busic, a Croat, hijacked a TWA plane in New 
York in 1976 using fake bombs because "... I care so much about human 
life... I couldn't put... hum an life of these passengers into another 
person's hands... it's against my principles." However, Busic did 
simultaneously use live bombs planted at Grand Central Station as 
insurance, one of which did explode, killing a policeman and blinding 
another. Clearly, his attitude towards the use of violence was far from 
straightforward.228 in some cases too, the decision to use violence 
appears not to be controversial: for the Stern Gang (LEHI), 
revolutionary terror was the only means of promoting the objective of 
removing the British from Palestine. The main point of debate was 
over its efficacy. Yitzhak Shamir says that Stern undertook no action 
blindly or automatically or for brutality's sake. Instead, the aim was less 
to punish than to deter the British and Arabs from taking or damaging 
Jewish lives.229
225 Alpert, Growing.... pp 196-197.
226 Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach p. 478
227 Leila Khaled, My People Shall Live, p. 109.
228 Kellen, 'Terrorists - What Are They Like? pp. 28-32.
229 Shamir, Summing.... pp. 22-23, Bell, Terror p. 63.
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It seems that in some cases, the terrorist group becomes a surrogate 
family for the terrorist and the leader of the group a mentor for the 
younger members. This appears to be more the case in examples of 
ideological terrorism, where terrorism is in part a reaction against 
society and an individual's origins, than w ith nationalist-separatist 
terrorism where, to some extent, the individual is more likely to be 
acting in accordance with their background and familial origins. The 
fact of being underground, cut off from the rest of society is almost 
certainly the key determ inant in w hether the terrorist group does 
become a surrogate family for the terrorist. For example, Maria 
McGuire stayed in regular contact with her family throughout her 
association with the IRA,230 whereas members of the Irgun were forced 
into liiding during the campaign. Begin wrote of the group; "We were 
a family. There was mutual trust. Each was prepared to give his life for 
his comrade... It was love, love of the ideal, that infused the fighters 
with mutual fraternal affection."23^  Terrorists are individuals with a 
powerful need to belong and this is not satisfied outside the group 
which provides the emotional protection and company that other 
people find in their family or circle of friends. The group therefore has 
a strong hold over the individual and the leader of the group is likely 
to be higWy influential in determining how new recruits view the 
organisation and its goals. Personal contacts are obviously im portant in 
an individual’s decision to join a group; although in the case of 
Armenian groups it appears that the entire political culture has a 
radicalising effect, in the same way that individuals do in other 
organisations. Certainly, this can be seen to be so in the example of 
Monte Melkonian, Armenian guerrilla leader in Nagorno-Karabakh 
until his death in June 1993.232 Other terrorists, though, clearly are 
influenced by individuals: Kozo Okamoto, one of the terrorists 
responsible for the attack on Lod Airport on May 30, 1972, was 
introduced to the JRA by his brother, Takeshi. Kozo w ent to 
Kagoshima University, studying in the agricultural faculty and 
becoming deeply involved in the pollution issue. He was active in the 
local chapter of Behiren, a large middle-of-the-road peace organisation, 
but despite attending all their meetings he believed it to be ineffective
230 McGuire, To Take Arms, p. 62.
231 Begin, The Revolt, p. 73.
232 Joseph E. Vorbach, "Monte Melkonian; Armenian Revolutionary Leader", Terrorism 
& Political Violence, Volume 6 Number 2 (Summer 1994).
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and had little affinity with its members. Early in 1970, he met with the 
JRA representative in Fukuoka, at his brother, Takeshi's, request, 
Takeshi was one of the JRA members involved in the hijacking of a 
Korean plane that year. A lthough he met w ith the JRA's Tokyo 
representatives a month after the Fukuoka meeting, and he organised 
JRA activities at Kagoshima in a fairly perfunctory way, Kozo had little 
real interest in the ideology of the organisation. He sought to be an 
active revolutionary, so long as it encompassed his concerns on 
pollution and his political frustrations. In September 1971, Kozo went 
to Beirut, ostensibly to see his brother; in fact he received seven weeks 
weapons training with the PFLP between April and May 1972. At the 
end of this time he was told about the proposed attack on Lod, to which 
he agreed, as he would have done to any action that furthered the 
revolution. The attack by three JRA members left twenty-six people 
dead and nearly eighty wounded. Kozo was the only one of the three 
to s u r v i v e . 2 3 3  Basque m ilitant organisations, youngsters were 
influenced in their choice by elder members; the Italian Red Brigades 
were found to contain a number of married couples. Sullwold argued 
that for women terrorists, personal contacts were especially influential 
in affecting their degree of participation, although the core motivations 
remained intrinsically the same as for male terrorists. A good example 
of such contact is that of Jane Alpert and Sam Melville. Alpert did not 
have an especially exceptional childhood: she had a secure family, 
although her father being made redundant ensured that money was 
fairly short at times; she was unhappy at school but did well and was 
able to go to college where she was rebellious and eventually was 
suspended. However, she went to Bryn Mawr and then to Columbia 
University, and became involved in radical politics, initially 
predominantly, feminist, but later more generally. Being vehemently 
antiwar she felt disenfranchised during the 1968 Presidential Election, 
so joined the SDS. She met Sam Melville, w ith whom she became 
besotted and acquiesced in his wild schemes of violence. She seems to 
have been a partially moderating influence in the group, but was also 
the one that gave intellectual weight and some ideological justification 
to their actions. Once outside Melville's influence, she rem ained 
radical and on the run for several years, but did not return to violence. 
It is possible to suggest that without Melville, Alpert would have been
233 See Steinhoff, "Kozo Okamoto", pp 830-839.
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politically radical, but perhaps not a terrorist: his influence in her 
decision to resort to violence was i m m e n s e . 2 3 4
Galvin disagrees with Sullwold's assessment: she believes that there 
are appreciable differences between male and female terrorists since the 
socialisation process and power structure of outside society that impacts 
on women generally are just as applicable witliin the terrorist group.235 
MacDonald also believes that im portant differences exist in the 
motivations of female terrorists compared to their male counterparts: 
"[They regard] themselves as victims not only of w hat their male 
comrades w ould  call ’po litical oppression ' b u t also of male 
oppression... The key awareness is of being a double victim, with 
oppression having to be fought on two fronts."236 Galvin did agree 
w ith Sullwold that personal contacts were im portant to female 
terrorists, citing the case of the example of women in Northern Ireland, 
witnessing the effects of terrorism at first hand and seeking revenge for 
injuries to acquaintances and the community.237 However, it should be 
noted that this aspect seems very similar for both m en and women 
involved in terrorism.238
There is a danger in clustering women terrorists together; clearly they 
are no more a homogenous group than are terrorists as a whole. 
However, there do seem to be a number of factors common to many 
women who become terrorists, but largely these are those that apply to 
terrorists in general, such as the relatively ordinary lives that they were 
relieved to leave; or the limitations on their lives once they had joined 
the terrorist group. Female members of radical terrorist groups, such as
234 Alpert, Growing Up Underground, see especially pp. 106 and 200-226.
235 Deborah M. Galvin, "The Female Terrorist: A Socio-Psychological Perspective", 
Behavioural Sciences & The Law. Volume 1, Number 2, (1983), p. 20.
236 MacDonald. Shoot.... p. 232. However, there are flaws in MacDonald's analysis 
and methodology that may limit the usefulness of her conclusions. See Bruce Hoffman’s 
review of Shoot The Women First in The Oral History Review. Volume 22, Number 1, 
(Summer 1995), pp. 126-129.
237 McGuire was in Spain in 1971 and was inspired to return to Northern Ireland when 
she learnt of the IRA taking up arms to defend the Catholic population against armed 
Protestants. She heard Sean O Bradaigh, Sinn Fein Director Of Publicity, on the radio, 
was impressed, and made contact with the organisation through him. She became 
involved in the publicity of the organisation, and from there progressed to attempting 
to collect an arms shipment from Amsterdam. McGuire, To Take Arms, pp. 18-21 and 41- 
51.
238 Galvin, "The Female Terrorist...", pp. 23-25.
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Susanna Ronconi or Jane Alpert, began as radical feminists and moved 
on to join men in a struggle against society's wider i n j u s t i c e s  2 3 9
Another important incentive for individuals to resort to terrorism is 
the social status that it offers, especially in the case of nationalist- 
separatist movements w ith community support. The recruit joins 
hoping to enhance their appearance in the eyes of family and friends 
and there can be no doubt that being a terrorist offers an opportunity to 
engage in fantasies of domination and heroism that would appeal to 
the adolescents, often psychologically insecure, that constitute a 
significant number of terrorist recruits. Terrorism may also offer the 
opportunity for material rewards although this is less of an incentive 
than others such as the need to b e l o n g . 2 4 0  While few terrorists have 
made large amounts of money from their activities, there are notable 
exceptions: "Carlos" was rumoured to have received around $5 m illion  
from Libya for his part in a number of terrorist acts.24i West German 
terrorists were frequently accused of leading extravagant lifestyles, 
preferring expensive sports cars for their getaways. Kellen suggests that 
terrorists are attracted to money and "increasing affluence" without the 
necessity of w o r k i n g . 2 4 2  For example, Baum ann found that the
239 McDonald, Shoot .... pp. 231-232.
240 stern’s reason when she was on the fringes of terrorism was;
...I felt I was part of a vast network of intense, exciting and brilliant people. I was 
amazed at the genius in the SDS. I was galvanized by the energy. I went to every SDS 
meeting, worked endlessly on every rally, demonstration and open forum we organized. 
I was learning all the time and loving it. Enthralled, as I was with political activity 
and political people, I couldn’t understand why everybody didn’t want to be in the 
SDS. Nothing in my life had ever been this exciting.
Stern, With The Weathermen, pp. 40-41.
2*^ 1 Knutson, "The Terrorist Dilemmas ...", p. 198.
The budget of some terrorist groups exceeds that of a number of small states. Drug 
trafficking netted a number of South American groups between $50m. and $150m. of 
profits in 1985 alone. Such vast amounts of money are not exceptional- Fatah allegedly 
had a budget of nearly $200m. in 1975. Clearly, there is scope for wealth accmnulation 
within these groups. George Ibrahim Abdullah’s Christian Lebanese terrorist group 
was said by members of his community to have devolved from fighters for freedom to 
seeking to gain wealth. Cited in Reich, "Understanding Terrorist Behaviour ...", pp. 
271-272n. Likewise, the PFLP was said to have rejected its Communist roots after a 
fund-raising visit by a number of leading terrorists, including Leila Khaled, to the 
United Arab Emirates in the early 1970s. There, they were well received, and acquired 
£1 million from Sheikh Zayid bin Sultan. This lead to the creation of a non-fighting 
clique within the organisation that began to move from its guerrilla origins towards 
more conventional warfare. See As'ad AbuKhalil, "Internal Contradictions In The 
PFLP: Decision Making And Policy Orientation", Middle East Tournai. Volume 41, 
Number 3, (Summer 1987), pp. 370-373.
242 Kellen, "Terrorists- What Are They Like? ...’’, pp 36-38.
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prospect of working in uninteresting jobs forever was a sufficiently 
great incentive for him to drop out and join dissident groups, 
ultimately leading to a terrorist c a r e e r  2 4 3  The romance of carrying a 
gun or the hope of material reward may have some part to play in why 
individuals join terrorist groups, but it has little role in their staying. 
Such goals are quickly overcome by the reality of living as a fugitive. 
People stay terrorists because they are driven by their ideology, their 
objective, and because they rapidly find that exiting is extremely 
difficult.244 In ETA, much of the time is devoted to study sessions or 
discussion groups that debate complex political, economic and 
ideological matters. Even senior members of the group attend. The 
sessions serve two purposes: they help recruitm ent because non­
members are able to attend and hear ETA in action, and they educate 
members, pursuant to the organisation's belief that well-informed and 
indoctrinated members are more reliable and effective in their
activities.245
The main reason for individuals embarking on terrorism remains that 
it is an alternative that offers the terrorist a sense of purpose and 
control over their own lives and equally importantly, those of other 
people. It enables them to m aster their feelings of futility through 
achieving goals. They become important, people who have to be 
acknowledged and dealt w ith by the authorities. At last, they are 
someone.246 This tendency applies as much to groups as it does to 
individuals, recognition of the terrorist group is a form of legitimation, 
an acknowledgement of their existence. It is for this reason, above all 
others, that terrorists seek the attention of the media, and through that, 
publicity. It is this that is a major motivating force in the planning of 
terrorist "spectaculars", of which nuclear terrorism would be a prime 
example. Such acts are therefore a means of pursuing recognition from 
the authorities, but also from the population at large. Bassam Abu- 
Sharif describes the PLO campaign following the 1967 Arab-Israeli 
War:
243 Michael Baumann, Terror Or Love?. (New York: Grove Press Incorporated, 1977). p. 
20.
244 F Bowyer Beil, "Revolutionary Dynamics: The Inherent Inefficiency of the 
Underground". Terrorism & Political Violence. Volume 2, Number 2, (Suimner 1990), p 
206.
245 Clark, "Patterns In The Lives...", pp. 443-444.
246 Kaplan, "The Psychodynamics ...", p. 245.
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There was no way a relative handful of young men, armed 
for the most part with antiquated hunting rifles, could take 
on the Israeli tanks, mines, and machine guns, the well 
armed and vigilant army patrols. But these raids were a 
necessary step. They showed the world that the Palestinian 
spirit was not crushed. They showed the Israelis that the 
Palestinian people would never give up, that they would 
fight with whatever came to hand, by whatever means they 
could, to recover their dignity and their lost lands, to get 
justice. But the cross-border raids were never practical. 
Looking back now, they were a joke.247
It is an example of Bakunin’s "propaganda by deed", actions aimed at
ensuring that both the Israelis and the Palestinian people remained
conscious that the PLO was still a force able to continue the fight, even
after the defeats of 1967. In that year, the PFLP began hijacking planes
outside the Middle East to prove their point and three years later, in
September 1970, attem pted to simultaneously hijack three planes
bound for New York; they were partially successful: the attack led by
Leila Khaled was foiled, but they managed to capture another plane in
its place. The operation was clearly aimed at displaying the power of
the PFLP, as well as forcing Israel and European states holding
Palestinian prisoners to n e g o t ia t e .2 4 8  This desire for w idespread
recognition and acknowledgement by authorities would be the ideal
motivation for an act of low-level nuclear terrorism, since even a
minor incident involving nuclear material would be likely to be highly
publicised. However, there have been literally dozens of hoaxes
involving nuclear material in the United States alone, most of which
have gone largely unnoticed by the public and the media, in part
because there is a understandable reluctance by the authorities to cause
unjustified alarm. This means that, to be effective, a threat would have
to be credible and sufficiently severe that it could not be reasonably kept
secret by the governm ent concerned. While this does not wholly
exclude the possibility, it sets the standard sufficiently high that there
are undoubtedly easier ways of attracting attention and publicit)'^, if that
is the terrorist's sole objective.
If the material and heroic attractions of being a terrorist are important 
then this has significant implications for group outcomes. The leader
247 Bassam Abu-Sharif & Uzi Mahnaimi, Tried By Fire, p. 58.
248 Ibid. pp. 80-82.
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cannot moderate without risking being usurped by someone willing to 
prosecute the campaign more vigorously. In extreme cases, this can 
actually result in a split w ithin the group, as one faction seeks to 
increase the level of violence employed. An example would be the 
Stern Gang, who in 1940 split from their parent organisation, the Irgun, 
over the best way to pursue the campaign to create a free and 
independent Jewish homeland. Irgun was m otivated partly by an 
inability to continue the violence and partly by a reluctance to try, since 
they believed that to do so would risk undermining the British (under 
whom they had a better opportunity for independence than would be 
the case under the Axis Powers) at a point in the Second World War 
when their grip on the Middle East was tenuous. Abraham Stern, the 
gang's leader, by contrast, was unwilling to accept any cessation of 
action. In his break from Irgun, he was accompanied by impatient, 
driven men who distrusted politics and instead required that action be 
taken.249 Zaw odny suggested  tha t the m ain de te rm inan t of 
underground decision making is the group's psychological climate, not 
the external reality of the situation.^so Personality clashes may also act 
as a catalyst for a split: in 1968 Ahmad Jibril left George Habash's PFLP 
to form his own group, the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) and in 1969 Nay if Hawatmah 
formed the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Both were, 
at least in part, reacting against the organisational dominance of 
Habash within the PFLP.^si
Terrorists tend to be action-oriented individuals who consequently will 
find inaction highly stressful, leading to tensions witliin the group. 
When Patty H earst and two other members of the SLA were 
underground, trapped in a flat together, and unable to go out for fear 
that they would be recognised and challenged, there was a great deal of 
fighting between them. Hearst says: "As time went on in that small 
apartment, they fought more and more over petty, ridiculous issues... 
When I quieted them they would usually sulk at opposite ends of the
249 Shamir, Smiuning.... pp. 30-31. Bell, Terror.... p. 62.
250 j, K. Zawodny, "Internal Organizational Problems & The Sources Of Tensions Of 
Terrorist Movements As Catalysts Of Violence", Terrorism: An International journal. 
Volume 1, Numbers 3 /4 , p. 278.
251 As’ad AbuKhalil, "Internal Contradictions...", pp. 363-364.
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room. But just as often, they w ould both turn  on m e."252 This 
willingness to fight within the group seems to apply particularly to 
underground terrorist organisations: "doves" within the IRA actually 
contemplated assassinating MacStiofain because he was prosecuting the 
military campaign too vigorously.253 However, this is exceptional, 
even within nationalist-separatist groups. The group has to commit 
terrorist acts to justify its existence and the leader has to plan such acts 
to enable the group to release its aggressive tendencies and reaffirm its 
identity. It is also extremely difficult for the leader to amend this 
identity in any way: the SLA was ostensibly an organisation that sought 
to liberate blacks and other oppressed people in the United States. 
However, it had one black member: Cinque, everyone else was white. 
When Teko, the leader of the surviving rum p of the group, tried to 
suggest that Doc Holiday, a black man, should be invited to lead the 
group so as to maintain the focus of the organisation, he was strongly 
opposed by those in the organisation who felt that the real aim of the 
group was simply revolutionary and that colour was an irrelevance. 
Both factions believed that they were trying to retain the true character 
of the organisation against encroachment by the other.254 Group 
dynamics therefore mitigate towards a maintenance of existing patterns 
of identity and action: a continuation of violence and the taking of ever 
greater risks. Janis thought that such organisations become subject to 
"group think": illusions of invulnerability leading to over optimism 
and excessive risk-taking; a presum ption of the group’s morality; a 
one-dimensional perception of the enemy as wholly evil; and an 
intolerance of internal challenges to shared key beliefs.255 These 
characteristics all increase the likelihood of the terrorist group 
concerned will believe that heightened levels of violence, perhaps 
including nuclear terrorism, can and should be achieved in the pursuit 
of their campaign.
Bion identified two types within the group: the "work group" and the 
basic assumption group". The former works in a goal-related manner 
to achieve stated objectives. However, he argued that this was
252 Hearst, Patty Hearst. p. 259.
253 McGuire. To Take Arms, pp. 115-116.
254 Hearst, Patty Hearst. p. 385.
255 Irving L. Janis, Victims Of Groupthink. (Boston: Houghton-Miffiin), 1972. pp. 191- 
192.
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relatively rare in terrorist groups and that the group tended instead to 
operate on the basis of basic assumptions. The "basic assum ption 
group" could be subdivided into the "fight- flight group" which defines 
itself in relation to the outside world that both threatens and justifies 
its existence so that it has to flee or fight the enemy; the "dependency 
group" w hich tu rns to an om nipotent leader for direction, 
subordinating individual judgement to theirs; and the "pairing group" 
which acts as though the group will bring forth a messiah who will 
lead them and create a better w o r l d . 2 5 6  While the extent to which these 
types apply to a group depends on the makeup of the individuals 
witliin it. Post believes that terrorist groups are the apotheosis of the 
"basic assumption group" and often fall into all three sub- types of that 
g r o u p . 2 5 7  An example of this would be the SLA which combined all 
three of Bion’s elements of the group. It needed the media attention to 
give it an identity, an acknowledged existence; members of the group 
deferred to Cinque even w hen he was clearly in the wrong or 
endangering the group with his actions; and they earnestly believed 
that the result of their campaign, and Cinque's leadership, would be a 
revolution that freed the people of their o p p r e s s o r s . 2 5 8
Terrorist organisations are likely to contain a combination of people 
whose need is the group and those who are seeking to change the 
political or social environment; both however need the organisation to 
satisfy their objectives. Stern says: "When it came to paying for the 
endless leaflets, no-one hassled me about where the money came from. 
The M ovement came first. It d idn 't m atter how I supported my 
habit."259 The social psychological dynamics of the group help to 
determine not only why individuals join, but why they stay and why 
terrorism  is chosen as a tactic. Terrorist organisations offer a 
counterculture w ith their own norm s and values into which new 
recruits are indoctrinated. They tend to demand complete obedience 
from their members, and to be largely exclusive, isolated from society. 
Abu Nidal controlled his members lives by keeping the rank-and-file 
members in camps isolated from the outside world. He forbade all
256 Wilfred R. Bion, Experiences In Groups. (London: Tavistock, 1970), 2nd edition, pp. 
98-137.
257 Post, "Terrorist Psycho- Logic ...", pp. 32-33.
258 Hearst, Patty Hearst. p. 88.
259 stern. With The Weathermen, p. 45.
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socialising amongst liis followers except on official business; all 
passports, forged or real, had to be handed in to him; the phone calls 
that they were allowed to make were restricted; and what his cadres 
were permitted to purchase on foreign missions was also limited. As 
much as anything, it was a means for Abu Nidal to impose his 
authority on the members of his group.26o Terrorist organisations 
strive for uniformity and cohesiveness, the group is built on the 
political homogeneity of like-minded individuals, their futures, goals 
and even their lives are bound together. It is essential that members 
are able to trust one another fully not to betray the group, they stand or 
fall together and that engenders cohesiveness. This cohesiveness may 
be further enhanced by the promise of violence if an individual 
appears to threaten to leave or in some way betray the group. For 
example, the Justice Committee of Abu Nidal's organisation regularly 
pursued purges of the group in its quest to eradicate spies. Prisoners 
were tortured and revealed their guilt, genuine or not, as a result. They 
were usually executed to avoid the Committee's m ethods from 
emerging although enough did survive for these means to be well 
know n throughou t the organisation.26i This all m eans th a t 
individuals have considerable influence over one another in the 
group, but also that the group's influence over the individual rises 
with growing cohesiveness. The element of shared danger increases 
the group's solidarity, and the motivation for the individual to remain 
affiliated to the group and therefore not to deviate from its norms 
because it is only within the group that the individual can receive the 
reassurance that they require when faced with the external threat of 
society. There is a lack of alternatives to membership of the group, 
there can be no going back, partly because the individual has become a 
pariah by being a terrorist, but more because they abandoned their 
previous life since it was so unsatisfactory. The main fear of group 
members is that they will be rejected by other members and abandoned 
by the group. It is this that is the key element in ensuring conformity 
within the group, and explains why ideologically anti authoritarian 
terrorist groups can be highly authoritarian in their organisational
260 Seale, Abu Nidal. pp. 258-259.
261 Ibid.. p p .  2 8 5 - 2 8 6 .
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p s y c h o l o g y .262 Members of such groups often feel a responsibility, a
duty to their superiors and their peers. Bandura argues that:
Self-sanctions operate m ost efficiently in the service of 
authority when followers assume personal responsibility for 
being du tifu l executors w hile relinquish ing  personal 
responsibility for the harm  caused by their behaviour. 
Followers who disowned responsibility without being bound 
by a sense of duty would be quite u n r e l i a b l e . 2 6 3
In this sense, terrorists are not unlike soldiers in their rationale, a
comparison that they seek to foster. Individuals therefore find it hard
to question or criticise the direction that the group is taking, unless it is
to urge even greater commitment to violence, w ithout triggering a
crisis in their identity. Consequently, particularly in small, cellular
organisations, it is possible for such groups to conform to the agenda
and concept of just a few of their members or even, in some cases, to
acquire a momentum of their own in pursuit of their campaign. There
are few mitigating factors or members calling for restraint on the levels
of violence being employed. It is not inconceivable to suggest that in
extreme cases, high levels of violence are employed by groups, none of
whose members, individually, believe is justified by the situation, but
who are unwilling to speak out for fear of endangering their position
within the organisation.
The factors that encouraged the individual to become a terrorist in the 
first place also lessen the opportunities for their re-entry to the society 
from which they have become isolated. The strong ties between 
members of the organisation reinforce the pressure to conform, the 
rewards for membership may be more related to the approval of an 
individual's peers than task-oriented, and this approval may be linked 
as m uch to a willingness to conform as to successful actions. 
Increasingly, the goal of the group becomes self-maintenance and 
decreasingly changing the political environment, members' primary 
objective is to keep the group together. It offers security to members; 
the group and its survival are paramount, its activities become less so. 
An exception to this is the example of the SLA following the argument 
about identity discussed above. The dissent of the group became too 
much for Teko who said: "That's it... It's all over...We have to split up
262 Post, "Hostilité ...", p. 216.
263 Bandura, "Mechanisms of Moral...", p. 175.
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and go our own separate ways!" He felt that violence and black 
leadership were integral to the SLA; others were less certain. While 
schisms within terrorist organisations are not unusual, the defection of 
the leadership is more so. However, in this case, the lack of willingness 
of the members of the group to conform made Teko believe they were 
endangering the group of wliich he and Yolanda had become the only 
true g u a r d i a n s . 2 6 4  xhe ease with whicli an individual is able to exit the 
group also has considerable correlation with the type of existence they 
have had within the organisation. Members who continue to live in 
their communities, such as most IRA or ETA terrorists, who largely 
have ordinary lives, interspersed with flurries of violent activity, find 
it easier to simply leave the group, even if the terrorist organisation 
does tlireaten reprisals against those to leave the struggle.265 It tends to 
be those involved in underground movements, whose whole life is 
subsumed by the group, that find it especially difficult to exit. However, 
in any variety of organisation, it seems to be a decision that is seldom 
taken lightly.
Group cohesiveness encourages the pursuit of violence because as the 
group becomes increasingly cut off from society most news of the 
outside world is filtered through the group, leading to increased 
misperceptions of the external environment, which in turn  reinforce 
the beliefs of the group and make it easier to assume that the enemy is 
unrelentingly hostile. Obviously, such groups rem ain in touch with 
the wider world via newspapers and the media, but if the group is the 
only form of hum an contact then the media sources are interpreted 
solely by the group; there is no relief from the organisation's spin on 
events .266 This serves an im portant purpose since the internal group 
tensions and hostilities can be projected onto an external source. There
264 Hearst, Patty Hearst. pp. 385-386.
265 See for example, Clark, "Patterns In The Lives...", p. 436.
266 After the SLA's kidnapping of Patty Hearst, the media portrayed the organisation 
as a band of misguided radicals; Cinque dismissed them as bourgeois and capitalist 
oriented. The group, as Hearst described it:
... Sunk into the depths of psychosis. We were cut off from the outside world and lived 
in an isolated realm of our own...The radio played all day long and most of the night 
too and Cinque would often hear song lyrics which contained for him special allusions 
to the revolution... we would all focus on a song's lyrics for a lunt of our revolution. I 
never doubted that the hidden meaning was there, only that I was not sufficiently 
knowledgeable to understand what our leader heard.
Hearst, Patty Hearst. p. 214.
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is also a propensity for individuals to be more willing to take risks 
when they are part of a group than tliey would be solely as individuals, 
encouraging escalation because the terrorist becomes less inhibited by 
the prospect of the negative consequences of their actions. Peer 
pressure means that individuals are more willing to perform acts that 
they would otherwise morally balk at. This willingness seems to 
correspond to the extent of relief that the recruit felt on joining the 
g r o u p . 2 6 7  The pressure also promotes acts of self-sacrifice: individuals 
imagine themselves as martyrs or avengers for the wrongs that been 
committed by the enemy or for former colleagues who have been 
captured or k i l l e d . 2 6 8  The fallen comrade then becomes an icon, a 
symbol that further precludes turning back since it would be a betrayal 
of their memory and would make their death merely a w a s t e . 2 6 9  This 
willingness for self- sacrifice is an important means for the terrorist to 
believe that their actions are not only justified, but also altruistic. Guilt 
avoidance of this type increases dependency on the group; induces the 
individual to commit more guilt-ridden acts; and makes exit from the 
group even more difficult since the individual would encounter social 
approbation, legal sanctions and remorse. It is easier to remain within 
the group.
Terrorist groups seem to regard dissent as a more severe threat than 
exit, it is equated with treason and as divisive because it questions the 
accepted reasoning and leadership of the group. Morucci, a member of 
the Italian Red Brigades, explained that organisational reasons always 
prevailed over individual intentions. When influential members of 
the group attem pted to change things the organisation broke u p . 270 
Dissent fragmented the group, conformity was the cement that bound 
the organisation together. Even in such cases though, the ideological
267 Post, "Terrorist Psycho- Logic p. 35.
268 Crenshaw, "Questions To Be Answered...", p. 18.
269 Joe McCann, a member of the Official IRA, was shot by British soldiers on June 15, 
1972. He was given a hero's funeral by the IRA and as McGuire says: "...liis life story, 
and the nature of his death, quickly became one of the myths of Irish Republican 
history." McGuire, To Take Arms, pp. 106-107. Of course, revenge forms another key 
aspect of the impact of martyrs on terrorism. When Abraham Stern was killed by 
Inspector Morton, a British policeman, while 'trying to escape' on February 12, 1941,the 
priority for his group, LEHI, became vengeance on his murderers by killing those 
responsible, even indirectly. The death of their founder and leader not only devastated 
their organisation, it considerably affected their victim targeting. Bell, Terror.... pp. 
72-73.
270 Jamieson, "Entry, Discipline...", p. 15.
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framework continues to be used as a justification for the actions of the 
group. It may not necessarily encourage the use of violence directly, but 
remains functional to many terrorists who resort to terrorism, a means 
of reaffirmation for their beliefs and actions, and a core pillar of the 
group.271 What the group through its interpretation of its ideology 
defines as moral becomes moral and the authority for compliant 
members: if "they" are responsible for our problems then "their" 
destruction can be justified. Stern rationalised her violent actions as
part of the Weathermen group:
I had tried working in the Establishment, first as a teacher, 
then as a social worker. Then I had tried to be a pacifist, first 
with the Civil Rights movement, then w ith the anti-war 
movement. I had joined SDS and demonstrated and marched 
for two years. And still the war continued. While the rich 
were getting richer, the poor were getting poorer. Since the 
government and the capitalist wouldn't listen to reason, then 
other means had to be employed.272 
Stern is clearly arguing that violence was a last resort; the authorities 
had failed to Msten other means; effectively, she displaces responsibility 
for the use of violence onto the government.
However, as Crenshaw notes, ideology may become increasingly 
corrupted and "surrealistic, used to escape a disconcerting reality rather 
than to guide actions. The extreme abstractness of such beliefs... 
disconnect their holders from objective reality."273 xhe individual 
becomes ever more dependent on the group for their existence. 
Whereas, Crenshaw sees terrorism as largely instrumental, a tactic to 
achieve goals. Post believes that violence becomes an end in itself and 
that group ideology is simply a rationale for the acts that terrorists are 
driven to commit. He argues that individuals join terrorist groups to 
become terrorists and commit acts of terrorism.274 if terrorism  is 
instrumental then it ought to cease if the goals it sought were achieved. 
Post cites the example of ETA that continues to use violence even 
though it has had many of its demands met and the use of force may be
271 Post, "Terrorist Psycho-Logic ...", p.34.
272 Stern, With The Weathermen, p. 88.
Stern is clearly arguing that violence was a last resort; the authorities had failed to 
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counter-productive. Its goals are absolutist, it seeks nothing less than 
total victory. The prim ary aim of all groups is survival. This is 
especially the case for terrorist groups and success is a threat because it 
removes the objectives of the organisation. It has to find a balance 
between being successful enough to attract members and perpetuate 
itself, yet not so successful that it puts itself out of business. It solves 
this dilemma by finding fresh goals to pursue through its use of 
absolutist rhetoric.275 The param ount im portance placed on the 
survival of the group means that other, non-terrorist, activity is 
justifiable in the greater good. Terrorism is expensive: apart from 
weapons, am m unition and publicity, especially if the group is 
underground, other items such as food are equally vital. Many 
organisations have relied on criminal acts such as bank robberies or 
extortion to finance their terrorist activities. One such example was 
LEHI, which, especially in the m onths after its split from Irgun did 
little else beyond work towards its own survival by stealing and 
threatening until sufficient funds were gained. They did try to justify 
this in terms of their revolutionary purpose and principles, although 
they convinced very few. However, the prim ary objective, group 
survival, was achieved.276
Hirschm an notes that organisations attem pt to lim it to risks of 
members departure by imposing "severe initiation costs", the idea that 
recruits will be reluctant to leave the group if they have had to invest a 
great deal to join initially.277 An excellent example of such an 
initiation is described in Seale's book on Abu Nidal. Jorde, a Kabyle 
recruit, joined the organisation in Beirut. He was made to write out the 
story of liis life; and was then flown to Libya for training in a camp run 
by the group. There, the discipline was extremely strict, and every 
aspect of the recruit's life was controlled. There were inconsistencies in 
Jorde's story, so he was made to write it out several times more, under 
the suspicion that he was a spy for some rival or intelligence service. 
While he was doing this, he was kept in solitary confinement, for ten 
days, in a very hot cupboard. He was then taken to a tent in the desert, 
where he was tied to the ground and beaten with hosepipes on the
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soles of his feet. He was kept there for days, being beaten periodically, 
and given Httle to eat or drink. He then spent a further two months in 
prison being beaten every day, before he was finally led to believe that 
he would be taken out and executed. Instead, he was congratulated on 
having passed the test, and his terrorist training began. He was taught 
to use various weapons and how to keep a target under surveillance 
without being spotted; to assume a false identity and other techniques 
potentially useful in intelligence gathering. Jorde was then sent on a 
fake mission to steal some passports in Athens for the organisation. 
Further trial missions to Belgrade and Brussels followed, before he was 
given his first genuine operation: to steal some passports and set up 
contacts in various European cities. After that, his role was 
predominantly to reconnoitre a target prior to an attack, as he did in 
synagogues in Istanbul. Jorde's experience is certainly exceptional: 
even within Abu Nidal's organisation few recruits received such a 
lengthy or tough initiation; the suspicion that he was a spy must in  
part account for this. The results of his interrogation seem to have been 
counter-productive if they were supposed to make exiting less likely 
since they made Jorde determined to leave as soon as he got the chance. 
It was only the latter part of his training that made it less certain that he 
would go.278 By contrast, Shamir's initiation into Irgun was designed 
to impress the importance of the undertaking into the recruit, but was 
a ritual, the decision to accept the recruit already having been made. 
Shamir writes:
It took place one evening in the darkened classroom of a Tel 
Aviv school... The only source of light was a gooseneck lamp 
beamed right at me to ensure that I could not get a good (i.e. 
an identifying) look at the three members of the admissions 
committee sitting at a table in  front of me. Someone 
solemnly asked ritual questions: Are you prepared to make 
sacrifices if called upon to do so?' Are you prepared to accept 
m ilitary discipline?' Are you aware that joining this 
organization may involve you in great danger?' Equally 
solemnly I gave ritual a n s w e r s . 279
Hirschman was writing initially about dysfunctional behaviour in the 
economy but firmly believed that the work was applicable to society as 
a whole. He was convinced that politics and economics were not 
m utually exclusive and that they would benefit from  using the
278 Seale, Abu Nidal. pp. 9-27.
279 shainir, Smmrdng.... pp. 20-21.
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analytical tools of one another. Consequently, he took his examples 
from both business and political groups. Terrorist organisations often 
require an illegal act as the cost of admission in order to eliminate the 
option of exiting for the new member; to test their commitment; and to 
increase the impetus for them to go underground. This has the added 
effect of inducing the individual to "fight harder" because it means that 
they are reluctant to admit defeat even if they believe that the group 
has failed in its objectives since they must prove that they were right to 
pay a high entrance fee to join the organisation.28o it may take the 
individual a considerable time to come to this belief because they have 
a stake in self-deception, in fighting the realisation that the group that 
they belong to is in the process of deterioration.28i Jamieson quotes 
Adriana Faranda who rem ained w ith the group long after she had 
ceased to support it and explained that the individual is extremely 
insecure and more likely to attribute the fault to themselves than the 
organisation, so stay within the group until the evidence against the 
organisation is undeniable. In an underground terrorist group, such as 
the Red Brigade, the individual has often had a close relationship with 
other members of the group, and may well be dependant on them in a 
num ber of ways, increasing the difficulties of leaving.282 if there 
appears to be no alternative to exit, either because dissent is impossible 
or ineffective, then the individual may seek to lessen the strain of 
defection by persuading others to leave as well. A good example of this 
is the split in the IRA in 1969 into what became the Official IRA and 
the Provisional IRA. Sean MacStiofain states in his autobiography that 
he made repeated attempts to persuade the IRA leadership in Belfast 
that they were on the wrong course, hoping that it would be possible to 
retain a united movement. The strains increased after August 1969 
when the IRA failed in their objective of protecting Catholics against 
the rioting Protestants of Northern Ireland; and by mid December, an
280 When all but tliree members of the SLA, including Hearst, were killed in a siege 
with the police, the group was clearly destroyed as a revolutionary organisation. 
However, they continued their efforts because, as Yolanda, one of the survivors, said: 
"Cin would want us to live and fight on... That's what we've got to do." This clearly 
reflects elements of the "fight harder" trait; but it also displays "survivor guilt": Teko, 
the leader of the remaining group, had said that the three of them should go and die 
with their comrades in the siege. Yolanda favoured making the deaths worthwhile 
and meaningful; Teko wanted to them sacrifice themselves in the name of their cause: 
both are different elements of the same phenomenon. Heast, Patty Hearst. pp. 244-245.
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extraordinary m eeting of the General Army Council was held. 
MacStiofain, then Director of Intelligence, failed to defeat a vote to 
allow members of Sinn Fein to sit in  the parliam ents at Dublin, 
W estminster or Stormont, if they were elected. MacStiofain left the 
Army Convention w ith  his allies, reconvened elsewhere, and 
contacted the units that had either been absent from the meeting or 
had been reorganised in recent months. A new IRA leadership was 
elected w ith MacStiofain as Chief of Staff. At Sinn Fein's annual 
conference, held on January 10, 1970, in Dublin, MacStiofain rejected a 
call for a vote of allegiance to the old Army Council; amiouncing that a 
"Provisional" Army Council had  been established; pledged his 
allegiance to this; and urged all Republicans to leave the conference 
with him. About 45% did so.283 This example is perhaps exceptional in 
terrorist groups because it was such a formalised and drawn-out exit, 
reflecting the established nature of the Republican movement. Equally 
exceptional, but because it did permit its members to leave, was the 
Irgun, in spite of the potential damage to the underground movement 
that former, disenchanted, members could do.284
Hirschm an notes that the actual decision to leave, especially by 
influential members of the group, is dependent less on an assessment 
of the suffering that the individual would have to endure in the 
process than on the impact on the organisation. If members believe 
that they have a voice, they are more likely to be concerned about 
w hether their departure from the group will resu lt in fu rther 
deterioration or deviation from the organisation's stated goals. 
Hirschman then argues that this suggests that full exit from the group 
is impossible, that even after the individual has formally left, they 
continue to be concerned about the group's activities.285 Individuals 
leave because they are disillusioned with the group, not necessarily 
with the cause. McGuire left the Provisional IRA because she believed 
that it had destroyed its best chance of success by restarting the military 
campaign after the truce of 1972; and she believed that power witliin 
the organisation had shifted decisively towards those, like MacStiofain, 
who favoured the military option, at the expense of more moderate
283 MacStiofain, Revolutionary .... pp. 128-143.
284 Begin, The Revolt, p. 74.
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members who had lost their voice in the group.286 Once they have left, 
they are likely to be super-critical of the parent organisation, fomenting 
severe inter-group rivalry. This is more the case w ith ideologically 
motivated groups than w ith nationalist-separatist ones: the IRA's 
membership reflects a steady turnover of people without there being 
considerable acrimony in the process, the members simply become 
steadily less active over a period of time, and in many cases, it is hard 
to adjudge precisely when the individual does exit the organisation. 
With ideologically motivated groups, the breaks do tend to be more 
extreme. Faranda and Morucci sought to set up a rival group to the Red 
Brigades, one where violence was not the "be all and end all" of the 
campaign,287 but in other cases, the creation of a rival organisation may 
mean that they resort to greater levels of violence to demonstrate the 
superior ardour of the new group and to provide attractive incentives 
to new recruits.288
Such rivalries can occur as easily intra-group as inter-group if the 
organisation dissolves into factions all intent on displaying their 
dedication to the cause. This was the case with members of the FLQ 
during the October Crisis of 1970. Those responsible for the 
kidnappings of James Cross, the British Trade Commissioner in 
Montreal, and Pierre Laporte, the Quebec Minister of Labour and 
Immigration, were centred on two leaders witliin the FLQ, Paul Rose 
and Jacques Lanctot. While Rose was more systematic, Lanctot became 
frustrated with the ineffectiveness of the organisation's campaign, so 
decided on a political kidnapping to increase p r o g r e s s . 2 8 9  it was a 
radical departure from the FLQ's usual tactics and was a change 
strongly opposed by Rose's group. In September 1970, having lost a 
vote to determine future strategy. Rose decided to establish a separate 
group and continue with the long-term strategy. He left the country on 
September 24 on hearing the nature of Lanctot's plans. Cross was 
kidnapped by Lanctot's group on October 5; the intention was that they 
w ould take a British d iplom at as a pro test against "cultural 
imperialism" and then an American diplomat as a protest against
286 McGuire, To Take Arms, pp. 146-147.
287 Jamieson, "Entry, Discipline...", p. 14.
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289 Ronald Crelinstein, "The Internal Dynamics Of The FLQ During The October Crisis 
Of 1970", Tournai of Strategic Studies. Volume 10, Number 4, (1987), p. 62.
85
"economic imperialism", but with insufficient resources to deal with a 
double kidnapping, the group determ ined on consecutive attacks. 
Rose's group was unaware of this dual strategy and believed that the 
kidnapping of Cross had actually underm ined the likelihood of a 
successful outcome (the release of 20 FLQ members held by the 
Canadian authorities). To attem pt to strengthen the kidnappers 
position they decided to re tu rn  to Quebec and stage another 
k i d n a p p i n g . 2 9 0  The result was the taking of Laporte by the Rose faction 
on October 10 and his death on October 17. Although they had initially 
opposed kidnapping as a tactic, it was the Rose group that proved to be 
more hard-line and extreme in its use once they had determined to 
emulate the Lanctot group, spurred on by the belief that they were 
acting in the best interests of their organisation and Quebec as a 
w h o le .2 9 1  Another example of in-fighting in a group is that of ASALA 
in July 1983 when it split into two factions over the bombing of the 
Turkish Airlines desk at Orly Airport that resulted in 8 deaths and 54 
injuries. Monte Melkonian, leader of the break away faction described 
the attack: "The people who died at Orly are to us innocent dead [sic]. 
They are detrimental to our cause." In the afterm ath of the split, 
ASALA leader Hagop Hagopian executed two of Melkonian's allies 
witliin ASALA in retaliation for the assassination of two of Hagopian’s 
closest a i d e s . 2 9 2
W here exit is possible through the defection to another group, 
increases in violence are less likely to be as a result of such 
factionalism. Baeyer-Kaette, a political psychologist, found that there 
was a high turnover of terrorists among German groups, largely due to 
individual doubts about the legitimacy of the organisation that had 
existed from the outset of the individual’s membership and wliich had 
never been resolved properly. They increasingly questioned the goals 
of the group and whether their actions did anything to promote these. 
The duration of their membership averaged only one year, with 36% 
staying for less than six months.293 Amongst Belfast members of the 
IRA, the average age for entry into the group was 19 years, and the
290 Ibid. pp. 68-69.
291 Peter Janke (ed.). Terrorism & Democracy. (London: Macmillan, 1992.) pp 42-57.
292 Vorbach, "Monte Melkonian...", pp. 182-183.
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average career length was 29 m onths .294 this respect, the RAF was 
clearly atypical as most of its members remained with the organisation 
for several years and exited as a result of being captured, rather than 
disillusioned with the group. Since the average age for the terrorists in 
all of the groups surveyed by Baeyer-Kaette was around 22, it might be 
possible to suggest that entrance to a group reflected the uncertainty of 
adolescence and youth while their exit showed the resolution of some 
of these life- cycle dilemmas. As terrorists grew slightly older, they 
became disillusioned and cynical about the group's objectives, with a 
corresponding increase in the drop out rate. Once the reason for the 
individual joining the terrorist group became less important, the hold 
on the individual by the group fell too, making exit increasingly 
likely.295
Zawodny argued that the composition of the group could also increase 
the likelihood of the organisation to use violence, citing the example of 
women members. He believed that while they were equal in their 
membership of the group, they also created internal pressures within 
it, particularly when the organisation was isolated from the rest of 
society, since the male membership would be in competition for the 
women, although possibly unconsciously. This competition might 
well manifest itself in the form of efforts to outdo the other male 
members of the group, by use of violence directed against external 
sources.296 Zawodny's example of women as catalysts for violence is 
perhaps questionable, although Kaplan agrees that there is an element 
of machismo to some terrorist acts;297 and Zawodny's view assumes 
that the decision to use violence is in the hands of individuals which is 
possibly not the case. It is supported to some extent by the example of 
Sam Melville, who became increasingly involved in terrorism as Jane 
Alpert became more focused on other aspects of her life and less on 
Melville; although the timing also corresponds w ith when Melville 
became increasingly erratic in his behaviour generally. It seems 
reasonable to suggest that in part at least, Melville's violence was an
294 Robert W. White & Terry Falkenberg White, "Revolution in the City: On the 
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attempt to re acquire Alpert's a t t e u t i o n . 2 9 8  Zawodny's hypothesis does 
highlight an incentive to escalate: that of competition w ithin the 
group. Individuals compete for peer approval, and may seek it by 
proposing greater levels of violence, thereby dem onstrating the 
strength of their adherence to the cause. Interestingly, Galvin also 
suggests that in some circum stances wom en may increase the 
probability of increased violence, that an added insecurity many female 
terrorists feel is sexual inferiority that they attempt to assuage by "out­
doing" their male counterparts in "daring, obduracy, and brutality."299 
Leila Khaled expressed the desire to carry out her mission (to hijack an 
El-Al plane from Amsterdam in September 1970) perfectly, and it was 
she, not her male companion who appears to have done the bulk of 
the terrorising.300 For such women, power and approval seem to be 
even greater motivations than they are for terrorists as a whole. Being 
extremely adept at their job, they have a means of being at least the 
equal of men and in many cases, superior to them. Leila Khaled found 
revolutionary activity to be a way of liberating herself from the 
traditional expectations of women. It would be quite wrong though to 
suggest that this motivation replaced those of ideology or nationalism 
that spurred others on. The sexual element was an added factor, not a 
replacement for those that was the ostensible cause of terrorist actions 
by men. Their dedication to the cause was no less than that of their 
male counterparts.^oi
Membership of the group makes it easier to avoid the guilt associated 
with even the worst terrorist actions since the norms and values of the 
group make violence against the enemy not merely acceptable bu t 
desirable, even a duty. The gross m isdeeds of the enemy are 
emphasised as a justification for acting against it. The opposition is 
reduced to an abstraction, it is a structure not a body consisting of 
individuals. In 1971, the IRA's Army Council set a target to kill thirty- 
six British soldiers, wMch was acliieved by November of that year. The 
num ber was then raised to eighty. Clearly, they soldiers were not 
treated as individuals, they were merely numbers in a quota to be
298 Alpert, Growing Up Underground.... p. 188.
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reached as quickly as p o s s i b l e  302 this way, it is possible to attack 
these people as representatives of the structure. They are dehumanised. 
Obviously, this is not always possible: Leila Khaled hijacked TWA 
flight 840 from Rome in August 1969, but experienced severe qualms 
about doing so when she saw a little girl on the plane wearing a badge 
on her dress with the message "Make Friends". It reminded Leila that 
the girl had committed no crime against the Palestinian people and it 
would be cruel to risk her life in an action over which the girl had no 
conception. Leila overcame her conscience by reminding herself of the 
fact that she and her people had done nothing to deserve the fate that 
they had received and therefore: "The operation m ust be carried out. 
There can be no doubt or retreat." Clearly in this case, Leila's 
commitment to the cause and her training were of greater significance 
to her ability to carry out the liijacking than an ability to dehumanise 
the passengers on the plane.303 Terrorists are freed from self-censuring 
restraints not by altering then personalities, aggressive drives or moral 
values but by redefining their actions as justifiable.304 Group decision 
making ensures that no one person feels responsible for decisions 
arrived at collectively. When everyone is responsible then no-one is 
really responsible. Collective action can also be used to diffuse the 
weakening of self-restraints. Any harm done by the group can always 
be attributed to the actions of other members, can be largely discounted 
by laying the blame for mistakes or over- reaction with others. People 
therefore act more harshly w hen their actions are obscured by 
collective instrumentality than when they have to hold themselves 
personally accountable for their actions.3os
Disregarding or misrepresenting the consequences of action also makes 
it easier for terrorists to commit their acts. This is achieved by 
minimising the damage that they cause and thus avoiding having to 
face the full implications of their actions. It is also easier if the 
suffering of the victims is not visible and when casual actions are 
physically and temporally removed from their effects. When aggressors 
do not know the harm  they inflict on their victims, it becomes 
depersonalised and therefore much less difficult to overcome any
302 McGuire, To Take Arms, pp. 74-75.
303 Leila Khaled. My People Shall Live, p. 133.
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moral inhibitions that m ight otherwise exist. For the same reason, 
distance from the results, if the decision- makers and executors of an 
action are not the same people it is easier for the former to call for 
higher levels of violence. When the SLA carried out a bank raid in 
which a female customer had been shot dead, those who had actually 
committed the robbery were initially shocked, although Yolanda, who 
had actually fired the shot, recovered quickly. Teko, the leader, who 
had planned the attack and had not been inside the bank, was 
positively enthusiastic, believing that it would improve the group's 
cohesion since they had now committed a capital offence; and joking 
"If it hadn't been for good ol' Myrna (the dead woman), one of our 
comrades would be dead now. Good old Myrna, she took all the 
buckshot."306 This divorce from effect is even more of a factor for 
intermediaries, since they have neither to make the decision nor carry 
it out, they are merely the messenger. However, Milgram found that in 
studies of commanded aggression, obedience diminished as the victims 
pain became more evident and personalised.307 While that was the 
case in a controlled laboratory experiment, it is less certain whether it 
would apply to the same degree once considerations of loyalty to the 
terrorist group had been taken into account.
An individual's ability to disengage from the moral realities of their
actions develops slowly rather than emerging complete as a result of
conviction or unconventional m oral values. It is an evolution of
which the individual themselves may be unaware of. The group often
eases the progress by asking the individual to perform unpleasant acts
that they can endure w ithout m uch self- censure. By repeated
perform ance and exposure to aggressive m odelling  by m ore
experienced associates, the bonds of self- reproof and discomfort are
weakened, permitting acts of greater ruthlessness, so that acts formerly
regarded as abhorrent can readily be performed by the individual. Sean
O'CaHaghan, describing his feelings after the mortar attack in which he
killed an Ulster Defence Regiment officer, Eva Martin, said:
Looking back I think it was a stinking, shameful thing to 
have been involved in. But when you are w rapped up in a 
cause you do not take much of normal life into account. I
306 Hearst.Patty Hearst. pp. 361-362.
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think I was slightly upset that it was a wom an who was 
killed, but this may just be retrospect
As another example, Patty Hearst was kidnapped and held against her
will for months, yet she also participated in the actions of the SLA, her
captors. It would be possible to suggest that she collaborated because the
alternative was death, and this is partially true, bu t she had
opportunities to escape in the course of missions, yet did not do so.
Instead, she carried out her part in these as a full member of the group
which she nonetheless hated. Her own view was that she had:
... acted instinctively, because I had been trained and drilled 
to do just that, to react to a situation without thinking, just as 
soldiers are trained and drilled to obey an order under fire 
instinctively, w ithout questioning it. By the time they had 
finished with me I was, in fact, a soldier in the Symbionese 
Liberation Army...The penalty for failure, in combat, 
according to our Codes of War, was death.309
The process will be accelerated if acts of violence are presented as
morally vital and the victims are depersonalised. This training,
combined with immersion in the group's ideology and value system,
instils the moral rectitude and importance of the cause for militant
action, as well as creating a sense of eliteness and providing the social
rew ards of group esteem and solidarity for excelling in terrorist
activities.310 It m ight reasonably be thought that the ability of
individual terrorists to disengage from the realities of their actions
would decrease as the consequences of that act increased and that
therefore, an act of mass terror would be less likely as a result.
However, this appears not to be the case. Once the victims cease to be
individuals and are reduced to an abstract, and provided the attack can
be ideologically justified, the difference between an ordinary act of
terrorism and an act of mass destructive terrorism is quantitative, not
qualitative. It is indicative that even when directly confronted with the
victims of the Murrah Buüding at liis trial, the results of his action, so
that he had to recognise the consequences of the attack, Tim McVeigh
remained impassive and calm, convinced that he had struck a valid
blow against a government he hated.
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Over time, violence becomes the norm of the group through a process
of desensitisation and brutalisation. Whereas the initial use of violent
force may be hotly debated w ithin the group, later it becomes the
accepted and required me ans .3 n  This is especially the case once a
terrorist group acquires a longevity beyond the first generation because
then its value system is set and violence is a characteristic of the group,
it is internalised in the psychological dynamics of the group and its
members so that ends and means become blurred since violence is tied
irrevocably to the values that it serves. This has the effect of
constraining the possibilities for compromise or innovation within the
terrorist group, since group norms become a restricting influence on
the leadership. Their position is dependent on their interpretation of
group goals and effective direction of terrorist operations and they
need to use violence as a means of maintaining group cohesiveness as
well as pursuing instrumental objectives. It is rarely possible for them
to find a substitute for violence since many recruits rejected other
organisations precisely because of their nonviolence. Pax to Unzueta, a
former member of ETA, said that:
Today’s ETA has nothing to do w ith the ETA of the 
beginning... We were against Franco and saw ourselves as 
part of an intellectual movement, influenced by the wider 
events of 1968. Most of us came from middle-class, urban 
backgrounds. A lot of us were students. Now the recruits are 
the disaffected youth in search of a ruck with authority .312
In this case it appears that violence may have become the end, not the
means as Post argued, and it is this violence that provides the raison
d'etre of the group. As wiU be discussed later, an excessive focus on the
struggle, rather than the goal, poses immense problems for the terrorist
organisation, if it still does have a nominal strategic objective. Cathal
Goulding recognised that the IRA were in such a position in the early
1960s:
The fight for freedom had become an end in itself to us. 
Instead of a means, it become an end. We hadn't planned to 
achieve the freedom of Ireland. We simply planned to f igh t
311 McGuire says that at one point, before she left the IRA, if she heard that a British 
soldier had been shot, she wotdd hope tliat he would be dead by morning; and that she 
accepted the bombing of Belfast, and when civilians were accidentally blown up 
dismissed this as one of the unfortunate consequences of urban guerrilla warfare. 
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for the freedom of Ireland. We could never hope to succeed 
because we never planned to s u c c e e d . 3 f 3
Psychology may not explain nuclear terrorism specifically, but it does 
offer significant explanations of the escalatory pressures on terrorists, 
both individually and collectively, that would be critical to any act of 
nuclear terrorism. It is clear that in some cases, terrorist groups move 
beyond employing violence as a instrum ent, and instead become 
driven to commit violent acts by individual and group pressures. This 
can be used as both an explanation and a justification since it enables 
the perpetrators of violence to deflect responsibility onto others. They 
can argue that "it's not really my fault", blaming outside authorities for 
"driving" them to terrorism as a last resort, and thus avoiding the guilt 
that would in other circumstances act as a check on their actions. This 
shifting of responsibility is important not only in the use of terrorism  
as a tactic, but in the specific levels of violence employed: escalations of 
violence, even acts of mass terror, can be justified in exactly the same 
way, that the terrorists were left with no choice in order to ensure that 
their message was heard. The need for publicity is "the lifeblood of 
terrorism", at least that committed for political ends, is vital and is 
intimately comiected to the survival of the group, the prime objective 
of the organisation. It is tliis that makes it hard for terrorist leaders to 
de-escalate the level of violence employed, particularly if there is 
competition either from within or without the group. Violence is also 
the main identifying aspect of the group, it is what sets it apart from 
other organisations. To even consider reducing the level of violence or 
stopping it altogether is to strike at the heart of the group's identity. 
Leaders have a key role, especially in close-knit groups that have gone 
underground. In such cases, the organisation may come to reflect the 
personality of the leader; a prime example of this is Abu Nidal, 
especially when fear and the pressures against dissent or exiting are 
strong. It is then hard to avoid doing the will of the group, as focused 
by the leader. However, this is not to suggest that there is a "terrorist 
personality", either amongst leaders or followers, and although some 
traits, such as a negative identity, do appear to be more prevalent 
amongst terrorists than society as a whole, it does not obviously 
correspond to a determinant of those who engage in terrorism. It is the
3^3 Smith, Fighting For Ireland.... pp. 72-73.
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act of terrorism that is the link between diffuse terrorists and groups 
w ith  a w ide range of m otivations, ra ther than  some initial 
psychological commonalty. Psychology does, though, offer a partial 
explanation for the way that individuals become involved, and the 
way that group dynamics determine the development of a terrorist 
campaign. As will be seen in later sections, although there are marked 
motivational differences between secular and religious terrorism, and 
even between left and right-wing terrorism, there are also significant 
psychological similarities, many of which have been discussed here.
Tactics & Targeting
Psychology and motivation may partially explain how an individual 
becomes a terrorist; why they remain involved and the pressures that 
are felt by both the individual and the group as a result of the dynamics 
of the organisation. However, it is of limited efficacy in establishing 
why a terrorist group uses a specific method to attem pt to achieve its 
ends, and thus to partially assess the likelihood of a group believing 
that the use of a weapon of mass destruction is in their interests. 
Psychology and motivation may explain why terrorism is used at all, 
but it needs a more instrumental approach to determine why the group 
uses a bomb over a gun, for example. It may be that, especially in the 
earlier stages of involvement, there is no separation between the resort 
to terrorism and the method chosen. It is clear that there is rarely a 
single, clear-cut decision to use terrorism . Instead, there is a 
progression towards violence, a process rather than a definite choice. 
That being so, it is quite likely that the first few terrorist attacks are 
likely to be determined to a very large extent on what is feasible: by 
those materials and skills that are available to the group. Later on, the 
tactics and targeting of the group will largely hinge on organisational 
dynamics: the belief system, structure and decision-making process 
within the group. Tactics employed, and the example set, by other 
groups may also represent an im portant influence on terrorist 
organisations. As groups decline in influence or begin to split, there is 
an increased tendency to escalate the level of violence employed, a 
trend that is reflected in a num ber of cases and which might have 
important implications for a terrorist use of nuclear means. However, 
overarching all this is the question of terrorist rationality: to what 
extent is strategic choice purely an instrum ental decision of which
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methods will be most effective for the group?3^4 %g also crucially 
affected by other factors, such as psychology, wliich partially determine 
tactics as well as involvement?^15 At this point, it is worth clarifying 
the concept of rational choice. It does not equate to the "right" decision 
of which strategy wiU be most effective in achieving goals. It does m ean 
though that there is a judgement of how to effectively tie means to 
ends, the conclusions of which are followed through consistently. The 
decision only needs to appear to be the optimal one at the given 
m oment, once a cost-benefit assessment has been m ade by the 
terrorist.316 it  would be a considerable mistake to wholly dismiss 
rationality as a basis for terrorist's tactical choices. Even in the case of 
fundamentalist terrorism, often perceived as one of the least rational 
forms of political violence, there are clear elements of pragmatism and 
instrumentality in strategic choices. Hizbollah's move from suicide- 
bombings to kidnapping foreigners in Lebanon during the mid-1980s 
was due to a number of factors, external as well as internal. Firstly, 
their previous tactic had succeeded in dram atically reducing the 
Western presence in Lebanon, so there were simply less obvious targets 
to bomb. However, the group wanted to continue to pressurise the 
West over its Middle Eastern policies. Furthermore, they sought a 
method that would permit this pressure to be exerted over a prolonged 
period, enabling their campaign to be tied to external factors such as the 
release of Shiite prisoners, notably the al Da'wa group in Kuwait. The 
move from kidnapping, with the release of Terry Anderson in 1991, 
was a reflection of Hizbollah's altering relationship with Iran and its
314 Martha Crenshaw, "The Strategic Development of Terrorism", Paper for the 1985 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. New Orleans, August 
29-September 1 1985, p. 1.
313 Bowyer Bell suggests that a central aspect of the life of the terrorist who lives 
underground is that they focus almost exclusively on survival, buoyed by ideology to 
maintain the struggle. "Their life is consumed by the cost of merely maintaining, much 
less escalating, the armed struggle." Bell, "Revolutionary..,", pp. 194-197. This suggests 
that tactical choices rely less on a conscious decision to pursue the most effective 
strategy, and more on simply avoiding capture whilst keeping the campaign alive. By 
tins logic, and in keeping with the findings described earlier on the psychological 
pressures of terrorism, organisational survival and expediency are the key 
determinants of tactics. However, even if terrorism was resource-led, it does not 
preclude that a large scope of tactical choices have to be made. For example, it is 
undeniable that terrorist groups do sometimes escalate their campaign, a decision that 
clearly does require some degree of instrumental assessment.
313 Lopez-Alves, "Political Crises...", p. 204.
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own role w ithin Lebanon, that m ade holding W estern hostages
superfluous 317
To some extent, terrorism as a strategy has already been discussed. 
Terrorism is the resort of the desperate: the defence that "we had no 
choice" is not only a justification; within the parameters of group goals, 
objectives, willingness to compromise, and likelihood of success 
otherwise, it is the truth. The options for would be terrorist groups are 
genuinely limited. In many cases, they do lack public support and this 
fatally restricts tlieir ability to alter government policies in their favour. 
As has already been discussed, terrorism is often a strategy of the 
impatient, those who have cursorily attempted to achieve their goals 
using the instrum ents available to them, bu t who are reluctant to 
invest the time, in mass organisational work for example, especially if 
the final success is doubtable. Connected to this is a frequent belief that 
time is short: either that they are unwilling to wait any longer for 
justice, or else that the moment for action is now, that the time is ripe, 
that there is an opportunity to be exploited. The decision to use 
terrorism is a process rather than a single choice, so other techniques 
will usually have been unsuccessfully attempted first. Terrorism has a 
number of potential advantages: it places an issue on the public agenda 
and it forces authorities to acknowledge the problem. Connected to that 
is that it creates publicity for the group, it makes them an entity that 
must be dealt with: they exist. Terrorism may also create the conditions 
for a w ider movement, one with more likelihood of success, if it 
insp ires the g roup 's po ten tia l constituency, underm ines the 
government's authority, or forces them to take measures that increase 
sympathy for the group and its c a u s e . 3 is it is important at this point to 
differentiate between the ultim ate goals of terrorist groups, their 
strategic objectives, and the tactical goals employed to achieve this. In 
essence, it is the difference between long-term political goals, such as 
the overthrow of a regime, and military goals, the means to obtain 
that.319 The scale of terrorist demands is also important because it will
317 Magnus Ranstorp, Hizb'allah In Lebanon: The Politics Of The Western Hostage 
Crisis. (London: Macmillan Press Limited, 1997), pp. 88-108.
318 Crenshaw, "The Strategic..'V pp. 2-7.
319 Wilkinson, Terrorism And The Liberal State, p. 106. For example, while the IRA's 
ultimate goal is a free, united Ireland; their military sti*ategy, as defined in the "Green 
Book" is:
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certainly, at least in part, determine the lengths to which the group will 
be willing to go. A group seeking only a change in policy has more 
interest in m aintaining the structure of governm ent than a group 
intent on revolution. It is logical to suggest therefore that the first 
group is less likely to be mlHng to inflict widespread damage on society 
than the second group. One of the key differences between various 
types of terrorist organisation is in how they define their enemies. 
Nationalist groups may regard the enemy as the nation oppressing 
them; revolutionaries as the ruling class; and religious groups as 
apostates or other corrupting influences. Each definition produces 
radically different targets and thus c a m p a i g n s . 3 2 0  Such factors m ust 
affect the tactics, strategies and means that a terrorist organisation is 
prepared to use. The question for this section then is "how are these 
strategic goals to be achieved, w ithin the framework of terrorism?" 
How do these goal-related choices affect the level of violence employed 
by terrorists, and thus how likely are they to use non-conventional 
weapomy?
One interesting, and possibly significant, point is made by Rapoport in 
his article on three premodern terrorist groups: the Assassins, Thugees 
and Zealot-Sicarii. In each case, the group was more durable and posed 
a greater threat to tlieir society than any modern terrorist organisation. 
Yet the weapons they employed were primitive; travel was by horse or 
foot; and communications were limited. It is one of Rapoport's 
contentions that: "The critical variable, therefore, cannot be technology: 
rather, the purpose and organization of particular groups and the
1. A war of attrition against enemy personnel which is aimed at causing as many 
casualties and deaths as possible so as to create a demand from their people at home for 
their withdrawal.
2. A bombing campaign aimed at making the enemy's financial interest in our country 
unprofitable while at the same time curbing long term financial investment in our 
country.
3. To make the Six Counties as at present and for the past several years ungovernable 
except by colonial military rule.
4. To sustain the war and gain support for its ends by National and International 
propaganda and publicity campaigns.
5. By defending the war of liberation by punishing criminals, collaborators and 
informers.
Tim Pat Coogan, The IRA, (London: Fontana, 1987), p. 693.
320 Christopher Hewitt, "Terrorism and Public Opinion: A Five Country Comparison', 
Terrorism & Political Violence. Volume 2 Number 2, (Summer 1990), p. 146.
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vulnerabilities of particular societies to them are decisive factors."32i 
This might be important in the possibilities for the effects of a terrorist 
attack using non-conventional weaponry. At the very least, it is worth 
considering as a possible rationale for terrorist tactics and targeting, 
since it suggests, logically, that terrorist groups tend to identify, and 
strike at, die weak spots of their victim.
Terrorists have proved extremely adept at inventing new methods of 
attack to circumvent the protective counter-measures imposed by 
state’s securit}?^  forces. It is this inventiveness, and willingness to adapt 
tactics that make it virtually impossible to protect against every 
possibility. Terrorist groups and security forces are engaged in a 
constant battle for technological supremacy. However, terrorist 
organisations are also able to inflict significant damage using low 
technology weaponry. One example was the Armed Islamic Group 
(GIA), a radical Algerian Islamic group, that between July and October 
1995, launched a campaign of nail-bombing in France, using camping 
gas canisters as their explosive. They succeeded in killing eight people, 
wounding 180, and caused 32,000 security personnel to be m o b i l i s e d . 3 2 2  
O ther w ell-established terro rist organisations have also been 
periodically willing to use crude but effective weapons in pursuit of 
their campaigns. The IRA bombings of July 20, 1982, also used nail- 
bombs, although the explosive used, 251bs of gelignite in the Hyde Park 
attack, was not as improvised as that of the GIA. The effects were 
devastating: seven members of the Royal Greenjackets were killed in 
Regent's Park and four members of the Household Cavalry and several 
horses died in Hyde Park. The British public's outrage at the attack 
apparently owed as much to the injuries to the animals, as to the 
s o l d i e r s . 3 2 3  Even well-established groups, such as the IRA, have been 
wiUing to use home-made weapons as a part of their arsenal. Although 
the organisation used Semtex as early as 1976 and retains a sizeable 
quantity of the plastic explosive, even today they still sometimes use 
agricultural chemicals and fuel as the basis for their devices. 
Furthermore, as the campaign has gone on, the IRA has become
321 David C. Rapoport, "Fear & Trembling; Terrorism In Three Religious Traditions", 
American Political Science Review. Volume 78, Number 3, (September 1984), p. 659.
322 Bruce Hoffman, "Intelligence and Terrorism: Emerging Threats and New Security 
Challenges in the Post-Cold War Era", Intelligence and National Security. Volume 11, 
Number 2, (April 1996), p. 207.
323 Coogan, The IRA, pp. 646-647.
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increasingly adept at building its own m ortars, hand grenades, 
mechanical and electronic timers, mercury fulminate detonators, radio 
and command wire bombs, and booby trap devices, to name only a
selection.324
One question that arises from attacks such as these is w hether a 
terrorist group uses a particular weapon because it has lim ited 
alternatives or because it is the best means of attracting attention to the 
campaign and forcing revolted governments and publics to reassess 
their willingness to remain committed to a particular course, such as 
the retention of a military presence in N orthern Ireland. The two 
options are not m utually exclusive, but they do have im portant 
reverberations for the issue of nuclear terrorism: if there is no 
terrorism involving nuclear devices, is it because no groups are able to 
get the necessary materials to commit such an act, or because no group 
wants to commit such an act, that conventional means rem ain 
sufficient? Is it always a sign of organisational weakness if a terrorist 
group resorts to low technology for their attacks?325 This is a critical 
question because one argum ent for possible circumstances in which 
terrorists might resort to non-conventional weaponry is precisely this 
point at which groups believe themselves to be in decline and decide to 
escalate their level of violence to ensure organisational survival. The 
two, desperation due to a perception of the group's weakness, and a 
desire to escalate, are entirely compatible. Terrorist groups decline for 
m ore reasons than  sim ply lack of resources. C learly then, 
organisational weakness and scarcity of resources are not synonymous 
and it is possible for some terrorist groups to escalate from a position of 
weakness. It may not even follow that low technology terrorism  
equates to a lack of alternatives due to a paucity of resources. In fact.
324 James Adams, Trading In Death: The Modern Arms Race. (London: Pan Books 
Limited, 1991), pp. 8-10.
323 Although, obviously, in many cases it is. One of the best examples of this comes 
from the Mau Mau movement in Kenya in the 1950s. Members of the Military Wing 
were mostly poor, landless, and semi-literate with little or no military training. 
However, the main constraint on their activity was the lack of weapons: only about 
10% -15% of members had precision weapons and only about 30% - 40% carried any 
weapon at all. Tire British took four years to suppress the rising but this was as a result 
of insufficient resources being applied to tire problem and to organisational deficiencies 
within the British administrative structure. Once these had been rectified, the rising 
was comprehensively defeated within a year. Randall W. Heather, "Intelligence and 
Counter-Insurgency in Kenya, 1952-56", Intelligence & National Security. Volume 5, 
Number 3, (July 1990), pp. 58,78-79.
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terrorists appear to be extremely technologically conservative. They
resort to a few well tested, and, as they perceive, reliable m e t h o d s . 3 2 6
Many terrorist organisations also appear to be risk-adverse: the
emphasis is often on the group's survival and practically, that requires
keeping its members alive and free from arrest. For example:
The principle that the terrorist must have a safe method of 
escape is the dom inant feature in PIRA tactics. FIR A very 
seldom plan operations that involve high risk and if in doubt 
they abort the m ission. Shooting attacks are m ainly 
conducted on the "shoot and scoot" principle.327
Obviously, this has the effect of mitigating towards the terrorist group
favouring the tactics and weaponry with wliich it is familiar.
Although Aum Shinrikyo's sarin gas attack in Tokyo represents an 
obvious exception, even non-traditional terrorist organisations such as 
the Unabomber, Tim McVeigh or the World Trade Center bombers 
have continued to use variants of traditional terrorist weapons. Even 
when terrorists want to be certain of making a successful attack or are 
seeking to cause widespread casualties, they may be able to do so by 
using multiple conventional weapons. Tliis may be especially so, given 
the untested and therefore unreliable nature of non-conventional 
weaponry as a terrorist device. On June 29, 1992, Mohammed Boudiaf, 
president of the Algerian High Committee of State, was assassinated in 
the town of Annaba as he gave a speech. A bomb was detonated first as 
a distraction wliile a gunman wearing a military uniform walked onto 
the platform and sprayed automatic fire. Boudiaf was fatally wounded 
in the back and head and 41 others were i n j u r e d . 3 2 8  On August 27,1979, 
the same day that they assassinated Earl M ountbatten, the IRA 
succeeded in killing 18 British soldiers at W arrenpoint in N orthern 
Ireland. They used two bombs, detonated by radio, one in a hay truck 
that exploded as a lorry filled with soldiers went past; and the second in 
an abandoned stone building that caught reinforcements arriving in 
two Land Rovers and a helicopter to assist the first group of soldiers.
326 See Bruce Hoffman, "Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and Potentialities" in 
Paul Wilkinson (ed.), "Technology & Terrorism", Terrorism & Political Violence. 
Special Edition, Volume 5 Number 2, (Summer 1993.)
32/ White & White, "Revolution in the City...", pp. 104-105.
328 Edgar O'Ballance, Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism. 1979-95: The Iranian 
Connection. (London: Macmillan, 1997), p. 187. Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Algerian President 
Fatally Shot at Rally", The New York Times. June 30, 1992, p. A8; "Algerian leader is 
assassinated". The Times. lune 30 1992, pp. 1,18; "Murder in Annaba", The Economist. 
July 41992, p. 37.
100
There was also an exchange of fire between the soldiers and terrorists 
that killed one passer-by and wounded another.329 Although obviously 
neither group had access to non-conventional weaponry for their 
attacks, it is almost inconceivable that they would have been used, 
even if available, conventional means being more effective.
There can be no doubt that terrorist tactics vary significantly over time: 
terrorists and authorities are engaged in a constant battle of wits to gain 
supremacy. A prime example of this is aircraft liijackings, during the 
late 1960s and early 1970s a regular high-profile target, but now rarely 
attacked since fewer countries are iviUing to accept the planes; weapon- 
detection at airports has m ade it harder; and many countries have 
special units able to deal with such incidents. All this has m eant that 
terrorists have moved on in search of easier targets that offer better 
returns.330 Similarly, until the recent barricade and hostage situation in 
Lima, the embassy siege had been in decline as a tactic since the early 
1980s, in contrast to 35 such incidents in 1979 and 42 in 1980 alone.331 
Obviously, tactics vary dram atically in intensity and violence over 
time. Between 1963 and 1967, the FLQ planted about 35, mostly small, 
bombs and carried out eight hold-ups. In the three years leading up to 
the October Crisis, these figures rose to 50-60 bombings and 25 hold­
ups.332 The level of violence in these attacks also increased: on June 24, 
1970, two were killed and two wounded in a bomb attack at Defense
329 See: Leonard Downie Jr, "IRA Bomb Kills Lord Moimtbatten", The Washington Post. 
August 28,1979, pp. A l, A8; Paul Potts, "Inch by inch check on ambushed vehicles". The 
Daily Telegraph. September 3,1979, p. 1.
330 Walter Laqueur, "Postmodern Terrorism", Foreign Affairs. Volume 75, Number 5, 
(September/October 1996), p. 25. However, terrorists have not completely abandoned 
hijacking as a tactic. One interesting variant occurred on December 24, 1994, when 
members of tlie GIA took over an Air France plane on its way between Algiers and Paris. 
It landed at Marseilles, where the hijackers used 20 sticks of dynamite to turn the 
plane into a vast bomb that they intended to detonate as the flew over Paris, sending 
the wreckage crashing into the city below. They were prevented from doing so because 
the French GIGN antiterrorist squad stormed the plane on the tarmac in Marseilles, 
killing all four terrorists, but injuring 25 others, including nine commandos, in the 
process. O'Ballance, Islamic.... pp. 183-184.
331 Paul Wilkinson, "Beleaguered in Lima", Times Higher Educational Supplement. 
February 211997, p. 18. In contrast, there were only 2 international terrorist barricade 
and hostage situations of any sort in 1994 and 4 such incidents in 1995. Bruce Hoffman & 
Donna Kim Hoffman, "The Rand-St Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism, 
1994", Terrorism & Political Violence. Volume 7, Number 4, (Winter 1995), p. 226; Bruce 
Hoffman & Donna Kim Hoffman, "The Rand-St Andrews Chronology of International 
Terrorist Incidents 1995", Terrorism & Political Violence. Volume 8, Number3, (Autumn 
1996), p. 95.
332 Wainstein, "The Cross...", p. 2.
101
Headquarters in Ottawa. In July, police defused 1501bs of dynamite 
planted in a car outside the Bank of Montreal.333 James Cross was 
kidnapped because he was senior British trade commissioner and head 
of the British government office in Montreal. The FLQ believed that as 
such, Ms abduction would be more easily identified with by the Anglo- 
Canadian community and therefore would be more likely to lead to a 
successful conclusion for the terrorists than could be achieved by 
attacking the original target, the American Consul-General.334 pierre 
Laporte was a target partly because he was a friend of Prime Minister 
Trudeau, and because he was an im portant figure, both in his own 
right and as a member of Bourassa's Quebec administration. The FLQ 
cell wanted to shock the authorities into action. That his house was 
only ten minutes drive from the kidnapper's in St Hubert was also an 
influence on their choice of victim.335
In recent years, there has been a significant decline in the proportion of 
bom bing incidents, com pared to other form s of in ternational 
terrorism. Between 1968 and 1969, 44% of all such terrorist attacks were 
bombings, it rose to 53% in the 1970s and then feU slightly to 49% in the 
1980s. However, by 1995, tMs figure had fallen to just 23%. In its place 
has been an increase in attacks designed to directly harm  persons. 
Arm ed attacks for example provided 44% of incidents in 1995, 
compared with an average of only 19% in 1 9 8 0 s.336 TMs is significant, 
since it supports the suggestion that terrorism is not only increasing in 
lethality, but that terrorists are selecting tactics that are more likely to 
cause fatalities, are more precise, in addition to employing familiar 
weapons in ways that are aimed at raising the likelihood of fatalities 
(e.g. by using bigger bombs). It is worth noting that, in 1995, although 
the number of fatal bombings fell to 21% of all types of fatal incidents, 
48% of aU fatalities caused by international terrorism were as a result of 
bombings.337 This is not exceptional. In 1994, the figures for bombings 
were 20% of all fatal incidents, but 51% of all fatalities.338 Furthermore,
333 VVainsteln, "The Cross...", p. 3.
334 Wainstein, "The Cross...", p. 4.
335 Wainstein, "The Cross...", pp. 38-39.
336 Hoffman & Hoffman, "The Rand-St Andrews... 1995", pp. 87 & 91 n.
337 Ibid.. p. 95.
338 Hoffman & Hoffman, "The Rand-St Andrews... 1994", p. 226.
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1994 and 1995 were "quiet" years, with few high fatality incidents.339 in  
other years, this proportionate figure would be m uch higher. It 
remains the case that bombings are the terrorist tactic most likely to 
cause wide-spread casualties. A key difference has occurred in the past 
few years though: whereas, in the past, terrorists tended to increase 
their technological sophistication,340 in some of the most significant
339 Although on July 18, 1994, 96 people were killed in a Hizbollah attack on the  
Argentine-Jewish Mutual Aid Association in Buenos Aires. See for example, 
O’Ballance, Islamic.... p. 13.
340 As an example, in two similar incidents, the RAF attempted to assassinate General 
Haig in 1979 and succeeded in killing Alfred Herrhausen, CEO of Deutsche Bank, in  
1988. In the first attack, they used lOOlbs of TNT, detonated by a household switch 
attached to four 9-volt batteries, which was connected to 180 yards of wire, laid under 
grass, leading to the explosive. The ambush relied on visual control; two motorcyclists 
with walkie-talkies w ould warn of the approach of H aig’s car. Despite good  
intelligence and considerable patience (the attackers had waited several weeks at the 
same place, waiting for Haig to take that route), the assault missed by a split-second 
and left Haig uninjured. See: Michael Field, "Haig escapes assassination by a second ”, 
Daily Telegraph. Time 26,1979, p. 1; John Vinocur, "Gen Haig Uninjured as Car Is Hit By 
Bomb on Road to NATO Office ”, New York Times. Tune 26 1979, pp. A l, A12 & "Bomb 
Attempt on Gen Haig's Life Not Tied to Major Terrorist Groups", New York Times. Tune 
27 1979; Michael Getler, "Haig Escapes Apparent Try On His Life", Washington Post. 
June 26 1979, pp. A l, A17; John Saar with David Fouquet, "Assassins Miss Haig - By 
Inches", Newsweek. July 9 1979, p. 44. The Herrhausen attack also relied on excellent 
intelligence and advanced planning. The bomb was set off when the car broke a beam of 
light between two poles on opposite sides of the road. A control cable was used to 
activate the trigger, ensuring that it was Herrhausen's car that broke the beam. The 
bomb, containing armour-piercing explosives, put in a funnel-shaped charge, and 
hidden inside a bicycle, was directed at the rear, right passenger door, exactly where 
Herrhausen was sitting. See: Ferdinand Protzman, "Head of Top West German Bank Is 
Killed in Bombing by Terrorists", New York Times. December 11989 & "German Slaying  
Was Well Planned", New York Times, December 2 1989; Anna Tomforde, "Killing 
breaks terrorist silence ”, The Guardian. December 1 1989; Michael La Garde & Waller 
Tarra, "Herrhausen Attack Possibly Rehearsed Near Vienna", FBIS-WEU-89-241. 
December 18 1989. The RAF frequently plamred its attacks months in advance. The 
assault on Karlheinz Beckurts, on July 9 1986, was, according to the BKA, prepared for 
three months. That prior to the attack on Herrhausen was almost certainly longer. 
Hans Horchem, "The Decline of the Red Army Faction", Terrorism & Political 
Violence. Volume 3. Number 2. (Summer 1991), p. 62. Preparations of tins scale are not 
unusual when terrorist groups target prominent people. Prior to their kidnapping of 
Aldo Moro, the Red Brigades considered Amintore Fanfani, the President of the Italian 
Senate and former Prime Minister, and Guilio Andreotti, the current Prime Minister, as 
possible alternative targets to Moro. However, the two were dismissed as options as a 
result of the intensive observation that the Red Brigades made of all three men 
throughout 1977. They found that Fanfani was too unpredictable in his movements and 
too well protected. Andreotti was ruled out because his house was continually guarded 
by at least ten armed police, and he always travelled with two escort cars and two 
motor cycle outriders. By contrast, Moro used one escort vehicle, and neither it nor his 
car was armoured. He left liis house each day at the same time and invariably made a 
ten minute stop at the church of Santa Chiara to pray each morning. Although  
accompanied by five armed bodyguards, Moro was thus an easier target. On March 16, 
1978, he was kidnapped from liis car, and six weeks later, murdered. Alison Jamieson,
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cases of terrorism of recent years, such as the bombings of the World 
Trade Center and the M urrah Building in Oklahoma, the perpetrators 
appear to have deliberately chosen to remain at a low technological 
level. Constructing bombs from diesel oil and nitrate fertilisers has a 
number of advantages, not least that it is a virtual impossibility to 
prevent terrorists obtaining such materials; but also that, given the 
amateur nature of those responsible for the bombings, crude home­
made devices were almost certainly the most practicable to build.
While the tactics employed by a group may have to change,34i it is also 
the case that most terrorist groups have a repertoire of favoured tactics, 
wliich they are reluctant to deviate from and which they adapt over 
time. These are not necessarily the same for aU other g r o u p s . 3 4 2  As an 
example, while almost all terrorist organisations use bombings as part 
of their tactics, relatively few rely on airline h i j a c k i n g s .3 4 3  To some 
extent this may be a result of the fact that some activities clearly require 
less expertise, resources and risk than others. In that sense, at their 
m ost sim plistic, bom bings and shootings are among the m ost
The Heart Attacked: Terrorism & Conflict In The Italian State. (London: Marion 
Boyars Publishers, 1989),. pp. 108,113.
341 pqj. example, the RAF’s strategy until 1977 had predominantly relied on 
kidnappings of leading political, economic and industrial figures, in order to place the 
authorities under pressure and compel them to release the RAF prisoners from German 
prisons. With the high profile failures of 1977, the murders of Ponto, Buback and 
Schleyer, with their attendant adverse and counter-productive reaction from the 
German public, the RAF abandoned the strategy. They turned instead to killing 
members of the Military-Industrial-Complex and of the "apparatus of repression". 
This was the strategy they would continue to use until their ultimate decline in 1992. 
Horchem, "The Decline...", p. 65.
342 The IRA, for example, have often used veliicle bombs, as a means to attack targets. 
Rather than stealing the vehicle, the group have periodically use "proxy bombs", 
members of the public, coerced by threats to themselves or their families into driving 
their bomb-laden vehicle to the target. Tliis removes much of the risk of planting the 
bomb for members of the IRA. Proxy bombs are usually detonated by a timer and the 
driver has enough time to get away from the scene. However, on October 24, 1990, the 
IRA used three "human bombs". Catholics deemed "collaborators", who were strapped 
into their veliicles and coerced by the threats made against their families into driving 
up to army posts or checkpoints just before the bombs exploded. Six soldiers and one of 
the drivers died, but the expectation was clearly that they all would. Tliis was seen by 
the IRA as both an effective weapon against the British military and a means of 
deterring further collaborators. C. J. M. Drake, "The Provisional IRA: A Case Study", 
Terrorism & Political Violence. Volume 3, Number 2, (Summer 1991), p. 50. Vehicle 
bombs offered a means to transport large explosive devices across Northern Ireland, and 
thus to devastate the Province's economic base by attacking commercial and business 
premises, driving away potential investors and forcing the British to pay 
compensation. Smith, Fighting For Ireland.... pp. 98-99.
343 Brian Jenkins, "The Terrorist Mindset And Terrorist Decisionmaking: Two Areas Of 
Ignorance", Rand P-6340. California, (June 1979), pp. 4-5.
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"accessible" of terrorist activities, and are certainly more so than more 
complex tactics such as kidnapping. Obviously, the tactic chosen 
depends on a number of factors, of which targeting and resources, both 
human and material, are the most important. For example, if a group 
has amongst its members a skilled bombmaker, then the likelihood is 
that they will favour bombing campaigns over other methods. Equally, 
members with formal military training might be able to effectively use 
liighly technical weaponry in a way that others could not. However, 
the bigger determinant is the availability of material: terrorists have 
repeatedly shown a willingness and an ability to learn new teclmiques, 
to adapt favoured tactics, but if the weaponry or the means are absent, 
then it is obviously a largely hypothetical issue. As an example, the 
four shipments of arms from Libya to the IRA in 1985 and 1986 
included a tonne of Semtex explosive, 12 SAM-7 ground-to-air 
missiles, rocket-propelled-grenade launchers, and nearly 120 tonnes of 
explosives, ammunition and guns. This arsenal continued to fuel the 
IRA's campaign for years: by 1990, British security forces had accounted 
for only a minute fraction of the weapons sliipped into I r e l a n d . 3 4 4  R  
would be inaccurate to suggest that IRA m ilitary strategy was 
determined by the shipment, but the availability of the arms did 
increase the options and directions that that strategy could take. The 
issue of resources is, at least in part, comiected to the stage that the 
terrorist group is at. hi 1968, for example, the arsenal of the Belfast unit 
of the IRA consisted of two Thompson sub-macliine guns, one Sten 
gun, one rifle and nine p i s t o l s . 3 4 5  Similarly, the FLQ's campaigns from 
1967 benefited greatly from the ready availability of detonators and 
dynamite, as a result of the construction of the Montreal Metro, Expo 
'67 and the Laurentian Autoroute, and from a num ber of quarries 
around Quebec. At aU these sites, security was poor and the explosives, 
were available in such large quantities that it took some time for the 
losses to be r e c o g n i s e d . 3 4 6  Such weaponry obviously limited the first 
few actions of the unit, until a wider range of arms was available. This
344 The Economist. "Arming The IRA: The Libyan Connection", March 31 1990, pp. 19- 
22. James Adams & Liam Clarke, "War Without End", Sunday Times. Tune 171990. An 
excellent, and more detailed, description of the IRA's attempts to effectively arm itse lf  
can be found in Adams, Trading.... pp. 1-47.
345 Adams & Clarke, "War..."
346 Jeffrey Ian Ross, "The R se and Fall of Québécois Separatist Terrorism: A Qualitive 
Application of Factors from Two Models”, Studies In Conflict & Terrorism. Volume 18, 
Number 4, (October-December 1995), p. 288.
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may be related to the reason that there often appears to be a time-lag 
between the decision to resort to form a quasi-military organisation 
and the first attacks they carry out. Other factors in this include the 
need for training in techniques and the time needed to construct an 
organisational structure. Clearly, tliis varies according to the size, 
complexity and sophistication of the group and the acts it intends to 
perpetrate. As an example, the Tupamaros carried out their first 
operations in 1 9 6 7 , but the underground military group from which 
they stemmed, the MLN, was created in m id -1 9 6 3 .3 4 7
The subject of targeting is vast in itself, but it is worth considering one 
particular aspect in this context: the intended audience. Some attacks 
clearly have an international viewer as their prime object. They hope 
to bring international coverage to their cause and possibly increase the 
likelihood of international interference on the terrorist's behalf. It is 
not a coincidence, for example, that the Tupac Amaru rebels chose to 
stage a take-over of the Japanese Am bassador’s residence in Lima 
during a reception that so many of the diplomatic corps attended. Not 
only did the rebels succeed in refuting President Fujimori's claim to 
have finally defeated terrorism in Peru, they also gained world-wide 
publicity for their ailing campaign.348 The ability of terrorists to attract 
this sort of coverage hinges on two aspects: either they must involve 
victims of interest to the world's media, which probably means citizens 
of Western countries,349 or else the implications or scale of the attack 
needs to be so immense that it is covered for its own sake. This is 
increasingly hard to achieve: on January 31, 1996, a suicide truck 
bomber drove into the Central Bank in the heart of Colombo’s business 
district. The 500kg of high explosive killed nearly 100 people, injured 
1400 others and caused millions of dollars w orth of damage, and 
possibly cost billions of dollars in loss of business confidence. In spite of 
this, the coverage of the incident was modest in the Western press, 
certainly compared to an incident such as the W orld Trade Center
347 Lopez-Alves, "Political...", pp. 214-215.
348 Ronald Crelinsten, "What the Peruvian hostage-takers wanted to achieve". The 
Globe & Mail. December 311996, p. A19.
349 For example, one of the reasons that the Dawa Hijacking between April 5 and 20, 
1988, was allowed to drag on for so long and coverage of event was so disappointing from 
the Hizbollah hijacker’s perspectives, was arguably that there were no American or 
Western hostages aboard. An unspecified PLO source, commenting on the affair, 
certainly had no doubt that this was one reason that the Western negotiators had been 
willing to permit the plane to depart for an Arab country. O'Ballance, Islamic.... p. 97.
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bombing, or even the Peru siege.350 In view of these circumstances, a 
terrorist group might be willing to consider a non-conventional attack, 
since that would increase the likelihood of widespread press coverage. 
However, it obviously poses considerable problems in other respects 
for the organisation.
Tins problem of receiving publicity and acknowledgement is not a new 
one for terrorists. The Stern Gang when they broke from Irgun in 1940, 
were badly equipped and funded and had few members. Consequently, 
they adop ted  the ir tactics to accom m odate th is w eakness. 
Revolutionary violence was only to be one part of the strategy, but it 
rapidly came to dominate all the others.3Si Initially, due to their belief 
that the Irgun would never take part in an armed revolt, the LEHI 
decided to act alone. Their basic tactic was to strike at the British in 
whatever way would hurt. This had the effect of encouraging sporadic 
and ill-directed violence. However, after the death of Stern and the 
arrests of 1941-1942, new strategies were formulated. Previously, they 
had been fairly open in their activity; they had been politically active 
and had rem ained in contact w ith friends, family and associates, 
making it easy for them to be arrested by the police. After this period, 
they resolved to go fully underground, to break all connections with 
those outside a trusted inner circle, and to use completely safe houses 
or else bunkers in deserted areas. They would vanish from sight, 
emerging only to attack.352
By 1944, as the full plight of the Jews in Europe began to be realised, 
LEHI sought a victim that would 'change history', rather than the 
police constables and inspectors who had been their main targets to 
date. That, at least, was their ostensible reason, the one that LEHI
350 Foj. example, the New York Times, The Times and The Globe & Mail all carried the 
Sri Lanka bombing on their front pages on February 1,1996. However, in each case, by 
February 2, the story had been relegated to a small article on an inside page. In 
contrast, the siege in Lima continued to receive front page coverage even after the 
situation had settled down to a long drawn out stalemate between the terrorists and the 
Peruvian security forces. The reasons for the decline in television coverage of foreign 
news are discussed in: Garrick Utley, "The Shrinking of Foreign News": From Broadcast 
to Narrowcast", Foreign Affairs. Volume 76, Number 2, (March/April 1997), pp. 2-10. 
He attributes the cause of this diminishing coverage in the USA to a widespread  
perception that foreign affairs are less relevant, now that the security threat has also 
decreased with the end of the Cold War. With no imminent existential danger, the 
focus has swung to domestic issues.
331 Bell, Terror.... pp. 62-63.
332 Bell. Terror.... p. 75.
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propaganda would later try to reinforce for posterity. Just as crucial was
the fact that Irgun's re tu rn  to prominence (with their revolt of
February 1944) was utterly eclipsing the efforts of LEHI. The group had
to find a new tactic to reclaim the limelight. They chose, as their next
target. High Commissioner Sir Harold MacMichael because he was the
highest representative of the British in Palestine; and because they
wanted to educate the British to the follies of their policy in the region
and their fellow Jews to the benefits of armed resistance. Furthermore,
it was MacMichael who had placed heavy restraints on Jewish
immigration to Palestine, compelling many to remain in Europe. This
final reason owes more to LEHI propaganda than  to reality:
MacMichael simply enforced policy made in London by the Cabinet. To
claim it was he who restricted Jewish immigrant access to Palestine was
a convenient, albeit inaccurate, justification to make him a target, to
legitimise attempting to assassinate him.353 Throughout the summer
of 1944, MacMichael's movements and routines were watched and
noted. There were no fewer than five assassination attempts that had
to be aborted for various reasons before they were able to ambush his
car between Jerusalem and Jaffa on August 8. A petrol bomb was
thrown, covering the road in flames and then the car was raked with
machine gun fire. MacMichael himself suffered only minor injuries
and, since he returned to Britain shortly afterw ards, had to be
abandoned as a target. LEHI again sought a significant victim and
found one in Lord Moyne, British Minister of State in Cairo and the
highest ranking British official in the Middle East. LEHI, in a further
effort at target legitimisation, would also claim he was anti-Zionist and
anti-Semitic, although the evidence for this is patchy at best. Yalin-
Mor, a member of LEFH would later affirm this, saying:
Really, these acts by Lord Moyne were without meaning for 
us. They were useful only as propaganda, because they 
allowed us to explain to the people why we had killed him. 
What was important to us was that he symbolized the British 
Empire in Cairo. We weren't yet in a position to try to h it 
Churchill in London, so the logical second best was to hit 
Lord Moyne in C a i r o . 3 5 4
Moyne was an attractive victim, even without an added incentive: a
cabinet minister, titled, a friend of the Prime Minister, liis death would
be noticed. It would force Britain to regard Palestine as an international
353 Bruce Hoffman, Author's Correspondance. May 141997. 
334 Bethell, The Palestine.... p. 181.
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problem, not an isolated and internal one as they would have liked to 
believe. A less important reason was that, as the Irgun also sought to 
do, LEHI hoped that it would draw Arab attention to the frailty of the 
British position, perhaps encouraging resistance there too, easing their 
task in Palestine. Two young members of the group were selected, 
Eliahu Hakim and Eliahu Bet-Zouri. Hakim spent the autum n of 1944 
watching Moyne's movements and was joined at the end of October by 
Bet-Zouri. On November 6, as Moyne, in his car, pulled up outside the 
ministerial residence for lunch, Hakim and Bet-Zouri approached on 
foot. Bet-Zouri shot Moyne's driver as he stood by the car and then 
Hakim, opening the rear door of the car, fatally shot Moyne three 
times, in the neck, abdom en and hand. They left Moyne's ADC, 
Captain Hughes-Onslow, and his secretary, Dorothy Osmond, entirely 
unharmed. The two assassins then tried to escape on rented bicycles 
they had left on the street, bu t were caught by a member of the 
Ministerial Protection Squad, El-Amin Mahomed Abdullah, whom 
they also refused to shot at because it would have alienated Arab 
support, potential allies, to do so. It was an example of the rationality 
and instrumentality of a group renowned for its bloody use of violence. 
It also offered LEHI two more martyrs, as Hakim and Bet-Zouri were 
tried, and then executed on March 23, 1945.355
Terrorists may also be able to gain publicity for their cause by using 
tactics that are fresh, that set them apart from previous groups or 
tactics. For example, one of the main reasons that 1968 is widely 
acknowledged as the beginning of the modern age of terrorism is that 
that was when the first airline hijackings occurred. Had the liijackers 
instead chosen to pursue a campaign of bombing and shooting, it is 
questionable whether they would have been perceived to be such a 
break from the numerous anti-colonial groups that had gone before. Of 
course, most terrorist organisations will not seek to achieve such 
"spectaculars" and will continue with variations on their previous 
c a m p a i g n s ; 3 5 6  but for those that do crave international recognition that
355 Bell, Terror.... pp. 89-100. Shamir, Smimüng.... pp. 52-54.
356 Some terrorist groups clearly do favour such "spectaculars", the PFLF being one and 
Tupac Amaru, although probably more accurately described as a guerrilla organisation, 
is another. Most of the Peruvian group's actions have been kidnappings of wealthy 
businessmen, attacks on buildings and hijackings of deliveries in Lima, all of which 
caused relatively few casualties, compared to the campaign of Sendero Luminoso. 
However, they were also responsible for seizing Juanjui, a city of over 20,000
109
sets them apart from other terrorists, the challenge is to find a "new" 
method of violence. It is here that a group might consider using non- 
conventional weaponry to achieve this objective.
Selecting a weakness in a victim 's defence need not necessarily 
preclude employing non-conventional means. In 1995, Ivan Kivelidi, 
chairman of Rosbiznesbank, was killed when the mafiya spread a 
nerve toxin arotmd his office. Although there was undoubted symbolic 
significance to the choice of weapon, part of the rationale may also 
have been that it offered a means to strike at the otherwise heavily 
protected target. By rejecting standard methods such as the bomb or 
bullet, Kivelidi's assassins were able to circumvent his d e f e n c e s . 3 5 7
There are historical precedents for terrorists deciding to make a 
technological leap in their weaponry. In the second half of the 19th 
Century, three groups, Narodnaya Volya in Russia, the Fenians in 
Ireland and Anarchists across Europe and the United States, relied 
heavily on the new invention  of dynam ite to prom ote their 
campaigns. The most spectacular example of its use was in the 
assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881. Although using a gun would 
have been easier and more reliable, dynamite was selected for the 
attack because, according to Mikhail Frolenko, a m em ber of the 
executive committee of Narodnaya Volya, using a gun would have 
m eant that "this assassination w ould not have created the same 
impression; it would have been interpreted as an ordinary murder, and 
w ould not have expressed a new  stage in the revolu tionary  
m ovem ent."358 Dynamite, as a terrorist weapon, was accorded vast, 
almost m ythical, powers until its lim itations became clear. The
inhabitants and the capital of the Huallaga region. Once there, they imprisoned the 
police in their barracks, convened community meetings and then organised soccer 
matches, dances and parties for the residents, in a clear attempt to "win hearts and 
minds." Jorge Aliaga, Terrorism in Peru. (Edinburgh: Jananti, 1995), pp. 39 & 44. 
Although most of their attacks prior to 1992 were targeted at property, after that date, 
they have killed policemen, soldiers and civilians, including a businessman who 
refused to pay a large ransom. Wilkinson, "Beleaguered...". Such actions have done 
much to reduce not only their support, but also their number of members from around 1000 
in the early 1990s to around 120 today. With this reduced membership has come 
heightened group security, and a tight cell-structure that has made it much harder for 
Peru's security services to infiltrate the organisation. Alistair Scrutton, "Peruvian 
rebels the devil peasants know ". Globe & Mail. March 61997. p. A ll.
357 Galeotti, "Mafiya... ", p. 11.
358 Ze'ev Iviansky, "Individual Terror: Concept and Typology", Tournai of 
Contemporary History. Volume 12 (1977), p. 47.
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parallels with terrorist use of non-conventional weaponry today are 
striking. Both appeared  to offer the instrum ent for enorm ous 
destruction and millennial redem ption, to annihilate the state, to 
expose its foundations in a way not possible with other weapons.359 
The dynamite campaigns ended, not as a result of governm ent 
measures to prevent access to dynamite (although the m ethod for 
manufacturing the explosive was widely disseminated amongst the 
terrorist groups, most chose to buy or steal ready-made dynamite), but 
because leaders such as Peter Kropotkin, a founding figure in the 
Anarchist movement, eventually concluded that it was not possible to 
destroy historical structures built over thousands of years with a few 
sticks of e x p lo s iv e .360 This again suggests that it is the target that 
matters, more than the weapon selected to attack it with.
One of the main weak spots of advanced industrial societies today may 
be their reliance on the electronic storage, retrieval, analysis and 
transmission of information. Therefore, it may be that the converse of 
Rapoport's theory is true: technology is vital. Vast areas of modern Hfe 
are affected by computers and are thus vulnerable to sabotage by 
hackers. M ost W estern states have com m unications, medical, 
transportation, and financial infrastructures that are all heavily 
dependent on computers. Dedicated hackers, even arm ed with the 
most ordinary computer, can cause chaos, as well as access the most 
sensitive information. The US Department of Defense estimates that it 
receives around 250,000 computer attacks each year36i and witliin the 
past couple of years, at least one hacker has very publicly broken into 
the CIA's fÜes. A concerted effort could, theoretically, render a country 
unable to function. Laqueur suggests the switch at Culpeper, Virginia, 
headquarters of the Federal Reserve’s electronic network, handling all 
federal funds and transactions, would be a possible place in the US at 
which to strike.362 R should be noted though that although the specific 
concern of a society vulnerable to attack through its computer system is 
com paratively new, the concept of states being technologically 
vulnerable is not. Into the 1980s, there was concern that a single
359 Foj. gj comparison, see David Ronfeldt and W. Sater, "The Mindsets of High- 
Technology Terrorists: Future Implications From An Historical Analog", RAND. 
California, March 1981.
360 Ivieinsky, "Individual Terror...", p. 45.
361 Sam Nunn, Congressional Record - US Senate. September 28 1996, S11756.
362 Laqueur, "Postmodern...", p. 35.
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terrorist bomb placed in the right place in the US power grid could 
disrupt lines to major cities, blacking out huge swathes of the country 
and causing massive disruption. It was also feared that a potential 
adversary might attempt to detonate a nuclear device that would create 
an electro-magnetic pulse over the Midwest, burning out the electronic 
controls for refineries, gas-processing plants and powerplants, to name 
only a few. With the difficulty of obtaining parts and the need for 
highly skilled labour to replace them, the disruption and economic cost 
would be potentially vast over a protracted period.363 a  similar attack 
was planned by the IRA in the summer of 1996. They intended to use 
multiple bombs to destroy six electric substations that link London and 
the South East of England to the National Grid. Despite the National 
Grid's contingency plans to deal with a cataclysmic power failure, the 
destruction of the transformers would have threatened to disrupt 
power to Britain’s capital for months.364 The economic, and therefore 
political, consequences of a successful attack w ould have been 
immense. However, it also raises the question, which will be returned 
to later, whether, given the potential effect of such a conventional 
attack, it would be necessary for any terrorist to resort to non- 
conventional weaponry.
It is relatively rare for the tactic of terrorism to have the desired effect. 
Yigal Amir's assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Rabin could easily 
have brought the more dovish Sliimon Peres to power in the May 1996 
elections, were it not for Muslim terrorists making security an election 
issue. Yet Amir acted because he believed Rabin was making too many 
concessions to the Palestinians in the peace settlements. Equally, while 
Hamas and Hizbollah may have succeeded in m aking such a 
settlement harder for Yasir Arafat, it is hard to see how a Likud 
government in Israel is in the best interests of the group's cause. Some
363 Amory & L. Hunter Lovins, "The Fragility of Domestic Energy", The Atlantic 
Monthly. (November 1983), pp. 118-126. The United States has four power grids, all of 
wliich intercoimect m Nebraska. The system is designed to deal with a problem in only 
one of the grids at any one time. If a primary line went down, power would be shut off to 
a specific section and electricity would be rerouted around the problem. However, if 
there were two such disruptions, the entire system is designed to shut down. Stephen 
Bowman, When The Eagle Screams: America's Vulnerability To Terrorism. (New York: 
Birch Lane Press, 1994), p. 125.
364 Stewart Tendler, "How police watched the 'A team' ", The Times. Tuly 3, 1997 & 
"The men who tried to shut London", The Times. July 3,1997.
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former terrorists have become leaders of their respective countries, 
Menachem Begin, Yassir Arafat and Yitzhak Shamir are all examples, 
but this has always occurred once they have renounced violence in 
favour of the political p r o c e s s  365 Most of the m arked successes of 
terrorism have come against colonial powers. Begin's strategy was 
largely to make the British withdraw from Palestine because they could 
no longer afford to be there. This was to be achieved by attacking 
property; the British would have to increase their garrison in the 
Levant which was economically unviable for any extended period; or 
else they w ould be driven to desperate, and possibly counter­
productive, measures to preserve their position.
Begin suggests that the Irgun made a deliberate attempt to undermine 
the British governm ent's position and particularly its prestige in 
Palestine. However, he beheved that this arose as much from the 
existence of the group, as from specific tactics or targeting. While on the 
one hand, they hit at British prestige "deliberately, tirelessly and 
unceasingly", the very fact of their presence, undefeated by repressive 
measures was enough to deny "the legend of its omnipotence". Begin's 
point almost certainly applies more widely to most groups fighting 
governments: "Even if the attack does not succeed, it makes a dent in 
that prestige, and that dent widens into a crack which is extended with 
every succeeding attack".366 The targeting of Irgun and LEHI represents 
a major difference between the groups. Begin said: "We never attacked 
individuals, not even policemen or soldiers...Our opinion was that if 
you killed an individual, there will be another individual. So we did 
not use this method."367 By contrast, LEHI believed that when Irgun 
focused entirely on attacking buildings, it perm itted the British to 
rebuild them, using money levied in Palestine. Shamir thought that 
the Irgun's strategy was less humane than LEHI's personal-terror tactic, 
since Irgun's bombing of buildings risked causing casualties at random, 
whereas LEHI's victims were all selected individually, for a specific 
reason.368 Clearly, as this example shows, it is possible for groups to 
have a similar objective, to both use terrorism, and still to have 
significantly different tactics from one another. The most effective
365 Laqueur, "Postmodern..." pp. 27-28.
366 Begin, The Revolt, p. 52.
367 Cited in Bethell, The Palestine.... p. 157.
368 Ibid.. p .  161.
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strategy to achieve a particular goal is not self-evident; there is no one 
terrorist tactic that is certain to bring the desired results. Consequently, 
terrorists have to be willing to alter their targeting and tactics. It also 
means that it is possible for terrorists to be unsuccessful in achieving 
their goal, yet believe that it is not the fact of using terrorism that is the 
problem, so much as the variety of violence they are using. This 
conclusion would obviously encourage experimentation w ith other 
types of terrorism, and, quite possibly, with an escalation of the level of 
violence being used, conceivably even to the level of non- 
conventional weaponry.
The Irgun had a relatively small num ber of full-time underground 
members (Begin claimed it was never more than 30-40) and hundreds 
of others who remained part-time and above ground. The group was 
led by a High Command advised by a General Staff that was organised 
in departments to suit the requirements of the underground. The High 
Command controlled both political and military actions by the group, 
considered general principles, strategies and tactics and dealt with all 
external relations. The High Command made all the decisions, there 
were none by individual commanders .36 9
The Irgun's most notorious attack, the bombing of the King David 
Hotel in Jerusalem, was carried out for two reasons. On June 29, 1946, 
the British occupied the Offices of the Jewish Agency. These were 
regarded  by the Jew ish independence m ovem ent as Jew ish 
headquarters, so they were determ ined to strike against British 
headquarters, situated in part of the hotel. The other, and more 
important, reason was that as a result of their occupation, the British 
had seized a num ber of documents that revealed vital details that 
would severely jeopardise the movement which had to be destroyed. 
This second reason was also the prime determinant of the amount of 
warning that Irgun gave before the detonation of the bomb: if it was too 
much, it was feared that the British might have the chance to remove 
not only themselves, but some of the more important documents from 
the hotel. Consequently, a warning time of 30 minutes was decided
upon.370
369 Begin, The Revolt, p. 61.
370 Begin, The Revolt, pp. 214-216.
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This attempt to expose the authorities as repressive and provoke them 
to over-react is a common objective of many terrorist campaigns, since 
it is hoped that it will lead to increased support, resources, members 
and thus ultimately to victory. Another example of this working 
successfully is that of the FLN in Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s. Algeria 
was governed on the premise that it was not a separate nation, but 
rather an integral part of France. The FLN sought to drive the French 
government to react in a way that would show comprehensively to 
Algerians that the French regarded them as a separate entity. The FLN 
planted bombs in m arket places and other crowded locations. The 
French treated all non-Europeans as potential suspects, and in the mid- 
1950s, transferred all Algerian Muslim military units to m ainland 
France and replaced them in Africa with European troops. The reality 
of an Algérie Française was thus hopelessly u n d e r m i n e d . 3 7 i  There can 
be little doubt that terrorism poses severe problems for any regime that 
is concerned to maintain a state governed by the rule of law and that 
preserves individual liberties. If the target is unable to protect its 
people, then it is failing m one of the most fundamental objectives of a 
state and the regime could be argued to lose some legitimacy as a result. 
The target's power is, to some extent, deflated. The nature of terrorism, 
seemingly random liit-and-run attacks, makes it extremely difficult to 
prevent altogether, and can therefore lend the terrorist organisation an 
air of superiority in the face of authority impotence. If unable to deal 
with the terrorist threat directly, a regime m ust try to minimise 
support for it. This can pose an awkward choice: do nothing and seem 
to be helpless; implement security measures that risk restricting the 
rights of uninvolved people as well as limiting the scope of terrorist 
actions; or make concessions to moderates, which although it may 
bleed off support for the terrorist group, can also be perceived as 
making concessions to the terrorist’s cause, possibly encouraging more 
attacks and groups in the l o n g - r u n . 3 7 2  in  each case, the results can be 
diametrically opposed to those intended and further underm ine the 
regime's legitimacy. However, w ith the exception of anti-colonial 
struggles, it is still the case that, as Paul Wilkinson has argued: "There 
is ample historical evidence that terror alone is not generally an
371 David Fromkin, “The Strategy Of Terrorism", Foreign Affairs. Volume 53, Number 
4, (July 1975), pp. 687-691.
372 Nicholas O. Berry, "Theories On The Efficacy Of Terrorism", Conflict Ouarterly. 
Volume 7, Number 1, (Winter 1987), pp. 10-14.
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effective weapon in bringing about the overthrow of dictatorships or 
democracies," Furthermore, even in those cases where terrorism was 
successful in achieving major political change, it was almost invariably 
in the context of other factors, such as the unwillingness of the 
authorities to impose repressive measures to eradicate the terrorism; 
overwhelming support for the group in the population at large; or an 
internecine conflict that precluded a poHtical or negotiated s o l u t i o n  3 7 3  
The absolutist nature of many insurgents and their organisations are 
precisely the factors that undermine their ultimate chances of success. 
This is reflected by Eamon de Valera, who in 1922, during the Irish 
Civil War, wrote: "What guerrilla warfare leads to is a desire on our 
opponent's part to come to terms with us, provided that these terms do 
not mean complete surrender by him to us, which is unfortunately
what we r e q u i r e . "374
Many terrorist groups have been inefficient in recognising the 
effectiveness of their campaigns. They frequently delude themselves as 
to the results they are able to achieve. However, once they do 
appreciate the true situation, the group is faced w ith a num ber of 
critical choices, all of wliich threaten potential decline: to carry on 
regardless, diversifying their tactics, to join another organisation or to 
escalate the level of violence that they employ. An example of this is 
the IRA campaign of the mid 1970s, when bewildered by the lack of 
success from their campaigns, they concluded not that the premise of 
the strategy had been flawed, but that they simply had not applied 
enough pressure. Consequently, they escalated the level of violence 
that they employed. The results were the series of devastating attacks 
on the British mainland, starting with the Birmingham pub bombings 
on November 21, 1974, in which 21 people d i e d . 3 7 5  Although the IRA 
themselves are extremely unlikely to resort to nuclear terrorism, their 
logic, that m ore violence ra ther than less was needed, could 
conceivably be used by other groups to justify acts of mass destructive 
terror. This is more plausible if the organisation is on the brink of 
collapse and failure, since, as has already been discussed, survival of 
the group can become the dom inant m otivation in determ ining a 
group's strategy.
373 Wilkinson, Terrorism & The Liberal State, pp. 50-51.
374 Smith, Fighting Tor Ireland, p. 60.
3 7 5 p. 127.
116
The reasons for terrorist groups' decline are far from clear and are 
almost certainly a different combination of factors in each individual 
case. One instrumental approach might be that terrorism ends when it 
is no longer viewed by its practitioners as effective or legitimate, is no 
longer justifiable in terms of the ends it serves.376 Certainly, the 
strategic choices of groups are key, but so are their organisational 
resources and the government's response. The effect of an action or 
response in ending terrorism  is also tremendously variable.377 Por 
example, while the pentiti system in Italy is widely credited with 
having contributed to the declme of the Red Brigades, the Supergrass 
system, applied in Northern Ireland, was an abject failure. An example 
of poor strategic choice would be the decision of the Red Brigades to 
kidnap and m urder Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978, a 
decision which "initiated its fragmentation and defeat. "378
As with the Moro case, the kidnapping and m urder of Laporte by the 
FLQ forced the population at large to make the choice between terror 
and more mainstream methods of pressure. In both cases they chose 
the peaceable option. When the Tupamaros kidnapped American 
police advisor, Dan M itrione, in A ugust 1970, the U ruguayan 
government declined to accommodate the terrorist's demands for the 
release of fellow group members. The Tupamaros felt obliged to 
execute their hostage, believing the government to be bluffing, but 
unwilling to risk losing bargaining power and the utility of political 
kidnapping (the group's main tactic at that point). As with the Red 
Brigades and the FLQ, their decision was the catalyst that permitted the 
govermnent to impose heightened security measures that contributed 
to the ultimate defeat of the o r g a n i s a t i o n . 3 7 9
In the Canadian example, there were other factors at work too. Many 
people were deterred by the War Measures Act (WMA) imposed in the 
wake of the murder. Furthermore, as legitimate Quebec nationalist 
political parties gained an effective voice, the need for terrorism  
appeared less pressing. This decline in public support corresponded 
with increasingly efficient antiterrorism techniques by the Canadian
376 Adrian Guelke cited in Martha Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines", Terrorism & 
Political Violence. Volume 3, Number 1, (Spring 1991).
377 Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines", pp. 80-81.
373 Jamieson, The Heart Attacked... p. 23.
379 Lopez-Alves, "Political...", pp. 228-229.
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police and military, widespread short-term imprisonments, and a high 
incidence of individual burnout amongst members of the FLQ who 
increasingly came to believe that their terrorism was no longer an 
effective w e a p o n  3 8 0  Certainly, this example w ould seem to be 
compatible with Ross and Gurr's assessment of why terrorism subsides: 
the authorities make it impossible for the group to act and increase the 
costs of their trying to do so. At the same time, there may be a decline 
in popular support for the group and increased disillusionm ent, 
causing members to exit the o r g a n i s a t i o n . 3 8 i  Crenshaw adds the 
possibility of physical defeat, a strategic shift, as well as internal 
disintegration to the possible reasons that terrorism might s u b s i d e . 3 8 2  
Reilly believes that the considerations affecting both the initiation and 
the decline of political violence in a given situation are centred around 
attitudes and approval levels towards violence in a society, on its 
utility and on the likelihood of the group achieving th^ir goals. The 
acceptability of violence in a society is key in whether terrorism is 
perceived to be a valid form of protest and thus may be closely linked 
to the level of support a group can hope to receive from their society at 
large. Clearly, these perceptions may vary over time and are certainly 
situationally determined, depending on the possibilities for a non­
violent solution and the importance assigned to the issue in question. 
However, it does seem connected to the role of violence in a society's 
history, w hether constitutional or unconstitutional traditions are 
dominant and whether violence succeeds in achieving goals for its 
u s e r s . 3 8 3  The role of this support is an especially central issue in the 
rise and decline of groups with nationaUst-separatist objectives, where 
popular support obviously does have some correlation to success. 
However, this can also apply to other types of terrorist group. The 
Tupamaros failed for a number of reasons, but a vital one was their 
inability to attract new members and supporters for their cause. Their 
urban strategy was an urban adaptation of Che Guevara's foco  theory of 
rural guerrilla warfare. They sought to provide the urban workers with
380 Ross, "The Rise...", pp. 292-294.
381 Jeffrey Ian Ross & Ted Robert Gurr, "Why Terrorism Subsides", Comparative 
Politics. Volume 21, Number 4, (July 1989.)
332 Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines"
383 Wayne G. Reilly, "The Management of Political Violence in Quebec and Northern 
Ireland: A Comparison", Terrorism & Political Violence, Volume 6, Number 1, (Spring 
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access to a well-organised revolutionary group, "in order to channel 
their revolutionary potential". They emphasised revolutionary actions 
above rhetoric, believed relative depravation theory, and thought that 
terrorism would be the spark that would turn mass discontent over 
falling real wages into revolutionary zeal. However, the group could 
offer only long-term ethereal gains to the workers, who really believed 
in reform elections anyway. Consequently, the overwhelming majority 
of people remained loyal to the party political system that already 
existed. Every use of terrorism by the Tupamaros thus served only to 
widen the gap between them and their potential constituents who now 
accepted elective politics as the n o r m . 3 8 4
It m ust be stated, though, that the correlation between support for 
terrorist groups and their decline is far from a straightforward one. 
Some organisations are clearly less reliant than others on popular 
support as a prop. Nationalist-separatist organisations seem, in most 
cases, to have a far higher "natural rate" of support amongst their 
constituency than is generally the case for anarchic-ideologue groups, 
although both may perceive their level of popular support to be 
significantly higher than it really is. Furthermore, support for such 
nationalist-separatist groups seems much less sensitive to decline as a 
result of terrorist actions, provided that the actions can be justified 
within the context of being part of a patriotic struggle and do not 
endanger fellow e t h n i c s . 3 8 5  This is important because the fear of losing 
popular support is often cited as a reason why terrorists seldom resort 
to high-level violence. However, provided it is within the accepted 
traditions of a nationalist struggle, higher levels of terrorism may not 
jeopardise support for nationalist-separatist groups to the extent that it 
might for anarchic-ideologue organisations. In this context, acts of mass 
destructive terrorism are not as inconceivable as was once thought. 
However, since the idea of acceptable traditions is likely to convey a 
degree of proportionality, it is probably stiU reasonable to say that an act 
of non-conventional terrorism on tliis basis is singularly unlikely.
This does not necessarily suggest that if support is lacking, terrorists 
will renounce violence because it is counter-productive. As was
334 Lopez-Alves, "Political...", pp. 217-222.
335 A fuller discussion of these points can be found in: Hewitt, "Terrorism...", pp. 143- 
170.
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observed earlier, part of their difficulty is that terrorist organisations 
often have grave difficulties in moving from violence. In part, this is 
as a result of psycliological pressures and a determination to preserve 
the group’s raison d'etre. However, it is also that many terrorist 
organisations are genuinely slow to recognise when there are gains to 
be made through non-violent activity. The IRA in 1972 was a good 
example of this, missing the opportunity for effective dialogue with the 
British government, after the latter had been driven into talks by 
Republican violence. Then, and in common with many other terrorist 
groups, they showed an inability to link their political demands to their 
military strength. It is w orth noting though, that in this case, the 
failure may have owed as much to the difficulty of persuading key 
members of the organisation to temporarily renounce violence, as to a 
deliberate, strategic choice.386 Even sophisticated organisations, such as 
the IRA, that have well-established political wings, appear to have 
difficulty in pursuing an effective dual-track strategy. Even once the 
movement had reorganised, after the failures of the 1970s, and the 
apparent success of Sinn Fein in the British elections of 1982-83 had 
suggested that a new "total strategy", incorporating the military as 
simply one tool in a wider campaign, might be more fruitful, the IRA 
retained primacy within the Republican movement and continued to 
use violence, irrespective of the political repercussions or popular 
reaction.387 Instead, compelled by a reluctance to compromise and a 
fear that any interim progress may become permanent, the campaign 
remains dominated by the military option.388 Tliis is summarised in 
Danny Morrison's observation in 1989 that: "when it is politically 
costly for the British to rem ain in Ireland, they'll go...it w on't be 
triggered until a large number of British soldiers are killed and that's 
what's going to happen"389 or as M artin McGuiness put it more 
succinctly in 1977, to keep "blattering on until the Brits leave."390 This 
inflexibility does not universally apply to terrorist groups: the 
Tupamaros never used it as their sole strategy, relying on exposing 
corruption and other mild tactics too. Their initial resort to terrorism
336 SiTiith, Fighting For Ireland, pp. 106-108,114-115 & 219-220.
337 Ibid. . pp. 152-7 & 170-178
338 Pop a discussion of why the IRA continue to use force as their primary means, see 
Smith, Fighting For Ireland, pp. 14-19 & 21-22.
339 Ibid. p.224.
390 David Blundy, "Inside The IRA", The Sunday Times. Tuly 3,1977.
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stemmed from an assessment of the conditions of Uruguayan society 
that the time was "ripe" for more revolutionary actions. It was not 
until the group neared its end that terrorism as a tactic gained a 
momentum of its own. Originally it was seen as an experimental, and 
lim ited, m ethod that could be abandoned, should  it prove 
unproductive. However, after the kidnapping and m urder of Dan 
Mitrione in 1970, the group, wrought with disagreement, faced with an 
increasingly repressive regime and unable to admit that they had made 
a mistake, were driven to pursue the tactic of terrorism  more 
thoroughly. It became the group norm  for a time, bu t the 
organisation's leaders were also aware that their strategy would 
ultimately end in failure. Consequently, they abandoned terrorism 
altogether and instead sought to move to rural guerrilla warfare and 
more open confrontation w ith the Uruguayan military. This too, 
would finish in failure, and finally end the g r o u p . 3 9 i
The strategic inflexibility of a movement at a given time does not 
necessarily preclude that they later learn to use a twin-track approach. 
The two arms of Republicanism in Northern Ireland, the IRA and 
Sinn Fein, have competing strategies: coercive military pressure 
against a desire to be included in any discussions about a solution to 
the situation in the province. By the 1990s, the movement had become 
more adept at alternating between the two to pu t pressure on the 
British. This can be seen in the use of short-term ceasefires in 1993 and 
1994 that seemed to place the onus on the British government to find a 
means of mamtaining the progress towards a settlement. It is in this 
context, that the unilateral and indefinite ceasefire declaration of 
August 31, 1994, can be seen.392 However, the strategy of the IRA has 
rem ained, in essence, unchanged: the British m ust w ithdraw , 
otherwise violence will ensue. The breakdown of the ceasefire, after 
over a year, reflected the growing frustration of the organisation at the 
perceived failure of the political process. Although affiliated to a wider 
movement, and more willing to act as a part of that, the IRA itself 
remains a military organisation. As such, it is dedicated to achieving its 
objectives through an arm ed strategy. A lthough, as part of the 
Republican movement, it obviously does have other options than the
391 Lopez-Alves, "Political...", pp. 226-229.
392 Smith, Fighting For Ireland, pp. 194,197-200 & 211-214.
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purely m ilitary one, and despite being a highly sophisticated 
organisation, the IRA rem ains as bound by the organisational 
dynamics described earlier as any other terrorist g r o u p  3 9 3  it is as 
dedicated to the military option as ever. Having made such a choice, 
terrorist groups are limited in the available possibilities to increase 
pressure on their target. Escalating the level of that violence is an 
obvious choice, one that, given the additional psychological and 
organisational pressures already discussed, can be irresistible. 
Potentially, this could lead terrorists to consider the ultimate increase 
in violence, to non-conventional means.
A variant on lack of support as the cause of terrorist group decline is 
that of the Red Army Faction. In this case, the German government 
took action that effectively denied the group's ability to attract new 
members. Imprisoned members of the RAF were vital to the group's 
strategy for recruitment. It was evident from the testimonies of former 
members of the organisation that many second and third generation 
terrorists "joined the RAF because of the alleged inhum an conditions 
of imprisonm ent and for the goal of liberating the p r i s o n e r s . " 3 9 4  
Consequently, from November 1991 to September 1992, led by Justice 
Minister, Klaus Kinkel, the Germ an governm ent released four 
members of the RAF after they had served the m inim um  time 
required by their sentences. The government made it clear that future 
prisoners would be released early, in accordance with the penal code, 
provided that the RAF cease-fire of April 1992 held.395 Denied much of 
its raison d'etre, terrorism, as well as the release of the prisoners, the 
group lost most of its direction and went into a terminal decline. This 
was more to do with the group's difficulties of recruitment than that 
the govermnent action per se forced them into premature retirement. 
These problems could also be attributed to the irrelevance of the RAF's 
ideology in tlie post-Gold War world and the consequent preference of 
potential German terrorists for more local, non-underground and 
issue-specific groups, such as the R evolutionary Cells and
393 Pqj, example, to admit that their military strategy had been a failure would be to 
suggest that those who died promoting it, the IRA’s martyrs, died in vain. Ibid. p. 225.
394 Dennis Pluchinsky, "Germany's Red Army Faction: An Obituary", Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism. Volume 16, Number 2, (April-June 1993), pp. 142-144.
395 Ibid.
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Autonomen.396 LEHI also feared the effects that prison would have on 
the group. Yalin-Mor said: "Our slogan was, 'Kill or be killed, but don't 
be arrested.' Prison could have destroyed our movement. Conditions 
in the detention camps were not bad and many people inside were 
broken. They became neutral."397 They were afraid that support would 
just haemorrhage away, undermining their campaign.
The extent to which the Soviet Union and Eastern European states 
ever heavily sponsored terrorism is debatable,398 but since tlie end of 
the Cold War, it has certainly been negligible. For example, in 1990, it 
was discovered that East Germany had permitted members of the RAF 
to live in the country, under assumed names, since around 1980. 
Before becoming citizens of the GDR, these terrorists first had to 
renounce violence and all connections with the RAF. This was largely 
as a result of the country's desire for better relations with the West, 
along with the financial assistance that that brought.399 This clearly 
indicates that state sponsorship takes more than one form. It may 
simply be shelter for group members. It further shows that deterrence 
of state-sponsorship may be a by-product of the "normalisation" of 
relations between opposing states. However, a few Middle Eastern and 
African states do continue to sponsor terrorists, although, since the 
1986 US airs trikes against Libya, countries such as Libya, Syria and Iran 
have been less overt in their actions.^oo a  major example of flagrant 
state-sponsorship is Sudan, which offers a safe haven for a multiplicity 
of groups, believing that no-one is sufficiently concerned by the 
situation that they will try to become involved in the state.^oi It is 
worth noting, though, that the likelihood of state-sponsored nuclear 
terrorism remains remote: those who have the material to do so have 
largely moved away from sponsorship, leaving those states that are not
396 Bruce A. Scharlau & Donald Philips, "Not the End of German Left-Wing 
Terrorism", Terrorism & Political Violence. Volume 4, Number 3, (Autumn 1992), p. 114.
397 Bethell, The Palestine.... p. 161.
398 poj. (Le leading argument that the Soviet bloc were the pre-eminent sponsors of 
terrorism, see Claire Sterling, The Terror Network. (N ew York: Holt, Reinhart & 
Winston, 1981.)
399 Horchem, "The Decline...", pp. 61-63.
400 Although they continue to do so. Both Iran and Syria cooperated with groups such 
as Hizbollah in the kidnapping of Westerners in Lebanon in the 1980s, partly in an 
attempt to influence Western policy in the country and partly to exploit the situation 
for regional foreign policy gains. Ranstorp. H izbollah.... p. 54.
^91 Laqueur, "Postmodern...", pp. 26-27.
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yet in a position to supply their client groups with the means for a 
nuclear attack. Furthermore, it seems unlikely, as has already been 
stated, that states with a nuclear capability would want to pass that on  
to organisations that are generally loosely affiliated with that state.
By and large, terrorism has been treated by authorities as a deviant 
behaviour, as abnormal and illegal. Therefore, the strategy to deter it 
has had strong parallels w ith campaigns against other, similarly, 
deviant behaviour such as crime or international aggression. This has 
tended to take the form of controlling immediate risks by measures 
such as target hardening and by imposing heavy costs in the form of 
punishments as a means of deterring further actions.402 Deterrence 
requires the ability to punish or deny success to the terrorist and the 
willingness to use this capability. However, when the terrorist group 
does not control territory, retribution against physical targets is rarely 
possible. Countermeasures do have some impact, bu t since one 
objective of terrorism is to drive the authorities to commit repressive 
measures, it does risk accentuating the tlireat, strengthening support 
for the organisation, if the authorities are perceived to have over­
reacted. The most effective countermeasures, in the short-term at least, 
are those that guarantee that a terrorist attack on a certain target will be 
a failure, since it means that most terrorist groups will seek other 
objects to attack. Since foiling terrorism can only be a partial solution, it 
being impossible to protect every potential target, the conclusion has to 
be that deterrence, in the form of target-hardening, can be used to 
prevent specific acts of terror, but not to prevent terrorism  as a 
who le.403 The issue of state-sponsorsliip does make deterrence against 
terrorism theoretically possible, since there is a physical target, the 
sponsoring state, that can be threatened. Even where a state is merely 
acting as host to a terrorist group rather than sponsoring it, as was the 
case with the PLO in Jordan between 1967 and 1970, it is possible to 
impose unacceptable costs on the host state, as Israel did in the 
Jordanian example, so that the group is constrained or expelled (as 
happened in September 1970, "Black September" to the Palestinian
492 Helen Purkitt, "Dealing with Terrorism: Deterrence and the Search for an 
Alternative Model" in Michael Banks (ed.). Conflict In World Society. (Brighton: 
Wheatsheaf Books Limited, 1984), pp 162-163.
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terrorists).404 Clearly in some cases, the sponsoring state can be 
"persuaded" to resort to tactics other than terrorism, especially when 
there are viable alternatives.405 However, the reality is that, even in  
the case of the Libyan airs trikes, often offered as proof that such 
military actions do have a positive impact, such attacks and threats are 
frequently counter-productive. In revenge, Libya attempted to arrange 
the bombing of a US military recruiting centre in New York City on 
April 15 1988, and the same day, the second anniversary of the airstrike, 
succeeded in sponsoring a carbomb attack on a USO club in Naples. 
They are also alleged to have orchestrated the destruction of Pan-Am 
Flight 103 over Lockerbie in December 1988; and certainly were 
involved in the shipping of arms to the IRA, as punishment for 
Britain’s role in the airstrikes.406 A rare successful use of deterrence 
against terrorism was the Soviet reaction to the kidnap of four 
members of their Beirut embassy by Hizbollah on September 30 1985. 
Several days later, one of the hostages was found dead in Beirut. The 
Soviets immediately withdrew staff from their embassy. Allegedly, a 
close male relative of Sheikh Fadlallah was then kidnapped and killed, 
and his private parts sent to the Sheikh in a plastic bag. The three 
remaining Soviet hostages were immediately released and no more 
Soviets were taken captive by the organisation.407 Clearly, Hizbollah s 
leaders were persuaded that it was not in their interests to kidnap 
Soviet citizens, but this model of deterrence (if it can be so called) is 
scarcely one that could be conscionably followed by a liberal democracy. 
It does however show that even experienced, hardened terrorists can be 
prevented from a certain course of action. In all probability, this simply 
represented an example of target substitution: the Soviet reaction 
certainly did not stop Hizbollah taking hostages, it meant only that they 
chose not to take Soviet ones, so instead concentrated on Westerners. 
Deterrence clearly did not work on the group responsible for the plot 
after the World Trade Center bombing, to release those imprisoned for 
the attack. Their plan also included bombing two of New York's 
tumiels under the Hudson; a carbomb attack on the UN Building; an 
assault on the FBI's New York headquarters; the bombing of the George
404 Ibid.. p .  127.
405 See for example, Diane Tueller Pritchett, "The Syrian Strategy on Terrorism: 1971- 
1977", Conflict Quarterly. Volume 8, Number 3, (Summer 1988), p. 28.
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W ashington Bridge; and the simultaneous assassination of Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali, Egyptian President M ubarak, New York Senator 
D'Amato, and Brooklyn Assemblyman Dov H i l k i n d . 4 0 8
It is worth noting that deterrence is not only an anti-terrorism tactic, 
but also a strategy used by terrorists themselves. They threaten to 
impose unacceptable costs on their target unless the victim does (or 
does not do) something. Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi, of Hizbollah, is 
reported to have said in 1989: "America should think a million times 
before carrying out any foolish action: There will be no limits 
whatsoever to our r e p r i s a l s . " 4 0 9  W hether such threats actually have 
the desired effect is almost impossible to prove (this is one of the 
central difficulties with deterrence of any variety), especially since most 
states are singularly reluctant to be perceived to be engaged in dialogue 
with terrorists, never mind making concessions to them. To be able to 
make the threat credible, groups such as Hizbollah must appear to be 
capable of widespread and large-scale actions. The alternative is that 
they are perceived to be making empty threats, not uncom m on 
amongst terrorist organisations, but something that does go some way 
towards undermining the credibility of the group itself. Since, as has 
been discussed, it is important to terrorists that they be taken seriously, 
this means that they must be reluctant to issue threats that can be 
readily "seen through". Therefore, their threats must either be tied to 
their capabilities, or else they m ust be seen to be plausibly seeking to 
escalate the level of violence they employ. In the case of already highly 
violent groups, this may mean that they at least contemplate non- 
conventional means.
Terrorist groups base their tactical and targeting decisions on what is 
feasible, the availability both of resources and of potential victims, and 
on what they believe will be effective in promoting the objectives of 
their campaign. However, the inability of many terrorist groups to see 
beyond a military option may mean those organisations, faced with 
their failure to obtain key objectives, may be more likely to interpret 
that as being due to insufficient levels of violence being employed, 
rather than an indication of the instrumental paucity of violence as a 
strategy. If that is so, the obvious conclusion of such an interpretation
408 Hoffman, "Intelligence...", p. 216.
409 Ranstorp, H izb ’a llah ..., p. 144.
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would be that an escalation of terrorism should be the preferred option. 
Given that the feasibility of high-level attacks has risen w ith the 
increased availability of new resources, such as fissile material, some 
groups might even extend that, if they could, to non-conventional 
weaponry and to nuclear terrorism. The next two sections analyse the 
two broad types of terrorist organisation that have come closest to 
resorting to mass destructive terrorism: those motivated by political 
extremism, and right-wing beliefs in particular, and those driven by 
religious ideologies.
127
Religious Terror
Religious Terrorism
Until now, this discussion has focused predom inantly on anarchic- 
ideologue and nationalist-separatist groups, but in the past fifteen years 
there has been a rising tide of terrorist violence from outside of these 
categories. In that time -there has been a renaissance of religiously- 
m otivated actions, and more recently, a resurgence of violence 
stemming from right-wing organisations. Between them, these types of 
groups have been responsible for many of the worst terrorist incidents 
of recent times, and therefore clearly m erit exploration in any 
assessment of possible perpetrators of nuclear terrorism.
To cleanly pigeon-hole many terrorist organisations is problematic, for
example AS ALA clearly contains both  nationalist and religious
elements, and it is also the case that religion and right-w ing
m otivations are in terlinked, notably in N orth  Am erican white
supremacist groups, but for the sake of clarity they will be dealt with
here as separate phenomena. Perhaps the easiest method to distinguish
religious terrorism from other types is that in the former case, the
group will make use of, and require, scripture or a clerical authority to
justify, sanction and approve the violence they employ. Hoffman notes
that in 1994 a third of the known, active international terrorist groups
had a predominantly religious component or motivation. By 1995 they
accounted for nearly  half the groups. This does not include
organisations, such as the IRA, ETA or Armenian groups that clearly
do have a religious element but whose main impetus is nationalist.^! o
Wieviorka states that:
... Apart from any violence overtly wreaked in the name of 
religion... there are a good number of armed insurgents who 
act in the name of the religious faith upon which their 
actions are founded... In a great num ber of m odern-day 
instances, the most striking phenomenon we notice is that of 
a disengagem ent from  one's religious background or 
training, a secularization of activities organized by leaders 
who, having passed through a rehgious phase, have deserted
410 jL e figures are: in 1994 16 of 49 groups were religious. By 1995, 25 of 58 or 42% of 
identified groups were religious. Hoffman, "Terrorism and WMD...", p. 48.
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it or at least abandoned it as the guiding principle of their 
struggle.41!
The examples Wieviorka cites are those of the Christian militias in the 
Lebanon and the Red Brigades in Italy, who define themselves by cause 
not religion. He suggests, though, that the importance of religion can 
also increase in a group's motivation. An example of this would be the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, which was originally a mass student 
m ovem ent concerned prim arily  w ith the lack of resources on 
university campuses in Egypt, but which became increasingly pro-Islam 
and was involved in the assassination of President Sadat.4i2 it is 
Rubenstein's contention that even fundamentalist terrorism is clearly 
nationalist. This is obviously so in some cases, Sikh militarism for 
example, but other movements do seem more religious than secular 
and more international than nationalist.^!^ However, even in these 
cases, terrorism comes from volatile extremist groups on the fringes of 
nationalist coalitions; this applies equally to Middle Eastern Muslim 
and to American Christian white supremacist fundamentalism. The 
decision to remain on that fringe or to break away is largely determined 
by political issues such as doctrinal differences w ithin the broader 
movement, tactical and local matters, and the degree of threat posed to 
their cause by secularisation.^!^ Religion is the way that they express 
political ideals, including hatred of foreign domination, dreams of 
national redemption and their social conservatism.^!^ They seek power 
to defend the faith, defeat their enemies and establish a regional 
dominance. A good example of this is Hamas which seeks to tu rn  
Palestine into an Islamic state. It has deep roots in the community and 
spends around 95% of its estimated $79 million annual budget on a 
network of schools, hospitals and mosques in most towns in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip rather than on terrorism. These social services
41! Michel Wieviorka, The Making Of Terrorism, (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1993) p. 33.
4 !2 ibid.pp. 38-40.
413 pqj. example, Hizbollah is a pan-Islamic movement, that seeks to create a single 
Islamic community and rejects the concepts of Arab or Persian nationalism. Rather, it 
sees itself as being at the vanguard of the struggle, led originally by Ayatollah 
Kliomeini, to free downtrodden Muslims from domination by imperial and colonial 
forces. See Ranstorp, H izb 'allah .... p. 55.
414 Magnus Ranstorp, "Terrorism in the Name of Religion", Tournai of International 
Affairs. Volume 50, Number 1, (Smmner 1996), p. 48.
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provide a cover and a recruiting ground for terrorists, as well as a 
means of support for the families of suicide bombers and others killed 
in the fight against I s r a e l  4 1 6
The upsurge in religious terrorism, especially since 1988, can in part be 
attributed to the widespread belief that the group's respective religions 
lie at a vital historical point. This stems from increased globalisation, 
and the perceived erosion of traditional values, along with widespread 
economic and political upheaval and inequality, leading to heightened 
feelings of fragility, instability and uncertainty about the future. 
Terrorists feel the need to preserve their religious identity, but also 
believe that there is the opportunity to fundam entally alter their 
futures. Religion is a refuge, familiar and reflecting constant values, in 
an age of change. It is also an instrument for political action. However, 
it remains defensive and reactive in the eyes of its perpetrators. This is 
often combined with an upsurge in militant clerical leaders. These 
more activist ideologues increase support, strengthen the group and act 
as a legitimating force for the use of violence through their theological 
justifications for terrorism.4!7
Since the quest for power is quintessential to politics and international 
relations, it is impossible to regard religious terrorists as apolitical.4!8 
Juergensmeyer, also suggests that by using a religious justification for 
violence, the terrorist becomes overtly political: they break the state's 
monopoly on morally justifiable killing, and therefore make a claim of 
political independence.4! 9 While driven by religion, rehgious terrorists 
undoubtedly make day-to-day practical political judgements as a result 
of their particular situation.420 However, this is not to deny that 
religious terrorism  is significantly d ifferent from  its secular 
counterpart, that it clearly has an added component that is lacking from  
nationalist-separatist or anarchic-ideologue violence.
4!6 John Kifner, "Alms and Arms: Tactics in a Holy War", N ew  York Times, March 15, 
1996, pp. Al,8.
417 Ranstorp, "Terrorism in tlie Name...", p. 46-50.
4!8 Bruce Hoffman, 'The Contrasting Ethical Foundations Of Terrorism In The 1980s", 
Terrorism & Political Violence. Volume 1, Number 3, (July 1989) p. 389.
419 Mark Juergensmeyer, "The Logic Of Religious Violence" in David C. Rapoport (ed.). 
Inside Terrorist Organizations. (London: Frank Cass & Company Limited, 1988). p. 183.
420 Ranstorp, "Terrorism in the Name...", p. 44.
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Religious terror is not new: Rapoport argues that until the 19th 
Century religion was the only justification for t e r r o r i s m /^ !  but as a 
m ajor m o tiva tion  of m odern  in te rn a tio n a l te rro rism  it is 
comparatively recent; in 1968 none of the 11 identifiable active terrorist 
groups could be classed as r e l i g i o u s . 4 2 2  The importance of religion in 
enhancing the likelihood of violence being employed by some groups 
is that it has the ability to inspire total loyalty and commitment, and as 
has been seen in  the case of secular terro rism , such an 
uncompromisingly holistic attitude is a prime factor in the utilisation 
of force as a valid means. The intensity of feeling that religion 
engenders also mitigates against ready resolutions to religious disputes 
and encourages more violent solutions than might otherwise have 
been the c a s e . 4 2 3  The struggle is often perceived as an all-out fight 
between good versus evil, believer versus unbeliever, justice against 
injustice, order versus chaos. This totalism is critical in justifying 
violence generally, but as w ith secular terrorism, can also be the 
legitimation for greater acts of terror than would otherwise be tolerable. 
The intensity and importance of the battle can be used to justify the 
levels of violence employed in its n a m e . 4 2 4  Also relevant is that, as a 
result of group fragmentation or the imprisonment or killing of older 
members, many religious terrorist groups have an extremely young, 
educated and newly urbanised m em bership that hold intolerant, 
radical worldviews. Such terrorists are more likely than their older 
counterparts to resort to liigher levels of v i o l e n c e , 4 2 S  and maybe, in 
some cases, to the very liighest levels, acts of nuclear terrorism.
Furthermore, the language of religion often deals explicitly w ith 
violence because it reflects the ultimate tension between order and 
disorder, the latter of which is inlierently violent. That language can 
readily be adopted by terrorists to reinforce their m e s s a g e . 4 2 6  This has 
two purposes: because religious images and m etaphors tend to be
421 Rapoport, "Fear & Trembling...", p. 659.
422 Bruce Hoffman, "’Holy Terror’: The Implications Of Terrorism Motivated By A 
Religious Imperative", Studies In Conflict & Terrorism. Volume 18, Number 4 ,  (1995), 
p. 272.
423 David C. Rapoport, "Some General Observations On Religion & Violence" in Mark 
Juergensmeyer (ed.), "Violence & The Sacred In The Modern World", Terrorism & 
Political Violence. Special Issue, Volume 3, Number 3, (Autiunn 1991), pp. 120-121.
424 Ranstorp, "Terrorism in the Name...", p. 52.
425 Ibid. pp. 54-55.
426 See Juergensmeyer, "The Logic...", pp. 180-182.
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widely and rapidly recognised by the population as a whole, it enables 
the terrorist group to easily portray their message, and also has the 
effect of giving that message a heightened legitimacy through 
assuming a divine purpose. Many Armenian groups, for instance, 
identify their struggle with Christ's Passion, an ideal m etaphor for 
revolution since it encompasses violence followed by rebirth. In 
messianic movements, it is the renewal and revival aspects of the 
religion that are key, a return to the vital core, and in many cases this 
means a resort to violence. In both Islam and Judaism, the founding 
period was defined by force: Mohammed and the early Caliphs were 
great warriors and in Israel, Gush Emunim members emphasise the 
ruthless conquest of Canaan and the partnership between God and 
Israel for taking the Promised Land, revealed in the Sinai Covenant. By 
contrast, the early Christian church was pacifist in nature, but even 
here, m essianic m ovem ents can find support for their cause, 
emphasising a vengeful Christ, returning to exact retribution for his 
wronged people and cleansing the world ready for Judgement.427 
Girard argues that religion and violence are inextricably linked, that its 
prime purpose is to direct violence outside the religious community, to 
avoid fratricide within the group. He believes that violence is necessary 
to conquer violence within the group, so that the states of violence and 
non-violence are not unconnected conditions. He argues that sacrifice 
is the primary sacred act because it offers a process whereby those 
performing the sacrifice project their own concerns onto the victim: by 
destroying the victim they demolish aspects of themselves. It channels 
their aggressive and violent activities away from their community, 
ensuring that it is not endangered by such sentiments. In this respect, 
the theories of Freud and Girard are similar, but they differ over the 
cause of these destructive urges that require sacrifice to divert them. 
Freud suggested m ost violence was an attack on a scapegoat 
representing the parental figure; Girard attributes violence to "mimetic 
desire". In this, one identifies w ith an idealised image of another 
person; but this can also lead to hatred and competition, so it is 
necessary to have symbols of the rival that can be conquered and thus 
assimilated, hence the centrality of the rite of sacrifice: it is a scapegoat
427 Rapoport, "Some General...", pp. 128-129.
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of the rival.428 This leads to the conclusion that religious terrorism 
might be a result of the failure of religious ritual to function correctly, 
creating a "sacrificial crisis" in Girard's phraseology. Girard's theory 
might be successfully applied to all the major world religions with the 
exception of Buddhism, which differs from the others in at least one 
key way: whereas other religions attach importance to a cosmic struggle 
enacted in the terrestrial world (there are numerous examples of this 
in both the Old and New Testaments and the Hindu Mahabharata, for 
instance). Buddhism's spiritual dash  is internalised in the mind of the 
believer between the perception that this imperfect and illusory world 
is real and a higher consciousness that surpasses worldly perception 
completely. Buddhism is a tradition almost wholly devoid of religious- 
sanctioned violence, so may well offer an exception that proves the
rule .429
Sacrifice & Martyrdom
The terrorism of the followers of Rabbi Meir Kahane does show 
elements of Girard's theory. Kahane displayed "mimetic desire" in his 
drive to avenge the perennial vilification of the Jews, to humiliate the 
Gentile, to be stronger than the other and to demonstrate that through 
physical force. He ideologised and sanctified anti-G entile violence; 
rather than his religion being a control on the use of violence in the 
community, it raised tensions and encouraged the resort to violence.43o
Some religious terrorism clearly does encompass the idea of sacrifice, 
sometimes expressed in the form of martyrdom, but much of it seems 
more akin to warfare than to sacrifice in a meaningful sense. However, 
there do seem to be Girardian elements in the use and selection of 
martyrs by Shiite groups in Lebanon during the 1980s. They had to be 
male; old enough to be deem ed individually responsible for their 
actions, yet young enough that they were not married so there would
428 Mark Juergensmeyer, "Editor's Introduction: Is Symbolic Violence Related To Real 
Violence?" in Juergensmeyer (ed.), "Violence & The Sacred..." pp. 2-3.
429 Juergensmeyer, "The Logic...", p. 186. There are a few examples of Buddhist sects 
using violence, such as Theravada Buddhists in Sri Lanka, but these are most unusual. 
Richard C. Martin, "The Study Of Religion & Violence" in Rapoport & Alexander 
(eds). The Morality Of Terrorism.... p. 349.
430Ehud Sprinzak, "Violence & Catastrophe In The Theology Of Rabbi Meir Kahane: 
The Ideologization Of Mimetic Desire", in Juergensmeyer (ed.), "Violence & The 
Sacred..." pp. 67-68.
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be no dependants left beliind; the martyrs could have no ties to anyone 
who might consider it their duty to avenge the death against its 
sponsors; those selected for self-sacrifice also had to have a m inim al 
measure of pious intent and no traits that might be interpreted in the 
surrounding society, the audience, as a sign of emotional disorder 
because it is important that only the purest of motives can be attached 
to the action.43! It was crucial to Girard that these people lacked a key 
social link because then they could be exposed to violence ivithout fear 
of reprisal. Their death w ould not automatically entail an act of 
vengeance. Israeli security services drew up a profile of the "average" 
Hamas or Islamic Jihad suicide-terrorist. They tended to be single; aged 
between 18 and 27; from a family of lim ited m eans; be either 
unemployed or with a meagre income; and have little education. Of 
those that lived in the Gaza Strip, most came from Gaza City itself; and 
from outside the region, most were from around Ramallah or the 
Jenin/Kalkilya region. In both localities, the terrorists had often been 
taught at religious educational institutions administered and funded by 
Hamas. All the terrorists studied by the security services were extreme 
in their nationalism  and religious adherence; and were mentally 
distressed after specific incidents at the hands of Israeli soldiers or 
civilians. There were other important secondary motivations too: the 
desire to imitate other suicides who had been successful in their 
mission and earned great prestige in the Palestinian community; the 
desire to avenge attacks by Israeli terrorists such as that by Baruch 
Goldstein on the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron in February 1994, or 
other past injustices; or the desire to cleanse the individual's name 
from a charge of collaboration, whether just or unjust, although this 
motivation appears rare in the case of suicide-terrorists.432 Bombers 
also believe that they are assured a place in heaven as a result of their 
actions. There, they will be allowed to choose 70 family members to 
join them; be fed oceans of milk, wine and honey; and receive the 
services of 70 virgins.433
431 Martin Kramer, "Sacrifice & Fratricide In Shiite Lebanon" in Juergensmeyer (ed.) 
"Violence & The Sacred..." pp. 38-40.
432 Ron Ben-Yishal, "Anatomy Of A Suicide", Yediot Ahronot. January 27, 1995, 
Supplement, pp. 7 & 23.
433 Sunday Times. "Wedded To Death In A Blaze Of Glory", March 10,1996.
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The voluntary acceptance of death in order to demonstrate the truth to 
man is a vital method of message-giving religions to dispel the doubts 
of believers and to aid evangelical efforts. It is only necessary to 
consider the role of the early saints in Christianity to see the truth of 
this. In Islam, m artyrdom  is also widely admired, especially if it is 
achieved attempting to defeat Islam's enemies. Hizbollah described the 
1983 embassy bombers in Beirut as: "two martyr mujahidin [who] set 
out to inflict on the US Administration an utter defeat not experienced 
since Vietnam, and a similar one upon the French Administration."434 
However, as Taylor points out, it is not only religion that incites 
martyrdom amongst fanatical adherents: he cites the example of the 
IRA hunger strikers in the early 1980s. Although they did not die 
committing a terrorist action, their deliberate, preplanned deaths 
clearly were a form of suicide in the pursuit of the cause. Roman 
Catholicism does play a significant role in Irish Nationalism, but it is 
not the primary motivation of the IRA. This suggests that religion pel­
se is not the critical factor in suicidal terrorism; rather, it is an 
environmental context that allows and supports m artyrdom  that is 
key, and religion is one of the possible environmental facilitators. 
However, in many cases, it is impossible to separate religion from 
other forces, such as nationalism . June Leavitt, a neighbour of 
Goldstein's, and someone who had known him for over ten years,
described his motivation for the Hebron attack as follows:
...[Tjhis coldness of character went together w ith a flaming 
feeling for God and the Jewish people, not as individuals 
who could be hurt by his severe manner but as a nation. He 
adored his family, yet his inner life was larger and more 
allegorical. He came to Israel because he believed the biblical 
prophecy that Jews would return to the land. He believed that 
this was the time of the redemption. He was back in the Bible 
when God spoke to people. Since the signing of the "peace 
treaty", at least 60 Israelis have been killed. Many of them he 
reached when their lungs and stomachs were hanging out.
He saw the ancient Philistines before his eyes. Heard the 
Jewish nation crying. The night before he committed his act 
of revenge, as he tried to listen to the Book of Esther for 
Purim in the Cave of the Fathers, he heard the chants of the 
modern Arabs "Itbach el Yehnd" ("Kill the Jews"). How long 
he planned to rise up like an ancient Samson and slay the 
ancient enemy, no one knows...If there was a God and if he 
came to people and made them do earth-shattering things.
434 Ranstorp, H izb 'allah .... p. 38.
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then he would come to a man like Baruch. Cold and hard 
like ice, with a fiery devotion to things higher and deeper 
than this world. God w ould choose a m an who could 
unblmkingly sit with his son and listen to the Book of Esther 
in the night, and in the morning put on his Army uniform, 
take his rifle and much ammunition, creep out of the house, 
knowing the chances were he'd never see his sleeping wife or 
children again.433
Martyrdom is important for the likelihood of nuclear terrorism in two 
respects. Firstly, it shows that there are individuals who might be 
willing to sacrifice themselves to ensure that a nuclear attack was 
executed effectively. Given the potential effect of such an attack, if the 
terrorist had to have the chance to escape, it would require more time 
than is the case with a conventional attack, increasing the possibility 
that the device might be discovered in the meantime. Secondly, it is 
clear that m artyrdom  is no t solely the province of extremely 
committed religious adherents. Although religion remains the chief 
m otivation of suicide-terrorists, individuals w illing to sacrifice 
themselves for such an attack could also come from a much wider, 
secular, background.
There are several examples of mass-suicides, usually in a religious or 
cult context, from Masada in 73 CE through Jim Jones Peoples Temple 
in 1977 to the Branch Davidians at Waco in 1993.436 While the
435 June Leavitt, "Maze of terror: A settler's diary. Fear and faith in a West Bank 
settlement", US News & World Report. April 18,1994, p 58.
436 On April 19,1993,86 people, including 24 children, were killed in an inferno at the 
Branch Davidians compound in Waco, Texas. Only nine members of the cult survived. It 
was the culmination of a 51-day standoff that had previously peaked on February 28 in 
a 45 minute exchange of fire between agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms and those in the compound. Four ATF officers and six cultists died and 16 were 
injured in this exchange and estimates of the number of rounds fired during it vary from 
10,000 to 1,500. US Congress. House Tudiciary Committee. "Events Surrounding The 
Branch Davidian Cult Standoff In Waco, Texas", 103rd Congress, 1st Session, April 28 
1993, pp. 3-5, 13, 130-131. The official assessments of whether David Koresh, cult 
leader, was suicidal also vary. However, he did believe himself to be Cod or the Son of 
Cod, and repeatedly used apocolyptic Biblical passages in his sermons, and was 
apparently determined not to be taken alive. Ibid., pp. 6, 124, 133. It is clear though 
that discipline in the compound was tight: between February 28 and March 23, 21 
children and 14 adults were permitted to leave the besieged compound, possibly 
expelled by Koresh for indiscipline. It is this possiblity that subsequently fuelled  
speculation that a mass suicide was an option. Ibid.. pp. 15,146. The cause of the fire on 
April 19 is the greatest source of controversy. The FBI claim that their helicoptor 
surveillance captured at least three of the fires being started deliberately by cult 
members. This is supported by the fact that the compound had apparently been doused
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religious aspect is obviously important, peer pressure seems to have 
been as vital in the decisions of people to voluntarily take their own 
l i v e s  .4 3 7  The threat to commit suicide remains as a potent weapon to 
groups: in April 1982 Rabbi Kahane's followers in Kach barricaded 
themselves underground in Yamit, as a protest at the Israeli withdraw 
from Sinai. The event achieved widespread coverage and Kahane was 
rushed from New York by the Israeli governm ent to negotiate a 
resolution to the situation. The action was unsuccessful in achieving a 
cessation of the withdrawal, but it did raise the profile of the group and 
their c a u s e . 4 3 8  However, the opportunity to commit mass-suicide does 
not appear to be an obvious motivation for an act of nuclear terrorism. 
There have been groups, such as Aum Shinrikyo, that attem pted to 
cause m assive casualties to hasten  A rm ageddon, as well as 
organisations in which everyone killed themselves, but there is little 
evidence, as yet, of terrorists that combine both elements, seeking, 
Samson-like, to destroy their enemies along with themselves.
The Objective Of Religious Terrorism
The primary concern of most religious radical movements is to save 
their own culture from  the dangers of apostates w ith in  the 
community, rather than from the influence of infidels w ithout it.439 
Juergensmeyer cites the example of Sikh extremists, who find that:
in petrol and by survivors who heard other cultists shouting: "The fire is lit, the fire is 
lit" and by one survivor's account that states that Koresh told his disciples to: "Stay 
put, do nothing, wait until you see God. Cod is coming, the end is nigh." All of this 
strongly suggests a mass suicide, rather than a tragic combination of unforseeable 
circumstances. Furthermore, there can be no doubt that Koresh him self commited 
suicide, since he died from gunshot wounds to his head, rather than from the effects of 
the fire. However, the other possibility is that the fire started as a result either of 
the FBI's use of tear gas or that in breaching the compound walls with their tanks, the 
FBI knocked over something flammable, such as a paraffin lamp. Since the compound 
was undeniably full of combustables such as ammunition, paraffin and petrol, this 
cannot be wholly dismissed as a possibility. Alan Hamilton, Martin Fletcher & Giles 
Whittell, "Dispute still rages over Waco inferno". The Times, April 20 1995.
437 Taylor, "The Terrorist", pp. 118-119.
438 Raphael Cohen-Almagor, "Vigilant Jewish Fundamentalism: From The JDL To 
Kach (or 'Shalom Jews, Shalom Dogs')", Terrorism & Political Violence. Volume 4, 
Number 1, (Spring 1992), pp. 51-52.
439 For example, Benazir Bhutto claims that Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of the WTC 
bombing, targeted her in 1993 because she was a moderate Muslim leader who was 
friendly to the West. However, the accuracy of her accusation is perhaps questionable, 
certainly Pakistani police found little proof of such a plot. John-Thor Dahlberg, 
"Bhutto Says Trade Center Suspect Also Targeted Her", Los Angeles Times. March 19. 
1995.
137
"secularism is as much a threat as Hinduism, and like fundamentalist 
movements in many other parts of the world, Sikh traditionalists have 
seen the secular government as the perpetrator of a dangerous anti- 
religious ideology that threatens the existence of such traditional 
religious comm unities as their own. "440 External enemies are of 
secondary importance to internal ones, and violence can easily become 
fratricidal; hence the need in G irard’s view for external sacrifices.44i 
The Shiite case provides evidence for this: when in the late 1980s it 
became clear that self-sacrifices were not achieving their military 
objectives, they were banned by Islamic clerics because they had lost 
their value as acts of war and become merely wasteful of life. In 
January 1989, several hundred Hizbollah fighters entered villages in 
southern Lebanon and slaughtered the followers of the rival Amal 
movement in their sleep. The two groups were contesting the ground 
that the Israelis left as they withdrew from southern Lebanon, and the 
conflict between the Shiite organisations threatened to destroy the 
community. Clerics appealed for an end to violence and banned the 
killing of a Muslim by a Muslim, but it had little effect: passions were 
deep-running and the self-sacrificing operations had suggested that one 
Muslim might legitimately kill another in the name of Islam. Girard 
argues that "the eroding of the sacrificial system seems to result in the 
emergence of reciprocal violence. Neighbours who have previously 
discharged their mutual aggressions on a third party, joining together 
in the sacrifice of an 'outside' victim, now turn to sacrificing one 
another."442 Another aspect of the same phenomenon is the way that 
individuals seeking to exit the organisation are treated. Some of the 
reasons for this are those that apply to secular terrorist groups: exit 
offers an increased risk of discovery and persecution by the enemies of 
the cause. As an additional factor though, as well as rejecting the group, 
the exiting individual may also be perceived to be rejecting the beliefs 
of the organisation. Effectively, they become apostates of the worst 
kind. An extreme example is that of the Aum Shinrikyo cult which 
kept its ordinary members subdued tlirough a poor diet; drugs, little 
sleep and other various bizarre methods such as the "Perfect Salvation 
Initiation (PSI)", an electrified skull cap that administered shocks to the
440 Juergensmeyer, "The Logic...", p. 173.
441 Emmanuel Sivan, "The Mythologies Of Religious Radicalism: Judaism & Islam” in 
M. Juergensmeyer (ed.), "Violence & The Sacred...", p. 84.
442 Kramer,. "Sacrifice...", pp. 43-45.
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member to harmonise their thought waves with that of cult leader 
Shoko Asahara.443 The cult became increasingly violent in dealing 
with dissent, attempts to leave or members who became excessively 
weak or mentally unbalanced by their experience w ithin Aum. They 
were murdered, or made to "disappear. "444 There are similarities in the 
example of the Branch Davidians at Waco: there, ordinary members 
were controlled by rationing their food; newcomers were gradually 
relieved of their assets; all male members of the cult had to be celibate 
except Koresh who could take as many wives as he wanted. He claimed 
to be the Lamb of God, that he alone could understand the Scriptures, 
Ms interpretations of wMch varied. There is no doubt, though, that Ms 
knowledge of them was formidable. Increasingly, he became fixated 
with the Apocalypse, focusing the cult in a shared vision that further 
severed the links between the group and the outside world in a cycle of 
paranoia, melodrama and shared catastrophe.445 He kept the cult in 
constant fear. "He developed a crisis mentality, constantly talking about 
the end of the world, telling [his followers] they always had to be ready 
for the aggressors who would come from without the walls to destroy 
them ."446 In tMs context, the events of April 19, 1993, may very well 
have seemed like the beginmng of the Last Days to members of the 
Branch Davidians in the compound, and may explain why so few 
attempted to leave during the siege, or even escape as it burned.
Although the prim ary concern might be religious purity w ithin a
religion, tMs does not preclude an outward focus too. The reason may
reflect a Girardian desire to sMft violent conflict onto an external body;
but it is more likely that it stems from a belief that it is necessary to
attack the cause of godlessness, corrupting parts of the religion, at its
root. Certainly, such an attitude would seem to be supported by
statements such as that contained in the letter given to the hostage,
JoMi McCarthy, on his release, to pass on to the UN Secretary General: 
TMs is a message for mankind, that they may thereby be 
warned, that they may know that there is but one God, and 
that men of understanding may ponder it.
443 Kaplan & Marshall, The Cult... pp. 32-33 and 62.
444 Ibid. pp. 35-37 and 114.
445 Richard Lacayo, "In The Grip Of A Psychopath", Time, May 31993, pp. 34-35.
446 Barbara Kantowitz, Andrew Murr, Peter Annin, Ginny Carroll and Tony Clifton, 
"The Messiah of Waco", Newsweek. March 15 1993, p. 56.
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The United Nations... has become a plaything in the hands 
of the Superpowers, particularly America, the Great Satan, 
since your organisation has become merely a cover to protect 
the interests of w orld im perialism , and suppress the 
m ovem ent of the oppressed peoples yearning for the 
achievement of their independence...
We appeal to you... and to the world as a whole, to adopt 
Islam as an ideology, a code of law, and a system and to 
follow the teachings of the great Imam Khomeini...
The u p ris in g  of peop le  seeking to achieve self- 
d e te rm in a tio n , recover th e ir s to len  freed o m  and  
independence, sever their links of dependence on the 
imperious states and ensure that the principles of justice are 
put into practice, is not terrorism: it is a legitimate right. If the 
slogan of the need to combat international terrorism is an 
attempt to divert us from our course o£ jihad  in the face of 
international arrogance, we will continue along the difficult 
path that we have chosen for ourselves, w ithout giving an inch.447
The language of this statement is significant since it demonises Islam's 
western enemies and therefore increases the perceived legitimacy of 
attacking them and thus the ease of doing so. Ramzi Yousef justified 
attacks on the US because of W estern support of Israel against the 
Palestinians and Lebanese and because it was of the "'utm ost 
importance' for the world to know that Muslims would never agree to 
give up J e r u s a l e m .  "4 4 8  As with secular terrorism, religious terrorists 
need to use instruments of guilt avoidance: reducing the opponent to 
an abstraction; transposing blame onto the victims and the enemy; and 
self-justification and restatement of the validity of the cause. Religious 
violence offers its perpetrator a greater opportunity for vengeance on 
their enemy than they would otherwise have. As with all terrorism, it 
gives them an influence and impact that is out of proportion to their 
size or voice in the political process. Furthermore, although it is 
unlikely that terrorists would resort to such indiscriminate methods 
against members of their own community, for fear of injuring the just, 
it is entirely plausible to suggest, particularly in view of the absolutist 
nature of many religious terrorists' beliefs, that acts of mass destructive 
terrorism could be used in an attem pt to destroy as m uch of a 
corrupting infidel as possible.
447 Cited in Peter Janke, "Terrorism: Trends & Growth?" RUSI Tournai. August 1993. p. 
25.
448 Washington Post. "World Trade Center Bombing Statement", March 25 1995.
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In some cases, violence is given a cleansing, redemptive property by
religions groups. Rabbi Meir Kahane argued that the Holocaust was a
natural product of anti-Semitism that could occur in any "normal"
society and therefore could recur; it left almost irreparable damage in
the Israeli nation's collective psyche that could only be redressed by
concrete revenge, a physical humiliation of the Gentiles. Peaceful
liberation of the Promised Land was insufficient; it required a military
force to awe the world, "a fist in the face of the Gentile". 4^9 por this
reason, Kahane attempted to put his teachings into practice by creating
a violent order that made anti-Gentile violence and terror the norm;
this was reflected in Ms involvement with groups such as the JDL and
Kach. He argued that "Jewish violence in the defence of Jewish
interests is never bad" because it was an extension of Ahavat Israel
(Jewish love) wMch requires Jews to care for and help one another
regardless of the circumstances involved.450 Unlike Fanon, who also
espoused violence as a therapeutic recompense for years of oppression
and mistreatment,45i Kahane's theory of violence is almost cosmic, it
is an insatiable desire for revenge wMch goes beyond time and space
and becomes metaMstorical. An example of tMs approach is;
The bitter battle some 2500 years ago was between those Jews 
who sought to create a truly Jewish culture and society as 
opposed to those who sought to be Greek in form and idea. 
The latter came to be known as the Hellenists and the real 
battle of the Maccabees was against them, against the 
perversion and corruption of the Jewish people into a 
hideous, Hebrew caricature of foreign, gentilized, culture. 
That is precisely w hat the struggle is today in the Jewishstate .45 2
By contrast, Fanon’s theory is whoUy rooted in a specific situation: the 
anti-colonial struggle in Africa. Kahane’s violence is not political; it 
stems from the belief that anti-Semitism will continue even after the 
foundation of the Israeli state. Gentiles will continue to wish to 
desecrate the name of God through the humiliation and persecution of 
His people until the arrival of the Messiah and the redemption of the 
world. This means that Jews should fight Gentiles wherever they are
449 Sprinzak, "Violence p. 51.
450 Ibid, pp. 54-56.
451 See Frantz Fanon, The Wretched Of The Earth. (London: Penguin Books, 1967.)
452 Meir Kahane, Forty Years. (Miami Beach: Institute of the Jewish Idea, 1983), p. 36.
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and since such violence is always legitimate, there is no need to worry 
about legality or restraints.453
A Comparison Of Religious & Secular Terrorism
There are, however, some clear similarities in motivations between 
these religiously-motivated terrorists and their secular counterparts: 
both  experience a key event that altered their perspective and 
willingness to take action (der sprung); the need for recognition and 
praise in their community; the use of role models and imitation of 
them; and aspects of "survivor guilt", manifested in the need to 
avenge fallen colleagues or coreligionists. A variant of survivor guilt is 
provided by several religions' historical traditions, and this may be 
instrumental in the resort to violence in some cases. Shiite Muslims 
bear communal guilt for failing to defend one of the founders of their 
tradition, Husain, when he was killed by the evil Yazid. By identifying 
subsequent enemies of Shiism as Yazids returned, and then attacking 
them, Shiites might hope to right an ancient wrong. The denial and 
betrayal of Christ by early Christians, and the individual responsibility 
for that which is an aspect of subsequent Christianity has led some 
Christians to violent anti-Semitism, believing that it was to the Jews 
that Christ was delivered by such n e g l i g e n c e . 4 5 4
Religious terrorists can be seen to be similar to nationalist-separatist 
terrorists in their use of violence as a means of attacking authority 
wliilst reinforcing their place in their community and therefore it 
might be possible to argue that religious terrorism is as motivated by 
the need to establish identity as is secular terrorism. The role of the 
group in the move to violence is also key in the case of these suicide- 
terrorists. After selecting those who will embark on such missions, the 
group takes the suicide to a secret place where they are isolated with 
their trainers and instructed in the use of the explosive device and on 
how to react in various possible situations; and at the same time the 
suicide bomber undergoes a process of indoctrination and purification, 
climaxing on the day of the action.455 Some of the trainees also 
undergo an initiation to test their nerve: two 17-year olds, captured
453 sprinzak, "Violence...", pp. 63-66.
454 juergensmeyer, "The Logic...", p. 187.
455 Ben-Yishal,"Anatomy of a Suicide"
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before they could go on a Hamas suicide mission, told of being taken to
a graveyard at night and then buried alive until dawn with just a small
breathing h o l e  456 The role of secrecy and mutual trust is vital too, and
often arises from personal and family connections: for example, one
trio of bom bers in  M arch 1996 were two cousins and their
n e i g h b o u r  4 5 7  Clearly the group plays a central role in directing and
focusing the actions of the prospective terrorist towards their violent
objective. In some cases, the group may also prey on the weaknesses of
potential members. An Australian Federal Police psychologist, asked to
profile members of the Aum cult, wrote that there was:
[N]o specific psychological profile that w ould predict a 
person's susceptibility for recruitment to the sect, although 
many sect members would have their personal, emotional, 
social and intellectual needs satisfied.
The rec ru itm en t of m em bers could  target people 
experiencing an existential or personal crisis which would 
provide an illusion of support, meaning, value or p o w e r .4 5 8
Taylor & Quayle argue that the behaviour of religious fundamentalists 
has similar qualities to that of "normal" people, differing along a 
con tinuum , ra th e r  th an  d iffering  in abso lu te  term s. The 
fundamentalist's behaviour is closely controlled by a limited set of 
rules that are tightly interrelated and relatively limited in scope. The 
rules are obviously different, but psychologically there is relatively 
little difference between a religious fundamentalist and a "normal" 
person, constrained by the rules and norms that govern everyday 
l i f e . 459 Religious violence also has the same degree of opportunism on 
both an individual and institutional level that applies to secular 
political violence. This reflects that in many cases, individuals wait 
until there is a movement to join, a ground swell, before acting because 
it is easier, both psychologically and instrumentally, to challenge the 
existing order as a member of a group than as an individual. Until that 
exists, even if they are severely discontented, it is certainly safer to
456 Sunday Times. "Wedded to Death "
457 Ibid.
458 u s  Senate Committe on Government Affairs. Permanent Subcommittee On 
Investigations. "Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction", 104th Congress, 
1st Session, US Congress, 104th Congress 1st Session, October 31 and November 1 1995, p. 
656.
459 Taylor & Quayle, Terrorist Lives, pp. 219-220.
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conform to societal norms and avoid such v i o l e n c e .4 6 0  is obvious 
that terrorism is situationally dependent: as an example, the extreme 
right in Israel grew greatly in strength after the 1967 Six Day War 
because it offered fresh hope to territorial maximalists and enabled the 
principle of an undivided Eretz Yisrael to become a central tenet of 
m odern Z i o n i s m . 461  For the extreme right, the victories of 1967 were 
nothing less than the hand of God assisting His people to reclaim 
another portion of land lost, by the pragmatism of Ben-Gurion and the 
betrayals of the UN, to the Arabs. Gush Emunim, founded in 1974, was 
able to exploit the idea of a Greater Israel to make political capital from 
the 1978 Camp David Accords that seemed to pose a threat to the gains 
of 1967. However, Gush Emunim and Kach form only a small part of 
those committed to Greater Eretz Yisrael, It also incorporates the radical 
leaders of the political parties Tehiya, Moledet and Tzomet, as well as 
elements within Likud, all of whom support the cause for reasons not 
related to religious f u n d a m e n t a l i s m .4 6 2  Organisations such as Gush 
Em unim  can, in such circum stances, be view ed as extremist 
beneficiaries of a more widespread movement.
Hoffman suggests that religious terror is significantly different from its 
secular counterpart in a num ber of key aspects. Whereas, in secular 
terrorism, violence usually begins as an instrument and may become 
an end in itself, in religious terrorism, violence is predom inantly a 
sacramental act or divine duty carried out in response to a theological
460 In tills, identification of the moment for dissent is clearly vital and it is here that 
the role of leadership is critical. Such leaders obviously cannot be effective if there is 
no background discontent, although it need not be overt. However, they do have a major 
effect in moulding and enliancing the effects of existing discontent. To do tliis, they must 
ensure that the continuation of the status quo no longer seems inevitable by emphasising 
the extent of Iiidden support the dissenting movement has; they must shape people's 
private preferences by finding flaws in the existing order and making people believe 
that they would be better off under a new regime; and enliance the benefits of siding 
with the opposition, both in positive and negative terms, emphasising the costs of not 
being on the right side when the opposition triumphs. See Timur Kuran, "Sparks & 
Prairie Fires: A Theory Of Unanticipated Political Violence", Public Choice. Volume 
61, (1989), pp. 41-74 or "The Element Of Surprise In The Eastern European Revolutions 
Of 1989", World Politics. Volume 44, (1991), pp. 7-48. An adaption of Timur's public 
preference falsification hypothesis can be found in Martha Crenshaw, "Political 
Violence In Algeria ", Terrorism & Political Violence. Volume 6 Number 3, (Autumn 
1994), pp. 261-280.
461 A good, if general, discussion of this development can be found in: Thomas 
Friedman, From Beirut To Terusalem. (New York: Doubleday, 1989), pp. 251-321.
462 Richard D. Hecht, "The Political Cultures of Israel's Radical Right: Commentary 
on Ehud Sprinzak’s The Ascendance of Israel’s Radical Right ", Terrorism & Political 
Violence. Volume 5 Number 1, (Spring 1993), pp. 135-137.
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imperative.463 Rapoport sees this transcendental source of religious 
terrorism as its most distinguisliing feature. It is the deity that has a 
decisive impact on the determination of means and ends, in contrast to 
the modern secular-motivated terrorist for whom political ends are the 
objective and are to be achieved wholly through hum an efforts.464 
Fromm notes that religion can have such an influence that it can even 
impel a parent to injure their child; one Biblical example would be that 
of Abraham and Isaac. Fromm's point is that the m an in such a 
situation is completely devoted to his religious system and is not cruel, 
although he may seem so to those outside of that system. Instead, he is 
operating within the parameters of his system.465 Tins characteristic 
means that religious-motivated terrorists may be less constrained by 
the moral, political or practical obstacles that impede other terrorists. 
Religion is a legitimising force, it can morally justify and even require 
the sort of indiscriminate or mass destructive violence that most 
secular terrorists would regard as immoral and counter-productive. 
This is because the constituencies of the two varieties of terrorism 
differ so greatly. Secular terrorists attempt to appeal to their actual or 
potential sympathisers, the people they claim to defend or speak for; in 
almost all cases, it is assumed that perpetrators only mean to harm 
their victims incidentally. It is the public that is the primary object of 
the action.466 Religious terro rists, on the o th er hand , are 
simultaneously both the perpetrator and the audience; they comprise 
the constituents themselves. Post believes that in the case of religious 
terrorists, the intended audience is the deity.467 This is im portant 
because, whereas usually the symbolic and the audience-oriented 
aspects of terrorism are separate, in the case of religious-inspired 
violence, the two are synonymous. The need to gear action to what the 
terrorist believes the audience considers appropriate is therefore 
removed as a constraining influence in the case of religious terror. This 
clearly increases the possibility that religion could be used as a 
justification for nuclear terrorism. The level of symbolism in much 
religiously-motivated terrorism is high. In the case of groups such as
463 Hoffman, '"Holy Terror’...", p. 272.
464 Rapoport, "Fear & Trembling...", p. 674.
465Promm,The Anatomy.... p. 243.
466 Rapoport, "Fear & Trembling...", p. 660.
467 Jerroid M. Post, "Fundamentalism & The Justification Of Terrorist Violence", 
Terrorism. Volume 11 Number 5, p. 369.
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Kach or Gush Emunim, the Land of Israel is key: one of the latter's 
rabbis wrote in Nekuda that "the land is the goal and the state is 
nothing but the means to achieve this g o a l " .4 6 8  The symbols of force 
and power are harnessed to intense symbolic nostalgia for the past, 
represented by the land. The messianic Jews believe that it is only 
through the land that redem ption will c o m e . 4 6 9  Other examples 
include striking at the heart of enemy territory, at the root of the 
perceived evil: an Islamic group attacking the World Trade Center in 
1992 is a good case of tliis. The timing of an attack may also be highly 
symbolic: for instance, the upsurge in Hamas violence in February 1996 
coincided with the second amiiversary of the massacre in H e b r o n . 4 7 0
Furthermore, in some extreme cases, the act of religious terrorism may 
have no political purpose at all: the aim is purely the satisfaction of 
religious objectives: the Thugs would be an example of this.47i This is 
not to suggest that no religious terrorism has a secular audience: in 
contrast to the Thugs, the Assassins and the Zealot-Sicariis had a 
hum an audience of importance. To some extent, this reflects the 
difference between terrorist sects based on the Hindu religion, where 
there is no ground for believing that the world can be changed so the 
Thugs were convinced their role was simply to maintain the world in 
balance, and Islam or Judaism where the possibilities for radical attacks 
are intrinsic to the concept of unfulfilled divine promises. Since the 
promises are known to every member of the religious community, the 
Islamic and Jewish terrorist has a human audience not present for their 
H indu counterparts.472 in some cases, this hum an audience has an 
important impact on the tactics or targeting employed, in the same way 
that it does in the case of secular terrorism: Islamic Jihad, unlike 
Hamas, does distinguish in its attacks between civilians and soldiers or 
settlers, trying to avoid victims from the former type. This may reflect 
that the relatively small group is keen to avoid incurring the 
condem nation  of the P a les tin ian  m ajority  w ho reject the 
indiscriminate killing of women and children.473 Even here though, it
468 Cited in Hecht, "Israel's Radical Right...", p. 143.
469 Ibid. pp. 154-157.
470 Ranstorp, "Terrorism in the Name...", p. 61.
471 Rapoport, "Fear & Trembling...", p. 662.
4^  ^Ibid, p. 673.
473 Ben-Yishal, "Anatomy..."
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remains that the prime object is not the secular audience as it is with 
non-religious terrorism. However, such considerations do play a role, 
and would make it much less likely that a group such as Islamic Jihad 
would resort to the sort of widespread and wholly indiscriminate attack 
that is necessarily implied in an act of mass destructive terrorism.
There is an absence of conflict for true believers whose actions are
reaffirmed by clerical authority as being consistent w ith the word of
God and His m i s s i o n . 4 7 4  Wieviorka claims that:
[There is] no dissociation between perpetrators of violence, 
clergy, or their communal constituency. Here we find a 
powerful band of unity between both religious and secular 
leaders, violent insurgent groups, and a given popularbase.475
However, this does not, as W ieviorka suggests,476 m ean that 
sociologically speaking, the actor cannot be regarded as a terrorist since 
it is the action, rather than the extent or nature of support, that is the 
defining principle.
One key similarity between religious and secular terrorism is that they 
both operate within the bounds of perceived rationality: the "mad 
bomber" is no more an aspect of the former than it is of the latter. 
Instead, as has been demonstrated, they represent a differing value 
system from that considered conventional. An example would be 
Yehuda Etzion, ideologist of Kach, who, w hen asked w hether he 
respected the legitimacy of the government, replied that he recognised 
its legitimacy as the sovereign, but not the legitimacy of every law it 
passed, each of which had to be analysed separately to see if it was 
compatible with the Law of the Torah. When the government disobeys 
the Law, it disobeys God and brings anarchy. If it did so, it lost any legal 
or moral right to the obedience of the people who wished to live 
according to the Law, and who therefore had a duty to oppose such a 
government by whatever means n e c e s s a r y .4 7 7  Even where, as in the 
case of the Thugs, no political objective is discernible, this rationality 
exists. Rapoport quotes two 19th Century British observers of the Thug 
cult:
474 Post, "Fimdamentalism...'V p. 370.
475 Wieviorka, The Making.... p. 264.
476 Ibid.
477 Cited in Cohen-Almagor, "Vigilant..", pp. 54-55.
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"Whatever the true source may be, (the system) is beyond all 
doubt the work of a man of genius, no ordinary man could 
have fenced and regulated it with so elaborate a code of rules 
- rules which the Thugs seem to believe are of divine origin, 
but in each of which we can trace a shrewd practical purpose." 
"Ridiculous as their superstitions must appear... they serve 
the most important purposes of cementing the union of the 
gang, of kindling courage, and confidence; and by an appeal to 
religious texts deem ed infallible of im parting to their 
atrocities the semblance of divine sanction."478
On an individual level, some of the m otivations for religious 
involvement are similar to those that impel activity in secular terrorist 
organisations. Erikson's hypothesis of the need by some (mostly young) 
people for identity applies equally in the case of extremist religions and 
may offer a partial explanation of the recruitment of individuals into 
such g r o u p s . 4 7 9  Individuals may be able to relieve their feelings of 
fragmented identity by adhering to an idealised self-image and by 
projecting weaknesses and faults onto scapegoats selected by the 
group's world view. The amount of relief and belonging that adherents 
feel on joining a religious group seems to be related to the extent of 
their societal alienation. They rapidly became dependent on the group 
for support and psychologically dependent on their enemies who 
symbolise evil to provide a focus and raison d'etre for the adherent's 
g r o u p . 4 8 0  The majority of Aum's members were in their early to mid 
twenties; some were dropouts from college, others already had jobs. 
Many of them were amongst the brightest of their generation and came 
from the best universities in Japan. By 1989, Aum had brilliant, highly 
qualified chemists, biologists, doctors and computer programmers at 
their disposal. Many of these recruits were attracted to the cult by the 
alternative that it offered to Japanese society that seemed to crush 
individualism; it appealed to those lost and alienated by the s y s t e m . 4 8 i  
However, Aum also targeted potential recruits: those who were young, 
lonely, financially needy, dropouts or otherwise detached from the 
norms of Japanese society were encouraged to join the cult, and then
478 Cited in Rapoport, "Fear & Trembling...", p. 663.
479 Dick Anthony & Thomas Robbins, "Religious Totalism, Violence and Exemplary 
Dualism: Beyond the Extrinsic Model" in M. Barkun (ed.) "Millennialism & Violence", 
Terrorism & Political Violence. Special Issue, Volume 7 Number 3, (Autumn 1995). pp. 
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480 Ibid.. pp. 10-50.
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found it exceptionally difficult to l e a v e . 4 8 2  As with secular terrorists, 
this has the effect of making individual terrorists far more willing to 
accept acts of violence that they might otherwise question.
Another significant similarity between religious and secular terrorism 
is the existence of inter-group rivalries; as in secular terrorism, they 
have the effect of increasing the frequency and level of violence 
employed. Amal and Hizbollah, for example, competed with each 
other for dominance in sponsoring suicide assaults. They sought to 
outdo the other in dem onstrating their capacity for mobilising the 
necessary forces for the operation. Amal and Hizbollah are fraternal 
m ovem en ts: a lleg ian ces  d iv id e d  fam ilies , v illag es and
neighbourhoods. Balance was crucial to maintaining peace between 
them and when Hizbollah initiated self-mar tyring operations, Amal 
had to follow suit. The m ilitary advantages of these became less 
significant; self-martyrdom was presented as having its own rewards. 
Therefore, the practical yield of such operations dim inished as 
Hizbollah and Amal sought to outdo the other in the frequency of their 
operations.483 This is important because it suggests that other inter and 
intra-group pressures that exist in secular groups might be just as 
prevalent within terrorist organisations with predom inantly religious 
motives. In his study of the structure of Hizbollah, Ranstorp has 
shown that such rivalry certainly applies w ith that group, and 
therefore it is almost impossible to regard it as an unitary actor. Rather, 
it is a loose coalition of Lebanese Shiite clerics, all with their own views 
and followings and all engaged in almost continuous factionalism 
amongst themselves .484 jf this is typically the case then it might be that 
the vital driving forces behind religious terrorism are psychological 
and organisational, just as they are with secular groups. This may 
mean that as rival groups seek to outdo each other in exhibiting their 
piety and fervour, they wiU resort to ever increasing levels of action, to 
attract support and new  adherents. W hat could better display 
commitment to, and a dedication to the pursuit of, the cause than an 
unsurpassed attack against the enemies of one's religion?
482 Ibid, p. 91.
483 Kramer, "Sacrifice...", pp. 40-41. For the causes of the split between Amal and 
Hizbollah, see: Ranstorp, Hizb'allah .... especially Chapter 2.
484 Magnus Ranstorp, "Hizbollah's Command Leadership: Its Structure, Decision- 
Making and Relationship with Iranian Clergy and Institutions", Terror & Political 
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This belief that organisation factors play an important role in religious
groups is supported by the example of the Branch Da vidians which
originated as a break from the Adventist Church in the 1930s, when its
founder, Victor Houteff, became obsessed with passages in the Book of
Ezekiel in which the faithful are divided from the sinful before
Jerusalem fell to the Babylonians. Convinced the Adventist Church
was sinful, Houteff established a new congregation at Waco, Texas. The
in-fighting was continued in the mid-1980s when David Koresh (then
called Vernon Howell) successfully battled for control of the cult with
George Roden, the previous l e a d e r . 4 8 5  Indeed, many underground
terrorist organisations are similar to religious cults in their redemptive
nature: dividing the world into those who are dam ned (them) and
those who are to be saved (us); being authoritarian in nature; rejecting
society; and offering solidarity and identity for their members. 486 a
good example of a secular group that contained this element of
salvation for its members is LEHL (the Stern Gang). Bell, who based his
work on interviews with former members of the group, wrote:
Everyone who came to LEHI entered into a mystical bond. All 
were dedicated to the destruction of the alien occupier and 
the creation of a Jewish state - they were a few hundred 
against an empire... Each had somehow been fired by the 
example of Stem... LEHI created a haven for those dedicated 
to the absolutes, those without restraints, for those who could 
feel in each other the dream  at work...[T]hey answered an 
ecstatic call w ithin themselves to participate in a violent 
redemption. Not only power and the state would come from 
the barrel of a gun, but also their own s a l v a t i o n . 4 8 7
In one sense, religious terrorists are quite limited in their objectives: 
they seek simply the maximum benefit for themselves and their 
coreligionists; whereas secular terrorists seek the maximum benefit for 
the greatest number possible. However, the reality of this is that secular 
terrorists (unless anarchists) tend to regard themselves as part of a 
system that they operate within and attempt to alter to their advantage; 
religious terrorists are more inclined to reject the system as a whole 
and seek to replace it with another, based on theological grounds. This 
self-perception of themselves as "outsiders" makes it easier for them to 
contemplate more deadly and extreme forms of political violence
485 Richard Layaco, "Cult of Death", Time. March 15,1993, pp. 36-37.
486 Crenshaw,"An Organizational...", pp. 481-482.
487 Bell, Terror.... p. 85.
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against a much wider-defined enemy than is the case with secular
terrorists 488
Messianism & Millennarialism
It is worth differentiating at tliis point between what Post describes as 
"message-oriented" religions, which believe that the promised future 
will occur only when all humanity hears their message, and messianic 
religions which are more prepared to emphasise the role of man in 
hastening the coming of a prophesied messiah. Messianic belief means 
that the end of the world is coming because God has promised that it is; 
and at that time. He will intervene to save only those who deserve to 
be saved. This is called millenarianism or millennialism . W hereas 
most religions are prepared to take a passive role in this respect, 
waiting in expectation, for some of the fundamentalist religions, it is 
possible to facilitate redemption, "to force the end". An example of the 
former would be Hinduism, which does have a messianic figure in the 
universal god, Vishnu, who will reappear at the time of worst distress. 
However, because this appearance is not predicted until 32,899 CE, and 
not even Vishnu can break the endless cosmic cycle and bring eternal 
redem ption, the idea of a m essiah figure is not significant in 
Hinduism. Likewise, in orthodox Buddhism, there is little need for a 
messiah because the emphasis is on the religious transformation of the 
individual and any change would occur only w hen a majority of 
people were inwardly reformed, an event that might not happen for 
ages to come, if ever.489 Tliis is not to deny that Hinduism and, to a 
lesser extent. Buddhism can and have been used to justify religious 
violence: for example, H indu rulers have rights and duties under 
sacred law, which if breached, justify their subjects in revolting against 
the ruler.490 However, millenarianism does not form a major part of 
either religion.
By contrast, Jewish Messianism, the belief in the heavenly ordained 
redemption of the Jewish people and the whole of mankind, is central 
to Judaism. Yahweh, as experienced by Israel in the Exodus, is a God of
488 Hoffman, ’"Holy Terror’...", p. 273.
489 GuenferLewy, Religion & Revolution, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 
pp. 13, 26-27.
490 Ibid.. pp. 13-14.
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action who expresses his power and purpose through historical events. 
There is a strong belief that God is working out his prime objective 
through hum an history and is working for the good of his chosen 
people. Yahweh is completely distinct from the world and completely 
supreme, and uses King-Messiah figures (David is the most important 
of these) as political and spiritual heads, whilst Yahweh remains the 
redeemer. The "Day of Yahweh" (Amos 5:18) speaks of God executing 
judgement and on that day the messianic era will become a fact.49i The 
traditional concept of it, especially following the failure of the Zealot's 
rising, involved a passive and apolitical attitude, while Jews awaited 
the coming of the M e s s i a h . 4 9 2  However, religious Zionism, as 
expounded by groups such as Gush Emunim, introduced a political 
element into that tradition by insisting on the religious right and duty 
of Jews in the post-emancipation period to actively participate in the 
God-ordained national redemption process, to be achieved by poHtical, 
economic and other means to resettle Jews in the land of Israel, and 
regain their national i n d e p e n d e n c e . 4 9 3  Rabbi Kahane developed his 
theory of "catastrophic Messianism" in his essays "Israel's Eternity and 
Victory" and "Numbers 23:9" based on the passage of Isaiah "In its 
tim e, I will hu rry  it (the Redem ption)" and the Rabbinical 
interpretation of the passage "If they, the Jews, merit it I will hurry it. If 
they do not merit it, it will come 'in its time'". He argued that although 
the redemption was inevitable, Jews had a choice how and w hen.it 
would occur: if they repented, then it would come quickly and 
painlessly, otherwise it would be preceded by a period of great troubles
and strife.494
As with Judaism, Christianity has a rich tradition of divinely-inspired 
radical movements, dating back to the earliest church. The synoptic 
Gospels predict the early realisation of the heavenly kingdom, as Christ 
returned and consum mated the messianic vision. Likewise, Paul 
assured the Thessalonians that the Second Coming was near and that
491 Ibid.. pp. 32-36.
492 Tbe Book of Lamentations (3:25-27) says the "The Lord is good to those whose hope 
is in liim, to the one who seeks him; it is good to wait quietly for the salvation of the 
Lord. It is good for a man to bear the yoke while he is young."
493 Eliezer Don-Yehiya, "Jewish Messianism, Religious Zionism And Israeli Politics: 
The Impact & Origins Of Gush Emunim", Middle Eastern Studies. Volume 23, Number 2, 
(April 1987) pp. 222-223.
494 Sprinzak, "Violence...", p. 53.
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he and many of them would live to see the day (1 Thessalonians 4:13- 
17). Just as much of the Old Testament deals with the tribulations of 
the Jewish nation; so too do the persecutions of the early Christians 
inspire apocalyptic writing, the best known of which is the Book of 
Revelation, written to comfort Christians suffering for their faith. It 
contains multiple references to the impending Second Coming: "The 
Lord, the God of the spirits of the prophets, sent his angel to show his 
servants the things that m ust soon take place."(22:6); "The time is 
near"(22:10); or "Behold, I am coming soon!"(22:12). Christ will defeat 
Satan and establish his kingdom on earth for 1000 years. After that will 
be the Last Judgement and then the new heaven and earth predicted in 
Isaiah 65:17. Mainstream Christianity also espouses a passive waiting 
for the coming, of salvation through faith alone. Christians must stand 
firm and continue to follow the teachings of Christ, until He comes 
again (2 Thessalonians 2:15). Neither are Christians to resist the 
established authorities (Romans 13:1-2), but they do have a liigher 
loyalty to the principles of Christianity, so must "obey God rather than 
men" (Acts 5:29).495 None of this calls for a proactive stance, to speed 
the Coming, but it is a constant theme throughout the New Testament 
to be ready, to "keep watch, because you do not know the day or the 
hour" (Matthew 25:13).
Islamic millenarian movements are predom inantly associated with 
Shia Muslims who believe that eventually a M ahdi (Messiah or 
Rightly Guided One) will emerge to lead a cleansing holy war against 
the Islamic orthodox establishment. This jihad (armed revolutionary 
struggle) is essential in Mahdist theory as the m ethod to achieve a 
perfected social order.496 One method of doing this is to remove or 
eliminate those who interfere w ith the propagation of the Truth.497 
There is no m ention of a M ahdi in either the Koran or in the 
collections of the Prophet's teachings. Lewy suggests this may be 
because in orthodox Islam, the faithful are saved by their membership 
of the Islamic community. The first Mahdi was Mohammed, the son of 
Ali (the Prophet Mohammed's son-in-law). This Mohammed was the 
first of a line of infallible leaders or Imams. The twelfth of these is
495 Lewy, R e lig io n ..pp.38-41.
496 Rapoport, "Fear & Trembling...", p. 665.
497 Post, "Fundamentalism...", p. 370.
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expected to return to earth, from heaven, as the Mahdi, to establish an 
era of righteousness. Eventually, messianic traditions established 
themselves in the beliefs of many Sunni Muslims too, and the role of 
the Mahdi developed from merely a just and righteous sovereign into 
a redeemer of the faithful.498
Not all messianic beliefs result in terrorism.499 They are not essentially 
or inherently violent; most of their adherents must be pushed before 
resorting to such extremes of action. However, such beliefs do create a 
background conducive to violence by polarising society and thereby 
exacerbating existing tensions.^oo Messianism appeals because although 
many established religions preach that the timing of the Messiah's 
coming is preordained, they also encourage the belief that the righteous 
and the wicked have different fates. Logically then, an individual's 
actions do count, and this makes it impossible for some who believe 
that the Coming is imminent to wait passively, because the risks of 
being mistaken are so momentous. At the least, they m ust work to 
ensure their own salvation; action is imperative.^oi There is also a 
need to "prove" faith to God through acts that display m oral 
worthiness. An example of this was in the 1st Century when the 
Zealots burned their own food supplies after Jerusalem was taken, to 
indicate that they had placed all their faith in God and that that faith 
was unshakeable. They believed that He was bound to act since He had 
promised to rescue the righteous remnant. In effect, it was an attempt 
to blackmail God into action, and was perceived as such by most 
rabbis.502 However, it is possible to prove faith with God by inaction 
too: Jesus' disciples were explicitly told not to take up arms, but to await 
the justice of God.503 Rapoport suggests that Messianic followers, 
believing that the time was near, tend to resort to one of two methods 
for "seeing the process in": pacifism or violence. The two responses are 
not as diametrically opposed as might at first seem to be the case since 
both reflect a rejection of conventional actions. Which is chosen at any
498 Lewy, Religion.... pp. 51-52.
499 David C. Rapoport, "Why Does Religious Messianism Produce Terror?" in 
Wilkinson & Stewart feds). Contemporary Research On Terrorism
500 Jean E. Rosenfeld, "Pai Marire: Peace and Violence in a N ew  Zealand Millenarian 
Tradition" in Barkun (ed.), M illennialism..., p. 86.
501 Rapoport, "Why Does Religious...", pp. 77-78.
502 p. 81.
503 Rosenfeld, "Pai Marire...", pp. 96-97.
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given point is, to some extent, a matter of timing. The major revealed 
religions all contain doctrinal images of both "the suffering servant" 
and "the avenging angel", the latter usually being reserved for the final 
days and the former appropriate only while waiting for the messianic 
activity to begin. Therefore, a choice between the two is dependant on 
the stage that the group believes the messianic process is at; and it is 
possible for such organisations to move between the two, based on the 
belief that they were formerly mistaken about the stage.504 Kaplan 
points out that this is an aspect of millenarian groups within White 
Supremacist movements in the United States. By the 1980s, they were 
bitterly split on the violence issue, due to differing interpretations of 
inerrant texts.505 Overall, they tend towards a quietist position, 
withdrawing to the greatest possible degree from a society that is 
inherently contaminating. Occasionally, they appear as activists or 
even as violent centres of revolutionary activism, before retiring back 
into withdrawal.506 Rosenfeld suggests that millenarian movements 
may still incite violence by withdrawing, if they proclaim allegiance to 
a higher law, effectively rejecting society and declaring their own
theocracy.507
Both Islam and Judaism contain examples of pacifist and violent 
groups. Members of Gush Emunim believe that it is possible to shape 
the messianic process and are zealous in prom oting the messianic 
convictions of the order, to the extent of organising the "Jewish 
Underground" and the "Temple M ount Plot", terrorist activities 
directed against the Palestinians. The Haredi tend towards the other 
extreme, believing it presumptuous for humans to attempt to alter the 
messianic process, so they w ithdraw from a Jewish state they do not 
recognise, usually only acting to prevent Jews around them from 
breaching sacred laws. In Islam, the entire Shia community moves at 
irregular intervals between passive and active phases, the latter usually 
accompanied by violence. Some Sunni m illenarian sects follow a 
similar pattern.508 Most messianic visions associate the destruction of
504 Rapoport, "Why Does Religious...", p. 79. I
505 Jeffrey Kaplan, "The Context Of American Millenarian Revolutionary Theology: |
The Case Of The 'Identity Christian' Church Of Israel", Terrorism & Political i
Violence. Volume 5, Number 1, (Spring 1993), p. 56. I
506 Kaplan, 'The Context... ", p. 31. ;
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the old order and the birth of the new with a series of cataclysmic 
disasters: a sign of deliverance is therefore a period of unsurpassed 
woe. This encourages people to commission and commit atrocities 
because if the fulfilment of the Promise is dependent on life being as 
terrible as possible, violence has no limits because it cannot be 
associated w ith principles that dem and cession or m oderation of 
action. If disasters do not bring forth the Promise, it may be that life is 
not yet terrible enough, more suffering and violence are r e q u i r e d . 5 0 9  
However, the failure of messianic activity to occur can also lead to great 
disappointm ent amongst the believers, and w ith it, a search for 
explanations.510 A common one is to believe that traitors were 
responsible, possibly with severe consequences for those who have 
been seen to have betrayed the cause. There is a tendency to perceive 
the enemy as wholly evil, always dangerous and thus to be ruthlessly 
destroyed since there is a belief by the group in the righteousness of 
themselves and their cause.^H In such circumstances, it is vital to 
remove these people that are delaying or possibly even threatening 
redemption. Since their destruction is committed in the pursuit of a 
higher good, any means to achieve this is likely to be viewed as 
justified. The overt rationale for many of Aum ’s actions was also 
redemptive: Asahara chose the Hindu god of destruction, Shiva, as the 
chief deity of the cult, but was eclectic, drawing on apocalyptic aspects of 
Nostradam us and the Book of Revelations too.512 Aum saw their 
mission was to save mankind after Armageddon, and seem to have 
drawn many of their plans for this from the science fiction of Isaac 
Asimov's Foundation books.^is When a vast earthquake struck the city 
of Kobe on January 17, 1995, it served only to confirm Aum in their 
beliefs that the end was near.5i4 By that time, after their defeats in 
elections for the Diet of February 1990, Asahara and Aum, feeling 
rejected and bent on revenge, had already decided that the world as a
509 Rapoport, "Why Does Religious...", p. 83.
510 Houteff s sect, which later became the Branch Davidians, originally predicted the 
last days of creation would begin on April 22, 1959. When that failed to come to 
fruition, the group, disappointed, declined to a rump of its former self. Lacayo, "Cult..", 
p. 36.
511 Rapoport, "Why Does Religious...", pp. 84-85,
512 Kaplan & Marshall, The Cult.... pp. 14-16.
513 Ibid. pp. 29-31.
514 Ibid. p. 222.
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whole was irredeemable, and therefore needed to be destroyed.^is 
David Koresh and the Branch Davidians blended apocalyptic theology 
w ith secular survivalism, building up vast stockpiles of food and 
am m unition and constructing a fortified com pound from their 
settlement.516 Koresh claimed to be the seventh and final angel, 
destined to be the agent of God who brought about the end of the 
world.517 Later, Koresh believed himself to be God: in letters of April 10 
and 11, 1993, w ritten to his besiegers, he signed himself "Yahweh 
Koresh" and wrote "I AM your God and you will bow under my feet" 
and "You have the chance to learn My Salvation. Do not find 
yourselves to be fighting against M e "  518 Koresh's apocalyptic vision 
relied heavily on the Book of Revelation and the Seven Seals described 
there. The Federal raid and battle on February 28 signalled the opening 
of the fifth seal, after which the faithful are "told to wait a little longer, 
until the number of their fellow servants and brothers who were to be 
killed as they had been was completed" (Revelation 6:11). Koresh 
interpreted this to mean that after a short while, it would be the turn of 
the rest of the cult to die, as some had on February 28,519
As the end of the century approaches, the am ount of m illennial 
terrorism  is likely to increase, a trend that is already occurring. 
Messianism is closely associated with "signs": for example, "The Last 
Days" in the Christian, Jewish and Islamic religions tend to be 
perceived as consisting predom inantly of w orld catastrophe, of 
Armageddon, a possibility that has seemed much more real in the last 
fifty years in a nuclear world than at any time in the past. Another 
common theme in both Christian and Jewish apocalyptic prophecies is 
the restoration of a state of Israel, which has again occurred within the 
last fifty y e a r s . 5 2 0  Finally, the impact of a new millennium is likely to 
be viewed by some groups as significant and a key date in the coming 
redemption, possibly a further impetus for a c t i o n .5 2 1  Important dates 
are often a spur to messianic action: in Islam, it is prophesied that a 
Mahdi will come at the start of a century, according to the Islamic
545 Ibid. pp. 34 & 46-48.
546 Lacayo, "Cult...", p. 37.
547 Kantrowitz, Murr, Annin, Carroll & Clifton, "The Messiah...", p. 57.
548 Cited as "Last Letters From David" in Time. May 31993, p. 36.
549 Nancy Gibbs, Time. May 31993, pp. 39-40.
520 Rapoport, "Why Does Religious...", pp. 76-77.
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calendar. The 1979 attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca corresponded 
with the first hour of the year 1400 in the Islamic calendar and had 
clear messianic c o n n o t a t i o n s / 2 2  did the assassination of the Sadat in 
the same year and the attack on General Gordon by the Sudanese 
Mahdi who claimed to be the Mahdi a century b e f o r e . 5 2 3  Messianism 
may mean that, as Aum did, some groups attempt to "hasten the end", 
to speed Armageddon. The destructive force of nuclear weapons makes 
them an attractive potential instrum ent for groups that hold such 
aims, once they believe that the time has come.
Religion gives a unique character to the violence perpetrated in its 
name because although religious terrorists are influenced by factors 
such as politics or nationalism, the justification and purpose of their 
violence is clearly qualitatively different from its secular equivalents. 
Religion offers a sanctuary of tradition and certainty, a refuge from an 
increasingly changing and unpredictable world, but religion itself must 
be defended against the apostasy and different cultures that are parts of 
this process. It is in this defence that religious terrorism occurs. The 
nature of religion, an all-out struggle for order and good against the 
corrupting forces of evil, m eans that it inspires total loyalty, 
commitment and an uncompromising position. Consequently, not 
only is violence valid in defence of religion, but also it is possible to use 
the images and language of the religion to reinforce and justify terror 
against a much broader-defined foe than is the case with secular 
terrorism. Whereas secular terrorism is, in most cases, instrumental 
and goal-oriented, religious terrorism is more focused on the divine 
for inspiration and as a determinant of objectives and therefore is able 
to justify high levels of violence, unfettered by the need for 
proportionality or support from  an audience w ith in  the w ider 
population because the religious terrorist regards themselves to be 
outsiders in the world system.
This trend appears to be especially prevalent in the case of messianic 
groups, which form a part of Islam, Judaism and Christianity, in 
particular. By believing that the role of Man is critical to the timing of
522 Tlie assault was in accordance with a well-known Islamic prophesy and one of the 
attackers was named by his co-assailants as Mahdi. Rapoport, "Why Does 
Religious...",p.
523 Ibid.
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the coming messiah, end of the world and salvation, they increase the 
importance of destroying those elements in the world that threaten the 
process. Since the individual must prove their faith at a time when the 
stakes are so high, when their eternal life is directly involved, it is 
unsurprising that there should be a willingness to resort to whatever 
means are necessary to achieve the required objective.
While religious factors are central to the pu rsu it of terrorism  
perpetrated in the name of religion, it is also the case that individual 
and organisational aspects have important influences as well, just as 
they do with secular terrorist groups. On an individual level, they 
encompass the need to establish identity, to follow the example of 
others, gain widespread acceptance and commendation, as well as for 
personnel spiritual gain. Religious groups are no less in competition 
with other religious organisations for adherents and support, than is so 
for secular groups. While support is not critical to religious terrorist 
groups for approbation and approval of their actions, it is central in 
determining their influence within the community and their survival. 
Continued terrorism not only displays commitment to the cause, but 
ensures that the group 's voice rem ains heard, vital since the 
organisation is likely to be certain of the ultim ate tru th  of their 
interpretation and pursuit of the correct path. It is for this reason that, 
as with secular groups, there is little toleration for dissent or exiting the 
organisation, since both are a betrayal not only of the group, but of their 
faith as well.
It is with the White Supremacist movement in the United States that it 
is hardest to separate religious and right-wing terrorism, but the two 
have some similarities. Both are rooted in a defensive reaction to a 
corrupting threat that endangers traditional-bound values and both 
offer the heightened opportunity for exacting vengeance on that 
debasing influence. If Girard's theory is accepted, violence is central to 
religion as a whole, but it certainly has a redemptive value for some 
millenarian groups, a role not dissimilar to some right-wing terrorist 
groups. Violence in that context may be justified as promoting the true 
way. This is especially likely to occur in the case of millenarian groups 
that believe they have a role to play in speeding the Last Days, the end 
of the world and redemption. It is such a group, Aum, that carried out 
the only major terrorist attack using non-conventional weaponry; and
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it is such a group that is still the most likely contender for any further 
incident. However, those motivated by right-wing beliefs should not be 
discounted either, as the next section will argue.
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Ideological Terrorism
Right-Wing Terrorism
Right-wing terrorism is extremely hard to define because it covers a 
vast spectrum of groups and actions, from millenarianists in N orth 
America that have racist dogmas as part of their religious beliefs, 
through politically-motivated actions, particularly in states such as 
Italy, to thuggery perpetrated by youths on ethnic minorities in a 
multitude of states. It is necessary to attempt to distinguish between the 
various types of right-wing violence if useful comments are to be made 
about any of them. The problem arises, though, that such divisions 
tend to be fairly arbitrary  since each group contains different 
combinations of a few key elements that may vary significantly, even 
within the same organisation, but which have a major impact in 
determining what sort of group it is in terms of dynamics, outlook and 
objectives.
An im portant division in strictly secular right-w ing terrorism  is 
between that perpetrated  by the "old right", that is, reactionary 
terrorism, and the "new right", which is the subject of much of this 
discussion. The former is mainly perpetrated by those who have lost 
political power or fear that they are in imminent danger of doing so. It 
is their quest for power and determination to preserve or restore the 
status quo that characterises them, rather than their ideology (although 
this is not to deny the importance of a belief system to such groups). 
This is "pro-state" violence, of the sort used by the Ulster loyalist 
paramilitaries: the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), which uses the 
name of the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) in attacks, and the Ulster 
Volunteer Force (UVF). "Pro-state" terrorism  is illegal violence 
employed in the defence of the state from its e n e m i e s . 5 2 4  Although in 
this particular case, the term "right-wing" is probably not a useful one, 
the loyalist paramilitaries clearly fit the mould of reactionary terrorists. 
Both organisations, although they had their roots earlier in the 
century, became active again in the early 1970s, as a response to IRA
524 Steve Bruce, "The Problems of 'Pro-State' Terrorism: Loyalist Paramilitaries in 
Northern Ireland", in  Paul W ilkinson (ed.). Terrorism: British Perspectives, 
(Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, 1993), p. 205.
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violence. They began as "defensive" organisations against the 
onslaught of republican attacks on the loyalist community in Northern 
Ireland. However, from the Spring of 1972, the loyalist paramilitaries 
began attacks on the Cathohc community at large, killing 102 people by 
the end of the year. Believing all Catholics to be potential rebels, the 
predom inantly Protestant param ilitaries targeted members of the 
Catholic community, irrespective of whether they were affiliated to 
Republican movements. This had two effects: firstly, it forced the IRA 
to choose between its role as defender of the Catholic community, 
developed during the civil unrest of 1969, and its ostensibly non­
sectarian campaign for a free and united Ireland. Secondly, as the 
attacks continued and escalated and the IRA responded in kind, it 
became increasing difficult for the British, in their role of peacekeepers 
between the communities, to withdraw from N orthern Ireland. This 
withdrawal is something the loyalists, regarding it as a "sell out" to the 
enemy within (the IRA) and w ithout (the Irish Republic), were 
determined to prevent.525 Another example of a reactionary group 
would be the Secret Army Organisation (GAS) in Algeria in the 1960s. 
They sought to prevent equal rights for Algerians in the late 1950s and 
then later, when it became clear that the French government would 
pull out of the country, assumed a secondary campaign aimed at the 
French government in France. Although 85% of the OAS’s victims 
were Algerian Muslims, the group also attacked police officers who 
sought to curtail the group's activities and European liberals who 
seemed overly sympathetic to the cause of an independent Algeria; 
they even attempted to assassinate French President Charles de Gaulle, 
who, they believed, had "sold out" French Algeria.526 This targeting is 
a vital aspect of "pro-state" or reactionary terrorism. Groups that use it 
rarely regard themselves as enemies of the state they purport to 
support, but, rather, they are in competition with it. This means that 
their actions may run contrary to the state's objectives and policies, but 
also that in some cases, as with the loyalist groups, as the protection the
525 Peter Taylor, States of Terror; Democracy and Political Violence. (London: 
Penguin/BBC Boota, 1993), pp. 285-286. Smith, Fighting For Ireland, pp. 117-118. 
Taylor & Quayle, Terrorist Lives, pp. 64-66. Arthur Aughey & Colin Mcllheney, "The 
Ulster Defense Association: Paramilitaries And Politics" in Wilkinson, Terrorism: 
British Perspectives, p. 189.
526 G. J. M. Drake, "The Phenomenon of Conservative Terrorism", Terrorism & Political 
Violence, Volume 8, Number 3, (Autumn 1996), p. 35.
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State is perceived to offer to the organisation's constituency increases, 
the level of support for the illegal group will d e c l i n e  5 2 7
Vigilante violence is used by groups and individuals who believe that 
they and their rights are not being adequately defended by the 
governm ent from incursions by "dangerous" sections of society. 
Consequently, they choose to protect themselves. They also rarely see 
themselves in conflict with the established authorities. Rather, they are 
simply enforcing justice and the law in self-defence. Vigilante violence 
has been especially prevalent in South America during periods of 
military rule and in apartheid-era South Africa. Faced by threats that 
the justice system was unable to control, police and military officers 
took the law into their own hands. Many of the actions taken in these 
cases appear to have been with the tacit co-operation of the police and 
governments involved, and the objective was to free the officers of the 
constraints of due process.528 To some extent, this is supported by 
Rubenstein who points out that even if both left and right seek to 
undermine the established government, rightist terrorists often have 
allies in the armed forces and security services, as well as amongst 
ultraconservative businessmen and landowners. They may even have 
support from secret organisations within the army, and covert aid from  
wealthy backers of large political parties. Such groups are effectively 
state terrorists if they represent either an authoritarian regime in 
power or dissident elements within the ruling class or armed forces. 
Rubenstein cited such examples as the death squads of El Salvador or 
Guatemala; or the Greek terrorists of the 1960s. They typically 
specialised in assassination and violence directed against liberal 
politicians, labour organisers. Communists, Jews, foreigners, and 
others that were seen as alien influences or enemies of the state; and 
their membership was largely drawn from the lower classes while their 
leaders tended to be of the higher echelons of society.529 However, it 
would be a mistake to see such right-wing terrorism  as limited to 
Central American groups or the past: it exists as an element in W estern 
terrorism, from the failed putsch of Colonel Tejero in Spain in
527 Bruce, "The Problem...", pp. 204-206.
528 Ehud Sprinzak, "Right-Wing Terrorism in a Comparative Perspective: The Case of 
Split Delegitimization" in Tore Bjorgo (ed.). Terror from the Extreme Right. (London: 
Frank Cass & Company Limited, 1995),. pp. 26-30.
529 Rubenstein, Alchem ists.... pp. 127-128.
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February 1981,530 to the activities of groups closely associated with 
legitimate political parties such as the MSI in Italy, the Front National 
in France,53i and even some of the more extreme elements of the 
Reform Party in Canada532 and the Republican Party in the United 
States,533 although it would be a mistake to see these as exclusively 
reactionary organisations. Extreme rightists have been characterised, 
ideologically, by a desire for authoritarian leadership, antipathy 
towards liberalism, communism and socialism, and by a belief that 
they alone are the true guardians of the nation's future and identity. 
The "old right" have tended to be authoritarian, monarchist and 
reactionary without sharing the Fascist or neo-Nazi ideals of the 
"new", radical right extremists.534 it is anti-revolutionary or counter­
revolutionary in contrast to the "new" right which clearly does contain 
revolutionary elements.535
Within the armies of the West too, there are clearly extreme right-wing 
factions, although increasingly, these are of the "new right". The 
perpetrators of the bombing of the Murrah Building, Oklahoma, Tim 
McVeigh and Terry Nichols, met in the 4th-36th Infantry Regiment, 
United States Army;536 and there was a considerable political scandal 
when, in 1993, it was discovered that Aryan Nations supporters were 
amongst those serving with the Canadian Airborne Regiment in 
Somalia.537 Rubenstein’s argument that far-right terrorists are seldom  
complete outsiders, even in the West, is probably decreasingly the case 
in North American Supremacist movements, but it does retain an 
element of the truth when examining European movements and 
groups, especially when compared to their left-wing counterparts.538
530 Paul Wilkinson, The N ew  Fascists. (London: Fan Books, 1983), pp. 133-137.
531 See Wilkinson, The N ew  Fascists.
532 See Warren Kinsella, Web Of Hate: Inside Canada's Far Right Network, (Toronto: 
HarperCollins Publishers Limited, 1994), p. 413.
533 M ichael Barkun, "Religion, M ilitias and Oklahoma City: The Mind of 
Conspiratorialists", Terrorism & Political Violence, Volume 8, Number 1, (Spring 
1996), pp. 56, 61-2.
534 Paul Wilkinson, "Violence and Terror and the Extreme Right", Terrorism & 
Political Violence. Volume 7, Number 4, (Winter 1995), p. 82.
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sprinzak argues that one of the key defining aspects of right-wing 
terror is that it is particularlist in contrast to most other forms that are 
universalist. That is they are fighting private wars against particular 
groups in the community: ethnic, "illegitimate" religious groups, 
classes of undesirable people or "inferior r a c e s " . 539 This leads to 
another key difference between right-wing terrorists and other groups: 
whereas left-wing and nationalist-separatist organisations are in direct 
conflict w ith the government of a state, right-wing groups conflict 
directly with "antisocial" groups in the community and only indirectly 
with the government, if they attem pt to intervene to protect these 
groups or fail to be sufficiently sympathetic towards the right-wing 
group. If the government responds to these cases of private violence by 
prosecuting the right wingers responsible, then sections of the group 
will transform the government into the prim ary enemy and begin 
acting a c c o r d i n g l y .540 This leads to what Sprinzak terms "a process of 
delegitimization" where the terrorist group becomes willing to use 
violence against the agents of the government. It theoretically consists 
of three stages: a crisis of confidence, a conflict of legitimacy and a crisis 
of le g i t im a c y .541 The crisis of confidence does not involve violence and 
implies only a conflict with specific rulers or policies rather than a 
challenge to the political system as a whole. There is no structural 
delegitimation. In a conflict of legitimacy, the group moves on to 
questioning the legitimacy of the entire regime, w ith alternative 
cultural and ideological systems being offered. Actions may vary 
between angry protest and low level violence directed against the 
regime. The movement becomes increasingly radicalised and close-knit 
and wholly discredits the existing social order. The crisis of legitimacy 
stems from the first two phases and extends the delegitimation of the 
system to every individual associated with it, dehumanising them and 
thereby justifying acts of violence against them. This is followed by 
systematic terrorism against anything associated with the status quo. 
The group will become increasingly isolated from mainstream society 
and will assume many of the characteristics described earlier in the
539 Sprinzak, "Right-Wing...", p. 17.
540 Leonard Weinberg, "On Responding to Right-wing Terrorism", Terrorism & 
Political Violence". Volume 8, Number 1, (Spring 1996), p. 82.
541 Sprinzak  ^"Right-Wing...", ppl7-18.
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discussion of underground g r o u p s  4^2 However, the reality of many 
right-wing groups is one of "split delegitimization" because they are 
initially unwilling to risk confrontation w ith the authorities and 
instead direct most of their actions at the non-ruling group. This 
implies an uneven radicalisation of the extremists developing against 
the two different entities. Most particularist groups begin w ith a 
conflict of legitimacy because, as a result of usually long-held beliefs, 
the object of their antipathy is regarded as illegitimate in the first place. 
They do not belong in the same society and should not be accorded the 
same status as the extremists. This is an im portant difference from 
other secular forms of terrorism, since, whereas others assume non­
violence to be the norm, and that the resort to violence is a temporary 
but necessary aberration, for particularist terrorists, violence is directed 
against certain sections of the community that are inferior and do not 
belong anyway, and who can be therefore treated accordingly. It is a 
control mechanism, so is reasonable and natural, and certainly does 
not require a justification. Using such logic, it is not inconceivable to 
suggest that an attack, even one that used non-conventional means, 
that destroyed a large part of that "illegitimate" section of society could 
also be defended as valid if it removed that unwanted and unnecessary 
part of the community.
The psychodynamics of right-wing terrorism are significantly different 
from those of the left-wing. For the former, violence is a societal norm, 
it does not require a psycho-political transformation to inflict it. Some 
right-wing ideologies, notably Fascism, positively glorify the use of 
violence and regard it as an essential aspect of government.543 
Traditionally though, even Fascist and neo-Nazi organisations have 
exercised "split delegitim ization", avoiding conflict w ith  the 
government and instead concentrating on targeted groups such as Jews 
or leftists. However, recently this has begun to change and many 
European and N orth American rightist organisations have become 
violently confrontational w ith governm ental authorities that are 
increasingly seen as Jewish dominated as the mythology of the ZOG 
has gained currency amongst these groups and consequently created 
the perception that such governments are irretrievably corrupted.^44 jt
542iH d,pp. 19-20. 
543 Ibid. pp. 20-23. 
544lW d,pp. 23-26.
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is in such circumstances that attacks such as the bombing of the 
Murrah Building, in Oklahoma, have occurred. Given a desire to attack 
the government and its agents, but a reluctance to inflict harm on 
other, innocent, members of society, it is plausible to suggest that 
terrorists might resort to limited non-conventional attacks, as a high 
profile alternative to major bombings using conventional explosives. 
Radiological terrorism  and some types of biological or chemical 
terrorism could ah be used in this way. However, although NEST, the 
Nuclear Emergency Search Team, has dealt with numerous hoaxes, 
many of them directed against governmental facilities, there has yet to 
be an unequivocated non-conventional assault of this type.
The most startling aspect of the "new right" has been the growth of 
youth counterculture terrorism and the rise of millenarian terrorism, 
the latter of which was largely discussed in the previous section. 
Sprinzak argues that millenarian terrorists rarely resort to violence as a 
direct result of their views. Instead, it is due either to a violence-prone 
leader, such as Shoko Asahara, or to having been forced into a corner 
by society; that is, they are unable to sufficiently seclude themselves 
from the wider community,545 such as might be argued to have been 
the case with the Branch Davidians. However, in such a case, violence 
is just as likely to be directed against the millenarians themselves as 
against the outside world. The youth counterculture, which in this case 
mainly means Skinheads, does not consist of systematic terrorists and 
their violence is an extension of their non-political glorification of 
brutality.546 However, in the past decade. Skinheads have taken part in 
numerous murderous assaults and arson attacks, the most notorious of 
which was in the German town of Molln on November 23, 1992, in
545 Sprinzak, "The Case...", p.33.
546^5 an example, of the 17 Skinhead caused fatalities in Germany in 1992, six were 
German homeless men; two were Germans who got in political arguments with a gang; 
two Germans died for no obvious reason; one was a Romanian asylum seeker, two were 
immigrants, one of which was killed in a discotheque, possibly over a girl, one was a 
Vietnamese knifed in a Berlin street; and the last three were the women in Molln. Tliis 
makes it hard to argue that the Skinheads exclusively targeted foreigners and asylum  
seekers. As well as these targets, other, non-fatal, objects of violence included the 
elderly, gays and lesbians, handicapped people, patrons at restaurants, passers-by, 
motorists, police, several proprietors of liquor stores, opposing fans at soccer games, and 
political opponents. It seems clear that, for such groups, arbitrary violence was the 
norm, determined not by political agenda so much as by whim. Peter Merkl, "Radical 
Right Parties in Europe and Anti-Foreign Violence: A Comparative Essay" in Bjorgo 
(ed,). Terror..., p. 105.
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which three Turkish women were killed in a fire-bomb attack. Alcohol 
seems to play a central part in these attacks: they are particularly 
prevalent after Skinhead concerts at which there is heavy drinking as 
well as music extolling violence.547 Although not politically organised 
in their own right, there is increasing evidence that Skinhead groups 
are being used by other more experienced groups and right-wing 
extremists as foot soldiers in their campaigns. Neo-fascist and neo-Nazi 
organisations exploit the social marginality, youth and socio-economic 
alienation of the Skinheads to recruit them to the cause. For example, 
most of the Skinhead groups in the USA are affiliated to neo-Nazi 
organisations or the Aryan Nation, who use them to commit many of 
their acts of extreme violence because the leaders of these other groups 
are more aware of the legal and political dangers of such action, and so 
are willing to let others take the risks. The American Anti-Defamation 
League currently believes Skinheads to be the most violent of White 
Supremacist groups. Almost all of this violence has been directed 
against minority groups: Blacks, Hispanics, Asians, homosexuals and 
the homeless.548 Part of the reason for the recruitment of skinheads by 
neo-Nazi groups in N orth America is that while they are extremely 
active, the neo-Nazis are also highly fratricidal and small in number, 
and thus are compelled to use outside help.549 Merkl suggests strongly 
that, in the European case, m uch of Skinhead violence can be 
attributed to negative identity, and vicious self-hatred; they turn onto 
groups that they perceive as weaker and even more contemptible than 
themselves. While they attem pt to attract community support by 
attacking refugee hostels, to make "them" go away, the first reason is 
the more significant: they are displaced and alienated youths that seek a 
soft target at which to strike out and on which to displace the blame for 
their own inadequacies onto.550 Skinhead violence can also occur 
within the group: in August 1987 a California group nailed its former 
leader to a plank. Violence is not only a norm, it is a requirement and 
prerequisite of membership. One of the California gang, explaining 
their action said: "To be a skinhead, none of the other skinheads are
547 sprinzak, "The Case...", p. 36.
548 Ibid. pp. 36-37.
549 Jeffrey Kaplan, "Right-Wing Violence In North America" in Bjorgo (ed.). Terror.... 
p. 56.
550 Merkl, "Radical Right...", p. 109-110.
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going to respect you unless you go out and mess somebody up, and if 
you don't, you get messed up."55i
A further problem for right wing groups that emphasise violence so 
much is that they attract "mentally unstable people, psychopaths, 
neurotics...whose hearts do not belong to our good cause."552 The issue 
of uncontrollable, fringe members of terrorist organisations is as much 
a facet of right wing as left wing violence. Some Swedish groups try to 
deal with this difficulty by allowing membership of their organisation 
only to those who have already "proved" themselves with their 
actions. This has the effect of making the group an elite and therefore 
making membership in it even more desirable to potential recruits 
since it carries a heightened status.553 However, whereas left-wing and 
religiously-m otivated terrorists appear not to conform  to any 
psychological profile of abnorm ality, there is some evidence for 
believing that many right-wingers are exceptional. Psychiatric studies 
of imprisoned neo-Fascist terrorists in Italy found that many exliibited 
"free-floating feelings of aggression and hostility". They were disturbed 
in a way that other types of terrorist rarely are. However, the evidence 
for this is relatively limited, so the implications to be drawn from it are
at best fragmentary.554
Membership of the Skinheads, along with religious millenarian sects 
and very extreme neo-Nazi groups, tends to be a full-time occupation. 
Their members have a high degree of alienation from society and reject 
many of its political and economic norms. They have less of a 
commitment to a bourgeois lifestyle, including property ownership 
and a regular family life. This is in contrast to most other perpetrators 
of right-wing violence who are less likely to live underground. Many 
members of these other groups lead an almost normal life, maintain 
families and may regard themselves as pillars of the community. Their 
terrorism is not a full-time exercise. It is a sideline, a means of dealing 
with socio-political pressures and concerns and of prom oting their
beliefs.555
551 David Van Biema, "When White Makes Right", Time. August 91993. p. 39.
552 Helene Loow, "Racist Violence and Criminal Behaviour In Sweden: Myths and 
Realities" in Bjorgo (ed.). Terror.... p. 123.
553 Loow, "Racist...", p. 122.
554 Weinberg, "On Responding...", p. 83.
555 sprinzak, "The Case..."„ pp. 38-39.
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The fact that most right-wing terrorists are not complete outsiders is 
significant. Ross suggests that membership of right-wing groups is 
flexible: an individual may simultaneously belong to several different 
radical groups; and others may periodically adhere to the agenda of the 
group to which they belong, whilst at other times act independently of 
these organisations.556 Kaplan agrees with this and, like Ross, believes 
that there are also lone actors who, although rare, occasionally decide 
to strike a blow for the cause by a random murder. The example he 
cites is that of the Goldmark family who were killed on Christmas Eve 
1985 by a single gunm an who mistakenly believed the couple were 
Jewish.557 That right-wingers may belong to several groups or to no 
groups at ail suggests that the close-knit, insular organisation that 
engenders a feeling of identity, of belonging, is less an aspect of right- 
wing terrorism than that of the left. Therefore, membership in the 
group, w ith its attendant pressures and dynamics may be less 
significant as a reason why right-w ingers become and rem ain 
terrorists. This makes sense if one considers that such individuals are 
closer, situationally, to nationalists than to left-wing terrorists, since, if 
their beliefs are widespread in their community, they have a ready­
made constituency from which to gain support and claim to represent. 
However, this accounts for only some right-wing terrorism: obviously, 
there are groups and individuals that do not enjoy such support, real 
or perceived, and the role of the group in such cases is presumably 
more important. Salmony and Smoke indicate that the Ku Klux Klan 
may provide support to its members in a way that has already been 
discussed in relation to left-wing terrorist organisations.558 Individuals 
who joined the Klan appeared to share a number of traits: aimlessness, 
personal failure, lack of status, low self-esteem, alienation and poor 
adaptation to the requirements of reality, which, in combination led 
them to seek a group that offered support and perm itted them to 
engage in regressive behaviour in some instances. Social groups are 
used by some adults as a defence against anxiety, because the group is 
able to organise itself as a defence against the common threat. The Klan
556 Jeffrey Ian Ross, "Research Note: Contempoary Radical Right-Wing Violence In 
Canada: A Quantitive Analysis", Terrorism & Political Violence. Volume 4. Number 3, 
(Autumn 1992), pp. 74-75.
557 Kaplan, "The Context...", pp. 38-39.
558 Steven E. Salmony & Richard Smoke, "The Appeal & Behaviour Of The Ku Klux 
Klan In Object Relations Perspective", Terrorism: An International Tournai. Volume 11, 
(1988)
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is such a group and bolsters the part of society that is positive from a 
white racist perspective, emphasising a white supremacist social order 
that evokes the Old South and a supportive bond among the members 
that excludes the rest of society. It makes its members feel part of a 
chosen group, an elite; and harks back to an idealised period when 
society was less threatening, offering a dominant place for "a White 
male Gentile person, a native-born citizen of the United States", the 
only section of society that can be a member of the KKK.559 in this case, 
the motivations behind group membership and the progression to 
violence are similar to that for long-standing terrorist groups of other 
varieties: the Klan has a tradition of violence, it is a norm  of the 
organisation, so those who elect to join it do so in that knowledge and 
therefore precisely because it is so. The attraction of the KKK is that it 
offers to its members a feeling of belonging and of being an elite, as 
well as the expectation of violence.
There clearly are appreciable differences between left and right wing 
terrorism. Weinberg and Eubank examined these as they appeared in 
the leaders and ordinary members of Italian groups. The rightist 
leaders tended to be older than their left-wing counterparts but the age 
difference between leaders and followers in groups of the right was 
more exaggerated than was the case with those on the left. W hereas 
groups from the left were inclined to have both male and female 
leaders, the right-wing groups were almost wholly male-dominated at 
that level of membership, although amongst the followers, women 
composed about 8% of the n u m b e r s .5 6 0  However, there were not 
significant geographical, religious, or parental occupational differences 
between left and right leaders. Weinberg and Eubank found no 
crossover between the two ideologies amongst the leadership, so clearly 
early political experience is significant, since they served to accentuate 
their polarisation. In general, the same kinds of background relevant 
for leadership roles in non-violent political organisations seem to 
distinguish leaders from followers in terrorist groups. Occupation was 
another key difference: both groups had white collar leaders, but while 
teachers, students, manual workers and a few sub proletarians played
559 Salmony & Smoke, "The Appeal....", pp. 249-254.
560 While this sexual discrepancy is largely true of extreme right groups, it is not 
applicable to Skinhead organisations which have had female leaders from the outset. 
See Van Biema, "When...", p. 40.
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prominent roles in the left-wing groups, they were largely lacking in 
the right-wing organisations, where businessmen, policemen and 
soldiers were m ore dom inant, although they were represented 
am ongst the followers 561 Italian  right-w ing terrorism  is not 
representative of the type in a num ber of ways though. It is m ore 
characteristic of the violence of the "old right". While there has been 
some violence directed against minorities, most Italian right-wing 
terrorism  has been anti-Com m unist and has continued for four 
decades, since shortly after the Second World War.562 While Italian 
right-w ing terrorists follow the pattern  of split delegitim isation 
described by Sprinzak in that they unleashed campaigns of mass 
violence and strategic terrorism  and, regarding the parliam entary 
regime as fatally flawed, sought to replace it with a military-backed one 
and attacked representatives of the government, such as members of 
the judiciary; in a num ber of key aspects they do not conform to 
Sprinzak's pattern. Italian right-wing terrorism was not particularlist. 
Instead, it was guided by universal neo-Fascist principles. One of the 
results of holding such views was that, far from  the Italian 
governm ent and state becoming delegitimised, they were always 
regarded with the utmost contempt by leaders of the Italian groups. 
Finally, rather than the transition between stages of disenchantment 
and alienation from the state described by Sprinzak, Italian right­
wingers sustained violent activity over the course of four decades. It 
was not a process of delegitimisation.563
The difference between terrorists from the left and right does apply 
more widely than the Italian example however. Handler's socio­
economic profile of American terrorists of the 1960s and 1970s 
reiterates m any of the same po in ts .564 W omen, w hile heavily 
represented at all levels in left-wing groups, w ere alm ost an 
irrelevance in right-wing groups. The pattern of leadership between 
terrorist groups appears to have been influenced by their political 
ideology. Whereas leftist groups seem more liberal, more egalitarian, 
right-wing groups, are reactionary by definition, pro-family and against
561 Weinberg & Eubank, "Leaders.,.", pp. 156-176.
562 Leonard Weinberg, "Italian Neo-Fascist Terrorism: A Comparative Perspective" in 
Bjorgo (ed.). Terror.... pp. 221-223.
563 Weinberg, "Italian...", pp. 221-223.
564 jeffey s. Handler, "Socioeconomic Profile Of An American Terrorist: 1960s & 1970s", 
Terrorism: An International lournal. Volume 13, (1990).
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anything that disrupted the pattern of the nuclear family. This view of 
the limited role for women m eant that such groups were not very 
attractive or welcoming to women. The chasm between leaders and 
ordinary members was clear in right-wing organisations: the former 
were mostly educated to college level and many held white-collar jobs; 
the latter had  usually only com pleted high school and were 
overwhelmingly blue-collar. This difference may have im portant 
implications for the group dynamics of such organisations since it 
suggests a lack of uniformity between the two that m ight lead to 
difficulties in  acting concertedly and in policy form ulation and 
implementation. Significantly, though, both sections were invariably 
Caucasian and nearly always Protestants from the Bible Belt providing 
some degree of commonality.565 Only the geographical origin of right- 
wing terrorists appears to be altering radically in recent years: as 
militias and other non-specifically White Supremacist m ovem ents 
grow in im portance, areas such as the N orthw est have risen in 
prominence alongside the Bible Belt.
In Sweden, in a study of the 165 arrested perpetrators of racist crime 
betw een 1990 and 1993, the majority of suspected or convicted 
perpetrators were between 16 and 20 years old at the time of their 
crime. Over half (52%) had previous convictions; almost all (98%) 
came from the town or village where the crime was committed or 
from the surrounding region. Very few of them can be traced to a 
nationalist or racist organisation and only slightly over half of them 
were intoxicated at the time of their crime. It is the last two points that 
are unusual, the lack of affiliation to a group and the role of 
d r i n k i n g . 5 6 6  Otherwise, the Swedish example does seem to correspond 
to the wider model of the perpetrators of hate violence. The lack of 
affiliation can perhaps be explained by the fact that some Swedish 
extreme right groups make potential recruits "prove" themselves, 
suggesting that those caught committing these acts were in the pre- 
membersliip stage. Drinking is a central part of Skinhead violence, but 
is less so with other extreme right movements whose violence is more 
instrumental. This suggests that, in the Swedish case, right-wing 
violence is caused both by Skinhead and by more politically focused
565 Handler, "Socioeconomic...", pp. 203-208.
566 Loow, "Racist...", pp. 132-133.
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organisations. Willems found some similarities in his study of right- 
wing youth violence in Germany between 1990 and 1993. Over 90% of 
crimes were committed by groups and especially by those connected 
with the Skinhead subculture (about 30% of all cases). There were 
relatively few examples of preplanned, instrumental violence. Instead, 
it was more likely to be spontaneous, encouraged by large quantities of 
alcohol. Around 10% of the perpetrators already had convictions for 
politically-motivated crimes and over 35% for other crimes. However, 
it is the socio-economic breakdown that is especially interesting: over 
95% of xenophobic crimes were committed by men; over 75% by men 
under 20 years old; and 35% by men under 18 years old. There was 
some correlation between such violence and lower levels of education, 
social problems, deficient family structures and lower social class. Once 
the perpetrators were subdivided into four types, though, considerable 
differences em erged in their socio-economic profiles. Politically- 
m otivated right-w ing extremists were mostly well-educated, had 
successfully undergone training and held jobs. They generally exhibited 
an ideologically-validated, disciplined and instrum entally -oriented 
attitude to violence against specific "ungerman" groups. It was such 
extremists who directed many of the other youths ideologically and, to 
some extent, strategically to commit their acts. Xenophobe or 
ethnocentric youths were more likely to have left school earlier and to 
have been sociologically disadvantaged than the right-wing extremists. 
Their m otivation was prim arily  one of feeling threatened by 
"foreigners" and refugees in particular who competed with them for 
jobs, housing and financial assistance. Their violence, although 
directed against specific groups, was m ore expressive than  
instrumental. Criminal and marginalised youths tended to be slightly 
older, to be unsuccessful at their careers and to have more likelihood of 
criminal records. They tended to be action and violence-oriented. For 
them, violence was a norm, not a political means, and was directed 
much more widely than simply against foreigners or refugees. The 
final type, fellow travellers, were better educated and often came from 
functional middle-class families. They rarely had prior convictions and 
were found in both skinhead and fascist groups. Their motivation for 
participation was group pressure and dynamics, rather than ideology or
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xenophobia. Although they did little to prevent violence, they were 
rarely violent themselves.567
The example of Ingo Hasselbach indicates that, on an individual level
too, there may be motivational similarities between left and right wing
terrorists. Hasselbach, an East German, was one of the leading neo-
Nazis in the reunified Germany until his defection in 1993. His father
was a leading supporter of the East German state, a communist
celebrity, who despised the Nazis. Hasselbach said: "... The state that
oppressed us all was the same. It was literally the extension of the will
of our parents, whose generation had strived to establish the first
German 'anti-Fascist' state...My father's voice was the state, and I
directed all my rage at it, rather than at him. He barely existed for
m e . "568 As it was for RAF members, H asselbach’s terrorism
represented a rebellion against parental authority, transposed onto the
state. He began by being a fringe member of a hippie commune, but
progressed through being a punk and then a skinhead and neo-Nazi,
all increasingly extreme means of reacting against the state. Imprisoned
for anti-state activities, he was exposed to unrepentant Nazis and it was
here that his hatred of anti-Fascism grew:
[In prison] the German anti-Fascist state carried on with the 
trappings of the German Fascist state... The hypocrisy of it 
bothered me more than anything: If you're going to worship 
power, why not adm it it? At least the Nazis had been 
straightforward in their brutality. These people insisted that 
they were beating you and locking you up for your own 
edification and for the sake of universal brotherhood... For 
me, protest became ever more closely associated with the 
forbidden Nazi past. I'd reached a point where I thought. I've 
always rejected Communism and the idea of the anti-Fascist 
state: now I would fight the anti-Fascists by being a Fascist.569
A vital point of Hasselbach's decision to be a neo-Nazi was when he
encountered W est Germ an mem bers who gave him litera ture
"proving" that Auschwitz and other Nazi atrocities had not occurred.
He describes the moment:
It was a revelation beyond words. No gas chambers! No mass 
m urder of the Jews! It had all been Communist lies, like so
567 Helmut W illems, "Development, Patterns and Causes of Violence Against 
Foreigners in Germany: Social and Biographical Characteristics of Perpetrators and 
the Process of Escalation" in Bjorgo (ed.). Terror.... pp. 168-173.
568 Ingo Hasselbach with Tom Reiss, "How Nazis Are Made", N ew  Yorker Magazine. 
January 81996, p. 39.
5691 ^  pp. 40-41.
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much else... And in this moment of relief and joy for me and 
other new recruits I think we passed from being simply rebels 
against the GDR to being true neo-Nazis. Even as citizens of 
the GDR, we'd grown up with German Guilt. Now this guilt 
was lifted.570
This seems to suggest that der sprung is as applicable to far-right 
terrorist groups as to other organisations. Loow cites a Swedish 
member of the extreme right who had a similar moment of revelation 
when he went to hear a former Nazi speak: "At first I thought the 
Nazis were just shit, I hated Germans, everything German, but I was 
interested in the Second World War... I and my friends went to a 
meeting where an old nationalist socialist spoke. He spoke about 
democracy, the hypocrisy, the double standard, the lies, it was like 
something fell from my eyes. I woke up."57i This is also significant 
because it shows the importance of the older generation of right 
wingers in motivating and politicising some of the modern activists.
Like other terrorists, Hasselbach developed the ability to distance
himself from everything except his group:
... I never thought about the safety or well-being of the people 
in the house [that was being attacked]. They didn't exist for 
me. Only my friends and I existed. And the Cause, the Party. 
The foreigners were far away from me somehow, even 
though I was acting as though they were so much in my way 
and pasting things on the walls of their h o u s e .572
It is common for activists to live together, and for the group to become
a surrogate family for them. Even those with families of their own
tend to steadily break their ties with the outside world as they become
more and more centred on the group. Loyalty towards the group is of
central importance for members. They are bound not only to the
immediate cell, but also to the wider community of the extreme right
who are regarded as brothers-in-arms.573
Hasselbach's Movement was also decentralised to enable its members 
to deny responsibility for violent actions and ease the process of 
justifying membership of the group. He states:
570 Ingo Hasselbach, "Fantasy Führer", The Guardian. Weekend, February 10, 1996, p. 
14.
571 Loow, "Racist...", p. 126.
572 Hasselbach with Reiss, "How...", p. 48.
573 Loow, "Racist...", p. 128.
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This deniability helps keep its members both morally and 
legally in the clear. Though I trained young people to hate, I 
could still express shock that any of them would go out and 
actually commit murder. Our racist propaganda always put 
hate in a positive light - it expressed racism as racial pride - 
and removed from the reader any responsibility for its bloody 
consequences. All responsibility rested with the victim, who 
was biologically inferior and brought trouble on himself ty  
mixing with the master race, or so the thinking went.574
The legitimacy of a target was also important. Hasselbach says that he 
never enjoyed attacking foreigners; they were a problem that had to be 
solved politically. The only violence he considered legitimate was that 
directed against the Anarchist Anti-Fascists who attacked the neo-Nazis 
with equal fervour.575 When three Turks were killed in a firebombing 
in Molln in November 1992, he felt that a certain boundary had been 
overstepped and that the act was reprehensible, cowardly and deadly.576 
However, by tliis point, he was seeking to exit the group: he had begun 
to doubt whether the Cause was worth risking his life for.577 The attack 
in Molln sickened him and made him question the group's tactics, 
especially since anti-immigrant feeling was so widespread amongst the 
German population as a whole that Hasselbach believed violence was 
now redundant.578 He quit publicly in March 1993, burning a picture of 
Hitler on national television. This was perceived as the ultim ate 
betrayal and Hasselbach was targeted by his former comrades who 
sought to kill liim and his relatives.579 por his part, Hasselbach has 
become hyper-critical of his former colleagues and has spent much of 
his time campaigning against them, a characteristic that is similar to 
other terrorists that succeed in exiting from their group.
Right-wing groups, like those engaged in other forms of terrorism, 
have contacts with similar, like-minded organisations, and learn from 
their experiences. Combat 18, a British neo-Nazi group, has clear links 
with groups in Denmark, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Austria 
and eastern Europe. From these connections. Combat 18 had little
574 Hasselbach with Reiss, "How...", p. 36.
575 Hasselbach, "Fantasy..,", p. 15.
576 Hasselbach with Reiss, "How...", p. 53. 
Ibid, p. 51.
578 Hasselbach, "Fantasy...", pp. 18-19.
579 Hasselbach with Reiss, "How...", pp. 54-56.
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difficulty in acquiring the technical expertise to build letter bombs. 
Previously limited to arson. Combat 18's links enabled it to escalate 
their level of violence and plan to post explosive devices in video 
cassettes from Sweden to targets in London.580 Likewise, the German 
neo-Nazis feel an affinity and commonalty with right-wingers in the 
United States, based on a hatred of government, a belief that their 
freedoms as white men were being infringed on by a multi-cultural 
society, and a general anti-Semitism. Hasselbach states that virtually all 
of his group's literature came from extremist organisations in the 
United States, where it is easier to publish such material. The neo- 
Nazis did a lot of weapons training, and read a great deal on terrorist 
tactics and on how to destroy bridges, cars, and train tracks. This was 
based on handbooks such as "A Movement in Arms” that was sent to 
the group from Nebraska via the Internet.^si Hasselbach says the 
international neo-Nazis movement was highly dependent on Gary Rex 
Lauck in Lincoln, Nebraska, who was the publisher and distributor of 
most of their propaganda. His "was also the center of a worldwide 
umbrella organization, with which practically every serious neo-Nazi
had contact."582
European radical rightists are rarely admirers of American society as a 
whole since it is seen as a warning for the future of their own 
countries. They particularly despise the ethnic and racial diversity of 
the United States, with all its attendant problems. This is an attitude 
that is shared by many on the American right. As the social and 
economic impact of m igration to European states continues, right­
wingers there see a society rem iniscent of the Am erican one 
developing. The result is the feelings of hatred and being dispossessed 
by immigrants that are indicative of much of European extreme right 
action. The link with American extremists is further cemented by the 
fact of the extraordinary views that they hold in common and which 
bind them to each other: of Holocaust revisionism. Identity theology
580 Stewart Tendler & Roger Boyes, "Letter bombs turn British neo-Nazis into 
terrorists". The Times, Januaiy 20,1997; Adrian Lee & Craig Lord, "Top sports stars are 
targeted by letter bombers". The Times. January 20,1997.
551 Hasselbach with Reiss, "How,.,", pp. 37 & 51.
582 Ibid. p. 47.
178
and Odinism.583 This heightens the perception within the group that 
there is also some wider community of right-wingers, an example of 
which is that they share a common martyrology.
Although the American White Supremacist movement is extremely 
diverse, there are a number of common factors to all of them: a m yth 
of a lost and bygone world of innocence and purity; a culture that has 
been stolen by influxes of immigrants into the United States; an 
ideology based on scriptural texts; a M anichaean w orld view; a 
conspiratorial view of history; the view of themselves as a persecuted 
elite; and a millenarian view centred on an imminent apocalypse 584 
The Christian Identity Church, part of the U nited States White 
Supremacist movement, is premillennialist (they believe that Jesus 
will return before the thousand year period of total bliss on earth 
begins); but they do not believe that the Chosen will be spared the 
seven-year Tribulation period of war, turmoil and suffering. This 
means that adherents are encouraged to act decisively to ensure their 
place amongst God's elect, and to survive the Tribulation period.585 
They see the existing order as irremediably evil and destined for 
destruction, and attribute the fulfilment of the millenarian to divine 
forces; yet they do occasionally resort to violence, believing that their 
actions do have some bearing on events.586 They seek the violent 
overthrow of the government and believe it is possible, basing their 
campaign on that laid out in "The Turner Diaries", an apocalyptic 
novel written under a pseudonym  by William Pierce, leader of the 
National Alliance. White Supremacists believe that there has to be a 
battle, a day of reckoning, between the children of darkness (Jews) and 
those of light (the Aryan race), not only to usher in the millennium of 
saintly rule, but also to ensure that the usurping Jews are thrown out as 
the chosen people return  to their roots and their "special destiny". 
Since the government of the United States is currently in the hands of 
the "Zionist Occupation Government" (ZOG), the country has been 
corrupted beyond reform; the political process is therefore a closed 
avenue and bringing down "ZOG" as quickly as possible is the only
583 Weinberg, "On Responding...", pp. 85-88.
584 Kaplan, "The Context...", pp. 42-43.
Ibid, p. 57.
586 Michael Barkun, "Millenarian Aspects Of 'White Supremacist' Movements", 
Terrorism & Political Violence. Volume 1, Number 4, (October 1989), p. 412,
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solution, enabling an A ryan state to be declared prior to the 
Tribulation.587 pierce himself sees no possibility for dealing with the 
deficiencies of governm ent o ther than a strategically planned 
insurrection, since the government is so completely corrupt. However, 
he has consistently urged caution against premature action before the 
National Alliance was ready. Consequently, although he certainly did 
not condemn it. Pierce was quick to dissociate himself from the 
Oklahoma Bombing of April 19, 1995 because, he argued, the bomber's 
action was random and ineffective.588
The role of martyrdom is of importance to many right-wing groups, 
and has assumed a central role in the mythology of some, notably those 
American organisations that emphasise events such as the Weaver 
siege in August 1993. Randy Weaver, a Christian Identity member, 
failed to appear at his trial for selling a saw-off shotgun, and fled to a 
cabin in the Idaho hills, where federal agents kept him and his family 
under surveillance for 20 months. It ended abruptly when the Weaver 
dog was killed, attacking a federal agent. This precipitated a gunfight in 
which Federal Marshall William Degan and Weaver's 14 year old son, 
Samuel, were killed. The siege then went on another 11 days, until 
Weaver's wife, Vicki, was also killed, as she sat at the kitchen table 
holding their 10 m onth old baby. At the subsequent trial, the jury, 
conscious of the recent apocalyptic end to the Waco siege, in which 85 
people died, and persuaded by Weaver's lawyer that the government 
could do this to anyone, acquitted Weaver and his co-defendant of all 
charges, including the original firearms o f f e n c e . 5 8 9  it is events such as 
this that suggest that Sprinzak's theory of split delegitimization may 
not be wholly accurate with regard to some of the N orth American 
groups since many have come to believe that the government and the 
"other" are inextricably linked. Therefore to strike at one is to strike at 
both. Increasingly, it is the government that is seen as the main threat 
and it is the government that is targeted.590 Wayne LaPierre (CEO of 
the National Rifle Association) indicated this feeling of government as 
the enemy in arguing that:
5 8 7 pp.  425-30.
588 Brad Whitsel, "Aryan Visions for the Future in the West Virginia Mountains", 
Terrorism & Political Violence. Volume 7, Number 4, (Winter 1995), pp. 132-133.
589 Kaplan, "Right Wing...", pp. 66-67.
Ibid, pp. 80-81.
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If owning multiple firearms is of itself sufficient reason to 
justify the conduct and actions of BATE [the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms] and the FBI at Randy 
Weaver's home and at Waco - and the Randy Weaver and 
Waco cases are just the beginning - we are clearly on the road 
to government oppression.591
Equally, Tim McVeigh's decision to attack a government building was
apparently sparked by the Waco siege, exactly two years before the
bombing at Oklahoma. McVeigh followed the televised live coverage
of the siege, ranting and crying at the result and the actions of the
government. He later made a pilgrimage to the site, returning with
burnt wood from the c o m p o u n d . 5 9 2
Closely connected with right wing terrorism in the United States in 
recent years has been the growth of the militia movement, of which 
there are between 40 and 100 in the country at the moment, with a 
membership of around 50,000.593 xhey trace themselves back to the 
citizen's militias of the American Revolutionary War, and have direct 
ancestry from the Minuteman movement in the 1950s and the Posse 
Comitatus of the 1970s. They reject all forms of government above the 
local level and deny the legitimacy of the means, such as taxes and the 
judiciary, that state and federal authorities use to reinforce their role. 
H ow ever, m ilitias are m ore th an  sim ply anti-governm ent 
movements. They embrace a wide variety of beliefs, connected to a 
religious veneer and racial intolerance. They combine a traditional 
right-wing fear of an elitist cabal with a millenarian view of h i s t o r y .594 
They tend to be strongly anti-communist, believe in the Protestant 
w ork ethic and distributive justice, and be based in rural areas. 
Interestingly, although part of a national network, there is some 
evidence that, as groups have felt increasingly alienated from the 
government, some have moved towards a more secure cellular model
591 Wayne LaPierre, Guns. Crime and Freedom. (New York: HarperPerennial, 1995), p. 
200.
592 Dalrymple, "Nightmare...", p. 39.
593 Bruce Hoffman, "American Right-Wing Extremism", lane's Intelligence Review. 
Volmne 7, Number 7, ( July 1995), pp. 329-330. Although the Klanwatch Project at the 
Southern Poverty Law Center puts the figure at 272 militia groups in 48 states, at least 
66 of wliich have links to the White Supremecist Movement. Brian Levin, Testimony to 
US House of Representatives Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee On Crime. "The 
Nature & Threat of Violent Anti-Government Groups hi America", 104th Congress, 1st 
Session, November 2,1995, p. 64.
594 Barkun, "Religion... ", p. 50.
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of organisation.595 They are obsessed with achieving religious and 
racial purity in the United States and with overthrowing the all- 
pervasive Jewish-controlled government (ZOG). Believing that the 
final victory of this cabal is imminent, they call for immediate action in  
the ultimate battle between good and evil.596 They are convinced that 
there is a world-wide conspiracy to create a New World Order, using 
the UN and other international forces, which will ultimately lead to 
the subjugation of the American people. Such conspiracy theorists 
have no difficulty pointing to suspicious government activities and 
agencies, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
that are acting to bring this disaster to reality597 and to other agencies 
that are committed to eradicating anti-government violence and 
therefore have increasingly focused on the activities of such 
organisations.598 xhe coimecting theme of many of these groups is the 
Christian Identity movement, a white supremacist religious ideology. 
The beliefs within the movement are diverse, depending to a large 
degree on which of the pastors within the movement is followed, but 
they almost all include that Christ was an Aryan rather than a Jew, as 
were the Lost Tribes of Israel; that the USA is the Promised Land; and 
that Anglo-Saxons are God's Chosen People. In the Last Days, the 
Chosen will fight against their foes until racial victory and the 
Kingdom of God is won.599
At the centre of the Christian Identity movement is the Aryan Nations, 
an anti-Semitic, neo-Nazi group founded in 1974 by Richard Butler. 
The organisation forms a liaison between like-minded groups and 
helps co-ordinate their efforts. There is little doubt that the militias and 
their connected organisations have an intimate link w ith much of the 
domestic terrorism occurring in the United States today, including the 
bombing of the M urrah Building in Oklahoma on April 19, 1995, in
595 Brent Smith, Testimony to US House of Representatives Tudiciary Committee. 
Subcommittee On Crime. "The Nature & Threat of Violent Anti-Government Groups In 
America", 104th Congress, 1st Session, November 2,1995, p. 21.
596 Barkun, "Religion...", p. 52.
597 Martin Durham, "Preparing for Armageddon: Citizen Militias, the Patriot 
Movement and the Oklahoma City Bombing", Terrorism & Political Violence, Volume 
8, Number 1, (Spring 1996), p. 70.
598 Smith, Testimony..., p. 21.
599 Durham, "Preparing...", p. 67.
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which 168 people died.^oo These groups, like others that are inspired by 
religious extrem ism , seem  unconstra ined  by the norm s of 
proportionality, instrumentality and societal acceptability that govern 
the action of most other terrorists. It is for this reason that their 
po ten tial for acts of m ass destruction  terro rism  cannot be 
discounted.601 However, confusingly, some of the militias clearly are 
not racist and may therefore simply be Patriot movements, dedicated to 
the rigorous upholding of the Constitution. The leader of one of the 
Oklahoma brigades is a Cherokee and the New Ham pshire militia 
supposedly includes blacks, Asians and Latinos. However, these are 
almost certainly exceptional, and possibly beside the point, given the 
role militias play in the right-wing movement in A m e r i c a . 6 0 2  Part of 
the significance of the militias is that they are an im portant link 
between other far-right organisations and the wider population. While 
they are connected to the right-w ing inform ation underground, 
militias also espouse a num ber of core American values, such as 
patriotism and constitutional fidelity, that make them more attractive 
to people within the mainstream and introduce them to other, more 
radical ideas.^os Even where the m ilitia leader is not a white 
supremacist, it is impossible to go to a militia meeting, read their 
literature or join a newsgroup on the Internet without being exposed to 
white supremacist v i e w s . ^ 9 4
In the early 1980s, there were a string of right-wing terrorist attacks, 
such as at Bologna train station or the Munich Oktoberfest, that seemed 
to herald a new period of highly-violent and relatively indiscriminate 
incidents, of a variety rarely observed in secular political terrorism 
until then. However, in subsequent years, these attacks have proved to 
be exceptional: the 1980s did not see a period of heightened right-wing
600 YLe Michigan Militia Corps, which McVeigh joined and enthusiastically threw 
himself into, denies any further connection with the Oklahoma bombing. In fact, it does 
seem that McVeigh was shunned by the Militia's leaders because "his ideas were 
pretty disturbing...he seemed to be pushing always for some action." Dalrymple, 
"Nightmare.,.", p. 37.
Hoffman, "American...", pp. 329-330.
Durham, "Preparing...", p. 75.
^^8 Barkun, "Religion...", p. 61
594 Kenneth Stern, Testimony to Testimony to US House of Representatives Tudiciary 
Committee. Subcommittee On Crime. "The Nature & Threat of Violent Anti- 
Government Groups In America", 104th Congress, 1st Session, November 2,1995, p. 50.
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violence in Europe, and, apart from the attack on the Naples-Milan 
express train in December 1984, in which 15 people died, there were 
relatively few indiscriminate bombings. Between 1969 and 1987, there 
were 359 attacks that caused death or injury in Italy, of which only 7.6% 
were perpetrated by the right-wing, compared to 74% by left-wing 
groups and 7% by foreign groups. However, of these attacks, the right- 
wing ones resulted in 193 deaths, compared to 148 in left wing-attacks. 
Even if the bombing of the railway station in Bologna in 1980, in which 
85 people died, is discounted as abnormal, the right-wing can be seen to 
be considerably m ore lethal per attack than  their left-w ing 
contemporaries.605 With a few exceptions, right-wing terrorism  in 
Europe was not indiscriminate: instead, it was mostly targeted against 
immigrants, Jews or Arabs in France and Germany and against left- 
wing targets in Italy.506 Xhe targets of such attacks were carefully 
chosen, but since these targets were often entire sections of the 
community, the intended victims were merely representatives of that 
group, rather than individual targets. In that sense, the violence is not 
so different from sectarian killings, purely on the basis of religion, that 
have been so much an aspect of terrorism in N orthern Ireland, or 
indeed from any other terrorism that is waged on communal grounds. 
It is here that it becomes hardest to distinguish far-right violence from 
that with a religious imperative because, as has been discussed earlier, 
much religious terrorism has an intensely nationalist element that is 
also common to extreme right terrorism.597
Providing that such an attack could be limited to members of that alien
community, so that it is indiscriminate w ithin only that group, a
widespread attack, possibly even using mass destructive weaponry,
seems initially plausible. However, when applied to purely secular
right-wing terrorism, Hoffman's analysis, w ritten in 1989, is still
completely relevant:
...Right-wing terrorism is based not on some pathological 
obsession to kill as many innocent people as possible, but on 
a deliberate policy of intimidating the general public into 
acceding to specific demands or pressure. The right-wing 
terrorists see themselves, if not as a revolutionary vanguard, 
then as a catalyst of events that will lead to an authoritarian
505 Jamieson,The Heart.... pp. 20-21.
506 Hoffman, "The Contrasting...", pp. 366-367.
507 Rubenstein, Alchem ists.... pp. 131-132.
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form of government. Thus, they tailor their violence to 
appeal to their perceived constituency... and, w ith the 
exception of a few indiscriminate bombings, they seek to keep 
it w ithin the bounds of what the ruling government will 
tolerate w ithout undertaking massive repressive actions 
against the terrorists themselves.508
For such right-wingers, terrorism  is an instrum ent to fu rther a
particular outcome, be it governmental policy or the driving of an
ethnic or religious group out of a state. That seems to utterly preclude
extreme levels of violence, especially in view  of the certain
governmental reaction to such an attack. However, in some groups,
notably a few Skinhead organisations, violence is a norm , a
prerequisite for membership, and assumes an almost therapeutic
quality. This violence can be directed, but it probably has relatively little
impact on high-level terrorism because such groups seem to relish a
type of violence that is intensely personal and low-tech, involving
brutal contact with the victim. Much of their violence is committed
without the long-term planning or rigorous preparations that would
characterise most acts of nuclear terrorism. However, when discussing
the effect of the combination of religion and right-wing violence, as
occurs amongst white supremacists in North America or in Jewish
groups such as Kach, it can be seen that the results are rather different
from that of the purely secular European political terrorists. There are
several exam ples of N orth  Am erican right-w ingers using or
threatening to use non-conventional weaponry. In March 1995, two
m em bers of the M innesota Patrio ts Council, a m ilitia-type
organisation, were convicted of attempting to kill federal officials by
mixing ricin with a solvent which would be absorbed through the skin.
They rubbed the mixture onto the doorknobs of federal buildings and
onto the doorhandles and steering wheels of cars.509 The possibility
that they might move from chemical to nuclear weaponry is a real one
that cannot be discounted.
Left-wing & Anti-nuclear Terrorism
In contrast to right-wing violence, left-wing terrorism is probably the 
least likely type to cause a high level act of nuclear terrorism. However,
508 Hoffman, "The Contrasting...", p. 367.
509 Sopko, "The Changing...", p. 9.
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it is conversely the variety that has been responsible for most of the 
low level acts to date. Connected with radicalism, especially since the 
growth of nuclear power as an alternative to fossil fuels in the 1970s, 
has been the rise of specifically anti-nuclear groups.
Violence by anti-nuclear groups, in this context, is an example of 
single-issue terrorism. As such, it has theoretical similarities w ith 
other v iolent single-cause organisations, such as anti-abortion 
campaigners that bomb clinics, animal rights activists that attack 
laboratories or radical environmentalists that "spike" trees that are to 
be logged or vandalise "destructive technology". One common feature 
of their respective campaigns has been a reluctance to attack people 
rather than property. Clutterbuck suggests that this is because such 
tactics are sufficient for their purpose and are the least likely to alienate 
potential supporters. Consequently, many militant single-issue groups 
set their bombs and incendiary devices to go off in the middle of the 
night, and threaten to escalate to peak-time attacks unless their 
demands are accommodated.^fo One exception to environm ental 
terrorists' preference of targeting property over people was Theodore 
Kaczynski, the alleged Unabomber. He was arrested in April 1996 
following a 17 year bombing campaign directed predominantly against 
workers involved w ith technology in the airline industry and in 
universities. Kaczynski's hatred of technology appears to stemmed, in 
p a rt, from  the com bination  of p o litica l rad ica lism  and 
environm entalism  that he developed whilst at the University of 
California in the 1960s. However, he is exceptional in two respects: he 
acted alone, being part of no group or organisation and until the New 
York Times and Washington Post published his 35,000 word Manifesto, 
shortly before his arrest, Kaczynski made little effort to publicise either 
his campaign or his beliefs and demands. Consequently, it is highly 
doubtful whether he is representative of other terrorists or of other 
radical environmental groups.
A nother tactic, this time fairly generally applicable to such 
organisations, is a strategy of intimidation directed at those who work 
in such research facilities. In Britain during the 1980s, the Animal
510 Clutterbuck, Terrorism In An Unstable World. p. 167. Obviously, this is not always 
the case: ETA killed Ryan, the head engineer of the Lemoniz plant, in January 1981 and 
Pascaul, the project leader, in April 1982. Wieviorka, The Making.... p. 168.
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Liberation Front (ALF) pursued such a campaign, spraying paint 
stripper on workers' cars, and using petrol bombs to start fires. In 1982, 
they posted letterbombs to four leading politicians, and in 1986 they 
placed magnetic bombs under the cars of research scientists. Their 
strategy also encompassed intimidating the public at large, hoping that 
they would pressure the government into meeting their demands. 
Consequently, in November 1984, they embarked on a campaign of 
product contamination against the confectionery manufacturer. Mars. 
The threats were largely hoaxes, but it still led to widespread concern 
amongst the public and to Mars withdrawing and destroying some £3 
million of its products.^n Such intim idation is an aspect of anti- 
nuclear violence as well. In March 1981, ETA sent death threats to 33 
technicians working in the Lemoniz plant. The letter explained that 
the group would target all specialised personnel "because of [their] 
participation in the illegal Lemoniz project." The threats had little 
impact: the technicians continued working at the nuclear power plant, 
even in the wake of the assassinations of the chief engineer and later of
the project m a n a g e r . 542
The definition of anti-nuclear terrorism is problematic for the same 
reason that terrorism perpetrated by right-wing youth counterculture 
groups is. Both grow out of wider, semi-organised movements that, 
while legal in themselves, engage occasionally in illegal acts. These 
m ovements are also the um brella for more radical and violent 
organisations that favour more illicit action. In the case of the anti- 
nuclear movement, this involves activities such as trespass actions at 
nuclear sites or civil disobedience to hinder the transport of nuclear 
material or waste. Their objective tends to be "demonstration" actions 
that increase public anxiety about nuclear safety and "co-opt anti- 
nuclear sentiment or environmental concerns for their own radical 
agenda" by exposing the lack of security, control and protection 
provided for nuclear programmes by either the nuclear industry or the 
government. Such groups rarely resort to high-level terrorist actions. 
Since the primary aim of anti-nuclear action is to win over public 
opinion, as well as to halt the construction or operation of nuclear
511 Clutterbuck, Terrorism In An Unstable World, pp. 171-172.
512 Konrad Kellen, "Appendix: Nuclear-Related Terrorist Activities by Political 
Terrorists" in Leventhal & Alexander (eds.). Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, pp. 129- 
130.
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facilities, they favour m ethods that, while d isruptive, are also 
proportional and as unlikely to injure people as possible. Equally, they 
are usually careful to use tactics that are unlikely to compromise so 
utterly the safety of a nuclear operation that it might result in the very 
danger to the su rrounding  environm ent that the anti-nuclear 
protesters most fear. Consequently, most anti-nuclear protests tend to 
be "nuisance actions", such as illegal entry into facilities, rather than 
anything more severe. Trespass actions at reactors are also fairly 
common and are often perceived to be a legitimate tactic of anti- 
nuclear protesters. For example, the activists at Greenham Common in 
Britain in the early 1980s made frequent attempts to cut through the 
fence and enter the USAF base, as a dem onstration against the 
deployment of cruise missiles there. However, nuclear facilities, as 
high-profile targets, even attract actions by adversaries with no obvious 
anti-nuclear agenda. In February 1993, a man drove tlirough the main 
gate at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant, and crashed through two 
closely spaced chain-linked fences into the "protected area" of the plant, 
where he hid for four hours, bu t caused no damage. The assailant. 
Pierce Hye, had recently been released from the m ental w ard of a 
community hospital in Ephrata, Pennsylvania, and had no clear
motive.513
Where the objective is to be more disruptive, activists have favoured 
actions such as destroying power lines to nuclear facilities, which has 
the advantages of being easier for the group, harder for the authorities 
to defend against, and serving as a means of effectively halting work at 
the facility, in the short term, without the attendant risks, to workers or 
the activists, that an attack on the facility itself might entail.5i4 In this 
respect, actions such as the bomb placed outside the Lawrence 
Livermore Laboratory on N ovem ber 28, 1987, m ay be fairly
513 Matthew L. Wald, "Gate Crasher Shakes Up Nuclear Debate", New York Times. 
February 111993, p. A16.
514 Bruce Hoffman, Report Of Dr Bruce Hoffman for Ontario Court (General Division! 
On The Likelihood Of Nuclear Terrorism In Canada. (July 1993), pp. 4-5. As an 
example, on January 25 1985, the 1,300-megawatt Krummel Nuclear Reactor in Germany 
was shut down when a 230-tower carrying electric cables between the plant and 
Hamburg was toppled by an explosive charge laid by activists, causing a short circuit 
on the power lines that tripped the plant's automatic switch. The shut down caused a 
blackout in Hamburg's suburbs for several hours. World Press Review. "Eco-Terrorists", 
(May 1985), p. 58.
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representative of violence by anti-nuclear activists. The bomb 
detonated just after midnight and destroyed dozens of windows and a 
car, damaged three other cars, and scattered debris over a wide area. 
However, the bombing, which was claimed by the Nuclear Liberation 
Front, injured no-one.5i5 As well as power lines to facilities, anti- 
nuclear protesters have also targeted the system used to transport 
nuclear materials to and from facilities. Examples of this type of action 
include the November 1994 sabotage of power lines on a railway line 
near Hanover, used in the transport of material to the storage site at 
Gorleben, and the 1996 destruction of tliis same piece of track.546 
However, it is risky to generalise too much about anti-nuclear activity 
because it has varied so greatly from one state to another and over 
time. For example, it was much less prevalent or violent in the United 
States than outside it between 1970 and 1984 and there was a much 
greater willingness to target people over property in these protests in 
other states.547 There have also been more violent attacks on reactors 
themselves. Although they are harder targets than research facilities, 
reactors are also attacked by anti-nuclear groups. An extreme example 
was the 1982 use of five antitank rockets against the Creys-Malville 
Superphoenix full-scale breeder reactor, near Lyon. The reactor was still 
under construction and, apart from damaging the outer shell of the 
building, little damage was done by the rockets. A previously unknow n 
group, called the Pacifist and Ecologist Com m ittee, claimed 
responsibility for the attack.548 However, it is w orth  trying to 
differentiate between violence by specifically anti-nuclear groups and 
attacks by wider organisations that merely have anti-nuclear activities 
as one of several aspects of their campaign. The most violent groups 
have, in many cases, fallen into the latter category, so it may still be 
possible to suggest that the majority of single-issue anti-nuclear groups 
are not interested in higher level attacks or in attacks directed primarily
615 "FBI Seizes Nuclear Protester In Car Bombing At A-Weapons Lab", Los Angeles 
Times. April 8,1988, p. A.32.
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at people rather than property. It is also worth noting that, although 
they are connected, there is a difference between anti-nuclear terrorism 
and the wider anti-nuclear movement. Increases in the former do not 
necessarily correspond w ith the peaks of activity in the latter. The 
height of peaceful anti-nuclear action was in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, when there were widespread attempts, in many states, to affect 
the decision-making process at a perceived critical time, when the fate 
of nuclear power was uncertain.549 There has been significant anti- 
nuclear terrorism both before and after this period.
Jasper and Poulsen conducted research with around 1000 anti-nuclear 
activists who were at a demonstration at Diablo Canyon nuclear power 
plant in August 1984. They found that US anti-nuclear activists tended 
to have been first involved in a range of other political protest 
m o v e m e n ts . T h ese  r a n g e d  fro m  a n ti-w a r ac tiv ities , 
environmentalism, feminism and the women's movement, nuclear 
disarmament and civil rights to animal rights. The protesters were 
mostly young (the median age was 32); well educated (95% were high 
school graduates and 88% had at least started college); had lower than 
average incomes; and overwhelm ingly described themselves as 
politically left of centre.520 Although factors such as friends and family, 
previous activism  and new s coverage were im portan t in the 
recruitment of anti-nuclear protesters, Jasper and Poulsen found that 
the key factor was specific events or moral shock arising from a series 
of these events.52i This makes sense, since it would explain rises in 
anti-nuclear protest in the wake of highly publicised incidents such as 
Three Mile Island in 1979 or Chernobyl in 1986.522 Interestingly,
519 Hoffman, Tompkins, Cordes, deLeon, Moran, "The Changing...", pp. 32-33.
520 This assessment of the background of antinuclear protesters is supported by other 
studies, such as: James Scaminaci III & Riley E. Dunlap, "No Nukes! A Comparison of 
Participants in Two National Antinuclear Demonstrations", Sociological Inquiry. 
Volume 56, Number 2, (Spring 1986), pp. 273-276.
521 James M. Jasper & Jane D. Poulsen, "Recruiting Strangers and Friends: Moral Shocks 
and Social Networks in Animal Rights and Anti-Nuclear Protests", Social Problems. 
Volume 42, Number 4, (November 1995), pp. 498-503.
522 Although this is a far from straightforward trend. In the US, the antinuclear 
movement was at its strongest between 1955 and 1963 (the test ban campaign) and again 
between 1981 and 1984 (the nuclear freeze campaign). David Meyer, "Peace Protest and 
Policy: Explaining the Rise and Decline of Antinuclear Movements in Postwar 
America", Policy Studies Tournai. Volume 21, Number 1, (1993), p. 40. Koopmans and 
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although Jasper and Poulsen studied activists, rather than anti-nuclear 
terrorists specifically, this aspect of the recruitment process is similar to 
the m om ent of "der sprung", described by Baumann and other 
terrorists. A nother key similarity was the depersonalisation and 
stereotyping of the enemy in general and of govermnental authorities 
in particular. In both cases, activists and terrorists, this serves as a 
recruitment aid and a justification for their actions. There is a clear 
anti-instrumental theme running through the anti-nuclear literature. 
Technology is depicted as out of control, the natural world as being 
destroyed and the governm ent complicitous. The m ain enemy is 
technocracy: large bureaucracies, driven by money and careerism, 
uncaring about human needs. The literature calls for moral standards 
and political control over the instrumental techniques and rationalities 
of the nuclear industry .^ 23 their view, nuclear energy is not only 
unsafe, uneconomical and unnecessary, it is also socially undesirable. It 
reinforces commercial growth at the expense of environmental quality, 
the power of large corporations over individuals, and an undue 
emphasis on materialistic consumption.^^^ Activists feel that they had 
been alienated. They feel victimised by public authorities that are 
perceived to be inflexible, secretive, and undem ocratic in their 
decision-making process.^^^
In the United States, anti-nuclear violence formed a major component 
of the attacks of the extreme environm entalist group, the Evan 
Mecham Eco-Terrorist International Conspiracy (EMETIC). This group 
grew out of the most radical elements of Earth First!, another
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advocates. However, incidents, such as Chernobyl do seem to have a multiplier effect 
on the state of the anti-nuclear campaign, as it already exists. So, for example, 
Chernobyl caused support for the movement to soar in Germany, where it was already 
strong, but made little impact on the weak French and Dutch movements, even although  
their countries were similarly affected to Germany. Ruud Koopmans & Jan Willem 
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environmental group. Angered by Earth Firstl's increased dedication to 
civil disobedience as a tactic, its leader, Dave Forman, and four others, 
all in their m id-thirties bu t from differing backgrounds, formed 
EMETIC in October 1 987 .^ ^ 6  gy then, m em bers of the nascent 
organisation had probably already been responsible for the May 1986 
attack on power lines at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, 
although they never claimed responsibility. The organisation was 
formed to conduct sabotage against nuclear power plants in the south­
western USA. On September 26, 1988, the group destroyed power lines 
feeding uranium mines around the Grand Canyon. Thirty-four power 
poles were damaged, restricting power supplies to two mines owned by 
Energy Fuels Nuclear. Two days later, EMETIC claimed responsibility 
for the attack. On May 30, 1989, three members of the group were 
arrested near Wendon, Arizona, attempting to cut through a support 
tower that delivered power to a local substation. The attack was 
intended as a dry-run before simultaneously attacking the electricity 
transmission cables at three nuclear facilities in Colorado, California 
and Arizona. They were subsequently sentenced to terms ranging from 
one month to six y e a r s . ^ 2 7
Earth First!, the group from which EMETIC grew, is noteworthy 
because it unusually combined radical and violent environm entalism  
with a form of millenarianism. At its foundation in 1980, Earth First! 
emphasised both non-violent direct action and attacks against private 
p roperty  to preserve the Am erican environm ent. Many of its 
adherents believed that the wasteful destructiveness of industrial 
civilisation would lead to its imminent collapse. Earth First! members' 
role, they believed, was to save as much of the American wilderness as 
possible, from this industrial complex, in the hope that biodiversity 
and evolution would be able to continue after the collapse. The Earth 
First! ideology was, like millenarian belief, essentially apocalyptic, but
Margaret Miller was a part-time worker at the local Planned Parenthood; Use 
Asplimd was a divorced mother of two who worked in Yauapai County, Arizona; and 
Marc Baker was married with two children and had a Ph.D in botany from Arizona 
State University. Brent L. Smith, Terrorism In America: Pipe Bombs and Pipe Dreams. 
(Albany, New York: State University of N ew  York Press, 1994), p. 126..
^^7 Smith, Terrorism In America..., pp. 26-27 & 125-127. Martha Lee, "Violence and the 
Enviroment: The Case of "Earth First!" in Barkun (ed.), "Millennialism & Violence", 
pp. 121-122. Paul Feldman & Richard E. Meyer, "4 Held In Plot To Cut Lines Near 
Nuclear Plants", The Los Angeles Times. Tune 11989, p. A l.
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they were convinced that their salvation would be secular and 
terrestrial, rather than spiritual, in the form of a healthy post­
apocalypse environm ent. C onvinced that the U nited  States 
government’s environmental protection programme had failed. Earth 
First! resolved to use more effective means to defend the wilderness. In 
this they were inspired by Edward Abbey's 1975 book: The Monkey 
Wrench Gang, a novel based on the experiences in the early 1970s of an 
Arizona-based environm ental group called the Eco-Raiders. Earth 
Firstl's initial action was at Glen Canyon Dam on March 20, 1980. A 
demonstration distracted the Dam's guards, while members of Earth 
First! placed a 300 foot plastic wedge on the dam's face, giving the 
impression that the Dam had been cracked. Later in their campaign, 
they used other tactics that included arson, tree and road spiking, 
grounding aircraft, and disabling heavy equipment, techniques they 
cumulatively called "monkeywrenching" or eco-sabotage. While not 
every member of Earth First! engaged in eco-sabotage, few condemned 
it. Believing that the earth should be placed first in any calculations, 
even ahead of hum an welfare, virtually any tactic was justifiable. 
However, increasingly, concerns about the use of eco-sabotage arose 
within the group due to fears of the counter-productive effect of 
causing injury or death and of encouraging mindless vandalism, rather 
than any moral constraint on doing so. However, despite numerical 
strength (it peaked at about 10,000 members in 1987), by the late 1980s 
Earth First! had still failed to make long-term gains in protecting the 
environment, and significantly declined following the defection of the 
faction lead by Dave Foreman.^^^
Anti-nuclear violence, while it can be single-issue terrorism, can also 
be the starting point for wider actions. Wieviorka suggests that in both 
France and the Basque homeland, what began as a campaign against 
nuclear power, came to be subsum ed into a w ider revolutionary 
struggle in France and in ETA's nationalist fight in Spain. In France, 
the anti-nuclear campaign moved from being simply a struggle against 
a particular type of power into a battle between the people and the 
regions versus a faceless, centralised, state-run entity, the power 
company, EDF.^29 Xn a few cases, nationalism also played a role in anti-
628 "Violence and the Environment...", pp. 109-121.
629 Wieviorka, The Making.... p. 118.
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nuclear violence w ithin France. On August 15 1975, two bombs 
exploded at the Mt D Arree Nuclear Power Plant in Brennilis, Brittany, 
causing minor damage. The chief suspects were Breton separatists.^^o 
In 1972-73, the Spanish governm ent announced four new nuclear 
projects (these would later become two: the Ea and Lemoniz facilities). 
Initially, resistance to these was localised and was driven specifically by 
fear and doubts. By 1976, the driving force behind the increasingly 
broad-based anti-nuclear m ovem ent had become anger at the 
highhandedness of the Spanish government and Iberduero SA (the 
electricity company), and the lack of democratic procedures in arriving 
at the decisions. The protest was gradually absorbed by the w ider 
Basque nationalist movement. From 1977, it was ETA that spearheaded 
the campaign, launching a number of attacks on the reactors and their 
personnel.^31 A ctiv ists w ho w ere pu rely  an ti-nuc lear were 
undoubtedly dismayed at the hijacking of their campaign. Generally, 
their sphere of operations was oriented towards Spain and even 
Europe as a whole. However, simultaneously, theirs were uniquely 
Basque organisations, which emphasised that character until it became
their defining a s p e c t . 6 3 2
One group that combined the wider left-wing concerns of the need to 
fight against an exploitive corporate-dominated state with the focus on 
environmental and specifically anti-nuclear issues, was the Canadian 
organisation. Direct Action, which was responsible for a num ber of 
attacks in the early 1980s. The five members of the group came from a 
variety of familial and educational backgrounds, although all were 
young, and had already shown a level of commitment to radical causes. 
They showed a number of characteristics, held in common with other 
terrorist groups: Juliet Beknas, the youngest of the group, 19 at the time 
of the attacks, was insecure and clearly greatly admired and respected 
the leaders of the group. Ami Brit Hansen and Brent Taylor. The other 
"soldier" of the group, Gerald Hannah, was a reluctant member, and 
refused to be involved in the bombings that the organisation 
perpetrated. Although not conclusive, this strongly hints that the 
organisational dynamics that make exit from, and dissension within, a
Richard Wigg, "Atom power station is sabotaged in France", The Times. August 16 
1975, p. 3.
631 Wieviorka, The Making.... pp. 166-168.
6 3 2 p. 174.
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group extremely difficult were present in Direct Action. The fifth
member of the organisation, Douglas Stewart, was the technical expert
and chief bomb-maker. His expertise was evident in the fact that the
May 31, 1982 bom bing of the (non-nuclear) D unsm uir British
Columbia Hydro substation on Vancouver Island, and the October 14,
1982 attack on the Litton Systems of Canada Limited factory in Toronto
were later described by investigating authorities as planted by someone
who knew exactly where to lay the explosives so as to cause maximum
damage and was "the work of experts". The group also firebombed
three of the pornographic Red Hot Video stores in the Vancouver area
on November 22, 1982 and subsequently plotted to attack Canadian
Forces jets, and a federal government icebreaker, and rehearsed an
armed robbery of a Brink's guard. Their various assaults caused around
$10 million of damage and w ounded or maimed 10 people. Direct
Action studied and admired European left-wing groups such as the Red
Brigades and Baader-Meinhof, as well as reading and discussing radical
writers such as Pierre Joseph Proudhon, who once declared "property is
theft". However, they chose their targets based on "a moral obligation
to do all that is humanly possible to prevent the destruction of the
earth." Even at their trials, the members of the group showed little
remorse, declaring that they were not terrorists. Rather, it was
"Businesses such as Litton (which m anufactured Cruise missile
guidance systems), B.C. Hydro and Red Hot Video [that] are the real
terrorists. They are guilty of crimes against humanity and the earth."
The 100kg of dynamite attack on the four 500 k.v. transformers at the
Dunsmuir substation was an attem pt to halt the building of a power
line from Cheekeye that w ould provide enough electricity for
heightened industrial activity on Vancouver I s l a n d . 6 3 3  Direct Action,
claiming responsibility for the attack said that they:
reject ecological destruction and human oppression whether 
they be caused by the corporate machines of the West or the 
Communist machine of the East... We m ust make this an 
insecure and inhabitable place for the capitalists and their
633 Gerry Bellett, "Mounties begin probe of sabotage at Hydro station", Vancouver Sun. 
June 1 1982, p. A3; Malcolm Gray, "A protest becomes destructive", Macleans, June 14 
1982; "Dynamite blasts Litton plant; 7 hurt". Globe & Mail. October 15 1982, pp. 1,2; 
Jock Ferguson & Lome Slotnick, "Litton blast called work of experts". Globe & Mail, 
October 16 1982, pp. 1,2; "Saboteur cites moral basis for bombings". Globe & Mail, Tune 6 
1984, p. 5; "Bomber gets life term, hurls tomato at judge". Globe & Mail, Tune 8 1984, pp. 
1,2; Ian Mulgrew, "The defiant Squamish Five: down to earth with a thud". Globe & 
M ail, Tune 191984, p. 7.
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projects. This is the best contribution we can make towards 
protecting the earth and struggling for a liberated society.634
While the attack on the substation was largely environm ental and
anti-developmental, the bombing of the Litton Systems plant was
overtly anti-nuclear. Nuclear w ar was "beyond question the ultimate
expression of the negative characteristics of W estern civilisation
[whose] roots lie deep w ith in  centuries of patriarchy, racism,
imperialism, class dom ination and all other forms of violence and
oppression that have scarred hum an h i s t o r y .  " 6 3 5  They explained the
rationale for selecting that target as:
We believe that people must actively fight the nuclear war 
system in whatever forms they exist and wherever they exist. 
Although, in total, the nuclear militarization of the world is 
a vast and seem ingly unfathom able and om nipotent 
network, it can be understood and effectively resisted when 
we recognise that it is designed, built and operated in 
thousands of separate facilities and industries spread 
th roughout the w orld. By analysing the interests and 
institutions in our own regions that are contributing to the 
nuclear build-up we find the smaller component pieces of the 
nuclear netw ork  th a t are realistic targets for direct 
confrontation and sabotage. Our opposition to the insanity of 
nuclear war must be transformed into militant resistance and 
direct action on a local and regional b a s i s . . . 6 3 6
This preoccupation w ith defending "the people" against technology 
and detrim ental foreign influences (especially during the Reagan 
Administration, anti-nuclear campaigns in Europe were tied, at least 
emotionally, with anti-Americanism) is common to many left-wing 
movements. It is even possible to see this in groups that have no 
obvious anti-nuclear agenda. An anti-A m erican sentim ent was 
especially prevalent amongst the European left-wing terrorists that 
conducted a series of joint operations in the mid 1980s, groups such as 
the Cellules Communistes Combatants of Belgium that, until 1984, 
committed attacks which were unlikely to cause fatalities, but after that 
date, sought to kill the "Yankee military and their a c c o m p l i c e s . " 6 3 7  
Although there are no nuclear reactors in Peru (Argentina's two at
634 "Sun receives 'blast' letter", Vancouver Sun. Tune 21982. pp. A1.2.
635 Direct Action, "Statement T^egarding The October 14 Litton Bombing”, October 17, 
1982.
636 Ibid.
637Laqueur.The Age.... p. 289.
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Embalse and Atucha and Brazil's one at Angra are the only South 
American plants), this anti-technology strategy can be seen to have 
been part of the Sendero Luminoso's (Shining Path) campaign to attack 
the Peruvian government. An offshoot of the Peruvian Com m unist 
Party, between 1976 and 1978, Sendero Luminoso took the decision to 
resort to armed struggle against a government that they denounced as 
both fascist and corporativist. Based predom inantly in the poor and 
underdeveloped area around Ayacucho, Sendero Luminoso launched 
their first armed action on June 16, 1980, attacking the town hall of San 
Martin de Porres with Molotov cocktails. By May, 1983, the group had 
attacked Lima's Bayer plant and succeeded in blacking out the dty. 
Their objective was the destruction of the state and the creation of a 
new democracy based on the peasants and the urban workers. By 1988, 
the focus of their actions had moved from a rural-based insurrection to 
an urban revolution, and they had attacked factories, power plants and 
com m unication and transport systems. They also directed their 
violence against foreign representatives, attacking the embassies of 
China, India, West Germany and Spain. The cause of these attacks 
seemed to have m ore to do w ith  underm ining  the Peruvian 
government than drawing the attention of the world to their case. In 
this sense, Sendero Luminoso differed considerably in objectives from 
its bitter rival, Tupac Amaru, which, in January and February 1991, as a 
protest against the Gulf War, attacked the US embassy with rocket 
propelled grenades and dynamited Lima's Pizza Hut, Kentucky Fried 
Chicken, Mormon churches and the US Peruvian Institute. Clearly, as 
w ith the group's long-running siege at the Japanese Ambassador's 
residence from December 1996 to April 1997, these actions were 
intended to have an impact on a foreign audience, not just one in 
P e r u . 6 3 8  However, these examples are not universally applicable: the 
Tupamaros of Uruguay made little effort to acquire foreign audiences 
or to attack foreign targets. There are several principle reasons for this: 
the Tupamaros had little hope of attracting assistance from other 
governments because their left-wing cause met w ith little sympathy 
amongst the increasingly reactionary regimes of Latin America; the 
importance of foreign influence was limited in Uruguay, so the 
assistance or pressure they could bring to bear was minimal; and there 
was a negligible Uruguayan diaspora, so there was little need for action
638 Aliaga, Terrorism.... pp. 32-35.47; Laqueur. The Age..., pp. 255-257.
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d e s ig n ed  to w in  over  p o ten tia l constituents.639 it  is a lso p o ssib le  for the
object and target of a terrorist group's campaign to change over time.
N ot only did  the RAF join "the w orldw ide revolt against US
imperialism", but:
In the various phases of our 22-year struggle, we intervened 
as guerrillas of the metropolis against the imperialist plans 
for world domination, against the US policy, against NATO, 
against the formation of a W estern European Bloc, and 
against the development of a Greater Germany into a world 
power, and against the 'New World Order'.640
Left-wing terrorism, like religious-inspired violence, is based heavily 
in textual references. These give both a philosophical and a practical 
basis for terrorism. Obviously, writers such as Marx, Lenin and Mao 
were tremendously influential, and all justified violence as a necessary 
condition of r e v o lu t io n .6 4 i  Writers who advocated violence but who
639 Lopez-Alves, "Political....", p. 216.
640 Translation of Red Army Faction's June 29 1992 communique in: Pluchinsky, 
"Germany's..", p. 154.
641 Marx's view of violence, like that of Lenin, is class-specific. However, for Marx, 
violence was a tool to enable successful revolution, never an end in itself. It might "help 
to refine the souls of the workers, but it is not necessarily an indispensable function". 
Raphael Cohen-Almagor, "Foundations Of Violence, Terror & War In The Writings Of 
Marx, Engels & Lenin", Terrorism & Political Violence. Volume 3, Number 2, (Summer 
1991), p.6.
He saw nothing wrong with revolution by peaceful means when the circumstances 
permit social transition without resorting to violence. However, Marx regarded it as 
implausible that the ruling classes would surrender power without the proletariat 
forcing them to do so through violence. It was therefore a "necessary means to bring 
about a more equal, more democratic society, more human than the exploitive 
capitalist system". Ibid., p. 7. He therefore argued that violence was only useful in 
dealing with absolutist regimes in which peaceful revolution was not a feasible option 
available for the proletariat. In such cases, violence became the instrument to enforce 
the reign of labour. However, for Marx there was another role for violence: revolution 
was vital, not only to create a more just society but to enable the rising class to renew 
itself by getting rid of the contaminating rubbish that was the ruHng class. It is hard to 
reconcile this view with Marx's arguments in favour of revolution by peaceful means. 
Furthermore, Marx realised that the exploited class had yet to realise the injustice of 
its situation or its full revolutionary potential and that violence, along with other 
measures, offered an opportunity for the revolutionary leadership to awaken the  
proletariat to the possibilities for seizing power. He argued that violence was 
"primarily necessary to transform the nature of the working class... it was therapeutic 
in character, and it alone would psychologically renovate the working class so that it 
would be fit to rule." Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982), p.23. It is as a result of this ambiguous position that many 
interpretations of Marx's attitude towards violence have been possible. He argues that 
there is a legitimate role for violence even where peaceful revolution is feasible. 
However, clearly for him, violence is the lever of the revolution and never the end in 
itself.
By contrast, even before the 1917 Revolution, Lenin was effectively arguing that the 
end justified the means regarding the use of force in perpetuating revolution. In his
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view, whatever factors could bring the eventual goal nearer were invariably positive 
and desirable. Ibid.. p. 18. However, like Marx, Lenin's view altered over the course of 
his works, allowing a great deal of latitude in interpreting his attitude towards 
violence. He originally opposed its use; but ended by giving unadulterated support for 
force and its application by all possible means. What is more important, he encouraged 
not only the use of force but the resort to terrorist activities. That is, he allowed the use 
of acts intended to arouse panic and fear amongst specific groups, justifying it w ith  
Marxist ideology, using the notions of "suppression of the governing bourgeoisie" and 
"proletariat dictatorship" for this purpose. It is for this reason, his support for the use 
of terror, that Lenin is perhaps more important than Marx in influencing modem 
terrorists. It is also crucial that whereas Marx was a theorist, Lenin implemented a 
revolution and it is therefore inevitable that he built on Marx's work, as well as others 
such as Engels, and that his own writings display a considerable development on from 
theirs.
The influence of all three has been repeatedly stated by national liberation  
movements, which chose violence and terror as means for achieving their ends. Ibid.. p. 
1. However, in most cases, their work has been a reference point to develop from, rather 
than a blueprint for the revolution. Mao Zedong deviated significantly from Leninism 
in developing the strategy of revolutionary war, a method of subversion aimed at 
overthrowing a regime and seizing power by ensuring that the vanguard of the 
revolution was grafted onto the peasantry so that they could effectively direct their 
efforts in pursuing revolution. Tliis teclmique of attempting to gain the support of a 
section of the population and retain it sufficiently long for the adversary to grow tired 
of the conflict and seek a settlement has been w idely used by Marxist-Leninist 
movements, with varying degrees of success.
A variation on Mao's revolutionary war was the Cuban theory of "foco" or mobile 
strategic base, launching the armed struggle without any of the preliminary political 
groundwork amongstthe population. Tliis resulted in a number of failed revolutions in 
the 1960s by Latin American movements and led the Tupamaros in Uruguay and Carlos 
Marighella in Brazil to adopt the tactics of the urban guerrilla, intrinsically a form of 
urban "foco". It is this model that has been widely copied across the world by other 
revolutionary groups and has meant that Marighella's 1969 book "Mini-Manual Of The 
Urban Guerrilla" has been vastly important as a source of practical advice to such 
movements. However, it offers more a discussion of tactics once the decision to resort to 
violence has already been made, rather than an incitement to use force in the first 
place. Moreover, terrorism and urban guerrilla warfare are not synonymous, although 
they do have considerable common ground. Gillespie argues that the latter is more 
discriminate and predictable in its use of violence than is terrorism. Richard Gillespie 
in Wilkinson (ed.) Terrorism: British Perspectives, p. 285. Urban guerrillas seldom  
reject terrorism, using it when they are weak or politically isolated, but it remains 
simply one of a series of tactics employed by them, rather than their sole method. 
Therefore, the importance of Marighella's work as a philosophical cause of terrorism 
is limited because he was dealing with an issue of which terrorism was only one aspect. 
The same argument could be levelled against the influence of other terrorists, such as 
Mikhail Bakunin or Nechayev, who wrote on the subject. Both were Russian activists 
of the late Nineteenth Century who were key in the development of anarchist and 
nihilist terrorism. Nechayev wrote "Revolutionary Catechism" in 1869, a book often 
quoted by present-day groups as a guide to part of their thinking. Wardlaw, 
Political.... p. 20. It is a handbook of terrorist organisation and tactics and a description 
of the ideal terrorist. But as he had no post-revolution vision, and therefore no 
political motivation, it is even questionable whether he was writing about terrorism in 
the true sense. His influence is more intellectual than concrete since unlike Marighella, 
Nechayev rarely engaged in terrorist activities himself. Bakunin however, spent much 
of his time travelling around Europe fermenting and assisting in revolutionary 
endeavours. He believed that the passion to destroy was a creative urge and that any 
state was eventually exploitive, regarding violence and bloodshed as the only
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were purely philosophical, such as Satre or Sorel, "instinctivists" such
as Lorenz, who argued that violence was a psychological need, or even
writers who influenced other types of groups, such as Fanon (who was
significant in justifying nationalist-separatist struggles), seem to have
been of less importance than those who could be seen to be overtly
revolutionary. The Red Brigades read and, to some extent, followed the
teachings of Mao and Carlos Marighella. This seems curious for an
u rb an  E uropean  g roup , g iven  th a t M ao's experience was
predominantly rural and that both his and Marighella's experiences
were non-European, being Chinese and South American respectively.
Marighella was admired because he had successfully implemented the
techniques he advocated in his "Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla"
which was the first practical text on how to effectively wage a guerrilla
w a r . 6 4 2  Marighella argued that:
The urban guerrilla is...a political revolutionary and an 
ardent patriot, he is a fighter for his country's liberation, a 
friend of the people and of freedom...The urban guerrilla 
follows a political goal and only attacks the government, the 
big capitalists, and the foreign imperialists...The urban 
guerrilla is the implacable enemy of the governm ent and 
systematically inflicts damage on the authorities and on the 
men who dominate the country and exercise power...The 
urban guerrilla's arms are inferior to the enemy's, but from a 
moral point of view, the urban guerrilla has an undeniable 
superiority. This moral superiority is what sustains the urban 
guerrilla. Thanks to it, the urban guerrilla can accomplish his 
principal duty, which is to attack and to s u r v i v e . 6 4 3
purgative to cleanse society. Ibid. In this, he was clearly at odds with Marx who saw  
capitalism as the problem rather than the state per se. Bakunin regarded the vanguard 
of the revolution to be the peasantry and banditry rather than the proletariat. 
However, his main contribution to revolutionary thinking was the concept of 
"propaganda of the deed", that violent acts should be committed as individual 
revolutionary statements. It is hard to ascertain the extent of the influence of such 
notions on terrorist movements in the post-war era, however they clearly do have some 
philosophical and intellectual debt to Russian terrorists and anarchist of the late 
Nineteenth Century. Although the use of terror was not new then, the use of it as a 
systematic prograimne was. The propaganda of groups such as Baader-Meinhof in 
Germany or the Weathermen in the United States has displayed anarchist or nihilist 
leanings wliich acknowledged that debt. Wilkinson, Terrorism & The Liberal State, p. 
98. However, since the nature of terrorism has altered radically in the last hundred 
years, it must be seen that such influences represent only one of many on contemporary 
groups.
642 Jamieson, The Heart.... p. 55.
643 Carlos Marighella, Mini-Manual Of The Urban Guerrilla. 1969, pp. 2-5.
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However, Mao was especially significant to the Red Brigades, possibly 
in part because a defining experience in the radicalisation of group 
members was opposition to the Vietnam War, and support for the 
supposedly Maoist Hanoi regime. However, the real importance of 
Mao to the group came from his guiding framework for revolution, 
rather than from the teachings themselves. The group especially 
favoured a teaching that fostered self-belief and patience for ultimate 
victory: the revolutionary process "cannot be other than protracted and 
ruthless...It is wrong to think that the forces of the Chinese revolution 
can be built up in the twinkling of an eye, or that China's revolution 
can triumph overnight." The Red Brigades were also able to use Mao’s 
teachings to justify not only their own potential death, but also their 
need to kill others in the process of revolution. As Mao himself 
argued:
All men must die, but death can vary in its significance. The 
ancient Chinese writer, Szuma Chien said, 'Though death 
befalls all men alike, it may be heavier than Mount Tai or 
lighter than a feather.’ To die for the people is heavier than 
M ount Tai, but to work for the fascists and die for the 
exploiters and oppressors is lighter than a feather.
Mao therefore glorified dying a "heavy death", and absolved the
m urderer that perpetrated a "light death" of moral responsibility or
guilt.644
The importance of ideology, in its strict theoretical sense, varies 
significantly from one group to another. While they would still be 
classified as anarchic-ideologue, organisations such as Action Direct or 
the Cellules Com m unistes Com battantes, in stark  contrast to 
organisations such as the Red Brigades or RAF, both of whom  
discussed their ideas in depth and produced manifestos, were evidently 
unimpressed by theoretical discussions, and instead favoured action, as 
is suggested by statements such as "les documents qui proposent 
DOCOM, sont des dociunents de combats, non des analyses de 
salon... One of the consequences of an ideological motivation is 
that, in contrast to groups motivated by other goals, such as nationalist- 
separatism , it perpetuates a w orld  view and thus lends an 
international, as well as a more narrow perspective to the cause. This is 
clearly supported by the example of left-wing terrorist groups, and
644 Janüeson, The Heart.... pp. 52-54.
645 Docom, 1981 or 1982, dted in Laqueur, The Age.... p. 302.
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especially by the RAF, which from the mid 1980s focused its efforts in 
an attem pt to build a West European Guerrilla organisation, an 
alliance w ith other Marxist-Leninist European terrorists, such as 
Action Direct (AD) or the Belgian Cellules Communistes Combattantes 
(CCC). The co-operation between the RAF and AD resulted in the 
murders of General Rene Audran in Paris and Ernst Zimmermann, a 
German manager in the munitions industry, in Munich on February 1 
1985; an attack on the US Air Base in Frankfurt; and the m urder of the 
Director-General of the French Renault Works, Georges Besse, on 
November 17 1986. All the m urder victims could be perceived to have 
been members of the European Military-Industry-Complex. The CCC 
was less involved in such collaborative efforts: the only evidence of 
practical co-operation is that the explosive used by the RAF in its failed 
December 1984 attack on the NATO School in Oberammergau was 
stolen by the CCC in June from a quarry in Belgium. Flowever, the 
arrests of the leading members of AD in February 1987 and the CCC in 
December 1985 largely finished those groups as viable organisations. 
After that, the RAF focused on its relationship with the Red Brigades, 
which by 1985 had split into two "positions": the BR-PCC (Red Brigades 
for the Construction of the Fighting Communist Party) which was 
internationalist and anti-im perialist, and the UCC (the Union of 
Fighting Communists) which was proletarian and focused on the class 
struggle. However, the attem pt to create a pan-European terrorist 
movement, directed predom inantly against NATO, was only half­
heartedly pursued and so failed.646 This fact was acknowledged in the 
RAF's statem ent of April 10, 1992, in which they announced the 
cessation of their violence in exchange for improvements in the prison 
conditions of those RAF members being held by the German state. Part
of the statement was as follows:
We were faced with the fact that we had failed to accomplish 
our objective, namely to achieve a breakthrough in the joint 
international struggle for liberation. The liberation struggles 
were generally too weak to hold their own against the 
imperialist war, which was extended to aU l e v e l s . 6 4 7
646 Horchem, 'The Decline...", pp. 67-69.
647 Translation of Red Army Faction's April 10 1992 communique in: Pluchinsky, 
"Germany's..." p. 148.
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The ability of the Red Brigades to justify their actions was enhanced by 
the belief that their violence was largely defensive. They were battling 
against oppression, on behalf of the exploited workers, for whom there 
were ever diminishing opportunities for liberty and justice. Within 
Italian society, violence was a norm, not an aberration; fascist violence 
was being perpetrated against the weaker members of society. The 
ruling elite would do anything to maintain their power; their code was 
arbitrarily imposed rules of law and morality. To disrupt or overthrow 
such a code, even using violence, was justifiable. To protect oneself 
against the violence of fascist policemen, industrialists or employers 
was certainly legitimate.648 This growing awareness about the intrinsic 
nature of Italian society was focused by a number of key events that 
appeared to confirm the first generation members of the Red Brigades 
in their belief that there was a need to act, to protect themselves and 
others from the threat of fascism. The key such event was the bombing 
of a bank in the Piazza Fontana in Milan on December 12, 1969, in 
wliich 16 people died and 88 were injured. The attack was perpetrated 
by conservative terrorists, intent on ensuring that left-wing groups 
were blamed, convincing the Italian population that their safety was so 
jeopardised that the sacrifice of freedoms to a military dictatorship was 
desirable. The inclination to initially accuse left-wingers of the act, and 
the subsequent political exploitation of the situation, acted as a catalyst 
for the members of the nascent Red Brigades.649
Martyrs played an im portant role in the perpetuation of the Italian 
terrorist groups, in common with most other terrorist organisations, 
including the West German groups, for whom imprisoned members 
were a vital source of inspiration and publicity, and who became 
increasingly critical to the group's identity and sense of p u r p o s e . 6 5 0  On 
June 4, 1975, the Red Brigades kidnapped the millionaire Vallarino 
Gancia. However, within a day, the Italian police had found and 
surrounded the building where Gancia was being held. In the 
subsequent shoot-out, one policeman was killed, two were injured and 
Mara Cagol, a founder member of the group, also died. The Red 
Brigade's tribute was clearly designed to inspire and motivate others to 
join the cause:
648 Jamieson, The Heart p. 53.
649 Ibid.. pp. 59-60.
650 ggg^  for example, Pluchinsky, "Germany's..."; Horchem, "The Decline..."
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Let all sincere revolutionaries honour the memory of Mara, 
reflecting on the political lesson she gave by means of her 
choice, her work, her Hfe. Let a thousand arms reach out to 
pick up her gun...Mara is a flower which has bloomed, and 
the Red Brigades will continue to cultivate this flower of 
liberty until victory comes.^^i
Adriana Faranda and Valerio Morucci, prominent second generation 
leaders of the Red Brigades, were examples of people attracted by the 
group’s campaign and martyrs such as Cagol. During 1975, both were 
active in the radical group, Formazioni Armante Comiiniste. In the 
autum n of 1976, they were offered the command of the newly formed 
Rome column of the Red Brigades by Mario M oretti. A lthough 
intended to help the oppressed workers, the Red Brigades included 
many clearly middle-class members. Faranda came from a close, 
relatively prosperous family in Sicily. She went to the Arts faculty of 
Rome university and gradually became radicalised, as her need to feel 
involved meshed with her growing social conscience. Although she 
initially participated solely in m ainstream  marches, rallies and 
distributions of leaflets, she became more drastic in her protest when it 
became clear that dissent was a punishable offence: at one march in 
1969, most of her friends ended up in prison or in hospital, so Faranda 
sought other means of action. Increasingly convinced that society was 
too corrupt to be recovered, she believed that ’’to bring about a radical 
transformation the only possible way was through revolution, which 
necessitated violence." Morucci was the son of Rome caretakers, and 
like Faranda, started in the Arts Faculty of Rome University in 1968. 
Also like Faranda, he spent much of the early 1970s in a series of 
increasingly radical organisations, such as Potere Operaio, in which he 
was a part of the hard-line semi-covert wing, as he grew increasingly 
frustrated at the lack of political will to transform Italian society, a 
reform it clearly needed.652
Unlike right-wing terrorists, left-wing groups have little experience of 
"split delegitimisation". For them, the government, establishment and 
enemy are all one and the same. As a result, such left-wing groups are 
more likely than reactionary terrorists to regard themselves as 
"outsiders" and to be irretrievably hostile to the authorities from the
631 Jamieson,The Heart... p. 89. 
652Ibid.. pp. 103-105.
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outset, driven on by revolutionary ideology. Such implacable 
opposition might, logically, be perceived to have an escalatory impact 
on the level of violence they are willing to employ against a state in 
which they have no stake. However, this is not obviously so, even in 
the most extreme cases. Although it is not typical of left-wing terrorist 
groups, both the Red Brigades and their contemporary West German 
organisations, such as Baader-Meinhof, shared a strong, adverse 
reaction against fascism and Nazism, as a major component of their 
initial radicalism and subsequent alienation from the Italian and West 
German establishment. In part, it reflected a generational difference, 
believing that these establishments represented the remnants of the 
far-right regimes of twenty-five years before. At best, they had colluded 
and collaborated with these regimes; at worst, they were these regimes, 
thinly cloaked under democratic respectability .6 53 Every clash the group 
had with authority was taken to represent further proof of an attempt 
by the right-w ing establishm ent to repress the freedom s of the 
organisation and the people. A good example is Baumann's comment 
that "The three deaths in Stammheim [the suicide of three leaders of 
the Baader-Meinhof gang] were regarded as confirmation by these 
groups that fascism has now broken out openly."654 Although none of 
its current membership had been active before 1984,655 even in 1992, in 
the RAF's penultim ate communiqué, Germany's Nazi past figured 
prominently in the group's justification for the original decision to use 
violence:
Our movement was possible...in this country, where the 
society has not come to grips with the realities of Auschwitz 
and its Nazi past, and where Nazis were reinstated in all 
sectors of governm ent and business, and where instead 
com m unists and  an tifascists w ere persecuted , and 
rearmament was forced on the society against the opposition 
of many who wanted a real break with the fascist past.656
Even when a state does have nuclear power, it is not invariably the 
case that left-wing groups within that state target the industry, as a core
653 Tbe best account of this aspect of the Baader-Meinhof is in: Jillian Becker, H itler's 
Children: The Story of the Baader-Meinhof Gang, 3rd edition, (London: Pickwick, 
1989).
654 Kellen, "Terrorists...", pp. 61-62.
655 Pluchinsky, "Germany's... ", p. 142.
656 Translation of Red Army Faction’s June 29 1992 communique in: Pluchinsky, 
"Germany's...", p. 154.
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part of their campaign, even if the rejection of the state's establishment 
is as total as was the case in both the Italian and German examples. Italy 
had four reactor sites (Latina, Garigliano, Caorso and Trino Vercellese), 
all of which have subsequently been closed; yet, according to a 
chronology of nuclear incidents based on the RAND-St Andrews 
Database, between 1968 and 1986, a period of intense terrorist activity in 
Italy, there were very few confirm ed incidents that could even 
conceivably be described as perpetrated by terrorists, and only one of 
those appeared to have an anti-nuclear motive. That was the May 1979 
attack on the National Nuclear Energy Centre in which intruders 
poured gasoline on a computer within the Centre and then returned 
fire when a night watchman discovered them and started shooting. No 
group claimed credit for the attack and a m otive was never 
established.657 it is interesting that in France and the United States, 
both of which had dozens of incidents over the same period, the 
overall level of terrorism was much lower than in West Germany or 
Italy, which had fewer nuclear incidents, in spite of a vibrant anti­
nuclear movement in the former case.
West Germany's example provides an interesting counter-weight to
the Italian one. Michael Baumann believed that, at one point, it was
entirely plausible that the RAF might engage in an act of nuclear
terrorism. In an interview with Encounter, he said:
I am not suggesting that at the present moment the groups 
have concrete plans or even ideas of that kind. But such 
things are in accordance with the logic of the age and the logic 
of the group...Henceforth there are no limits...Now [the RAF 
have] got to do something that wiU certainly work. And what 
can that be except an ultim ate thing like that [nuclear 
terrorism]?..They are clever people, and they have vast
657 There were however, a number of other incidents in Italy that were unconfirmed or 
the work of disaffected individuals. These included the supposed plot, revealed in 
October 1974, of a right-wing group that planned to poison several aqueducts with  
radioactive waste stolen from a nuclear plant in northern Italy. However, in spite of 
vast publicity and a thorough investigation, the evidence for these allegations was 
sketchy. In August 1980, SNIA-Techint was bombed in Rome by the Committee for the 
Defence of the Islamic Revolution. The company had supplied nuclear technology to 
Iraq, h i November 1983,11 ounces of radioactive material were seized by Rome pohce. 
The material was low-grade uranium, intended for an unspecified Middle Eastern 
country. The following year, around 30 Italians and a Turk were arrested for planning to 
smuggle nuclear bombs. Exocet missiles, uranium and plutonium to Iraq. Their ability to 
acquire any of these was uncertain. RAND-St Andrews Database.
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amounts of money. A primitive atomic bomb could also be 
made. But a raid on a stockpile is more l i k e l y .6 5 8
However, such a possibility came to nothing, and there is little other
evidence of a serious attem pt to perpetrate such an attack. It could,
therefore, possibly be dismissed as idle speculation by someone who
was, at the time of the interview, an alienated former member of a
rival terrorist organisation. Despite the apparent interest of left-wing
terrorists in the potentialities of nuclear terrorism,659 and with the
exception of a few high-profile mcidents, such as the assassinations of
Heinz Karry in 1981 and of Karl-Heinz Beckurts in 1986 that although
they had a nuclear component owed more to other f a c t o r s , 6 6 o  the
overwhelm ing majority of nuclear incidents, in W est Germany,
recorded by the Rand-St Andrews Database for the years 1969 to 1986
were perpetrated by genuinely single-issue anti-nuclear groups. Apart
from these high-profile incidents, most of the other events appear to
have been relatively low-level and directed against property, not
people. These include: eight attacks on reactors in northern Germany
between 1977 and April 1979, all using home-made explosives; an
attack using two home-made bombs on a mast carrying a high-tension
line from the Esenham power plant in April 1979; the June 1979 attack
on the building of the "Urangesellschaft" (Uranium Company) in
Frankfurt; the bombing in December 1980 of the Society for Nuclear
658 Peter Neuhauser, "The Mind of a German Terrorist", Encounter, p. 87.
659 See too Baumami's comments that there had been discussion in the group about the 
possibility of nuclear terrorism and that "Anyone who had som ething like that 
[nuclear weapons] in hand has enough power to make the Prime Minister dance on a 
table in front of a T.V. camera."in Kellen, "Terrorists...", pp. 61-62.
660 Karry, the economics minister of Hesse, was shot in Ms bed in a well-organised  
attack (despite issuing several warnings to Karry, the assassins were able to cut the 
telephone wires to the house, and enter the building undetected) in May 1981. Police 
suggested that the motive might have stemmed from Karry's support for the expansion 
of Frankfurt airport and the building of a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in Hesse. 
Karry was Jewish and his assassination had similarities with the earlier killing of 
Heinz Nittel, also a prominent Jew, which was claimed by Al-Assifa, one of the 
alternative names for Abu Nidal's organisation. However, the Karry killing was later 
claimed by the Revolutionary Cells, who stated that his death was an accident since 
they had intended to "punish" him by shooting him in the legs. RAND- St Andrews 
Database. Karl-Heinz Beckurts, a senior executive of the company Siemans, was 
killed, along with Ms driver, in July 1986 by a 22-pound bomb that was detonated by 
remote control as his car went by. Responsibility was claimed by the RAF, who 
attributed the attack to Siemans involvement in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) 
research, the company's plans to build a nuclear reprocessing plant in Bavaria, and to 
Beckurt's position as one of the premier industrialists in West Germany. William  
Tuohy, "Terrorists' Bomb Kills W. German A-Scientist", Los Angeles Times. July 10 
1986, p. A l; Robert J. McCartney, "Terrorist Group kills Executive Near Munich", 
Washington Post. Tuly 101986, p. A l.
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Reactor Security's office in Cologne; an unexploded bomb at the West 
Berlin turbine plant of the builders of nuclear power plants, Kraftwerk 
Union, in March 1981; a July 1986 fire at a firm that built nuclear fuel 
reprocessing plants in Schwandorf; as well as a series of attacks and 
trespass actions at United States Army bases.66i
The Italian and German examples suggest that anti-nuclear violence is 
not necessarily a factor in left-wing terrorism, even when it might be 
an option and where the terrorist depiction of their adversaries comes 
close to démonisation. There evidently has to be another element as 
well to explain the actions of left-wing groups such as Action Direct in 
France and Direct Action in Canada, or nationalist-separatist groups 
such as ETA in Spain. Despite the dominance of left-wing motivations 
in anti-nuclear violence, it remains the case that this type of group is 
singularly unlikely to be responsible for a high-level act of nuclear 
terrorism. There are a number of reasons for this, most critically, that 
left-wing groups actions are mitigated by bounded morality. As has 
been discussed with the bounded rationality of terrorist's actions, while 
their morality may not be clear to, or shared by, the majority of the 
population, it exists in a way that is a genuine constraint on the scope 
of left-wing groups' campaigns. Bearing in m ind this dichotomy 
between the ethics of the terrorist and that of the general population, it 
is curious that the basis for left-wing organisations' self-imposed 
limitations is their perception of their audience's morality, in terms of 
what actions by the terrorists will be tolerated. Nonetheless, this 
morality is critical in legitimising the actions of left-wing terrorists. It is 
this that separates them in their own minds from criminals; it justifies 
their consistent infringement of widely accepted moral and legal 
boundaries in society. They can claim to be fighting a defensive and 
"just" w ar against an oppressive  and overbearing  state.662 
Furthermore, since a great deal of left-wing violence is perpetuated by a 
"revolutionary vanguard", in the name of the people, against the 
government and elite of a state, such groups are reluctant to commit 
acts that needlessly injure "innocent" people.663 Horst Mahler, one of 
the founders of the Baader-Meinhof group, said of their targeting: "Of
661 Rand-St Andrews Database
662 Bonnie Cordes, "When Terrorists Do the Talking: Reflections on Terrorist 
Literature" in Rapoport (ed.). Inside.... p. 157.
663 Hoffman, "The Ethical...", pp. 363-364.
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course, it was not 'the people', the little man who is innocent and not 
involved in any repression that we would kill. The main point in our 
struggle was to be some kind of sabotage and punishm ent of 
responsible personages for cruelties against the people."664 Direct 
Action are another example of this, in that they displayed a 
ruthlessness and contempt towards their enemies, but were equally 
appalled when their attacks wounded innocent people. The Tupamaros 
are also a good example of this: they sought to be the "armed 
vanguard" of the Uruguayan left, a perspective that led it to treat 
terrorism as just one tactic amongst several on the road to political 
power. The group never ceased to be aware that terrorism could be 
potentially damaging to the revolution, so constantly sought to avoid 
unnecessary violence and especially injury to people other than their 
targets.665 This point is so im portant as to bear re-emphasis: the 
targeting  and actions of left-w ing groups are restric ted  by 
proportionality and justice: attacks that are disproportionate or unjust 
are counter-productive, risking causing a govermnent clamp-down, as 
well as alienating the terrorists from their audience and potential 
sympathisers. Consequently, while they may be capable of mass 
destructive terrorism, left-wing groups are unlikely to engage in such 
actions. The likelihood of nuclear terrorism, determ ined by such 
considerations of tactics and targeting, and shaped by factors like 
ideology, psychology and opportunity, is the focus of the next section.
664 Elizabeth Pond, "Remorseful terrorist looks back", Christian Science Monitor. 
August 291978, p. 13.
665 Lopez-Alves, "Political...", pp. 203-206.
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The Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism
The implications of the increased opportunity to proliferate arising 
from the collapse of the former Soviet Union are far from clear when it 
comes to applying them to nuclear terrorism. Jenkins has suggested that 
it is psychotics that are most likely to be attracted to such acts, but that, of 
all terrorists, it is also psychotics that would be least capable of the 
sustained teamwork and incremental progress that would probably 
characterise this variety of terrorism.666 Post generally agrees with this 
assessment but believes that it risks oversimplifying the case.667 Most 
crucially, it fails to differentiate between various types of nuclear 
terrorism: are the implications for a radiological device necessarily the 
same as for the likelihood of terrorists building a yield-giving bomb or 
using one? It seems unlikely. The most crucial difference that has 
emerged in recent years is between those that stress terrorist capability 
and those that emphasise terrorist intent as the main factor affecting the 
likelihood of a terrorist nuclear device. In both cases, though, nuclear 
terrorism would be "a quantum  leap" from conventional weapons
terrorism.668
Setting off a nuclear-yield bomb would require that a group somehow 
acquire a weapon, possibly through state-sponsorship, but more likely 
by stealing one, an extremely difficult proposition and a relatively 
unlikely one, given the presum ed need of terrorists or states for 
anonymity and complete security at such a delicate stage of their 
operations. The other, more likely, alternative would be that they build 
a bomb; since this would require fissile m aterial it would seem to 
preclude all but the most well-off or state-sponsored terrorist groups. If 
terrorists were intent on building a nuclear-yield device, their biggest 
technical difficulty would almost certainly be the acquisition of fissile 
material. It is worth recalling that the design for a crude nuclear device 
has been publicly accessible for 25 years and that it relies on technology 
that was challenging in the 1940s, but that is almost certainly no longer
666 Brian Jenkins, "The Potential For Nuclear Terrorism", RAND P-5876. May 1977.
667 jerrold M. Post "Prospects For Nuclear Terrorism: Psychological Motivations & 
Constraints" in Leventhal & Alexander (ed.). Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, p. 92.
668 Clarke, Author's...
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S0.669 Balanced against that is the argument that states such as Iran and 
Iraq have been actively pursuing a nuclear weapons capability for a
669 Yijjg jg especially the case if the assumption is that terrorists are content with 
a crude nuclear weapon, of variable and uncertain yield. Easiest to construct would 
be a gun-type assembly using HEU. A less than critical mass quantity of uranium 
(probably around 15kg) would be fired down a cylinder, using a high explosive 
charge, into another less than critical mass quantity of uranium (about 40kg) at the 
other end of the cylinder and which had been hollowed out so that the smaller 
quantity of uranium fitted snugly, forming a supercritical mass and creating a 
nuclear explosion. Although such a device requires a relatively large amount of 
HEU and a thick-walled cylinder, probably about 50cm long, the device would not 
be impossibly heavy and could certainly be easily transported by van. Terrorists 
could use any plutonium for a bomb, but if it were reactor grade material it would 
probably be first necessary to convert plutonium oxide into metal, a relatively 
straightforward chemical process. For a bomb, a quantity of material close to 
critical mass (about 8kg for plutonium metal) would be used since that would negate 
the necessity of using shaped high explosives to create a supercritical mass. It 
would be sufficient to shnply stack the explosives around the plutonium which 
would need to have been machined to a sphere (this could be readily done in a 
machine-shop, preferably one with a fume cupboard since plutonium metal can 
spontaneously burst into flames in air) and place 50-60 detonators, fired 
simultaneously, so that the plutonium is compressed symmetrically enough to form 
a supercritical mass. There are some potential risks to building a crude nuclear 
bomb, but fairly elementary precautions would minimise the danger of radiological 
hazards or accidentally achieving criticality. A crude device could be built by a 
small group, using the open literature, and without requiring testing of components 
or a great deal of technological equipment, the cost of whicli would be a fraction of 
a million dollars. International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, 
"Crude Nuclear Weapons; Proliferation and the Terrorist Threat", IPPNW Global 
Health Watch, Report Number 1, 1996, pp. 6-10.
The biggest barrier to such a device is access to the nuclear material. The amount of 
fissile material required to build a bomb is much disputed: the IAEA assumes that 
181bs (8 kg) of weapons-grade plutonium is enough, but the American lobby group, 
the National Resources Defence Council (NRDC), puts the figure at significantly 
less. The bomb at Nagasaki in August 1945 produced a yield equivalent to 21,000 
tonnes of TNT using 6kg of plutonium. The NRDC believes that experts could 
achieve the same yield now with a third of the fissile material. However, this 
sort of efficiency requires computer-modelling and components testing. Without 
that, it is still possible to make a device: South Africa's bombs were certain to 
work, but did use 60kg of highly-enriched uranium. "Little Boys", The Economist. 
August 271994, p. 74. Frank Barnaby, a former nuclear scientist, states that at most, 
10 kg of plutonium or 50 kg of highly enriched uranium are needed to create a 
nuclear explosion. Barnaby, "Nuclear Accidents... ", p. 95. Oleg Bukharin, a 
research fellow at Princeton's Center for Energy & Enviromental Studies, puts the  
figure at 6kg of plutonium or 25kg of higlily enriched uranium for a crude implosion- 
type device and about 50kg of uranium for a gun-type device. Bukharin, "Nuclear 
Safeguards... ", p. 54. The cost of building such a bomb would certainly run into the 
millions or tens of millions for the material alone, probably more than most 
terrorist organisations could afford. However, if the group is contemplating 
acquiring a nuclear device, it would be unwise to suppose that their abilities do not 
extend to also acquiring the means to buy enough fissile material for the bomb. 
Nelan, "Formula... ", p. 19. There is also no agreement about the black market price 
of nuclear materials, particularly since the quahty of the materials is so variable. 
The Berlin Information Centre for Transatlantic Security, an independent research 
institute, claimed that the price in 1994 was $6 million per kilogram of plutonium.
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number of years and have still not succeeded. This has as much to do
with their difficulty in obtaining sufficient fissile material as anything
else. However, it is precisely this possibility, a terrorist built nuclear
device, that is the focus of so much attention and speculation currently
and is the reason that events in the former Soviet Union are of such
importance. While terrorism other than a nuclear-yield bomb, such as a
radiological device, is more likely, the severity of the former means that
the extent of the problem of a radiological device is not proportionate to
a full scale terrorist nuclear weapon; thus most of the focus has thus far
been on the nuclear-yield d e v i c e . 6 7 0  However, there is widespread
recognition that:
Adding to this threat [the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction] is the emergence of low-technology nuclear 
devices and radioactive material dispersal weapons, based on 
diverted or stolen material (nuclear smuggling); indigenous 
or covert production of biological or chemical agents (as 
dem onstrated by the Aum Shinrikyo cult's attack); and 
advances and diffusion of biotechnology tha t enable 
genetically engineered agents that may thw art the use of 
productive countermeasures.67i
It still seems unlikely that most terrorist organisations would seek to 
enrich material for a yield-producing device: it is simply too complex 
and requires considerable expertise and unnecessary cost to achieve. The 
more telling argument against it, though, is that enrichment would be 
unnecessary in many cases: a crude nuclear-yield bomb can be made 
with material that is not weapons-grade and even low-grade fissile 
material would have considerable utility as the basis for a radiological 
device. Materials in this category can be more easily stolen from 
nuclear, industrial and research facilities than can weapons-grade
but other sources put it as low  as $250,000. Michael Evans, "Russian Officials 
Offered Plutonium Sale To Briton", The Times. August 18,1994, p. 1. The Russian 
Counter-Intelligence Service cites $400,000 a kilo for uranium fuel rods and $2.2 
million a kilo for weapons grade uranium as the price in 1995. "Nuclear Smuggling", 
Chamiel 4 Television 7 pm News. February 15,1995.
670 Falkenrath, Author’s...
671 D. Cobb & W. Kirchner, Testimony to US Senate Governmental Affairs 
Committee. Permanent Subcommittee On Investigations. "Reducing the Threat of 
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Proliferation and Terrorism", 104th Congress 
2nd Session, March 13,20, and 221996, p. 4.
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material.672 Since such a radiological device would be extremely easy to 
construct (it need only be an aerosol can or a bomb with a radioactive 
coating or with a container of radioactive material next to it), and since 
the materials for it are so widely available (cesium-137, for example, is 
commonly used in hospitals for X-rays), it is by far the most likely form 
of nuclear device, as well as the least catastrophic. However, it would 
still have considerable value as a terrorist weapon, since the mere fact of 
being "nuclear" would almost certainly ensure that it had an impact on 
the public's im agination and fear, and thus on a governm ental 
response, far in excess of the danger it poses. An example of this would 
be the response to the Three Mile Island accident in 1979: the risk to the 
public was minimal, but the outcry and fear were considerable.673 
Radiological devices are not ideal for creating mass casualties, and 
certainly not in the short-term, but they would have vast impact and 
could, potentially, pose a considerable problem for an extended period. 
Once aware of the problem, it would probably be possible to clean up the 
radiological effects of a device, but restoring public confidence would be 
very difficult.674 Suppose that terrorists put radioactive material in the 
main ventilation system of a building such as the World Trade Center 
or of the New York subway. Even if all of the material was successfully 
removed and the contamination dealt with, how easy would it be to 
persuade people to return to work in the WTC or to use the subway 
again? Clearly, the disruption would be immense. The decision as to 
whether or not to use a nuclear-yield device, or a radiological weapon.
672 Louis Freeh, Testimony to US Senate Governmental Affairs Committee. 
Permanent Subcommittee On Investigations. "International Organized Crime And 
Its Impact On The United States", 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, May 25 1994, p. 62.
673 It is almost impossible to generalise on the extent of the risk to the public from a 
radiological dispersal device: it depends so much on the material used, the means 
of dispersal, population density, weather conditions and the period of time that 
the public is exposed to it. However, the IPPNW, in their publication on crude 
nuclear weapons, argue that:
...[T]he consequences of a radiological weapon using plutonium in amounts 
that are potentially available for a terrorist attack are very largely long­
term in nature: primarily increased cancer incidence, particularly of lung, 
bone, and liver cancer... Thus in health effect terms, the impact of such a 
weapon would be hidden for several decades, and probably would not be 
dramatic. However, given the public aversion to cancer risk, and the fears 
engendered by plutonium as a potential carcinogen, there are likely to be 
immediate and dramatic responses by the emergency services.
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. "Crude...", p. 38.
674 Spector, Author's...
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or neither, must be largely dependent not only on the type of terrorist 
group concerned, but also on the type of target selected. An attack 
requiring the destruction of an enormous area, such as an army base, or 
the death of as many people as possible, might conceivably justify the 
use of a full-scale nuclear weapon. However, in terms of destructive 
capability, a radiological device is unlikely to improve significantly on 
conventional weapons. This, then, leads to the question: why would 
one use such a weapon, since it would require so much more effort, 
especially in acquiring fissile material, than w ould conventional 
terrorism?675 Part of the answer must lie in its publicity value, and the 
fear it is capable of engendering. At the moment, it is still possible to 
argue that massive conventional attacks attract just as much coverage as 
previous non-conventional actions: the publicity around the WTC and 
Oklahoma attacks or the assault on the Marine Barracks in Beirut or the 
destruction of Pan-Am 103 was just as intense as that surrounding the 
sarin attack in Tokyo by Aum. It is no less so for the fact that there have 
now been several such devastating attacks in the past 15 years. 
However, radiological terrorism is potentially attractive to a terrorist 
because it sets them apart from other groups; it takes terrorism to a new 
level, and it evokes the word "nuclear" and all that that conjures in the 
minds of the public. Perversely, given the immense destructiveness 
associated with nuclear weapons, radiological terrorism offers terrorists 
the opportunity to obtain vast publicity w ithou t  necessarily having to 
kill many people, at least not visibly or immediately. However, the sorts 
of group that might consider this an advantage are those whose strategy 
is based on an element of rationality, those that do have an earthly 
objective, and therefore those that are likely to be reluctant to 
potentially commit themselves to being considered responsible for 
continuing to kill people decades after the attack. To a very large extent, 
though, the effects of a radiological weapon are dependent on the type 
of material used: while weapons-grade plutonium might cause limited 
damage, other elements such as cesium or even radioactive waste are 
potentially lethal very rapidly. In 1987, in Goiana, Brazil, two adults 
broke open a cesium source found abandoned in a clinic and allowed 
children to play w ith the glowing material inside. W ithin days, four 
people died and 249 others were contaminated. There was public
675 Brad Thayer & Robert Newman, Research Fellows, Center for Science and 
International Affairs, JFK School of Government, Harvard University, Interview 
With Author. November 12,1996, Cambridge, Mass.
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hysteria and thousands of cubic metres of soil had to be removed for
decontamination.676
The Psychology of Nuclear Terrorism
Nuclear terrorism encompasses a number of different acts that have to 
be treated individually if a discussion of the psychological m otivations 
for nuclear terrorism is to have much meaning. It is hard to envisage a 
psychologically normal person who would be willing to carry out an act 
of mass destruction, yet most terrorists are psychologically normal. They 
may be particularly susceptible to group or organisational pressures, be 
social or personal failures so that they feel marginalised and use the 
terrorist group as a means of consolidating their identity, but most 
terrorists are not insane or psychotic. However, the propensity of some 
terrorists to suffer from "survivor guilt", as has already been discussed, 
is potentially significant. DeNike has argued that the willingness of 
some terrorists to sacrifice themselves actually extends not only to being 
prepared to die but even to a desire to die. He cites the example of 
skyjackers who "lack the guts to kill themselves. They manipulate their 
society into killing them... [they] are often committing the act to be 
killed"677 This would be important for nuclear terrorism not because it 
seems probable that many terrorists, determined to "go out in a blaze of 
glory", would go to the considerable trouble of acquiring nuclear means 
to do so, but because it clearly suggests that there are some terrorists for 
whom the certainty of death would not be a disincentive. There has 
been at least one hoaxed extortion threat of kamikaze action against a 
nuclear facility. In November 1972, hijackers of a Southern Airways DC- 
9 forced it to circle the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee, 
threatening to crash the plane into the plant unless a ransom of $10 
million was paid. Personnel were evacuated from the facility but the 
threat came to nothing. Furthermore, this incident cannot really be 
regarded as terrorism since the hijackers of the plane were driven by a
676 Sopko, "The Changing...", pp.7-8.
677 L. Douglas DeNike, " The Psychology Of Nuclear - Related Crimes & 
Terrorism", Invited Testimony To Subcommittee On Energy & The Enviroment. 
House Committee On Interior & Insular Affairs. WashingtonDC, Febuary 26 1976. 
p. 4.
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financial/ not a political motivation.^^® It is also possible to argue that in 
some cases the people ultimately responsible for the terrorist act would 
not be the same as those who carried it out and that the latter might be 
unaware of the full extent of their physical danger. Merari suggested 
that this might be the case with some of the suicidal bombers in the 
Middle East in the early to mid 1980s. He thought that some of these 
were in reality "remote control martyrs", fooled by their senders into 
believing that they would survive the operation. In several attempted 
Lebanese car-bombings, the detonation was from a following vehicle, 
giving the driver of the lead car carrying the explosive, no possibility of 
escape.<579 jt is worth noting that, psychologically, there is a considerable 
difference between genuinely suicidal attacks, such as the majority of 
car-bombings, and those attacks where there is a high probability of 
death: the difference between seeking to die and being ready to die. In 
contrast to DeNike, Merari believed that those who actively sought 
death were quite limited in number, even amongst those motivated by 
religious factors; for example, claiming that a major reason for the 
decline of Shiite suicide bombings in the mid 1980s was that they simply 
ran out of volunteers.^^o However, even if this was once the case, it is 
evidently no longer so: according to Ami Ayalon, head of Israel's Shin 
Bet intelligence service, Hamas has thousands of Palestinian youths 
awaiting their chance.^si Merari's views would be important, if correct, 
because they w ould suggest that terrorism , even if religiously- 
m otivated, offers only the opportun ity  to comm it suicide for 
individuals already predisposed to do so, just as Post argued that a 
major reason individuals became terrorists was that it offered the 
means for them to use violence. However, there can be little doubt now 
that religion can motivate individuals sufficiently for them to commit
678 "Hijacked Plane Lands In Havana A Second Time, 31 Hostages Free; 3 Gunmen 
Seized After 29 Hours", New York Times. Novenber 121972, pp. 1,73.
Ariel Merari, "The Readiness to Kill & Die; Suicided Terrorism In The Middle 
East" in Reich (ed.) Origins of Terrorism, pp. 194-96.
680 Merari suggests that religion is not the key factor in truely suicidal terrorism, 
believing that only those who wish to die as distinct from those willing to die 
resort to it. Therefore, it is a personal rather than a group-inspired decision. He 
does however concede that the individual's choice may be heavily affected by 
culture, situation & indoctrination as well as personality, and that it is in this 
respect that religion is significant. Ibid. p. 206. This view is rather the exception. 
Kramer attributes the decline to a tactical choice by groups such as Hizballah. 
Kramer, "The Moral Logic Of Hizballah", in Reich (ed) Origins of Terrorism, p. 
148.
681 "Wedded To Death In A Blaze Of Glory", Sunday Times. March 10, 1996.
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suicidal acts. Even some secularly-motivated terrorist organisations can 
inspire their adherents sufficiently that they are willing to commit 
suicide rather than be captured if they are wounded in combat. The 
Tamil Tigers carry cyanide around their neck for just such a p u r p o s e . ^ ^ z  
It should be noted, though, that the Tamil example is exceptional, 
particularly amongst nationalist-separatist groups.
The decision to resort to weapons of mass destruction, if it was made, 
and assuming that terrorists were able to acquire the means to engage in 
such an act, would be more likely to be a result of group dynamics than 
any individual's choice, although this is more likely to be the case in 
secular groups than religious groups or cults where the influence of a 
single person, such as Shoko Asahara the leader of Aum Shinrikyo, can 
be decisive. The group becomes subject to "group think", as described by 
Janis, in which it over-estimates both its own strength and the threat 
posed to the organisation by external factors. However, the group needs 
this danger to have meaning in order to enable the organisation to 
focus their attentions and frustrations on the threat from without. 
Terrorist groups are dominated by the "flight-fight" tendency in Bion's 
"basic- assumption group". Their belief that the world is out to destroy 
them is not merely a paranoid delusion since, while this view may 
initially be caused by internal psychological convictions, it becomes self- 
fulfilling once the group begins to engage in terrorist acts. This would be 
especially the case if a group were to engage in terrorism employing 
WMD, since it would elicit an extremely strong response from the 
governm ent threatened, possibly endangering the existence of the 
group itself. Counter-balancing this seeming disincentive is the fact that 
many terrorist groups try to make the government over-react to the 
threat, and experience a rise in  support, resu lting  from the 
government's repressive measures. Furthermore, fear of repression is 
scarcely a disincentive to those desperate groups that believe they have 
little chance of survival anyway or to those motivated by apocalyptic 
religious b e lie fs .6 8 3  However, the likelihood of terrorists gaining 
support as a result of government repression is also remote, since it is
See Mark Fineman, "Rebels' Weapon: Cyanide", Los Angeles Times. Januaiy 20, 
1992, pp. A l, 10,12.
683 Purver, "Understanding Past Non-Use of CBW By Terrorists", Conference on 
'ChenBio Terrorism: Wave of the Future?’ Sponsored by the Chemical and 
Biological Arms Control Institute. Washington DC, April 29,1996, pp. 7-8.
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more than possible that the majority of people would regard almost any 
(temporary) measure as commensurate with the threat of high-level 
nuclear terrorism, and it is this perceived proportionality that is key to 
terrorist support.
A possible motivation for nuclear terrorism would be the group's belief 
that it has nothing to lose. The core priority of the organisation is 
survival; acts justify and call attention to its existence. If the group felt 
that it was fading, dissolving into factions or being usurped for 
prominence by another group, it m ight launch an act of nuclear 
terrorism  to regain its status. The moral constraints against using 
terrorism are eroded by the use of ideology and rhetoric to polarise 
"them" from "us" and to reinforce the pressure to conform. If an act, no 
matter how heinous, furthers the group cause then it must be good by 
definition. The cause of society's ills is perceived to lie outside the 
group, often with the establishment. To destroy the source of those ills 
is therefore the height of morality.
Mass m urder is a relatively rare terrorist phenomenon, since in most 
cases, killing a handful is just as effective for achieving group goals.684 
There have been no instances to date where terrorists have resorted to 
nuclear weapons for mass destruction. There are a num ber of 
important reasons for this: terrorists are technologically conservative; 
preferring to use tried and tested methods to achieve their aims, they 
have yet to reach what Hoffman calls "their killing potential" using 
conventional weaponry, so have little need to be innovative.^^^ This is 
reinforced by the fact that the organisational dynamics of many terrorist 
groups mitigate the sudden escalation of means into the nuclear 
domain because that would cause intense debate and risk s c h i s m . 6 8 6  
Most terrorist groups have latent defectors; the group is likely to be split 
at the decision to "go nuclear" between those who want to escalate and 
those who do not want to. Such polarisation increases the likelihood of 
splitting and therefore raises the risk of b e t r a y a l . 6 8 7  Since the primary 
goal of the organisation is survival, such controversies are avoided.
684 Brian Jenkins, "The Likelihood Of Nuclear Terrorism", RAND P-7119. July 
1985, p. 6.
685 Hoffman, "Terrorist Targeting...",p. 23.
686 Hoffman, "An Assessment Of The Potential..." p. 9.
687 Jeirkins, "The Likelihood...", p. 8.
218
However, d istorted  decision-m aking does not equate to to tal 
irrationality. Do circumstances exist where terrorists would seek to kill 
many people? Jenkins has argued that "terrorists want a lot of people 
watching not a lot of people dead."688 The key point in favour of this 
view is that causing mass casualties would be counter-productive; if this 
were not so, if such an act did not alienate the terrorist's constituency of 
supporters, then a major limitation would have been removed. While 
organisations such as ETA, the IRA or the RAF are trying to alter the 
views of their own population, for groups that operate across state 
boundaries the disapproval of the targeted population is a reward not a 
disincentive. Two possible, related, examples of this might be the attack 
by Baruch Goldstein at the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron on February 
24, 1994 and the attack by Hamas member Salah Abdel-Rahim Hassan 
Assawi on a bus in Tel Aviv on October 19, 1994, In the first attack, 30 
Muslim worshippers were killed; in the second, 22 Israelis. Both 
Goldstein and Assawi were fanatical opponents of the September 1993 
Israeli-Palestinian Peace Accord; each sought, by an act of terrorism 
beyond the usual level of violence, to encourage an adverse reaction in 
the population as a whole, making further concessions impossible and 
derailing the entire Peace Process.689 in  these cases, the levels of 
violence are not constrained by what might be deemed 'acceptable' to 
the targeted audience, so much as accentuated by the terrorist's desire 
that they are as unacceptably high as possible. However, it is 
questionable w hether nuclear weapons would be appropriate as 
"spoilers" since such an action depends on an individual or group 
claiming responsibility, the implications of which, in the context of a 
nuclear-yield bomb, are likely to be severe and possibly counter­
productive if it m eant that there w ould be increased outside 
intervention to compel an agreement.690 Another possible scenario for 
a terrorist use of a nuclear-yield device is an attack on an ally of the US, 
rather than on a US target, for "demonstration purposes", with the clear 
possibility of a further attack, to compel compliance by the US 
administration. The logic of such a high-profile action would be that it 
would place a huge amount of pressure on the US governm ent without 
necessarily producing  the same degree of counter-productive
688 Jenkins, "Will Terrorist Go Nuclear?", pp. 4-5.
689 Friedman, From Beirut To Terusalem. pp. 559-560.
690 Thayer & Newman, Author's...
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sentiments and over-powering desire for revenge that an attack on US 
soil would e n g e n d e r . 6 9 1  The subsequent reaction to such an assault is 
not clear; the scale of the threat and the trend towards international co­
operation on terrorism  might well mean that the intelligence and 
security force efforts to deal with the situation might be no less as a 
result of an attack in Britain or Canada than for one in the United 
States. Furthermore, restating a pledge made by the United States, 
Britain and the USSR in the 1968 UN Security Council Resolution 255 
"to provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the 
Charter" in the event of nuclear aggression or the threat of it, in 1995 all 
five Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) gave non-specific promises to take 
measures to restore international peace and security, in the event of a 
nuclear attack on a Non-Nuclear W eapon State (NNWS). However, 
they stopped short of guaranteeing a nuclear or even a m ilitary 
response.692 Although this probably should not be regarded as binding, 
it does show a clear, long-standing, commitment to regarding nuclear 
use or the threat of it as a problem that transcends state boundaries. 
Therefore, the fear of the possible repercussions may be just as much a 
factor when terrorists contemplate using nuclear weapons outside the 
US as within it. One, more justifiably worrying, factor that might 
encourage a terrorist use of non-conventional weaponry is that, 
particularly in some parts of the world, even secular terrorism  is 
perceived in absolutist terms, more readily associated with religious 
motivations for violence. The Armenian example has already been 
cited, but it applies equally to parts of South Asia. Some groups are 
willing to define their enemies in very broad terms: anyone belonging 
to a rival sect, organisation or community, and to target them 
indiscriminately as a c o n s e q u e n c e , 6 9 3  Such a trait is certainly not unique 
to these groups, but it is rarer that they also have the willingness to 
impose mass casualties at random, as happened in the business district 
of Colombo in January 1996.
Jenkins made his point about the objectives of terrorists in the mid- 
Seventies, so it is reasonable to question whether it is still applicable
691 David I. Ross, "Canada and the world at risk: depression, war and isolationism  
in the 21st century?". International Journal. Volume LIT Number 1 Winter 1996-7, p. 
13.
692 E. Johanson, "Nuke Vote". Voice of America, April 11 1995.
693 Paul Leventhal & Brahma Challaney, "Nuclear Terrorism: Threat, Perception, 
and Response in South Asia". Terrorism. Volume 11, (1988), pp. 458-459.
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today, especially since the opportunities for nuclear terrorism  have 
undoubtedly grown in the afterm ath of the end of the Cold War. 
However, despite examples such as Hebron and Tel Aviv, it largely 
seems that Jenkins point is still valid: "simply killing a lot of people has 
seldom been one terrorist objective... terrorists operate on the principle 
of the minimum force necessary. They find it unnecessary to kill many, 
as long as killing a few suffices for their purposes."694 Although there 
have been several small scale attacks against nuclear plants across the 
world, none have endangered any part of their nuclear component or 
produced nuclear fallout. The only credible threats have been against 
non-operational or newly constructed plants.695 Other, non-reactor 
targets connected with the nuclear industry have included the Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory which was car bombed in 1987696 and a 
factory near Toronto that produced guidance systems for the Cruise 
M is s i le .6 9 7  Personnel connected with the nuclear industry have also 
been attacked: Lemoniz project manager Angel Fascual was murdered
694 Jenkins, "The Likelihood....", RAND P- 7119. p. 6.
695 Attacks have included an antitank rocket assault on the partially constructed 
Creys-Malville plant in France. Priai, "Antitank Rockets Are Fired At French 
Nuclear Reactor", p. A3. Others have been: one against the Koeberg nuclear power 
plant near Cape Town where the facility's control room was damaged; a rocket- 
powered grenade attack by ETA against a reactor containment tower at Lemoniz; 
and the bombing of three off-site power lines at Palo Verde nuclear power plant in 
Arizonia in May 1986. D. Fischer's response to T. Davies "What Nuclear Means & 
Targets Might Terrorists Find Attractive?" in Leventhal & Alexander (eds.). 
Nuclear Terrorism:Defining The Threat, pp. 85-86. Other targets within the 
United States have included the visitor's centre of the Trojan reactor in Oregon 
which was bombed in 1971; and unexploded bombs have been found at the Point 
Beach reactor in Wisconsin in 1970 and the Illinois Institute of Teclmology reactor 
in 1969. Discontented workers have done milhons of dollars of damage, the Indian 
Point Two reactor in N ew York in 1971, Zion reactor in Illinois, Quad Cities in 
Illinois, Peach Bottom in Pennsylvania, Fort St Vrain in Colorado, Browns Ferry in 
Alabama, Beaver Valley plant in Pennsylvania and the Surrey reactor in Virginia 
all being notable examples. Allegedly, there have also been numerous examples of 
theft from US facilities: the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory lost a ton of lead 
sliielding in a year; two sixty-six-pound drums of low-enriched uranium were stolen 
from the General Electric Fuel Processing Plant in Wilmington, North Carolina, by 
an employee seeking to extort $100,000 from the company; and the Apollo, 
Pennsylvania plant lost enough highly enriched uranium for several nuclear bombs. 
Bowman, When The Eagle.... pp. 134-135.
696 "FBI Seizes Nuclear Protestor In Car Bombing At A-Weapons Lab ", Los Angeles 
Times. April 8,1988, p. A32.
697 See Nicholas Hirst, "Bomb Damages Cruise Missile Plant In Toronto ", 
Financial Times. October 16, 1982; or John Best, "Toronto Missile Plant Bombed", 
The Times, October 16,1982, p. 6.
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by ETA in 1982,698  in 1 9 8 6  the RAF assassinated Karl Heinz 
Beckurts, a physicist in charge of research and technology for Siemens, 
because he represented "Western Europe's biggest high-tech concern 
and the world's third-biggest atomic c o n c e r n " . 6 9 9  jsjone of these attacks 
could be regarded as approaching mass-destructive terrorism, despite 
their nuclear component. There have, though, been other incidents, 
some of which are discussed below, that show an alarming trend 
towards using fissile material as a radiological weapon.
Most terrorist violence is symbolic: aimed at drawing attention to the 
group and its cause rather than to destroying people or property 
unnecessarily. Consequently, most of such violence is directed against 
inanimate objects: fatal attacks accounted for only about 29% of all 
assaults in 1995. However, this figure is rising: in 1994 it was 27% of 
incidents and it was only 19% in the 1980s and 17% in the 1970s. Most 
attacks are still against targets w ith symbolic importance for the 
terrorist, so that (in descending order) diplomatic, business, airline, 
military and finally civilian targets are the most frequent. It is extremely 
rare for terrorists to contemplate the infliction of mass casualties such as 
might be caused by a nuclear incident. Of over 8000 international 
terrorist incidents since 1968, fewer than 60 show any indication of 
terrorists seeking to use non-conventional means.700
However, terrorism  is becoming increasingly lethal: in the 1980s 
terrorist incidents rose by a third compared to the 1970s, but the result 
was a twofold increase in fatalities as a result of these attacks.^oi While 
fatalities from international terrorism peaked at 800 in 1987, followed by 
663 in 1988, 661 in 1983 and 467 in 1993,702 ij^e percentage of incidents 
that involved at least one fatality in 1995 was higher than at any time 
since 1968 at 29%.703 To some extent, tliis could be explained by the fact
698 Jules Stewart, "The Murder Of Lemoniz Project Manager Angel Pascual", 
Nucleonics Week. Volume 23 Number 19, May 13,1982, p. 2.
699 William Tuohy, 'Terrorists Bomb Kills W. German A-Scientist", Los Angeles 
Times. July 10,1986, p. A l; Robert J. McCartney, "Terrorist Group Kills Executive 
Near Munich", Washington Post. Tuly 10,1986, p. A l.
700 RAND-St Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism.
701 Bruce Hoffman, "Testimony Before The US Senate Committee On Enviroment & 
Public Works, Subcommittee On Clean Air & Nuclear Regulation", RAND. (March 
1993), p. 7.
702 Hoffman & Hoffman, "The Rand-St Andrews... 1994", p. 185.
703 Hoffman & Hoffman, "The Rand-St Andrews... 1995", p. 87.
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that a few incidents, such as the bombing of the US Marine barracks in 
Beirut in 1983, the 1985 bombing of the Air hidia jet, and the bombing of 
Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie in 1988, each resulted in the deaths of 
hundreds of people causing terrorism as a whole to appear increasingly 
lethal. However, such figures also reflect a trend that has three key 
elem ents: the "am ateurisation" of terrorism , the contrastingly 
improved professionalism of other terrorists, and the rise of religious 
terrorism.
Previously, terrorist groups were largely seen as well-defined bodies
with a coherent (although sometimes loose) command and control
structure704 that spent the bulk of their time focused on their cause and
planning future actions. The W orld Trade Centre (WTC) attack in
February 1993 compelled many of these assumptions to be re-examined.
It was a one-off operation conducted on an ad hoc basis by a group of
like-minded individuals who shared similar frustrations, friends and
religious beliefs. They were only indirectly connected to a controlling
body making it very hard for the authorities to trace them beforehand.
This would be significant for the likelihood of nuclear terrorism for two
reasons: the lack of tight controls may mean that there are fewer
constraints for terrorists to cause mass casualties and the use of cut-outs
would mean that state-sponsorship of nuclear terrorism could not be
ruled out, so long as the state concerned could continue to plausibly
deny all knowledge of the attack.7os Acting D irector of Central
Intelligence, William Studeman, testified in April 1995 that:
...a new Islamic extremist threat is on the rise. These groups - 
often ad hoc - are even more dangerous in some ways than 
the traditional groups because they do not have a well 
established organizational iden tity  and they tend to 
decentralize and compartment their activities. They also are 
capable of p roducing  and using m ore sophisticated 
conventional weapons as well as chemical and biological 
agents. They are less restrained by state sponsors or other 
benefactors than are the traditional groups. These groups 
appear disinclined to negotiate, but instead seek to take 
revenge on the United States and W estern countries by 
inflicting heavy civilian casualties...
704 See for example, Crenshaw, "An Organizational Approach..."
705 Hoffman, "Responding To Terrorism Across The Technological Spectrum", 
RAND. (April 1994), pp. 13-16.
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Both the traditional Islamic terrorists and the new breed have 
filled their ranks with militants who trained in the Afghan 
war, where they learned the value of violence in defeating a 
major power. They are well funded. Some have developed 
sopliisticated international networks that allow them great 
freedom of movement and opportunity to strike, including 
in the United States. They also are attracting a more qualified 
cadre with greater technical skills. Several groups have 
established footholds w ith in  ethnic or res id en t alien 
communities here in the United States. These communities 
offer terrorists financial support and a source for newrecruits.706
In the past, it was easier to argue that terrorism  was clearly 
instrumental, at least in part: groups sought legitimacy and "a seat at the 
table". However, now it is possible to see organisations that, as Brad 
Roberts of the Institute for Defense Analyses in Virginia, states: "don't 
seem to care about establishing legitimacy, but just want to strike a blow 
in anger and kill as many people as possible... For them, the calculation 
of the right level of violence seems to have no upper bounds."707 To 
brand most terrorism in this way would be an over-generalisation: 
politically-motivated groups retain as much rationality and calculated 
instrumentalism  as ever. But Robert's point does have some validity 
for a num ber of other, p redom inantly  religiously-m otivated, 
organisations, such as Aum Shinrikyo.
Religious terrorist groups appear to have a higher level of lethality than 
m ost other types of groups: since 1982 Shia groups have been 
responsible for 8% of terrorist attacks but 28% of deaths arising from 
such attacks. Such forms of terrorism  are widespread: from Islamic 
groups to white supremacists in the US, ultra-Orthodox Jews in Israel, 
or Sikhs in  India. The im portance of religion in enhancing the 
likelihood of violence being employed by some groups is that it has the 
ability to inspire total loyalty and commitment, and as has been seen in 
the case of secular terrorism , such an uncomprom isingly holistic 
attitude is a prime factor in the utilisation of force as a valid means. 
Such organisations may seek to remove whole sections of society and
706 W illiam  O. Studeman, Testimony Of The Acting Director Of Central 
Intelligence To The House Judiciary Committee Hearings On The Omnibus 
Counterterrorism Act Of 1995. April 6,1995.
707 Cited in Robert Taylor, "All Fall Down", New Scientist. May 11, 1996, pp. 32- 
33.
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are not constrained by the political, practical or moral factors that limit 
others' actions/08 Whereas, in secular terrorism, violence usually 
begins as an instrument and may become an end in itself, in religious 
terrorism, violence can be an end in itself, a sacramental act or divine 
duty carried out in response to a theological im p e ra t iv e R e lig io n  is a 
legitimising force, it can morally justify and even require the sort of 
indiscriminate violence that most secular terrorists would regard as 
immoral and counter-productive. This is because the constituencies of 
the two varieties of terrorism differ so greatly. Secular terrorists attempt 
to appeal to their actual or potential sympathisers, the people they claim 
to defend or speak for; in almost all cases, it is assumed that perpetrators 
mean to harm their victims only incidentally. It is the public that is the 
primary object of the action/^ o Religious terrorists, on the other hand, 
are sim ultaneously both the perpetrator and the audience, they 
comprise the constituents themselves. This is im portant because, 
whereas usually the symbolic and the audience-oriented aspects of 
terrorism are separate, in the case of religious-inspired violence, the two 
are synonymous. The need to gear action to what the terrorist believes 
the audience considers appropria te  is therefore rem oved as a 
constraining influence in the case of religious terror.
Cults and millenarian groups are the most likely of religious groups to 
resort to high-level violence because, in the former case, they are the 
most likely to be controlled by a single leader and to be isolated from 
moderating outside influences. As can be seen from examples such as 
Shoko Asahara, Jim Jones or David Koresh, undiluted authority can be 
rigorously imposed with devastating effects to both the cult members 
and the wider world. Millenarian groups believe that the world will 
end imm inently w ith the descent from heaven of a redeemer, a 
messiah. This means that they have nothing to lose by extreme action 
and may even be encouraged by the prospect of speeding the process. In 
both cases, cultists and millenarians may be spurred on to drastic action 
involving high-level violence, in the belief that they are fulfilling* their 
divine duty. Post uses the example of a Jewish sect that formed a group 
within the Gush Emunim organisation, and that planned to destroy the 
El Aksa Mosque and the Mosque of Omar (the Dome of the Rock), both
708 Hoffman^ "Responding...", pp. 9-12.
709 Hoffman, ’’’Holy Terror...’’, p. 272.
710 Rapoport, "Fear & Trembling...", p. 660.
225
in Jerusalem. The former is the third holiest site in Islam, bu t the 
Jewish terrorists argued that it stood on Temple Mount, the holiest 
place in Judaism. As Kabbalist millenarians, they believed that the 
coming of the Messiah would be delayed for a thousand years unless 
they helped to promote the world's redemption, scheduled for the year 
6000 in the Jewish calendar, and that the destruction of the mosques was 
wholly justifiable and necessary. Post argues that such acts would surely 
have caused a world-wide jihad and made the possibility of nuclear 
terrorism  against Israel perm issible in the eyes of some Islamic 
groups.711 However, this fails to distinguish between motivation and 
intent; it is the latter that is vital to any assessment of the likelihood of 
nuclear terrorism since possible motivations for such an act are so 
numerous that it does little to assist in an helpful analysis of the 
situation. A similar case involves white supremacists in the United 
States who allegedly sought to engage in mass indiscriminate killing. 
The federal grand jury indictment stated that they met in 1983 at Aryan 
Nations headquarters in Idaho and there plotted to overthrow the 
federal government and establish a separate Aryan state w ithin the 
United States. To achieve this, they planned to assassinate federal 
officials, politicians and Jews, and to bomb and pollute municipal water 
supplies. When, in April 1984, federal agents raided a supremacist 
compound in Arkansas, they found 30 gallons of cyanide intended for 
this mass p o i s o n i n g . 7 i 2  This program  of action was in line with that 
prescribed in "The Turner Diaries", an apocalyptic novel that has 
become the manual of the white supremacy m ovem ent in planning 
actions. It culminates w ith supremacists gaining control of the US 
nuclear arsenal and using it to obliterate their foes, and is one of the 
reasons that some white supremacists seem to positively welcome the 
prospect of nuclear war as a means to achieve their objective of creating 
a new world order consisting exclusively of the white race.7i3 White 
supremacists continue to experiment with WMD: in April 1993 there 
was an attempt by Thomas Lewis Lavy to smuggle 130 grams of ricin (a 
nerve agent) into Canada from Alaska. The Lavy example is significant 
because although he had links to white supremacist and survivalist 
groups, he acted alone in bringing in enough ricin to kill thousands of
711 Post, "Prospects ...", pp. 99-100.
712 Hoffman, "’Holy Terror’...", p. 277.
713 Ibid.. pp. 277-278.
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people. When he was arrested, he was carrying four guns, 20,000 rounds 
of ammunition and at least two pieces of survivalist literature: "The 
Poisoner's Handbook" and "Silent Death".7i4 A nother incident of 
significance was the May 1995 arrest of Larry Wayne Harris, a former 
member of the Aryan Nations, who successfully m ail-ordered three 
vials of bubonic plague bacteria for $240 from the American Type 
Culture Collection. When arrested, Harris claimed he was working on 
an antidote for plague and was "concerned about an im m inent 
invasion from Iraq of super-germ-carrying rats".7i5
Professional terrorists have become increasingly ruthless, as well as 
more sophisticated and operationally competent. Each group learns 
from the mistakes of its predecessors making it harder for state 
authorities to detect and destroy them. Although most groups remain 
technologically conservative in that they prefer off-the-shelf weaponry 
with which they are familiar and confident, some groups are also adept 
at adapting or improvising their weaponry: the WTC bombers used 
readily available fertiliser as the main component of their device. Such 
innovation from freely available resources makes it almost impossible 
for the governmental forces to guard against every eventuality and 
protect every target.716 Conventional explosives such as Semtex, used 
to destroy the Pan Am flight over Lockerbie, are sufficiently powerful 
that relatively little is required  to inflict considerable damage: 
theoretically, a quantity the size of a fist would be enough to blow a hole 
in the side of an aircraft.7i7 Therefore, even when it is not a viable 
option to p lant a truckbom b, there are conventional explosives
714 gee: "Arrest follows 1993 poison seizure". Globe & Mail. December 23 1995, p. 
A13; John Kifner, "Antiterrorism Law Used In Poison Smuggling Case", New  York 
Times, December 23, 1995, p. A7, Joim Kifner, "Man Arrested In Poison Case Kills 
Himself In Jail Cell", New York Times. December 241995, p. A ll .
715 Sopko, "The Changing...",pp. 4-6.
716 This inability to provide constant protection even applies to high-profile 
targets such as the Channel Tunnel. The IRA apparently considered an attack on 
the Tunnel itself, but decided it was too well protect, so elected to launch an assault 
on its electricity supply, tlrreatemng to black out the Tunnel and bring all trams to a 
halt. The operation was prevented because the IRA cell involved had been under 
police surveillance and was destroyed in September 1996. Police admitted though 
that Cheriton, the power substation that provides electricity for the tunnel, could 
be patroUed occasionally but not kept under constant observation. David Leppard, 
"Dead IRA suspect planned to black out Channel tunnel". The Sunday Times. 
September 29,1996, p. Al,2.
717 Vitali Vitaliov Pardubice, "Semtex sales go through the roof". The Sunday 
Times. 29 September, 1996, p. A16.
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available to terrorists that negate the necessity of escalating to non- 
conventional weaponry. This w ould seem to m itigate against the 
higher-level forms of nuclear terrorism: as yet the materials for it are 
not easily available and vast damage can be achieved using more 
conventional means, even against major targets, since they cannot be 
comprehensively guarded all the time.^is
The psychological constraints are almost certainly less extreme for the 
use of a nuclear hoax or the seizure of a nuclear weapon than for the 
detonation of one. A credible hoax might well be an attractive option 
for a terrorist group because it would require high-level decision 
making by the threatened state, which might be regarded by the group as 
a success in itself since it conveys prestige and status upon the group, 
thus making them a major actor. DeLeon, Hoffman, Kellen and Jenkins 
argued that while there were at least three major motivations for acts of 
nuclear terrorism, propaganda, coercion and destruction, it was probable 
that any such act would reflect a combination of all three.7i9 Since both 
the public and government agencies are so sensitised to the potential of 
nuclear weapons, even a minor incident would cause chaos and panic 
and risk a break-down in co-operation with authorities.72o Even a 
credible nuclear hoax, posing no danger to an area, could potentially 
cause panic, create vast disruption to daily life and commerce and could 
result in casualties as terrified residents fled from the area. Even if the 
physical damage caused by the incident were to be minimal, the 
psychological ramifications for the public and governm ent and the 
cache for the terrorists would be considerable.72i Knutson noted that 
while a fait accompli might be safer, there is a high possibility that it 
will easily be dismissed from our consciousness (very unlikely in the 
case of nuclear terrorism) or that the horror of a major nuclear event 
would erase any interest in its political intent, that the act would 
obscure the cause.722 in the case of nuclear terrorism, the threat is as 
politically potent as the execution, and once such an act has been 
committed the efforts to trace the terrorists would be unhindered by the
718 Hoffman, "Responding...", pp. 21-26.
719 Peter DeLeon, Bruce Hoffman with Konrad Kellen & Brian Jenkins, "The 
Threat Of Nuclear Terrorism: A Reexamination", RAND. (January 1988). p. 3.
720 Clarke, Author's...
721 Hoffman, "An Assessment...", p. 4.
722 Knutson, "The Terrorists Dilemmas ...", p. 201.
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fear of what was to come (always supposing that the terrorists were not 
capable of more than one such act). In such circumstances, it may be that 
time-bound violence in the form of an accomplished action may be an 
inferior option to an ongoing, negotiated act in which the terrorist’s 
aim is instrumental. An example of what might happen if there was a 
credible hoax occurred in Japan on April 15, 1995, when Aum Shinrikyo 
threatened further attacks in Tokyo. Having already established that 
they were capable of such action by attacking the underground with 
chemical weapons on March 20, the threat was taken seriously; there 
was widespread alarm and the city remained at a standstill on what 
would ordinarily have been a busy working d a y . 7 2 3
One difficulty w ith a high-level act of nuclear terrorism  is that of 
credibility: terrorists have to prove to govermnents that they are capable 
of the acts that are being threatened. They also have to persuade the 
governm ent that it is w orth negotiating, that a settlem ent can be 
reached without the tlireat being consummated. In some cases this is 
clearly not feasible: no government could agree to dissolve itself for 
example, nor could policy be permanently altered because it would 
require retaining a perpetual threat and one governm ent condition 
would certainly be the surrender of the nuclear capability. These 
problem s w ould not be insoluble for a terrorist group, merely 
complicating factors and constraints on what was possible. However, 
such high-level acts might be unnecessary anyway, since there is plenty 
of low-level nuclear terrorism that could potentially give almost as 
much leverage to the terrorists.724 Shortly after the WTC bombing in 
February 1993, the FBI investigated whether a group of Iranians was 
planning a nuclear attack on New York. They were allegedly going to 
smuggle radioactive m aterial into the city and distribute it around 
Manhattan. A successful attack would have caused panic and made the 
area unusable for a long time. The FBI was concerned, too, that the 
proliferation of fissile material out of the former USSR would result, 
not in a terrorist nuclear bomb, but in a nuclear-enriched conventional 
explosion.725 The Chechen case in Moscow in November 1995 may 
represent the first stage in a move towards a terrorist "dirty" bomb, a
723 Kaplan & Marshall, The Cult.... p. 271.
724 Jenkins, "The LikeHhood...", pp. 10-11.
725 "FBI probed Iranian nuclear attack plan". United Press International. Februaiy 
18,1996.
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conventional device w ith a highly radioactive coating, the sort of 
weapon that the FBI feared could be used in Manhattan. The CIA are 
also concerned that non-fissile, radioactive materials could be used in a 
terrorist device designed to create psychological or economic trauma or 
to contaminate buildings or localised a r e a s . 7 2 6  Such a bomb could make 
whole areas no-go zones without requiring the cost, difficulty or risk 
that is entailed by a nuclear bomb. Such a device would also be less 
likely to cause massive casualties, so the political risks of using one are 
less than for a nuclear w e a p o n . 7 2 7
An Assessment Of The Future Risk Of Nuclear Terrorism
Low-level nuclear terrorism is already a reality: on November 23, 1995, 
Chechen guerrilla leader, Shamyl Basayev, inform ed the Russian 
television network, NTV, that four cases of radioactive cesium had 
been hidden around Moscow. NTV discovered the 32 kilo case, wrapped 
in a yellow plastic bag and giving off 310 times the normal amount of 
radioactivity in Ismailovo P a r k . 7 2 8  Basayev had repeatedly threatened to 
attack Moscow with nuclear or chemical weapons, and had already 
proved liis ability to create "terrorist spectaculars" by taking 1500 people 
hostage in Budennovsk in June. Russian officials largely dismissed the 
nuclear threat, claiming that the material was cesium 137, used in X-ray 
equipment or some industrial processes, capable only of emitting 100 
times the background amount of radioactivity.729 Western experts also 
dismissed the tlireat, doubting that the Chechens had access to weapons- 
grade m aterial although quite possibly to lower-grade radiological 
sources from an inventory of nuclear waste in Grozny, the Chechen
726 TEe danger posed by terrorists attempting to poison water supplies with nuclear 
material is small though. Such attacks have occured; in 1985, plutonium tri­
chloride was put in reservoirs serving New York by a man demanding that murder 
charges be dropped against Bernard Goetz, who shot four black youths allegedly 
attempting to mug him  on the subway. "Mayor Says Man Threatened To Put 
Plutonium In City Water", Reuters, luly 27,1985. In this and other cases, though the 
amount of plutonium in the water was a fraction of the danger level. Even if a 
kilogram of weapons grade plutonium were deposited in a billion-cubic-metre 
reservoir, the increased level of concentration would be less than one year's natural 
background radiation. This is partly because plutonium is so insoluble. A chemical 
agent such as potassium  cyanide w ould be a far more effective means of 
contaminating water supplies. Mark Hibbs, "Plutonium Thieves Pose No Threat To 
Drinking Water, LLNL Reports", Nucleonics Week. Volume 36 Number 6. (February 
9, 1995), p. 13.
727 See Oehler, "The Continuing..."
728 Agence France Presse. November 23,1995.
729 Agence France Presse. November 23,1995.
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c a p i t a l . 7 3 0  However, the truth about the material is less important than 
the fact that it was credible, as shown by the precautions the Russian 
authorities took, sending emergency search teams out around the city 
with Geiger c o u n t e r s . 7 3 1 if the Chechens had sought to inflict harm on 
the city's residents, they could have left the container open and allowed 
the contents to disseminate through the p a r k . 7 3 2  Dzhohar Dudayev, 
then Chechen leader, did claim that there were conventional explosives 
with the nuclear material, threatening radiological dispersal, but this 
was a h o a x . 7 3 3  Basayev was intent on displaying capability and in 
ensuring that his threats to launch further attacks against Moscow, 
unless Russia withdrew from Chechenya, were taken s e r i o u s l y .7 3 4  His 
attack was plausible because the state of the Russian nuclear industry 
made it impossible to rule out that the Chechens did have access to 
fissile material.
A far more serious incident was the attack on March 20, 1995 in Tokyo. 
At about 8am, the morning rush hour, sarin, a lethal nerve-gas agent, 
was simultaneously released on five underground trains, all bound for 
central government ministries.735 Twelve people were killed and about 
5500 were injured in the attack.736 This attack followed another in 
Matsumoto on June 24, 1994, in which seven died and over 200 were 
treated for the effects of sarin.737 Blame for both incidents was levelled 
at the Aum Shinrikyo cult, led by Shoko Asahara. Subsequent police 
raids uncovered vast amounts of raw materials for making sarin at
73ÛMark Hibbs, "Chechen Separatists Take Credit For Moscow Cesium-137 
Threat", Nuclear Fuel, Volume 20 Number 25, (December 5,1995), p. 5.
731 pEil Reeves, "Moscow Tries To Play Down Radioactive Chechen Feat", The 
Irish Times, November 25.1995. p. 11. "Moscow On Alert For Radiation Hot Spots", 
The Herald (Glasgow), November 25,1995, p. 10.
732 Eileen O'Connor, "Russians Tighten Radioactive Monitoring After Scare", 
Cable News Network. Incorporated. November 24,1995.
733 "Chechen...", Nuclear Fuel, p. 5.
734 Stéphane Orjollet, "Nuke package raises fear of Chechen attacks - but how real 
are they?". Agence France Presse. November 24, 1995. Nanette Van Der Laan, 
"Rebel’s Nuclear Threat To Moscow", The Daily Telegraph. November 25, 1995, p. 
13.
735 "Six Die, 3,200 Hurt In Gas Attack", The Tapan Times. March 21, 1995, p. 1. 
Clive Cookson, "How Sarin Killed In Tokyo", The Financial Times. March 21,1995.
736 Gwen Robinson, "Diary Blames Asahara For Subway Attack", The Times. April 
18,1995, p. 10.
737 Jonathan Annells & James Adams, " Did Terrorists Kill With Deadly Nerve 
Gas Test?", The Sunday Times. March 19,1995
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various cult buildings.738 The chemical fingerprints at these facilities, 
along with the quantity and variety of chemicals stored there, leave 
little doubt that Aum Shinrikyo was responsible for the attacks.739
While the immediate timing of the Tokyo attack may have reflected the 
fact that the cult was tmder investigation by the Japanese authorities,740 
more significantly, the cult displayed clear m illenarian tendencies: 
Shoko Asahara had predicted that the world would end in 1997, in an 
Armageddon-type finale that the cult planned to further by bringing 
down the Japanese establishment.74i it planned to extend its campaign 
of slaughter to include the United States: Yoshihiro Inoue, the cult's 
"hitelligence Minister", stated at the trial of Asahara that "If things had 
gone as planned, the Aum Shinrikyo would have released 50 tonnes of 
sarin in Tokyo and ten tonnes each in Washington and New York... We 
regarded the world outside as evil, and destroying the evil was
salvation. "742
Aum ensured unswerving loyalty from its members by brainwashing 
them: individuals were made to wear "brain-hats" which delivered 4 to 
10-volt shocks;743 other cultists were imprisoned against their will, or 
were drugged using a glucose solution that induced a "m editative 
state".744 The cult even contemplated developing nuclear weapons, 
investigating methods of enricMng uranium,745 but chose not to pursue 
the option. While their reasons for investigating non-conventional 
means at all is unknown nuclear weaponry, appearing to incorporate 
cosmic energy and possessing the ability to destroy hum an life on earth, 
seems to transfer w orld-destroying capabilities from the deity to
738 "Sarin Raw Material Seized In Raid", The Tapan Times, March 23,1995, p. 1.
739 "Alt Three Sarin Cases Tied To Same Group", The Tapan Times, March 26, 1995,
p. 1.
740 Gwen Robinson & Michael Binyon, "Police Raid May Have Triggered Nerve 
Gas Attack", The Times. March 21,1995, p. 10.
741 "Doomsday Cult Plotted Urban War On Japan - Report", The Daily Telegraph. 
May 26, 1995.
742 Robert Whymant, "Cult planned gas raids on America", The Times. March 29 
1997.
743 Sunday Times. March 26,1995.
744 Robert Guest, "Police Make More Finds At Supreme Truth Commune Of Aum 
Cult", The Daily Telegraph. March 28,1995.
745 "Cult 'Linked To Nuclear Weapons'", The Times, April 3,1995, p. 10. They used 
lasers in an attempt to enrich U-235 to 80%. Kaplan & Marshall, The Cult.... p. 208. 
For a discussion on how close the cult was to nuclear weapons, see Ibid. pp. 190-192.
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humans and thus make the terrorist the arbiter of human destiny in the 
place of God, making it possibly attractive to millenarian groups, such 
as Aum Shinrikyo/46 Chemical weapons, though, do not so obviously 
contain these cosmic elements, so the rationale behind the cult's tactical 
choice is unclear. Furthermore, "if destabilizing society or drawing 
attention to one's cause is the goal, a mushroom cloud outranks truck 
bombs and sarin attacks".747 There can be no doubt that there is a 
fascination that exists with nuclear weapons which is starting to have 
an impact on the tactical decisions of would-be attackers. Three New 
Yorkers were arrested in June 1996 for plotting to kill the chief 
investigator for Brookhaven and two officials of the local Republican 
Party by planting radioactive material in their food and in their cars. 
Rather than trying to use the five cases of radium that they stole from a 
defence contractor, it would have been far more straightforward and 
effective to rely on conventional means for the assault.748 jn  the past, 
there have been a few isolated incidents of radiological poisoning, but it 
does seem to be becoming a more widespread phenomenon, and one 
that, whereas in the past, was largely the province of disaffected workers 
able to exploit their access to nuclear material, is increasingly the tactic 
of attackers with a political motive for their actions.749
746 Barkun, "Millenarian...", p. 431.
747 Douglas Waller, "Nuclear Ninjas: A N ew  Kind Of SWAT Team Hunts Atomic 
Terrorists. An Exclusive Look At Their Operation", Time, Volume 147 Number 2,
(January 8,1996), pp. 38-40.
748 "jsjY Police Uncover Plot Against Politicians", Reuters. June 13, 1996. John T.
McQuiston, "Third Man Held In Plot To Use Radium to Kill N.Y. Officials", New  
York Times, June 14,1996, p. B2.
749 Previous cases of use (rather than tlireats, of which there are dozens) of 
radiological weapons include: a mentally ill Austrian with little political agenda 
who contaminated a railway coach with non-lethal quantities of Iodine 131 and, 
the following week. Indium 113-M in Vienna in April 1974. There was an attempt 
by a disaffected worker to kill Ms supervisor using three Mghly irradiated pieces 
of magnesium placed under the driver's seat of the foreman's car. The pair worked 
at the French Atomic Energy Commision s nuclear waste reprocessing plant at La 
Hague in Normandy and the worker was able to simple walk out of the plant with 
the material. The supervisor was exposed, between August and November 1978, to 
many times the recommended level of radiation, but appeared to suffer no ill effects 
beyond fatigue. In 1982, two university laboratory researchers at Brown University,
Rhode Island, were apparently deliberately contaminated with a small amount of 
radioactive phosphorous, when the material was used to poison their food. I
Authorities asserted that it was impossible for tins contamination to have occurred I
accidently. RAND-St-Andrews Database. |
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The Tokyo attack was unusual not because it was an attem pt to kill 
hundreds of people, although in this century fewer than a dozen 
incidents have resulted in over 100 deathsf^o instead it was unusual 
because of the method chosen. Although there have been previous 
incidents, such as followers of Baghwan Shree Rajneesh contaminating 
salad bars in a small Oregon town with salmonella bacteria to debilitate 
the localS/751 or the Russian Mafia killing a Moscow businessman by 
planting gamma-ray-emitting pellets in his o f f i c e , 7 5 2  Tokyo was by far 
the most serious sub-state actor use of non-conventional w e a p o n r y .7 ^ 3  
However, with the exception of some religious organisations, most 
groups do not want to cause mass-killings; and conventional means 
rem ain sufficient to achieve their objectives. There is the added 
disincentive for using high-level non-conventional weapons that the 
results are highly unpredictable and radiological, chemical or biological 
effects continue to occur over a long time, denying the immediacy that 
many terrorists seek and providing a residue of counter-productive 
publicity long after the event. However, this should not be overstated as 
a reason against terrorist use of WMD because this element of 
uncertainty exists, to some extent, with any weapon and where the 
objective is to maximise casualties, the whole concept of uncertainty is 
largely m e a n i n g l e s s . 7 5 4  A related issue is that of indiscrimination: most 
terrorism  in the past has been limited and has been targeted. A 
pow erful elem ent of terrorism  is that it appears random  and 
indiscriminate. The reality is that it is only so within a set framework;
750 Jenkins, "The Likelihood...", p. 7.
751 Bruce Hoffman, "Apocalypse Now?", Times Higher Education Supplement. 
April 7, 1995, p.l6.
752 'Williams & Woessner, "The Real Tlireat...", p. 30.
753 Other serious examples of biological or chemical terrorism include:
a 1970s attempt by the Weather Underground to acquire biological agents from the US 
Army's biological weapons facility in Fort Detrick, Maryland; the 1980s discovery of a 
Red Army Faction 'safe house' in Paris containing quantities of botulinal toxin...the 
1980 discovery of an RAF safe house in Germany containing several hundred kilograms 
of organophosphorous compounds; the 1975 theft of a large quantity of mustard gas from 
a US ammunition bunker in West Germany, followed by threats of its use by the 
Baader-M einhof Gang against Stuttgart and possibly other cities; the 1970s 
contamination of Israeli citrus fruit exports to Europe with liquid mercury, resulting in 
severe economic losses to Israel; and similar tlireats of contamination of South African 
products, also resulting in their removal from the market. Ron Purver, "Chemical And 
Biological Terrorism: The Threat According To The Open Literature", June 1995, p. 151.
754 Purver, "Understanding... ", pp. 3-4.
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the location and timing of an attack determine the probable victims: a 
bomb detonated at 8am in the City of London is likely to predominantly 
injure people who work in the financial sector for example. The 
randomness within that is which financial workers it is that are hurt. 
Even in much less narrow examples, it is still possible to argue that this 
element of targeting exists, that those injured were representative of a 
widely-defined intended victim, such as "the United States" or "the 
West". A truly random terrorist attack would have to be objectiveless, 
and although a completely nihilistic attack is not unprecedented, it is 
extremely rare. The consequence of this for terrorists' use of WMD is 
minimal: the scale of destruction would be larger, but the basic concept 
of injuring "imiocent" people is no different from that with any other 
form of terrorism.
It is worth more fully considering chemical and biological weapons as 
alternatives to nuclear devices. As with nuclear weapons, they have the 
potential to cause a range of effects, varying from m ass-murder to 
incapacitating a small portion of the population. Aum undoubtedly 
sought to cause as many fatalities as possible, but were betrayed in their 
objective by the poor quality of the sarin and the dispersal device that 
they e m p l o y e d . 7 5 5  However, prior to Aum's assault, even if they had 
the opportunity and the resources to launch such an attack, terrorists 
have abstained from  doing so. As w ith nuclear terrorism , the 
ramifications of Aum's attack on future uses of chemical or biological 
weapons by terrorists is far from clear.756
The factors that mitigate against most terrorists, and especially those 
with left-wing or nationalist-separatist motivations, resorting to nuclear 
weapons apply equally to both biological and chemical weapons. Aum 
represented a new type of terrorist group, being both apocalyptic and, in 
part, criminal, since they sought to extort money from both members 
and non-members to prom ote the activities of the organisation. 
However, even groups such as Aum are not certain to resort to these 
weapons again. It is possible that the cult represented a unique
755 Jonathan B. Tucker, "Chemical/Biological Terrorism: Coping with a New  
Threat", Politics and the Life Sciences. Volume 15, Number 2, (September 1996), p. 
167.
756 Richard Falkenrath, "Chemical?Biological Terrorism: Coping with Uncertain 
Threats and Certain Vulnerablities", Politics and the Life Sciences. Volume 15. 
Number 2, (September 1996), pp. 201-202.
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combination of factors, motivated by revenge, apocalyptic desires and 
material greed. It would be unwise, though, to preclude the possibility 
that they were not unique and may represent the pattern of future 
attempts to produce mass destructive terrorism. Roberts points out that 
many terrorist groups mimic other groups' actions, so the fact that one 
chemical attack has occurred would significantly increase the likelihood 
of another such incident.757
Despite the example of Aum, terrorist use of either chemical or 
biological agents is a rarity. At least in part, this is a result of the same 
factors that have restricted the terrorist use of nuclear devices: a fear of 
the response by both governments and potential supporters, along with 
a belief that such an act would be not only unnecessary, given the 
potential of conventional weapons, but is also disproportionate and 
counter-productive. This is especially so, given the abhorrence with 
which chemical and biological weaponry are widely regarded. This 
repugnance exceeds even that for nuclear weapons, which are, at least, 
acknowledged and legitimate instruments of states in a way that other 
weapons of mass destruction have not been since the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol on Chemical and Biological Weapons (although that has not 
prevented many states continuing to produce, and even use, both until 
the present).758 Furthermore, and certainly compared to conventional 
weapons w ith which terrorist are familiar, chemical or biological 
weapons would present a significant risk to the terrorists themselves, 
arising from the toxic nature of the materials being handled. This is one 
of the most significant barriers to terrorist use of biological weapons in 
particular. The extent of the risk is shown by the U.S. biological 
weapons programme between the 1950s and early 1970s, in which, even 
under the most tightly controlled and well-funded conditions, there 
were at least four fatalities and 400 other incidents in which the victims 
did not die, as a result of the accidental exposure of workers to the 
agents.759 Furthermore, weaponising the biological agent would be 
problematic, given that dispersal in a water supply would be ineffective 
and that an open air dispersal method would pose as great a risk to the
757 Brad Roberts, "Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Has the Taboo Been 
Broken?", Politics and the Life Sciences. Volume 15, Number 2, (September 1996), 
pp. 216-217.
758 Tucker, "Chemical/Biological...", p. 169.
759 Purver, "Chemical and Biological...", p. 42.
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terrorist as to the target a u d i e n c e / 6 0  TEe possibility of self-sacrifice 
might not be a significant disincentive to some groups, (the role of 
martyrs in such organisations has been discussed already), but it may 
represent a barrier at the production stage. While there is ample 
evidence of suicidal terrorists being willing to die delivering their 
weapon and attacking the enemy in the process, there is little proof that 
any terrorists favour taking risks that are not absolutely necessary in 
manufacturing their weapon. To die killing an adversary may be one, 
acceptable, thing; to die mixing chemicals or preparing a biological agent 
may be quite another.
Assuming that the terrorists were unused to dealing w ith such 
weapons, there would also be additional technical hurdles to be 
overcome and heightened uncertainty about the likely effects of an 
attack with either chemical or biological weapons, due, in large part, to 
the importance of weather conditions in the effective dissemination of 
such agents. Both types of agent would be a liighly inefficient means of 
attack as a result of tliis uncertainty. To be sure of causing the desired 
effect, terrorists would probably have to obtain and release significantly 
greater quantities of the m aterial than would be the case under 
optimum conditions. This obviously heightens other difficulties, such 
as the uncertainty over the effect of the attack and the problems 
associated w ith acquiring the requisite am ounts of the agent.761 
Particularly in the case of biological weapons, this leaves the possibility 
that the effects could range from non-existent to a w orldw ide 
e p id e m ic .7 6 2  Even if terrorists were willing to accept m assive, 
indiscriminate casualties, this does pose difficulties of reliability and 
effectiveness. Consequently, terrorists m ight be more inclined to 
chamiel their efforts into other types of weapons. Finally, especially in 
the case of biological weapons, the effects tend not to be immediate, but 
rather require an incubation period from hours to days, depending on 
the type of agent used. Chemical agents vary considerably in the rapidity 
of their effects: some nerve agents are almost instantaneous, whereas 
others, such as sulphur mustard, take between three and eight hours 
following exposure to cause pain and blistering. This robs terrorists of
760 Yf Mullins cited in Ibid.
761 Graham S. Pearson, "Chemical/Biological Terrorism: How Serious a Risk?", 
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the spectacular effects that might be achieved using other weapons. 
Consequently, as authors such as Tucker argue, a biological attack is 
unlikely to appeal to a group seeking to use their terrorism as a means 
of drawing attention to themselves and their c a u s e . 7 6 3  However, this 
assumes that media and public attention can be obtained only through 
immediate and devastating attacks; it is more persuasive to suggest that 
any terrorist attack using biological weapons would, by its very nature, 
attract attention and that, as large numbers of people became sick, there 
would be considerable interest in the cause of the outbreak.
Both chemical and biological weapons would have some appeal for a 
terrorist group intent on a non-conventional attack because, certainly 
compared to a nuclear weapon, chemical and biological weapons have 
the potential to be cheap and are lethal in small quantities, easing the 
problems of production, concealment, transportation and delivery. 
They are also less likely to be detected, and so increase the likelihood 
that the terrorists would "get away with it". In addition, due to the 
possibility of pre-testing and in spite of the uncertainties described 
above, they are still likely to be more reliable than a nuclear w e a p o n . 7 6 4  
Furthermore, the lead time between "desiring and acquiring" a useful 
capability is much shorter for chemical weapons than for their nuclear 
equivalent: Shoko Asahara ordered his cult to develop chemical 
weapons in 1993, only slightly over a year before the Tokyo attack. It is 
for these reasons that the most immediate terrorist threat is from a 
chemical or biological weapon, although, if the prospects for nuclear 
non-proliferation were to deteriorate significantly, this would compel a 
rapid reassessment of the situation especially in light of the greater 
scope for destruction of nuclear weapons than chemical or biological 
ones.765 However, while these advantages undoubtedly do apply when 
chemical and biological weapons are compared to a nuclear-yield 
device, they are much less obvious when the comparison is with a 
radiological dispersal device, since all of these factors are equally 
applicable to a weapon using highly radioactive material, such as cobalt-
763 Tucker, "Chemical/Biological...", p. 169.
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765 John Deutch, Conference on Nuclear. Biological. Chemical Weapons 
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60; thus it would be unwise to exclude the possibility of this variety of 
nuclear terrorism now.
Terrorists intent on acquiring a chemical or biological weapon capability 
would have a number of possible avenues of obtaining the required 
material. Probably not amongst those options is state sponsorship. 
Although many more states have chemical or biological weapons than 
have nuclear ones, the arguments against transferring control of any of 
that capability to a client group is basically the same: an unwillingness 
to abdicate control over both the material and the group, and a fear of 
the possible repercussions from attacked states. Roberts disagrees with 
this assessment, arguing that it would be more feasible for an aggressor 
state to be able to deny responsibility for an epidemic of a naturally 
occurring disease, as m ight be caused by a biological attack. 
Consequently, the risks of retaliation from the victim state would be 
lessened, and the willingness of the state to sponsor mass-destructive 
terrorism increased as a result.766 However, this does not preclude the 
possibility that terrorists might covertly acquire their capability from a 
state's stockpile. In addition to states such as Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya and 
North Korea, all of which possess such a supply, Russia alone has, by its 
own admission, 40,000 metric tons of chemical-warfare agents. These 
are stored at seven declared sites, at least four of which have recently 
been found to have lax security, closely replicating the situation at a 
number of storage sites for nuclear material in Russia.767 Terrorists' 
other option would be to m anufacture the chemical or biological 
weapons themselves. Although this would not be an easy process, 
depending on the agents being manufactured, neither would it be an 
impossible one, particularly for groups that had sufficient financial and 
technical resources, as was the case with Aum. Organisations such as 
the Australia Group of States do attempt to impose some restrictions 
and export-controls on the sale of chemical and biological weapons- 
usable materials and equipm ent. However, these are far from an 
effective barrier to proliferation because restrictions are limited to 
targeted states, so it is possible, through legitimate front companies, for 
determined states or terrorist groups to obtain the necessary materials.
766 Roberts, "Terrorism...", p. 216. 
767Ibid.. p. 170.
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Aum had particular difficulty in finding an effective means of delivery 
for their chemical weapons. This problem is especially acute due to the 
highly hazardous nature of the agents. This risk could be minimised by 
using "binary" chemical weapons, since they are easier to produce, 
transport and use. This means that two precursor chemicals are stored 
separately and then mixed to form the agent immediately before use. 
There are methods to achieve tliis mixing process automatically or by 
remote-control, but these have, so far, proved to technologically 
difficult or unreliable (as the Aum example shows). The most likely 
possibility is that terrorists would have to manually mix the precursor 
chemicals, an extremely hazardous procedure and one that, at least in 
part, defeats the purpose of separating the chemicals in the first p l a c e . 7 6 s
Biological agents have the potential to be extremely effective and potent 
weapons. Since pathogenic micro-organisms are able to rapidly multiply 
within a host, only small quantities of the agent are required to cause 
w idespread casualties over an extended area, especially if it is 
disseminated through the air in the form of an aerosol. Furthermore, 
many animal pathogens, such as anthrax or brucellosis, are highly 
lethal when inhaled, but are not passed from one individual to another. 
Therefore, they have the advantage that it would be possible for the 
terrorists to partially control the extent of the attack, using such agents. 
However, other types of potential biological weaponry are contagious, 
such as pneumonic plague bacteria or haemorrhagic fever viruses such 
as Ebola, and could be used with the objective of causing mass casualties 
from an epidemic. Aum certainly considered this possibility: members 
of the cult were sent to Zaire in 1992, ostensibly to minister to the 
victims of the Ebola virus, as part of their "African Salvation Tour", 
but, in reality, to collect samples of the disease to aid production of 
biological w e a p o n s . 7 6 9  Once back in Japan, the cult was unable to 
cultivate its samples into a usable form. A biological weapon attack 
would almost certainly be undetectable, both because it is odourless, 
colourless and tasteless and because its effects would not be manifest for 
hours or even days, depending on the agent used. Therefore, the 
likelihood would be that if the attack was conducted covertly, its
768 Ibid.. p. 172.
769 Kaplan & Marshall, The Cult.... pp. 96-97.
240
perpetrators would have ample time to make their escape, an attractive 
proposition for most terrorists.
The production of biological agents is certainly not an insurm ountable 
problem for terrorists. Most of the material and equipment are readily 
available because they have other, legitimate, commercial applications. 
Even lethal agents, such as anthrax, can currently be openly obtained by 
sending a letter on the letterhead of a university or research institute to 
commercial vendors. Biological agents also have the advantage that 
they can be grow n in a short time, even using low-technology 
equipment; there would thus be no need for terrorists to stockpile it for 
long periods before an attack. The cultivation process would not be 
especially dangerous, compared to that for chemical weapons. The use 
of masks and vaccinations against the agent w ould probably be 
sufficient protection at this stage of the process. Later parts of the 
manufacturing process would be more risky: concentrating the agent in 
a continuous-flow centrifuge, drying it in a spray or freeze-dryer, and 
milling the dried cake into a fine powder would all entail greater danger 
and would require more protective measures.^^® These parts of the 
process w ould be necessary if terrorists sought to maximise the 
effectiveness of their biological agent because most biological weapons 
rely on inhalation of the material, rather than penetration of the skin. 
Therefore, ideally, the biological agent needs to be contained in an 
aerosol and to consist of particles small enough (a diameter of about 1-5 
microns or thousandths of a millimetre) to remain suspended in the 
atmosphere for long periods. This would be technologically difficult to 
achieve, so terrorists might well choose instead to prepare the agent in 
liquid form and then refrigerate it until use, a considerably easier, if less 
efficient method. As with nuclear weaponry, there is some concern that 
affluent terrorists might be able to acquire the services of scientists who 
had worked on a state's biological weapons program, in particular that 
of Russia. There has been speculation that President Yeltsin's 1992 
decision to eliminate the Russian program has resulted in hundreds of 
unemployed scientists, all w ith the knowledge that would greatly 
enhance the development of a biological weapons capability by sub-state 
actors.
Tucker, "Chemical/Biological...", p. 174.
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The effects of a biological weapons attack would be hard to gauge 
because, like chemical weapons, the result depends heavily on a 
num ber of external factors, such as w eather conditions. Warm 
convection currents would cause the agent to dissipate, and living 
biological agents would rapidly die if exposed to direct sunlight. For that 
reason, an attack would be more effective when it was overcast or dark. 
However, even under the best of conditions there is considerable 
uncertainty as to the result: Aum apparently launched two biological 
attacks in Tokyo with no effect at all.^^i Clearly, chemical and biological 
weapons, as well as nuclear ones, are not straightforward to use, which 
is a major reason that makes a massive conventional attack a more 
realistic option for the majority of terrorists.
It is important to note that the devastation caused by fertiliser bombs at 
the WTC and Oklahoma suggests that even when groups are less 
concerned about a counter-productive impact on their audience, 
conventional weaponry is still enough.^^i Furthermore, it is cheaper, 
easier to access, harder for the authorities to detect, and given most 
terrorists' unfamiliarity with non-conventional weapons, probably safer 
to use as well.^^s Furthermore, there is a very real element to which 
terrorist tactical decisions rest on chance, insofar as many of them are 
opportunistic and dependent on circumstances. A prim e example of 
this that, though fictional, has great relevance to the actions of a 
number of extremist groups in North America, is that in The Turner 
Diaries the terrorists used a radiological device, largely because the 
author, William Pierce, was a nuclear physicist. He could just as easily 
have been a biologist, a chemist or a demolition expert, all of which 
might have influenced the tactics used in his book. It is precisely this
Kaplan & Marshall, The Cult.... pp. 94-96.
Another example is the FBI-named "Beta cell" that in the summer of 1993 
plotted to bomb the Holland and Lincoln Tunnels in New York and then attack the 
UN Building and the Jacob Javits Federal Building. The eight Muslims arrested for 
the plot were planning to use fuel oil, fertiliser pellets and detonators to make a 
vitually identical bomb to that which wrecked the WTC in 1992. See Tom 
Morganthau with Tom Masland, Karen Breslau, Robin Spareman, Susan Miller, Bob 
Cobb and Douglas Waller, "The New Terrorism", Newsweek, July 5,1993, pp. 18-23.
Although weapons grade material is not very difficult to handle. Weapons 
grade plutonium emits alpha particles but these caimot penetrate skin; HEU is 
hardly radioactive at all. It is only the less pure varieties of fissile material that 
are radioactively dangerous. Allison & Falkenrath, "The World's...", p. 83.
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type of wildcard that makes it almost impossible to reliably predict 
terrorist incidents. For example, who would have been able to state w ith 
confidence in 1994 that the first major substate use of non-conventional 
weaponry would be a chemical attack in Tokyo?
The increased availability of fissile material has probably had relatively 
little impact on the likelihood of a terrorist nuclear bomb: it would still 
be difficult and expensive to build, and the credibility of all but a cult 
group using such a device rem ains low. The Aum cult may have 
investigated the possibility of building a nuclear bomb, but they were 
still a long way off achieving it, and consequently chose a more 
straightforward method of creating terror. However, fissile material 
availability has made the feasibility and thus the credibility of a threat or 
hoax involving radiological terrorism a much more real possibility, one 
that will have to be taken seriously and would give considerable 
leverage to any group using such a threat. This may mean that the 
arguments against any secular sub-state use of non-conventional means 
are lessened. Religious terrorism is undoubtedly on the increase, but it 
is for the above reasons that it is the attack in Moscow and possibly the 
threat in New York, not the attack in Tokyo that is the most likely 
model for nuclear terrorism in the near future. However, this is not to 
deny the importance of the attack. Aum Shinrikyo set a precedent, being 
the first terrorist attem pt at an act of mass-destruction using non- 
conventional means. As Brian Jenkins has said: "It breaks a taboo and 
has psychological import. Others wiU ask whether such tactics should be 
adopted by them. It is now more likely that at least some will say 
yes."77^ According to Bruce Hoffman, "We've definitely crossed a 
threshold. This is the cutting edge of high-tech terrorism for the year 
2000 and beyond. It's the nightmare scenario that people have quietly 
talked about for years coming true."77S
Governmental Responses
Part of the difficulty in formulating a response to this danger has been 
that there is a definitional problem. Issues that might in the past have 
been regarded as distinct are clearly now merging to some extent:
Cited in Ron Purver, "The Threat Of C hem ical/B iological Terrorism", 
Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Commentary. Number 60. (August 19951.
Cited in Kaplan & Marshall, The Cult.... p. 289.
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proliferation, terrorism, arms control and organised crime. Solutions 
have to be reached that at least begin to address this fact.^^^ There is 
widespread recognition that: "The control of nuclear materials and 
weapons remains one of the primary means of preventing the entire 
range of nuclear threats - nuclear weapon proliferation by nations or 
nuclear terrorism by subnational g r o u p s . S o m e  measures are being 
undertaken  to im prove the situation: the problem  of m aterial 
proliferation from the former Soviet Union has two core elements, 
money and the lack of a culture of nuclear safety.^ 78 Some analysts go 
even further, suggesting that the real problem is weak govermnent, that 
the rule of law applies in Russia only to those not powerful enough to 
ignore it with impunity.779 Either way, the safety mindset is simply not 
as great as it perhaps ought to be: there appears to be a genuine 
difference of opinion on the seriousness of the problem between the 
West and the Russians.^so However, the Russians have accepted US 
assistance in upgrading equipment, training and procedures to remedy 
faults in their security programs. It is a slow process, but safety cultures 
are being built and there is some prioritisation in allocating money to 
the m ost sensitive areas.^^i Joint US-Russian co-operation on 
improving material protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A) is 
also a reality.782 Almost $2 billion is being spent to install video 
cameras, locks, alarm systems, electronic fences, and gates at over 25 
civilian and military nuclear sites within Russia. As an indication of 
this increased co-operation, the American-installed security cameras at 
the Kurchatov Institute send images not only to its Russian defenders, 
but also to the Los Alamos Laboratory in New Mexico, so that the US is 
able to m onitor security, and detect intruders, as well. Perhaps
Sopko, "The Changing...", p. 16.
Cobb & Kirchner, Testimony..., p. 6.
The lack of the latter is clearly demonstrated by the events on the Kola 
Peninsula of Russia'a Arctic coast when the local electricity company was able to 
temporarily cut power to the Northern Fleet (they had not paid their bül), causing 
the risk that the Fleet’s nuclear submarine reactors, requiring a constant energy 
flow, would overheat and meltdown. Armed marines had to be sent to take over 
power stations and restore the flow of electricity to the Fleet. See Richard Beeston, 
"Russian Marines Get Back Power", The Times. September 23,1995, p. 1.
Henry Sokolski, Executive Director, The Nonprliferation Policy Education 
Center, Washington DC, Interview with Author. November 13, 1996,Washington 
DC,
Cochran, Author's...
Spector, Author's...
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unsurprisingly, this has generated considerable opposition from 
Russian nationalists, who view this collaboration in so sensitive an 
area as a threat to their state's security783
In April 1994, the US Departm ent of Energy initiated the lab-to-lab 
program m e, co-operating w ith  Russian laboratory personnel in 
bringing MPC&A improvements to Russian nuclear facilities/84 This is 
probably the most effective part of the upgrade programme/85 ^  major 
step would be the concentration of nuclear material in a few sites, 
ideally in as few as 20 sites. This is occurring, particularly with material 
from dismantled weapons, but there is still a long way to go.^86 The 1992 
C ooperative T hreat R eduction  program m e (the N unn-L ugar 
programme) provides American financial assistance for the safe 
transport of weapons from the former-Soviet republics to storage sites 
w ithin Russia, the destruction of the weapons and the alternative 
employment in Russia of ex-Soviet nuclear scientists.^®? However, 
there has been a two-year lag on Nunn-Lugar, so the effects have started 
to be felt only in the last couple of years.^®® The United States is also 
buying 500 tonnes of highly-enriched uranium  from dism antled 
Russian w arheads, which w hen mixed w ith natu ra l uranium  or 
depleted uranium in Russia, is useful for powering reactors, but useless 
for building nuclear weapons.^®^ A similar operation was conducted in
783 Franchetti, "US atom...".
784y g  General Accounting Office. "Nuclear...", p.l4.
785 Cochran, Author'...
Spector, Author's...
787 The International Science and Technology Center in Moscow, administered by 
the State Department, provides funding for scientists of the former-Soviet Union to 
collaborate with Department of Energy - Defense Programs laboratatories on non­
weapons projects of benefit to both states. There is also an Industrial Partnering 
Program which, in 1996, employed over 2000 scientists on 200 projects in 60 institutes 
in the former-Soviet Union. Cobb & Kirchner, Testimony.... pp. 8-9.
John Sopko, Chief Counsel (M inority), Permanent Subcommittee On 
Investigations, US Senate, Interview with Author. November 19.1996. Washington 
DC.
There are, however, considerable doubts about whether the purchase agreement 
for Russian higlily enriched uranium is verifiable. When the Bush administration 
negotiated the $12 billion deal in 1992, the intention was that the weapons grade 
material containing 90% pure U-235 would be shipped to the United States and 
there diluted to the 4% piuity required for industry. However, by the time the 
Clinton administration signed the agreement in February 1993, it was the Russians 
who had become responsible for diluting the uranium, making it impossible for US 
experts to ascertain its source or original purity so that it is equally impossible to be 
certain that it is weapons grade material that is being removed from circulation. 
Although no evidence exists that the Russians are deliberately attempting to
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October 1994 to remove 600kg of highly-enriched uranium  from the 
Ust-Kamenogorsk plant, near Ulba in Kazakhstan, w ith the co­
operation of the Kazkakh government, and transport it to Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee for reprocessing/^® However, these m easures have been 
criticised as insufficient: Congress has allocated approximately $1200 
million to the Cooperative Threat Reduction program m e/^i It is true 
that this represents a solution to just a small fraction of the problem,^®^ 
especially in view of the lack of a safety culture in Russia, but it is at 
least some progress/^® A bigger problem stems from the Russians' 
apparent unwillingness to prioritise the proliferation issue above all 
others. One of the reasons that Operation Sapphire is unlikely to be 
repeated on a wide scale is, quite apart from the cost,^®4 that the 
Russians have been extremely reluctant to discuss the widespread 
removal of nuclear material from Russian soil.^^^ As another example, 
Russian officials refused, initially, to reveal details of its global arms 
sales to the new export control regime, the W assenaar Arrangement,
evade the terms of the agreement, the US remains sufficiently concerned that it is 
attempting to renegotiate the verification procedures. William J. Broad, "Uranium 
Deal: Is Russia Delivering?", New York Times. January 29,1996, p. A6.
See "US Smuggles Uranium Out Of Former Soviet Union", The Glasgow Herald. 
November 24, 1994; or "US Secures Kazakhstan Nuclear Stock", The Guardian. 
November 24, 1994, Kazakhstan originally offered to sell to the US l,3231bs of 
highly enriched uranium that it felt unable to store securely. M. Fletcher, "US 
Smuggles Soviet Uranium To Safety", The Times. November 24, 1994, p. 1. The US 
govermnent bought the uranium because it feared that the material would fall into 
terrorist or other unfriendly hands. This concern was heightened by the poor 
security at the plant: the warehouse where the material was being stored was 
secured solely by "a big padlock like the kind you see on Saturday morning cartoon 
shows". "US Takes Nuclear Fuel: Officials Feared Terrorism In Kazakhstan", The 
Waslungton Post. November 23, 1994, pp. 1,4. The material accounting procedures 
were also rudimentary at the warehouse wliich was sited in the middle of the 
plant that employed around 14,000 people. There were no chemical assays or 
radiation sensors to limit the risk of theft. Instead, all the material was simply 
recorded by hand in notebooks. "Kazakhstan Site Had Lax Security", The 
Washington Post. November 24, 1994. The laxity of the accounting is further 
demonstrated by the fact that when the shipment arrived in Tennessee, it was 
found to contain 4% more material than had been bought by the US. Allison, 
Testimony..., August 23, 1995. The reported cost of the material for the US was 
around $20 million. AUison, Testimony.... March 13, 1996.
^ 1^ International Institute For Strategic Studies, Transnational Crime. Strategic 
Survey 1994-1995. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
For example, the 600kg of uranium moved to the USA from Kazakhstan 
represents just 0.05% of the total weapons-usuable material in the former Soviet 
Union. Robitaille & Purver, "Smuggling..."
Barnaby, "Nuclear...", p. 95.
794 On purely cost grounds, it is probably justifiable. See Allison, Testimony.... 
March 13,1996.
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aimed at being a first line of defence against proliferation. The officials 
feared that such disclosures might jeopardise a key source of hard 
currency, required to prop up the ailing Russian economy.^®® The 
effectiveness of these US-sponsored measures is debatable; on the one 
hand, there has not been a serious nuclear smuggling incident since 
1994, but that may only reflect that none have been discovered rather 
than that none have occurred. On the other hand, Russian military pay 
and morale remains poor, and the situation is actually worsening, 
although it is the civilian side that remains the m ain proliferation 
concern.^®^ The Nunn-Lugar-D om enici am endm ent to the 1997 
Defense Authorization Act, passed at the end of the 104th Congress in 
1996, goes further towards trying to solve the problem, not only of 
avoiding nuclear leakage from the form er Soviet Union, bu t of 
improving the US domestic response to a nuclear incident. It provides 
training and advice to local officials likely to be first on the scene of any 
incident and im proves co-operation betw een federal and local 
authorities in responding to an incident involving WMD. It provides 
funds for both US and Russian customs officials to buy equipment that 
would ease their task of detecting materials crossing their borders.^^® It 
provides funds for MPCA programmes in the US Departm ents of 
Energy and Defense and builds on the Co-operative Threat Reduction 
programme, extending its provisions to other states in the former 
Soviet U nion, and  p ro v id in g  increased  funds to continue 
im provem ents in safeguards on weapons, w eapons m aterials, 
technology and expertise. Finally, it creates a Presidentially-appointed 
national co-ordinator to oversee US policy and counter-measures 
against proliferation of WMD and related materials and technologies.^®^
Michael Dynes, "Russians Torpedo Plan to Control Global Arms Sales", The 
Times, April 2,1996.
Sopko, Author's...
798 The Los Alamos National Laboratory is in the process of developing new sensors 
for a range of applications, from unattended ground-based instruments, to space- 
based ones carried by satellite. Cobb & Kirchner, Testimony.... p . 3. However, even 
this may be of limited use since it is quite possible to hide fissile material or 
smuggle it across a border by "shielding" it, so that it was not "detectable by 
practical gamma-ray moitoring means". The reality is that techniques, such as 
gamma-ray monitoring. X-ray radiography, or physical search will detect only a 
portion of the illegal material. Obviously, this is better than detecting none of it, 
but is still far from a solution. See: Bukliarin, "The Future of Russia's...", p. 127.
Sam Nunn, Former US Senator, Georgia, Author's Correspondence. See also 
Sopko, "The Changing...", pp. 16-20.
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It is worth noting that although the current focus of attention is the 
proliferation problem from the former Soviet Union, in a few years the 
problem could be equally great from another source, for example China 
or Pakistan. It is impossible to accurately predict the future, so it is 
important that there are non-proliferation measures that extend beyond 
safeguarding material in Russia now. Essentially, what is needed is an 
effective two-tier system. The priority needs to be on control at the 
source; but there also have to be export controls and effective non­
proliferation regimes, especially since, at the moment, dual-use goods 
are poorly protected at the source.®®® While they contain a num ber of 
helpful provisions and certainly continue to have an important role in 
non-proliferation, especially in establishing the norm s of a state's 
nuclear-related activities, providing "a moral and legal framework for 
practical mechanisms to deter and detect violations of international 
treaties",®®  ^ the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Chemical W eapons 
Convention (CWC), may be of only limited effectiveness in countering 
the acquisition of WMD by terrorists. For example, even if the CWC had 
been fully in place, the Aum Cult would have had little difficulty 
gaining the means required for its Tokyo attack, since they used 
information publicly accessible in the United States, and the chemicals 
used were all classed as Schedule 3 (those with the widest application 
and supposedly least likely to be used in chemical weapons) such as the 
pesticide phosphorous trichloride.®®^ The problem of dual-usage is less 
acute for weapons-grade nuclear material, but is considerable for 
material such as cesium-137 or cobalt-60 which could be used for a 
terrorist "dirty" bomb. It is hard to envisage how a regime such as the 
NPT could successfully close these loopholes and therefore genuinely 
control access to these necessary m aterials that are nonetheless 
exploitable for terrorist use.®®® There are similar problems with dual- 
use m achinery and instrum ents: Aum attem pted  to buy an 
interferometer in New York, ostensibly to use in a semi-conductor 
plant, but it could be used for the precise shaping of plutonium that is 
required to make a bomb. Aum were told that they would not need a 
special export licence to ship it overseas and were not seriously
Spector, Author's..■
Sam Nunn, Congressional Record - Senate. September 28 1996, S11755. 
Kaplan & Marshall, The Cult... pp. 101-102.
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questioned about why they needed such m a c h i n e r y Agreements, 
such as the NPT, may slow the transfer of relevant technologies and 
materials but they remain most unlikely to stop them.®®® This remains 
particularly the case since, under Article IV of the NPT, the non- 
discrim inatory dissem ination of nuclear technology for peaceful 
purposes is encouraged. It was an important provision of the Treaty that 
was vital in guaranteeing the adherence of a num ber of key non­
nuclear weapon states (NNWS). There are two problems that arise from 
this: even nuclear technology intended for peaceful use is helpful in 
developing weapons, and states that were once allies and consequently 
given a wide range of teclmological assistance with their nuclear energy 
programmes can relatively rapidly become steadfast enemies of their 
former benefactors. The best and most obvious example of this latter 
point is Iraq, which received aid from France, Britain and West 
Germany during its war with Iran, but which is now regarded as a 
continued proliferation threat, even after the UN-enforced eradication 
of much of its nuclear programme following the Gulf War of 1991. The 
acceptability of a state's nuclear programme is irrevocably tied to the 
geo-politics of the time, providing that its attempts at proliferation can 
be plausibly denied by its supplier state. Pakistan was regarded as a rogue 
state by the Carter administration for its efforts to develop a nuclear 
capability. When The USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan 
became a key regional power and the nuclear issue was temporarily 
sidelined. At the end of the Cold War, Pakistan's status as a rogue 
proliferator was reaffirmed. Yet the pattern  of Pakistani nuclear 
weapons work remained consistent throughout this period; it is only 
international, and especially US attitudes to the work that vary. Micro­
proliferation may be intimately connected with macro-proliferation, at 
the very least, the opportunities for the former will increase with the 
latter, so a consistent and unified policy by governments on nuclear 
p ro liferation  as a whole rem ains crucial to avoiding nuclear 
terrorism.®®®
Kaplan & Marshall, The Cult.... pp. 99-100.
805 Deutch, Conference...
806 por a discussion of the inconsistancies of proliferation policy, see for example: 
A. Kapur, "Rogue states and the international nuclear order". International Tournai. 
Volmne LI Number 3 Summer 1996.
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The establishment or government's psychological response to the threat 
of nuclear terrorism is also important. If the extent of the threat is so 
immense, then it is possible that the govermnent would be unable to 
attend to the political message that underlay the threat or to evaluate 
rather than prejudge the characteristics of their opponents, perceiving 
the need for a total response to a total threat. The government cannot 
afford to underestimate the threat, so will overestimate it and refuse to 
take any unnecessary risks.®®^  This severely constrains the likelihood of 
a successful negotiated settlement to such a crisis.
Perhaps the best example of a government overestimating the threat of 
terrorism and acting accordingly is that of the Canadian administration 
during the crisis of October 1970 when the FLQ kidnapped James Cross 
and Pierre Laporte and subsequently killed the latter. The group was 
amateurish compared to many other terrorist organisations; it posed 
little genuine threat to the stability of Canada, and lacked the 
organisational or structural cohesiveness to generate a concerted attack 
on the government. Furthermore, it displayed a consistent lack of 
ruthlessness in its campaigns between 1963 and 1972: all of those killed 
as a result of their actions were the results of bombings or robberies that 
went wrong.®®® Even Laporte's murder on October 17, 1970 was arguably 
as a result of the failure of satisfactory negotiations; the terrorists 
believed that they had lost any scope for flexibility if they were to retain 
credibility. Neither Laporte's nor the other deaths were preplanned by 
the FLQ. However, the Canadian government's response to the crisis 
was to introduce the War Measures Act for two months, enabling the 
federal authorities to send troops into the Montreal area to perform 
static guard duties (following the kidnappings, all public figures that 
were possible future targets were heavily protected), leaving the police 
free to search for the kidnappers.^®® The security services were given 
widespread powers of search, arrest and holding of suspects without 
w arrant that they used in the detention for questioning of 340 
individuals believed to be FLQ activists. However, they assumed no
8®7 Knutson, "The Terrorists Dilemmas ...", pp. 206-208.
8®8 janke. Terrorism & Democracy, p. 61.
At the height of the crisis, there were about 7500 troops on duty in Quebec, and 
it was made clear by both the federal and provincial governments that martial law  
had not been imposed, the troops were simply there to assist the police. Wainstein, 
"The Cross..", p. 53.
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other extraordinary powers.®i® The formal request for this military
assistance came from the Quebec provincial administration of Robert
Bourassa, and especially after the m urder of Laporte, there was nearly
universal support for the measures despite the threat that it posed to
civil liberties.®!^ Prime Minister Trudeau led this hard-line response,
stating on October 13:
It's more im portant to m aintain law and order in society 
than to worry about weak-kneed people who don't like the 
looks of an army... Society m ust use every means at its 
disposal to defend itself against the emergence of a parallel 
power wliich defies the elected power in this country, and I 
think that that goes to any distance. So long as there is a 
power which is challenging the elected representatives of the 
people, then I think that power must be stopped and I think 
it's only, I repeat, weak-kneed bleeding hearts who are afraid 
to take these m ea su re s .® ^ ^
Prior to Laporte's death, there had been public dem onstrations of
support for the FLQ: students at various universities in Quebec
boycotted their classes and there was a rally of between 1500 and 3000
people at the Paul Sauve Arena on the evening of October 15. It was in
this climate that governmental estimates of 3000 terrorists in Quebec
armed with thousands of weapons were made.®i® In fact, as was noted
earlier, the FLQ had only a fraction of those numbers, but this stage of
the crisis was accompanied by increasing numbers of bomb threats,
rumours, false leads and requests for protection. The regular policing
authorities in the area found themselves stretched beyond their
capacity.® 4^ W hether Trudeau over-reacted is largely an irrelevance;
there can be little doubt that he firmly believed that the situation was a
national emergency. The crisis made him determined to crush the FLQ
properly, and this was achieved by 1972, although the schism within the
terrorist group was the greatest factor. The group had always been a
810 Ibid.
Crelinstein, "The FLQ...", pp. 63-64. The Information Collection Institute 
published a poll on October 19, show ing that 78% of Montrealers wholly  
disapproved of the kidnappings as against 1% who supported them. The day after 
the WMA was enacted, but before Laporte’s death, a Canadian Institute of Public 
Affairs poll indicated that 86 - 88% of Canadians supported the government's 
actions. About 85% of Quebecers supported the govermnent in a November 15 poll for 
CTV, but by November 27, as the level of the threat was perceived to have 
subsided, that support had fallen to 73%. Wainstein, "The Cross...", p. 49.
Janke, Terrorism.... p. 53.
Ibid. p. 203.
814wainstein, "The Cross...", p. 52.
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loosely bound cell organisation, but the WMA and its successor of 
December 1970, the Public Order (Temporary Measures) Act, in effect 
until April 1971, polarised the FLQ between those that sought to escalate 
the fight and those that wished to lie low and reorganise.®i®
The vital result of the kidnappings was to draw  the attention of 
Canadians to the FLQ and to make it a m atter of prestige for the 
government to defeat the terrorists. It is this point that is crucial to a 
discussion of possible governm ental responses to acts of nuclear 
terrorism: Trudeau was prepared to go to the brink of martial law, 
supported by the m ajority of Canadians and other dem ocratic 
governments, to overcome the FLQ. It would be reasonable to anticipate 
a similarly extreme response to an act of nuclear terrorism. While one 
objective of terrorism is to provoke the government into over-reaction, 
to make it seem panicked and out of control, the scale of the threat 
would make it hard to argue that this was possible in the case of a 
severe nuclear threat. It is also w orth noting from this example the 
response of the terrorists to the government's actions. Even writers at 
the time thought it unlikely that the FLQ would be intimidated by the 
WMA: Morf argued that it was more likely to make them withdraw for 
a while and then commit acts of retaliation at a later stage: if anything it 
would make them more determined. He cited an unspecified supporter 
of the FLQ:
[Although he] admitted that they could not win they would 
be prepared to go to any lengths to overthrow the existing 
order and go down with it so as to focus national and world 
attention on the plight of Quebec.®^®
There is clearly a problem with this quote since the source was merely 
"a supporter" and given the cell structure of the FLQ, it is unlikely that 
it is representative of the kidnappers of Cross or Laporte. Equally, it 
could easily be dism issed as an overblown statem ent that was 
impossible to prove one way or the other. However, if it truly reflected 
the attitude of the organisation, then it would be significant, showing 
the degree of fanaticism that stems from politically-motivated as well as 
religiously-motivated terrorism. It seems possible though that it is not 
wholly reflective since the FLQ, as was show n earlier, became
815 Crelinstein, "The FLQ...", p. 83.
816 Hilary Brigstocke, "Police Frustrated In Quebec Search", The Times. October 
26,1970, p. 6.
252
decreasingly focused on their political goals, suggesting that any action 
that risked destroying the group was unlikely to be encouraged.
The representativeness of the Canadian government's response to the 
threat under which it perceived itself to be is far from clear when 
applied to potential acts of nuclear terrorism. Obviously, the variety of 
response would depend almost entirely on the type of threat being 
posed, but it seems possible to make a few general points. Particularly in 
democratic states, there is a problem balancing the need for security 
against the core values of social justice and civil liberties that are 
essential to the existence of such states as democracies. Beres argues that 
a full-scale military assault designed to eradicate the terrorist group 
altogether is most unlikely in such states, although it would be more 
probable in less democratic countries. As well as the threat it would 
pose to civil liberties, such a response also risks conferring combatant 
status on the terrorists, granting them a greater degree of legitimacy.®^^ 
A less extreme series of measures remains a more likely answer unless 
the crisis was to be perceived by the government or the public to be out 
of control. The precedents for emergency powers short of military 
authority are manifold: the UK Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary 
Provisions) Act, 1974, allowed detention without a hearing for 48 hours, 
extendible by five more days. Even in the United States, there is some 
evidence that greater central authority would be demanded in the event 
of a major nuclear crisis. There is a clear delineation of duties between 
federal and state powers in such an event,®^® bu t the possibility of 
central involvement would probably be in proportion to the extent of 
the threat. Although there has been a trend towards mistrust of the 
federal authorities in the past few years in the United States, it still 
seems likely that there would be widespread support for a temporary 
extension of central powers in a nuclear emergency. It is also probable 
that limited measures such as extended area searches, wiretappmg or 
surveillance and increased powers of detention would be upheld as 
constitutional by the Supreme Court in the event of a challenge.®^® The
81^ Louis Rene Beres, "Responding To The Tlireat Of Nuclear Terrorism" in Charles 
Kegley Jr, (ed.) International Terrorism: Characteristics. Causes. Controls. (New  
York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1990), p. 238.
818 See for example: California Office of Emergency Services, Nuclear Blackmail 
Or Nuclear Threat Emergency Response Plan. Sacramento, 1976.
8i® J. H. Barton, "The Civil Liberties Implications Of A Nuclear Emergency", New  
York University Review Of Law & Social Change. Volume 10, (1981), pp. 310- 314.
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priorities of the state are likely to be geared towards survival and that 
may lead it to over-ride the norms of democratic countries temporarily. 
W hether such measures could be preserved in the long-term, if for 
example, there was a heightened risk of nuclear terrorism  bu t no 
specific threat, is more open to question.
Contingency planning for nuclear emergencies, including terrorist 
incidents, is vital to an effective response and, as has already been 
discussed, that is one of the main provisions of the new Nunn-Lugar- 
Domenici amendment. As well as civic actions such as the California 
Office Of Emergency Services's "Nuclear Blackmail Or Nuclear Threat 
Emergency Response Plan", the US also has the NEST, a government 
agency with 1000 volunteers mostly taken from w ithin the nuclear 
power industry.®20 Their role is similar to that of the search teams that 
were deployed in Moscow following the Chechen threat. NEST has a 
database of everything written publicly about making a nuclear weapon, 
enabling computers to run cross-checks to see if the potential terrorist 
really knows how to build a bomb or is a hoaxer merely quoting from a 
thriller novel.®2i Specialists are on constant standby to respond to a 
threat and can be anywhere witliin tfie US in four hours.®22 get up in 
1975 within the Department of Energy, which now has an annual 
budget of $70 million to deal with nuclear emergencies,®^® the agency is 
linked to the White House, Pentagon, CIA, FBI and State Department. 
They operate in teams to search for nuclear devices using radiation 
detectors, and have been placed on alert over 110 times and mobilised 
30 times, although always for what turned out to be a hoax,®^4 for 
example, 42 members of the Las Vegas-based team were sent to Reno on 
January 9,1981 in response to a tlireat to detonate explosives that would 
unleash plutonium  throughout the air ducts of Harrah's Hotel and 
Casino.®^® If a genuine device were found, NEST has various m ethods 
of disabling the bomb or conducting a controlled conventional 
explosion that prevents the nuclear component from detonating.
820 James Bone, "American Nuclear ’Swat' Team Emerges From The Shadows", The 
Times. January 2,1996, p. 9.
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Although NEST does not operate outside the USA, its scientists do 
maintain links with their counterparts abroad, and are able to offer 
advice and equipment to assist in the recovery and handling stolen 
w e a p o n s . ® 2 6  Other states have equivalent organisations: Canada has a 
Special Threat Assessm ent Group (STAG), form ed in 1976 and 
comprising medics and scientists, to assess, prevent, contain or assist in 
the response to terrorist threats and incidents involving non- 
conventional w e a p o n r y . ® ^ ?  addition, both Canadian and United 
States armed forces retain specially trained response teams to deal with 
such a tlireat: in Canada, the Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) 
Response Team, attached to the NBC School at CFB Borden, Ontario®^® 
and in the US counter-proliferation is one of the Principal Special 
Operations Missions of the Special Operations Forces (SOF).®2®
A proactive response to the problem is difficult. By target-hardening 
and a variety of measures, largely discussed above, designed to make it 
as difficult as possible for terrorists both to acquire fissile material at all 
and to be in a position where they can use such material for terrorism, it 
may be possible to deflect most potential terrorists onto other tactics and 
targets. It will probably not deter the most determ ined and most 
resourceful groups. Effective intelligence does offer some protection, but 
even this is limited. Inter-agency co-operation is good amongst most of 
the states of Western Europe and N orth America, but it remains, as 
always, dependent on personalities: intelligence sharing is contingent 
upon trust and reliability between agencies. A bigger problem (from a 
purely law-enforcement and anti-terrorism, rather than a civil rights, 
perspective) is that democratic societies rightly protect the liberties of 
the individual. However, this does mean that it is hard for intelligence 
agencies to track groups and individuals, protected by freedoms of 
speech, travel and religion, unless there is clear proof that the in tent 
and ability to commit an offence exists. The best example of this is that 
of Aum which, under Japanese law, was strongly protected as a religious 
movement, severely lim iting the extent to which Japanese law-
826 Waller, "Nuclear Ninjas..."
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enforcement agencies were willing to investigate their activities.®®® 
However, it is precisely these non-traditional types of organisation that 
it is most important to target in defending against nuclear terrorism 
because they are the least predictable and currently most likely to find a 
non-conventional attack conceivable. As well as the legal difficulties in 
such an approach is the sheer magnitude of the task: even focusing on 
one type of group in one country, the militias in the United States, is a 
massive task. Effective defence wül realistically mean concentrating on 
scores of different types of organisation in dozens of states.®®^
Efforts to combat nuclear terrorism  should therefore have three 
elements: "deterrence, interdiction and consequence mitigation ."®®2 On 
the basis that intelligence and effective policing may only partially deal 
with the problem, the most effective policy to prevent nuclear terrorism 
is likely to continue to be one of international co-operation 
encompassing risk minim isation schemes such as the Cooperative 
Threat Reduction programme, strong export controls, the preservation 
of international regimes such as the NPT, and target-hardening 
measures designed to deter potential terrorists as m uch as possible, 
along w ith vigorous police and intelligence efforts to detect and 
intercept possible terrorist attacks and incidents of nuclear smuggling. 
Finally, in the event that these policies fail to deflect an incident of 
nuclear terrorism, there should be an effective emergency response that 
provides a fully trained and prepared, multi-agency effort that ensures 
that the results of such an act are as minimal and harmless as possible. 
This three-pronged approach to nuclear terrorism cannot guarantee that 
there will never be such an act, but it can go some way to guaranteeing 
that it is difficult to achieve and that its repercussions are mitigated as 
far as possible. While not ideal, it is the best, most realistically available 
solution.
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Conclusion
The issue of mass destructive terrorism has, in the post-Gold War era, 
caused concern to an unprecedented degree. This sentiment was aptly 
expressed by former United States Senator Sam N unn who has argued 
that: "Combating the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological 
weapons is the most pressing issue that we face today."®®® Indeed, 
Senator N unn has contended, rogue nation's or terrorist groups' 
possession of nuclear weapons "could pose a clear and present danger 
to our s o c ie t y .  "®®4 Particularly in the case of nuclear terrorism, the 
impetus for such concern is often cited as being the collapse of the 
former Soviet Union which has led to increased opportunities for 
proliferation. However, it is the argument of this thesis that the real 
driving force behind the heightened danger of nuclear terrorism lies 
not with the increased opportunities for micro-prohferation, but rather 
with the changing nature of political violence and the psychological 
and organisational characteristics of terrorism itself. It is these that are 
the true factors that would make terrorist resort to nuclear weapons.
While the ostensible source of this concern is relatively new, arising 
from the opportunities for nuclear smuggling,®®® the fact of it is not. 
Nuclear terrorism has been a source of regular academic and policy- 
oriented discussion from the early 1970s onwards. Authors, such as 
Willrich and Taylor, Brian Jenkins, Norton and Greenberg, Leventhal 
and Alexander, Gail Bass, Bruce Hoffman, and Peter deLeon have been 
arguing that nuclear terrorism posed a threat that could not be ignored, 
well before the end of the Cold War.®®® This strongly suggests that the
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danger stems from more than simply the fact that terrorists now have a 
better chance to acquire fissile materials and then use it.
In fact, the very nature of terrorist behaviour is at the core of this 
problem. It is a conflict between the psychological and instrumental 
instincts of terrorists. At a psychological level, terrorism is essentially 
about the search for, and then the reaffirmation of, identity. It is 
violence that defines the group and the individual within that group. 
It is the aspect that sets them apart from other types of group or 
indiv idual. A lthough there is no "terrorist personality", no 
psychological profile that would describe all perpetrators of political 
violence, there are clearly characteristics that are common to many 
groups and individuals that make heightened levels of violence not 
only more likely, but from an organisational perspective, even highly 
desirable.
Individuals tend to initially join terrorist groups because it offers an 
opportunity to belong, an identity as part of the organisation, and 
because it offers an outlet to channel their frustrations and anger at 
society or some element within that society. They find themselves 
finally accepted, usually after a progression through several other 
groups, amongst similarly-minded individuals. Certainly, the evidence 
for this sequence of events is supported by the examples of individuals 
such as Adriana Faranda, of the Italian Red Brigades, or Susan Stern of 
the Weathermen. There are a num ber of important consequences of 
this progression that have an impact on the willingness of groups to 
use extremes of violence. Since individuals tend to become members 
of terrorist organisations only after they have rejected, and moved on 
from, membership of less violent groups, there is a very real extent to 
which they "have nowhere else to go". This, combined with the fact 
that the terrorist group offers an identity, a sense of belonging, means 
that the individual's prim ary concern is to rem ain w ithin the 
organisation. As a result, they are far more likely to accept the 
absolutist and violent characteristics of the group than might otherwise 
be the case. Their psychological and em otional well-being are 
intimately associated with the group and with the members within it. 
This not only partially  explains why ind iv iduals jo in  such 
organisations, but also why, once they are members, they are able to 
engage in violent acts. The group enables them to feel powerful and
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fulfilled as individuals. The group's violence compels recognition 
from their society and government. Not only m ust it acknowledge 
their existence for the first time, but the government must also deal 
with the group. The bigger the problem the group creates through its 
actions, the more urgently the government m ust try to overcome 
them, tacitly recognising them  as "a player" in the process. The 
individual is emotionally, intellectually and psychologically tied to the 
group. As well as making it less likely that they would seek to leave the 
organisation, it also ensures that individuals have a stake in  
preserving the identity, the character, and above all, the existence of the 
group. It is from this that the need to maintain violence as a tactic, and 
even to escalate it, comes.
At the same time, the emotional and ideological justifications of the
organisation protect its members from suffering the psychological costs
of imposing violence on its victims. The moral imperative for the
action is altered by using the norms and values of the group to make
such attacks a desirable duty, ra ther than an abhorrence. By
emphasising the necessity of the action, in the face of the enemy's gross
misdeeds, terrorism is justified, within the group's moral framework.
The worthy end, the group’s objective, permits the violent means since
it is perpetrated in pursuit of the higher good. Furthermore, when the
victims of the terrorist act are depicted as representatives of the enemy,
rather than as individuals, they are depersonalised, dehumanised, so
that the consequences of the violence are psychologically easier to
accept for the individual terrorist. The explanation of Adriana Faranda,
a member of the Red Brigades, was that:
[T]here is a very high level of abstraction, wliich serves to 
project a series of feelings over a whole category of people 
and over the symbols that represent this category. And in 
carrying out this m ental process of abstraction, you can 
attribute a series of responsibilities or blame for things on to 
the category: things which are also concrete facts ~ the real 
unhappiness of people, deaths at the workplace...and also our 
own friends, comrades killed during demonstrations by the 
police.®®^
They are able to disengage from the realities of their actions by 
redefining the moral framework in which it occurs. This is im portant 
because it means that morality, at either a group or an individual level.
837 Cited in Jamieson, The Heart.... pp. 270-271.
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could not, by itself, be regarded as a restraint on mass destructive 
terrorism. There is no moral absolute that would prohibit the use of 
such weapons in all circumstances. If a sufficiently important end were 
sought by the group, all means, including nuclear terrorism might be 
justifiable.
At the same time, anarchic-ideologue groups, especially ones that are 
compelled by a lack of support to exist underground, tend to contain 
members that are much more dependent on the organisation and are 
consequently much more affected by the dynamics of the group. This is 
best shown in the case of the SLA, as described by Patty Hearst, in which 
the pressures of being cut off from the rest of society, and the 
interactions between the members of the group, had a profound impact 
on the range of actions that the SLA pursued. An important example of 
this was their need to perform acts of terrorism on a regular basis, to 
reaffirm the group's importance, defined by the publicity and attention 
it received. The individual's need for feelings of power and authority 
over others was transferred onto the group as well. It had to be 
constantly planning or perpetrating acts of terrorism  to satisfy its 
members' psychological requirem ents. Group dynamics therefore 
perpetuated existing patterns of behaviour, identity and action: the 
continued use of violence.
The need to preserve the group's organisational integrity and identity 
manifests itself in a num ber of critical ways. It ensures that any 
challenge, either internal or external, to the group is likely to be 
regarded adversely by its members. This applies equally to dissent or 
attempts to leave by individuals within the terrorist organisation, and 
to any attem pt by factions within the group to mitigate the level of 
violence that the organisation employs. Such challenges threaten to 
split the group because they dispute the norms of the group. They are 
equated with treason within the group because they risk destroying the 
organisation. As the survival of the group becomes paramount, the 
instrumental objectives of the organisation become subverted. Since 
violence defines the group and sets it apart from other organisations, to 
cease or reduce the level of violence that the terrorists use is to lower 
the group to the status of other non-violent organisations. Such groups 
were previously psychologically unsatisfactory for the individual, so 
they have a stake in maintaining the organisation in its present state.
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Consequently, even when the group does acliieve its declared goal, it 
may not disband. This is not a universal trend: in these circumstances, 
ETA continued their campaign, but in a similar case, the FLO moved to 
pursuing their goals through non-violent means.
This inability to alter the character of the group has an impact not only 
on the type of action, violence, that the terrorist organisation employs, 
but also on the level of that violence. Terrorism rarely achieves its 
intended goal. However, even when the utility of terrorism, as an 
instrum ent with which to achieve strategic objectives, has declined, 
many groups remain committed to the military option. Faced with the 
failure of their campaign, terrorist groups face a series of unpalatable 
choices, all of which may ultimately risk the destruction of the group. 
Since terrorist organisations define themselves in terms of their 
violence, and since, as has been shown, they are singularly poor in 
their ability to pursue twin-track strategies, their solution to the threat 
of extinction is likely to be further violence. In such circumstances, it is 
not unreasonable to suggest that an escalation of violence is the most 
plausible outcome. Such an assertion is supported by examples such as 
the IRA's campaign, particularly in the 1970s, or the Tamil Tigers in 
recent years. In the latter example, as Sri Lankan government forces 
compelled a Tamil retreat, the violence of Tiger attacks in Colombo has 
increased, culminating in the devastating bombings of January 31, 1996, 
and October 15, 1997. One group that is an exception to this trend 
towards escalation is the RAF, which did not attem pt a violent 
recovery to stem its decline. However, in this respect, the RAF is not 
strictly comparable to other organisations, since it collapsed due to the 
increasing irrelevance of its ideology and rem oval of its m ain 
campaign objectives, following the release of prisoners under the 
Kinkel initiative of 1992.
As a group declines, it may be tempted to attempt a "spectacular", such 
as the Tamil bombings, to achieve publicity and thus to reassert its 
cause and attract much-needed support from potential sympathisers, 
im pressed w ith  the group 's capability and com m itm ent to its 
objectives. While the need for publicity is by no means universal, it is a 
common m otivation for many organisations. It emphasises their 
power and importance, so reinforces the psycho-dynamics of terrorism 
that make such groups attractive to their members in the first instance.
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This need to set themselves apart, to use a "spectacular", means that 
terrorists must either resort to new tactics, or to new levels of violence. 
The series of hijackings of airliners in 1968 by the PFLF was an example 
of the former; an act of m ass-destructive terrorism  would be an 
example of the latter.
Instrum entally, terrorist groups base their tactical and targeting 
decisions not only on their capabilities, but also, to a crucial extent, on 
their strategic objectives. For many organisations, these both form very 
considerable barriers to any use of non-conventional weaponry. 
Terrorist groups all use an element of rational choice in their pursuit 
of goals. A lthough the group's instrum ental decisions may be 
constrained or partially determined by psychology, this rationality does 
exist. It is crucially tied to proportionality, to the way that means are 
tied to ends. The scale of terrorist demands and their perception of 
their enemy are clearly linked to the lengths to which they are likely to 
be willing to go in pursuit of their campaign. A group that defines an 
entire society as its opponent and wishes to purify the world in 
preparation for a messianic arrival is far more likely to be willing to 
regard high levels of violence against that society as acceptable than 
would a group that purports to fight on behalf of that society against an 
oppressive and exploitative governm ent. Obviously then, the 
motivation of the organisation plays a central role in determining their 
willingness to engage in high level acts of terrorism.
While it might be argued that major incidents of nuclear terrorism 
have not occurred as a result of terrorists' inability to acquire the 
means to do so, in fact, it appears that the majority of groups choose 
not to. They are tactically conservative, preferring the weapons with 
which they are familiar. Rather than adopting entirely new techniques, 
most terrorists appear to prefer to adapt and improve their existing 
ones, as the RAF did in its use of bombs to attack dignitaries travelling 
in moving cars. In such examples, it seems clear that such a radical 
departure as the use of non-conventional weaponry, though not 
unprecedented, is highly improbable. This is partly because more 
straightforw ard conventional attacks have a higher probability of 
success, requiring less technical skills, resources or risks than would 
presumably be entailed in producing a non-conventional weapon.
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Despite psychological escalatory pressures, there have been few 
incidents of mass destructive terrorism , and no m ajor nuclear 
terrorism incidents, to date. This is largely because, until relatively 
recently, the prevalent types of terrorism, while containing these 
escalatory pressures, were also, paradoxically, self-moderating. Heavily 
dependent on the support, or at least on the perceived support, of a 
wider audience, terrorist groups largely had to restrict their actions to 
those that were tolerable to this audience. The role of an individual's 
identity, in determining terrorist action, is fundamentally different, 
depending on the type of group that they are a member of, and this is 
reflected in their respective willingness to engage in acts of mass 
destruction. In the case of nationalist-separatist groups, such as the IRA 
or ETA, an individual's violence can be seen to be an effort to promote 
their national identity. It is an attempt to earn the approbation of their 
community, to "prove" their loyalty, by attacking the enemies of their 
people. Even if the wider community does not wholly support the 
methods of the terrorists, they may have some sympathy for their 
objectives. A lthough not universally applicable to nationalist- 
separatist groups, the FLQ are one exception, there does tend to be some 
support for the group in the wider community. This support is vital, 
emotionally and often logistically, to the terrorists and their actions are, 
to a considerable extent, geared to a level that will enable them to 
maintain that support. When the group oversteps the boundaries of 
"acceptable" violence, it may not necessarily denounce the attack or 
apologise, as the IRA did following the Remembrance Day bombing in 
Enniskillen in 1987, but they will often issue a statement explaining 
that it was not their intention to cause considerable loss of life. An 
example of this might be Irgun's bombing of the King David Hotel in 
Jerusalem  in 1946. Consequently, assum ing that their national 
community's desire for mass destructive terrorism remains small, the 
likelihood of nationalist-separatist terrorists using nuclear terrorism 
remains small too.
In contrast to national-separatists, anarchic-ideologues, left-wing 
terrorists such as the Red Brigades or the RAF, perpetrate violence as a 
rejection of the values of their community. In this case, it is far more 
likely that their terrorism will be perceived wholly negatively by their 
society. Left-wing terrorism is usually an attack on the "establishment" 
of a community, and on the political, military and economic leadership
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in particular. Ideologically, left-wing terrorism is perpetrated on behalf 
of "the people", to liberate them from oppression. This means though, 
that any action tliat injures innocent victims, members of "the people", 
is u n ju s tif ia b le , d isp ro p o r tio n a te  and  counter-productive. 
Consequently, an act, such as nuclear terrorism, that threatens the lives 
of hundreds or even thousands of innocents is extremely unlikely.
However, where it was once the case that nationalist-separatist and 
anarchic-ideologue violence were the p redom inant varieties of 
terrorism, other types have become increasingly prevalent today. The 
change has not been rapid or total, but its effect on the nature of 
contemporary terrorism, and thus on the likelihood of terrorist using 
nuclear weapons, has been profound. Amongst the most significant of 
these developments has been the grow th in religious-m otivated 
terrorism. Religion may be the oldest cause of political violence, but in 
the m odern era, it has been largely overshadow ed by secular 
m otivations. In 1968, no international terrorist group could be 
described as religious; by 1980, only two of 64 could be classed as non­
secular. However, in the 1990s, the proportion had risen markedly: in 
1992, 11 of 48 terrorist groups were religious, in 1994, 16 of 49, and in 
1995, 25 of 58 active international terrorist organisations were 
predominantly religious in character or motivation.®®®
There are two inter-related consequences of the increase in religious 
terrorism, both of which are significant for the likelihood of nuclear 
terrorism. Firstly, the nature of religion, as a motivation for terrorism, 
means that it is more likely to support, and even demand, higher 
levels of violence than secular-oriented terrorism. Secondly, although 
religiously-motivated terrorism, as a whole, is more lethal than secular 
terrorism, there has also been a growth in terrorism  driven by 
messianic beliefs or millenarianism, both of which appear to especially 
inspire heightened levels of violence.
Terrorism in general is becoming increasingly lethal: in 1995, 29% of 
incidents resulted in at least one fatality, the highest percentage since 
1968. During the 1980s, the num ber of terrorist incidents rose by 
roughly 30%, compared to the 1970s; fatalities rose by 100% in the same 
period. Religious terrorism accounts for a disproportionate amount of
838 Hoffman, "Terrorism and WMD..,", p. 48.
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this. Between 1982 and 1992, Shia groups caused 28% of fatalities from 
terrorism, but were responsible for only 8% of attacks. There are a 
number of reasons for this. In the case of religious terrorism, violence 
is perceived to be part of an all-encompassing struggle between good 
and evil. The stakes involved legitimise the means used by religious 
terrorists to defend their faith and even justify acts of self-sacrifice in 
that protection. A lthough m uch religious violence is aim ed at 
preserving purity  w ithin that religion, it is also directed against 
external sources of corruption which threaten to erode that purity. It is 
entirely possible that, in order to protect their faith from such an 
influence, adherents m ight resort to extreme levels of violence, 
especially given the totalist nature of many religious terrorist beliefs.
However, the organisational dynamics that apply to secular terrorism 
also have a role to play in religious terrorism  and it is therefore 
reasonable to suggest that many of the same escalatory pressures also 
exist. A critical difference is that whereas these pressures are somewhat 
moderated by instrumental considerations in nationalist-separatist and 
anarchic-ideologue terrorism, these considerations have a less effective 
mitigating role in religious violence. As with nationalist-separatists, 
religious terrorists use their violence as a means of establishing their 
identity w ithin their com m unity. However, w hereas in secular 
terrorism, the rewards of victory are finite, in religious terrorism they 
are infin ite: national determ ination , com pared to paradise. 
Furthermore, religious terrorism is sanctioned by figures who draw 
their justifications from the highest sources, interpreted in holy texts. 
Consequently, not only is the absolutist and uncompromising aspect of 
the terrorist magnified, but the possibility of unconditional support 
from their community is also increased. Secular groups, such as 
nationalist-separatists, that find that a "natural constituency's" support 
is critical to their continuation, are much more likely to be moderate in 
their actions because that support is conditional, so there has to be 
some proportionality between their goals and the means used to attain 
those. In the case of religious terrorists, that necessity for moderation is 
removed, thus the likelihood of high levels of violence is increased. 
This is especially so since the organisational pressures that inhibit 
moderate action or de-escalation in secular terrorism also apply to 
religious terrorism, but with the added aspect that any compromise
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may be perceived as a betrayal not only of the goal or the group, but of 
an entire faith and perhaps of God as well.
The danger of non-conventional terrorism is especially acute in the 
case of messianic or millenarian groups since, in some cases, they may 
come to believe that their role and duty is to speed the end of the 
world, to facilitate redemption. Since the ultimate result will be the 
higher good, the salvation of the righteous and the punishment of the 
faithless, any action that promotes this situation, including a wholesale 
destruction of the corrupting elements of society, may be justified. This 
problem of religious-inspired violence is even greater now, as the 
millennium  approaches and the num bers of m illenarian groups 
increase. Not all messianic belief results in terrorism, but for that 
which does, that violence may well be at an apocalyptic level. Aum 
Shinrikyo offers the clearest example of this.
Significantly, although groups such as the RAF talked about using 
nuclear weapons, it has been non-traditional, often amateur, types of 
organisations, such as Aum, that have come closest to using weapons 
of mass destruction. These include various white supremacist plots in 
the United States to use chemical or biological agents, and the attempt 
by followers of Baghwan Shree Rajneesh to use salmonella to debilitate 
an entire town. In common w ith Aum and groups, such as the 
bombers of the World Trade Center and the Kabbalist millenarians 
who tried to destroy the El Aksa Mosque and the Mosque of Omar in 
Jerusalem, who have used conventional w eaponry for a mass 
destructive act of terrorism, these organisations all have a significant 
religious content. Clearly, not all large-scale terrorist attacks are 
perpetrated by religious terrorists; for example, the Tamil Tigers, 
responsible for a series of massive bombings in Sri Lanka, are 
predom inantly driven by nationalism. Neither are all uses of non- 
conventional weaponry by religious terrorists; (the Chechen tlireat in 
Moscow in December 1995 is one secular example), bu t virtually all 
attempts to cause mass casualties with non-conventional weapons, and 
the majority of attempts to do so w ith conventional weapons, have 
been by terrorists for whom religion is a key component in their 
m otivation.
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The collapse of the former Soviet Union has significantly increased the 
opportunities for terrorists, particularly well-funded or state-sponsored 
ones, to acquire fissile materials. The question remains, however, of 
whether terrorists would necessarily seek to exploit this, given the 
technological conservatism that has already been discussed. This is 
particularly so since building and using nuclear-yield, chemical or 
biological weapons, although not impossible, is also far from  
straightforward. However, these difficulties should not be over­
estimated as a barrier to micro-proliferation. In all probability, it is the 
acquisition of fissile materials that is the greatest obstacle for terrorists 
seeking to construct a nuclear bomb, which, since a device of uncertain 
and variable yield can be built using more easily obtained non- 
weapons-grade material, is certainly not an insuperable problem. Such 
a weapon could be built, at modest expense, using the open literature, 
and with minimal risk of detection, since it would be unnecessary to 
test the components.^^^
However, this should not mask the fact that the level of difficulty 
required to construct such a weapon is stiU considerably above that of a 
large conventional device that would be capable of causing mass- 
casualties. The bomb used at Oklahoma consisted of little more than 
nitrate fertiliser and benzene. Why then, would non-conventional 
weaponry be attractive to terrorists? Certainly, their destructive 
potential would be beyond that of any conventional device, but there 
are other reasons too. In the case of nuclear weapons, it would have 
considerable value as a terrorist instrument, since the mere fact of 
being "nuclear" would almost certainly ensure that it had vast coercive 
power, having a considerable impact on the public's imagination and 
fear, and thus on a governmental response. For the same reason, being 
"nuclear", it w ould convey added prestige and status on the 
perpetrators. It would also set them apart from other groups, in a way 
that even the use of biological or chemical weapons could not.
Much of the material potentially available to terrorists through the 
"grey market" has been of non-fissionable quality. This has opened a 
further possibility: that of radiological terrorism. This would consist of 
either leaving radiation-emitting material to contaminate an area, as 
the Chechen separatists claimed to have done in 1995, or of wrapping
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, pp. 6-10.
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conventional explosives in a radiological agent, to create a "dirty 
bomb." In both cases, such a weapon would offer many of the same 
benefits to the terrorist as a full-scale nuclear-yield device, whilst also 
being more credible and easier for the terrorist to build and use.
There can be no doubt that the attraction of using nuclear weapons has 
had some impact on the tactical decisions of would be terrorists. The 
RAF talked about using a nuclear bomb because they perceived it to be 
the "ultimate thing. However, wliile there are concrete examples of 
radiological terrorism , such as the three men accused of using 
radioactive material against Republican Party officials and the chief 
investigator for Brookhaven in New York,^4i or the Russian Mafiya's 
assassination of a Moscow businessman using gamma ray emitting 
pellets,842 there are few clear-cut cases, apart from Aum, of terrorists 
trying to construct a nuclear-yield weapon. Instead, most examples of 
non-conventional attem pts to cause mass-casualties have involved 
chemical or biological weapons, as Aum ultimately used, or the alleged 
plot by the World Trade Center bombers to use sodium cyanide 
simultaneously with a conventional bomb, so as to kill any survivors 
of the e x p l o s i o n . ^ 4 3  This suggests that chemical and biological weapons 
are more readily accessible than nuclear-yield weapons for mass- 
destructive terrorism. Although both chemical and biological weapons 
share the problem, with nuclear-yield weapons, of having an uncertain 
effect, they have the advantage of being cheaper to produce and may be 
lethal in small quantities, easing the production process. Furthermore, 
although this process is not simple, particularly in "weaponising" the 
agent, chemical and biological weapons could be produced more 
rapidly and require less specialist equipment and expertise than a 
nuclear weapon would necessitate. Consequently, a chemical or 
biological weapon is a more likely method than a nuclear yield device 
for terrorists to achieve an attack in which mass-casualties is the 
primary objective. However, where the objective is to set the group 
apart from others and to guarantee that the group continues to be 
noticed, to be acknowledged as an im portant entity, radiological
Neuhauser, "The Mind of a German Terrorist", Encoimter. p. 87.
McQuiston, "Third Man Held In Plot To Use Radium to Kill N.Y. Officials'
842 Williams and Woessner, "The Real Threat...", p. 30.
Hoffman, "Terrorism and WMD...", p. 50.
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terrorism, combining the coercive advantage of being "nuclear" with 
ease of production and access to raw materials may be the most likely 
form of non-conventional terrorism.
The collapse of the former Soviet Union has undoubtedly made the 
opportunities for nuclear terrorism significantly greater but even if 
these increased chances for micro-proliferation had not existed, the 
threat of nuclear terrorism would still be significantly greater than it 
was fifteen years ago. The key point is that terrorism is growing in its 
lethality. How individual groups achieve that is partly an instrumental 
decision, based on the objectives of the group, and partly a matter of 
opportunism. M ass-destructive terrorism is now the greatest non- 
traditional threat to international security, and of these, nuclear 
terrorism poses a real danger. A terrorist use of a nuclear-yield device is 
the most devastating type of terrorism conceivable and a radiological 
attack is the most likely variety of non-conventional terrorism. It is a 
danger that cannot be ignored since, given that it is not the current 
proliferation problems, but rather the current psycho-dynamics of 
terrorist groups combined with the nature of terrorism in the 1990s 
that make the threat so potent, it will not recede in the foreseeable 
future.
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